



This is a digital copy of a book that was preserved for generations on library shelves before it was carefully scanned by Google as part of a project to make the world's books discoverable online.

It has survived long enough for the copyright to expire and the book to enter the public domain. A public domain book is one that was never subject to copyright or whose legal copyright term has expired. Whether a book is in the public domain may vary country to country. Public domain books are our gateways to the past, representing a wealth of history, culture and knowledge that's often difficult to discover.

Marks, notations and other marginalia present in the original volume will appear in this file - a reminder of this book's long journey from the publisher to a library and finally to you.

Usage guidelines

Google is proud to partner with libraries to digitize public domain materials and make them widely accessible. Public domain books belong to the public and we are merely their custodians. Nevertheless, this work is expensive, so in order to keep providing this resource, we have taken steps to prevent abuse by commercial parties, including placing technical restrictions on automated querying.

We also ask that you:

- + *Make non-commercial use of the files* We designed Google Book Search for use by individuals, and we request that you use these files for personal, non-commercial purposes.
- + *Refrain from automated querying* Do not send automated queries of any sort to Google's system: If you are conducting research on machine translation, optical character recognition or other areas where access to a large amount of text is helpful, please contact us. We encourage the use of public domain materials for these purposes and may be able to help.
- + *Maintain attribution* The Google "watermark" you see on each file is essential for informing people about this project and helping them find additional materials through Google Book Search. Please do not remove it.
- + *Keep it legal* Whatever your use, remember that you are responsible for ensuring that what you are doing is legal. Do not assume that just because we believe a book is in the public domain for users in the United States, that the work is also in the public domain for users in other countries. Whether a book is still in copyright varies from country to country, and we can't offer guidance on whether any specific use of any specific book is allowed. Please do not assume that a book's appearance in Google Book Search means it can be used in any manner anywhere in the world. Copyright infringement liability can be quite severe.

About Google Book Search

Google's mission is to organize the world's information and to make it universally accessible and useful. Google Book Search helps readers discover the world's books while helping authors and publishers reach new audiences. You can search through the full text of this book on the web at <http://books.google.com/>

B 1,008,194







25710

THE
NORTH AMERICAN
REVIEW.

EDITED BY ALLEN THORNDIKE RICE.


VOL. CXL

Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

NEW YORK:
No. 30 LAFAYETTE PLACE.
1885.

COPYRIGHT BY
ALLEN THORNDIKE RICE.
1885.

AP
2
.N87



NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXXXVIII.

JANUARY, 1885.

VITUPERATION IN POLITICS.

IN an ideal method of popular government candidates for office would be selected for their faculty for public business, their good sense, their probity, and their proved purpose to sacrifice personal interests and ambition to a constitutional and impartial administration of their trust; the ordinary presumption being that they who are least anxious for the office are worthiest of the trust. An election campaign would consist of a temperate discussion, addressed to the intelligence of the people, of any questions of statesmanship and policy involved in the pending issue, with only such criticism of the private character of the candidate as might relate to his convictions and qualifications in those particulars. The election itself would then be a fair expression, under the provisions of law, of the choice of every citizen entitled to suffrage. Whatever capacities or accomplishments, virtues or graces, might be found in the candidate beyond the mark thus designated, must be regarded as advantages rather than as essentials to his fitness; and whatever defects he might have in other respects would be occasions of understood regret rather than subjects for gratuitous gossip or public attack. It is assumed that moral decency

is included in "probity." It is also assumed that experience has shown political parties to be a general convenience for carrying on the practical operations of the governmental system. They are not the creature of the state, but of exigencies in the state that may be local or transient. They are a foe to good government when they substitute subordinate ends for the order and welfare of society; they are a usurpation when they invade personal independence of thought or action; they are unpatriotic when they coerce political conduct to the damage of personal manhood; and they are an impertinence when they undertake to dictate to the judgment or conscience of the individual voter.

Vituperation in politics is largely due to party in politics. All the personal animosities between politicians in the whole country would not go very far to produce the venom discharged from press and platform in the course of a presidential election; nor would it be distilled or diffused to any considerable extent by the mere heating and antagonizing force of differences of opinion on great matters of public concern. It is true that some of these, pertaining to both domestic and foreign policy, so affect material industries and profits as to engage passion as well as reason and arouse a polemical temper. Regarded, however, purely as subjects of national legislation, or as studies in political economy, it cannot be supposed that State rights and federal centralization, internal revenue or improvements, the tariff or the currency, could ever provoke more than a moderate amount of angry abuse. Into other questions, like slavery, repudiation, Mormonism, and the regulation of the sale of liquors, a moral sentiment enters that is not unlikely to find vent in immoral speech. Yet it can hardly be doubted that reasonable limits would be set to all this sort of evil but for the instigation of that peculiar element in the social nature which we call party-spirit. It is one of the ways in which man in combinations is worse than man by himself. Just as zeal for a sect in religion substitutes itself for faith in the Original of all religious light and life, becoming at once provincial and quarrelsome, so servitude to a political party, with all its behests and devices, displaces loyalty to the supreme seat of truth and right in the nation, and is fatal to patriotism. Party is made a power of itself, irrespective of the principle that created it, standing somewhere between the sphere of personal accountability and the law of the land. It takes on authority, claims rights, issues

commands, exercises privileges. Among the latter is the liberty of hatred and misrepresentation, the privilege of being a common scold. Here is an advocate before an unsworn bench and jury, unrestrained by the decencies of the court-room. What wonder if it sometimes sinks to vulgarity? If it is said that these dangers are obviated by the circumstance that parties are set over against one another, so that they neutralize each other's wrongs, there is nevertheless a residuum of mischief, apart from the question directly in hand, in an injury done to the manners and character of the people. Without pretending that politics can be altogether detached from parties, thoughtful men, in proportion as they are patriotic, will weigh that injury.

In view of the magnitude of this evil, as lately shown in the United States, one casts about in a spirit of judicial fairness to find some possible palliation. Allow, then, that in the masculine encounters of debate hard blows must be given and taken, that robust contestants cannot always be expected to glove their hands or polish their blades, and that wounded sensibilities are not to complain if the campaign does not always move

"To the Dorian mood
Of flutes and soft recorders."

Allow also that, under the glamour of the strife, to the eye of his opponent a candidate for office is partially dehumanized and passes for the time into the order of insensates. Allow, further, that there is a widely accepted theory that, except for the immediate political purpose, the objurgative language is divested of its usually offensive meaning, being by common consent canceled after election. These extenuations are admissible; but they are, after all, much too slender to save the vituperative habit from being an abomination.

As most germane to the subject-matter, among the counts of this reproach stands first a degradation of the business of government itself. Inevitably men recognize a reciprocal relation between high place and him who holds it, between rule and ruler, between official authority and the personage wielding it. Republics have not yet exterminated the reverence that hedges about the person of a sovereign, nor is it best that, while changing the names and forms of power, they should abolish this salutary respect. Whatever lowers the height or cheapens the dignity of the chief—emperor or president—touches the

sanctity of law and impairs the awfulness of its execution, so long as the higher instincts of mankind continue as they are. Despotie Cæsars or criminal presidents may have to be reckoned with terribly in the name of justice or liberty; but even regicide and impeachment ought to be managed with a certain decorum. "Honor the king." Little service is done to history or morality by pictures of the vices and foibles of crown or court. Scott's capital representation of the weakness of royalty, in the "*Fortunes of Nigel*," hardly leaves the sweet taste in the mouth with which one ordinarily turns from his pages. If an empire is dishonored with its throne, so is a democracy with its leaders; and there are better ways of making such leaders what they ought to be than vilifying their reputations. St. Paul was writing for the subjects of no particular kind of government, and like both a statesman and a gentleman, no less than an apostle, when he directed one of his juniors: "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to speak evil of no man, to be no brawlers," as if political vituperation were the very thing he had in mind.

The standing of the presidency itself before the world, whether or not it is loftier than any kingship, has not been elevated by the canvass just closed, for ribaldry can elevate nothing. Whichever of the principal candidates might have prevailed, it must take more than four years of blameless living and administrative integrity to clear him of all marks and memories of the needless smirches with which ferocious pens and a prostituted art have blotted his name. Coarsely done or cleverly done, that cruel business has now, so soon, no approval in the conscience or kind-heartedness of the doers. It is even doubtful if the letters of Junius, unique contribution as they were to literature, classical as their invective is, raised the tone of British public life, or really changed the general estimate of North or Mansfield, Lord Granby or the Duke of Grafton. What shall be said of the lampoons of London, Paris, and New York? In this country, more than in any on earth, each citizen has a vital share in the common stock of national credit; here is a universal motive for the maintenance of that credit, and one means of maintaining it is to be jealous of the good repute of its chosen representatives. How much the political character of the country suffers from the ordeal of defamation to which all candidates for elective offices are exposed, begins to

appear. A well-bred and self-respecting person need not be very fastidious to decline a race where the prize, if gained, is no offset to the bespattering on the course; or a post where his service to his constituents must be crippled by the malign falsehoods heaped on him before he reaches it. At almost any time in the past thirty years there have been statesmen and scholars in these States, whose names could be easily spoken, and enough of them to furnish a cabinet, if not a senate, who have silently preferred a clean retirement to a calumnious publicity. Neither property nor education, commerce nor manufactures, legislature nor judiciary, can afford to dispense with the strongest minds and ripest wisdom at the reckless pleasure of a few unscrupulous orators, editors, or preachers. It may be answered, that brave men should be equal to martyrdom. We are not dealing at present with the victims, but with the tormentors. During the presidential struggle ending in 1868 the writer of this was in conversation in Massachusetts with one of the most earnest and successful ministers in the land, who lived in one of the Middle States, and had extensive opportunities to know men as well as things accurately. Mention being casually made of Horatio Seymour, whose name was then before the people, the minister said, speaking without the least hesitation, positively and emphatically: "Mr. Seymour, sir, is a bad man; I refer not to his politics, but to his character. He is a copperhead, to be sure; but that is not what I mean now. He is a thoroughly bad man." Not many months afterward the hearer of this perfectly sincere slander had abundant knowledge that Mr. Seymour's private life was and had been as nearly faultless as that of any Christian man within his acquaintance, and that the confidence reposed in him by those who knew him was absolute and unbounded.

Other lines of life furnish no parallel to this traducement. In parliamentary assemblies, at the bar, on the exchange, on the street, in all the intercourse of civilized communities, a common law of civility condemns and restrains even personalities that are not slanderous, much more scurrility. Neighbors or strangers are not apt to assail each other rancorously with tongue or types on account of divergences of opinion on other subjects; and yet those differences continually divide men, as to their real interests, far more widely than almost any in politics. How is it that so rational an undertaking as a choice of rulers opens the sluice-ways? What can be the secret of

this affinity for poison in the process of reducing to practice a theory of political economy? Why should the fact that the friends of a fellow-citizen have thought him worthy to take up a grave and august duty suddenly develop the brutal side of our constitution, stimulate the relish for human vivisection, uncover again in the highest type the claws and stings of inferior animals, and rouse in mild-mannered husbands and fathers, sitting at desks or standing on platforms, the savagery that has been slumbering since the days of Hengist and Horsa? It looks like an exception to the unities of nature. It is a puzzle that might well exercise the wits of the masters of journalism for four years to come, North and South, East and West. A story of Samuel Ward, the "Sam Ward" of English dinner-tables, "the most perfect gentleman of either hemisphere," is pertinent. In a company of clever people, who were talking of horses, as Englishmen occasionally do after dinner, Professor Huxley observed that the modern horse is without question a descendant of the ancient mesohippus; to which remark Mr. Ward replied that it was very sad, but "the scandal never would have come out if the horse hadn't been running for something."

Suppose we apply a test of sincerity. The struggle of 1884 has been attended with an unprecedented display of moral sensibility in two directions; in fact, it has created an original moral classification. As a singular effect of the nominations, it has been discovered that all Republicans have an intense horror of personal impurity, and that all Democrats abominate fraud and falsehood. That there should be just this uniform coincidence between the line dividing two great political parties and the line between two familiar forms of iniquity is what no sagacity could have foreseen. What can be the hidden tie between free trade and veracity, or chastity and protection? The two parties committed themselves on the ethical issue with a distinctness and emphasis that could leave no manner of misunderstanding. They declared themselves in every possible way in which opinion and conviction and passion can be expressed. What must follow? Whichever candidate was elected we should expect to see a new era of cleanliness and integrity. As the vote was close, just about one-half of the nation hereafter will be faultlessly chaste, and the other half incorruptibly honest. Dissolute or sensual Republicans —

whether editors, publishers, speech-makers, or office-holders — will be patterns of domestic virtue. Lying, sordid, unscrupulous Democrats will disappear. People will say of man or woman, "He is as trustworthy as a Democrat," or "She is as modest as a Republican." The city of Washington will be transformed, unless the country has been for four months the theater of hypocrisy, and the canvass a din of "sound and fury signifying nothing."

Something might be said of the insult put by the scurrilous style of political controversy upon the cause of good letters. Literary purity in America has many perils. Not the least of them lies in the rapidity and immensity of composition and declamation in our periodical elections. Newspaper writing favors some rhetorical merits, notably energy, conciseness, and vividness; and we have some fine specimens of editorial ability. It cannot be believed that the masters in that responsible calling will permit the disgraceful mistakes of the past year to be repeated. They will hardly consent, by constant extravagance of epithets and expletives in personal and partisan detraction, to destroy actual distinctions, to submerge the lights and shades of language under an effusion of words so superlative as to be meaningless, or to disfigure their style with slang. It would seem reasonable to hope that a corresponding standard of taste, if not the rule of right, must forbid intrusion into those private quarters where either the bad traits imputed do not touch the administration of the office for which the candidate is set up, or where condemnation cannot be justified till a judicial tribunal has pronounced sentence. The Almighty has often used rough instruments for rough work, thrashing guilty nations with jagged flails; but he reserves the ultimate judgment of men to his own omniscience.

Apologies have been sometimes made for profane swearing, on the ground that a sound of strength in it carries compulsion, commanding obedience on the part of minds so low as to be insensible to any decorous address. Some such pretext may be thought to excuse violence or acerbity in polemics. It is a flimsy defense, and it puts an undeserved contempt on even the worst of our kind. Men of any intellectual or moral rank whatever are not convinced or converted or corrected by wrath. They who are farthest astray or farthest down will see through the shallowness of those opponents who vilify only because they are

vile, or use filth to fight with because they have no other ammunition. But charity forbids us to vituperate even the vituperators. To a degree deplorable and extraordinary we have had a political campaign of dirt and disgust. Let the dirt fall to dirt. The disgust ought to remain to admonish us when the temptation returns. Nobody is the better, wiser, happier for all the scandals. Were there any actual service to any party in obloquy, the benefit on one side would offset the benefit on the other, like two successive torch-light processions with their pyrotechnics, leaving nothing but a bad smell in the air. It is not well to be reading every day, for four or five months, columns of the most explicit and dogmatic accusations, which at best make only an impression of unreality, exciting a frequent suspicion that we are being fooled, and, for the time, expelling from the mind every generous sentiment and every noble thought. According to their natural or acquired moral aversions, men and women will feel special indignation either at sins of the will or sins of impulse, at rapacity or lust, at Marlborough or William Wycherley, at Sunderland or Henry Sidney. It will be safe to allow history and God to make up the final award for each of them. It will not be safe at all to construct standards of moral judgment out of our partisan predilections, or to let political prejudice instead of certified evidence determine our utterances about the living or the dead.

F. D. HUNTINGTON.

FROUDE'S LIFE OF CARLYLE.

THE greatest master of English prose within our generation intrusted the story of his life to one of the most skillful of living writers. The material for judging Thomas Carlyle is ample indeed: thirty octavo volumes of his own, four volumes by his biographer, two volumes of his "Reminiscences," three volumes of his wife's letters, diaries, notes, personal anecdotes, gossip, portraits. Never was man—neither Johnson, Voltaire, Goethe, nor Byron—more familiar, more interesting. We know now, perhaps, all of importance that we are ever likely to know. Sartor stands before us at last as mere man. The philosopher of clothes has stripped off his own, to show us that he stands a son of Adam, assuredly not ashamed, as bare before the world as when he came into it nearly ninety years ago.

Have we gained so very much by all this volume of biographical matter? Do we know Thomas Carlyle really better for it, more truly than we knew him from his books forty years ago, and from the passing glimpses of him and tales about him that we in London used to have while he was with us? It may be doubted. The man is in substance what we knew him and judged him to be. The biographies and autobiographies, the unroofing of his home and the unveiling of his hearth, the letters, journals, and recorded sayings, are intensely interesting. But they have told us things that we would rather not have heard. Those who loved him and those who loved her have been shocked, amazed, ashamed, in turn. Those who love good men and good women, those who honor great intellects, those who reverence human nature, have been wounded to the heart. Foul odors, as from a charnel-house, have been suddenly opened on us. We feel as if, in obedience to a call of duty, which we had never knowingly undertaken, we had been forced to stand beside some *post mortem* dissection of one we revered; as if the diaries of his very physi-

cians and surgeons had been read to us. They have shown us the very entrails of our dead friend.

"*Expede Hannibalem, quot libras in duce summo
Invenies?*"

And yet, now that we have gone through all this, do we really know him better? Is there anything essential that we did not already know? Of essential, nothing. It is the Thomas Carlyle we knew all our lives—great prose-poet, potent inspirer of high purposes, master of literary painting, a type of indomitable courage. His own newly published words are full of the old force, but they add nothing to our sense of his genius. The anecdotes and the revelations have a ghastly interest that is difficult to resist. He holds us with his glittering eye; we listen like a three-years' child; the mariner hath his will. We must all stand and hear the tale, even if we shudder. But the tale tells us nothing that we did not know.

And yet, perhaps, to the multitude and the thoughtless, the new biographical instrument through which we are bidden to look at our old master may prove a hindrance and a source of error. Those who can use the human microscope will understand the exaggeration and distortion it presents. The rugosities of the surface, the anatomical details it reveals, will not disgust them. But the many will be puzzled and misled. Such was the imaginative hypertrophy in which Carlyle's great brain habitually worked, such the Rabelaisian redundancy of his humor, such the punctilious piety of his literary executor, that his memory has been subjected to a wholly abnormal examination. Jeremy Bentham, in the interest of mankind and to the furtherance of science, left his body to be dealt with by the surgeons, and then to be preserved to the gaze of the world in the museum of University College. Thomas Carlyle has chosen to leave his life and his home, his aches and his sores, his grumblings and his washing-bills, to the impartial verdict of posterity. In Mr. Froude he has found a trustee who is ready to carry out his wishes without flinching. The Shakespearean wealth of imagery that Carlyle carried about with him into every detail of the supper-table or the wardrobe, the scrupulosity of the disciple, and his abundant power as a colorist, have contrived to present a series of pictures that, to those not accustomed to the methods of psychological portrait-painting,

may give the effect of a caricature. It is as if the living body of Thomas Carlyle were subjected to the resources of modern science, and the untrained public were called in to stand at the instruments. The microphone is used to enlarge his speech. The grunt or the psha that escapes the best of us at times is heard, by Mr. Froude's scientific appliances, as the roaring of a wounded buffalo. The old man's laugh, which in life was so cheery, comes up to us as out of a phonograph, harsh as the mockery of the devils that Dante heard in Malebolge. The oxy-hydrogen microscope is applied to the pimples on his chin or the warts on his thumb, and they loom to us as big as wens or cancers. The electric light is thrown upon the bared nerve; the photograph reveals the excoriations or callosities of every inch of skin. Poor Swift suffered something of the kind, and Rousseaun; and one cannot but regret that, to a brain so far more sane, to a nature so far more robust than theirs, it has been needful to apply a somewhat similar resource.

As we read these letters and diaries, these tales of Carlyle and of his wife, on which art has thrown a light so dazzling, and a magnifying power so peculiar, we feel as if we were caught up again into the bewildering realm of Brobdingnag. Husband and wife rail at each other like giants and giantesses in a fairy tale; when they have a tiff, it stuns us like the Tower of Babel. The giant's head is the size of a house, with warts like a camel's hump, and a hide like an elephant's. Bugs as big as hedge-hogs crawl over his bed. Cocks and hens as large as ostriches crow and scream with the power of a steam-whistle. The giant clears his throat with the sound of an express train; and if his stomach aches, his groaning is as loud as the roaring of a cow that has lost her calf. We know, if the world does not, that all this is an optical and acoustic effect of the oxy-hydrogen or electric magnifier, of the combination of literary telephone, microphone, and phonograph. But though we know better than to take it all as literal, we are not raised or purified by it. We do not know our fine old master any better, we do not love him more, we do not feel him to be a greater, more creative soul. No, rather contrariwise.

Thomas Carlyle stands out to us in these posthumous volumes substantially the man we found him in the thirty volumes of his works. Somewhat darker, fiercer, more inhuman in his ill moods, perhaps; more cruel in little things than we

could suppose; more petulant and unmanly at times, with uglier domestic skeletons than we ever suspected. All this is clear and naked. He and his trustee will have it so. They have forced us to pry into his vitals, one might almost say into his boils and blains. And the world has turned aside shuddering. But this is not all the man, nor the true man; much of it we see to be morbid anatomy; much of it is mere literary exaggeration. Let us look calmly at the whole tale, and weigh the whole thirty-nine volumes in the mass, and we see still a very great nature; a very noble life, however unlovely; a very memorable work done, passing though it be, leaving no fruit behind. But in the end the man stands out, of solid worth and indomitable will; capable of great generosity, of sincere love; faithful, truthful, simple, kindly, in the main, in all the greater duties; and of heroic courage in the task to which his life was so passionately dedicated from his youth. This is the substance, mixed as we now see it, from first to last, with really ferocious habits in smaller things, strange coarseness of fiber, an egoism hardly sane, and laughable weakness in the petty ills of existence. That imagination of his, as powerful in its sphere as any recorded in our literature, is now seen to be part of his breath and life. The poet's eye rolls in a fine frenzy night and day incessantly, as he tosses on his bed or eats his porridge, or walks abroad. Carlyle lives in one waking vision; houses, factories, fields and mountains glared at him like phantoms in Hades; men and women around him gibbered with the hollow voices of ghosts; the ordinary sounds of our daily life—a barking dog, a crowing cock, the rattle of wheels, and the tradesman's call—seemed to him the din of a nightmare. Carlyle walked about London like Dante in the streets of Verona, gnawing his own heart and dreaming dreams of Inferno. To both the passers-by might have said, See! there goes the man who has seen hell!

And that marvelous gift of language we see in his journals and letters to be the very skin of his body; the style itself part of his very mind, which he could no more put off than he could put off his Annandale accent. We see it shaping every word he uttered or spoke, to his wife, his mother, the most trivial phrase, the most solemn records of his heart,—all stand in the irrepressible Carlylese. Carlylese is not a wholly satisfactory, never a pleasing tongue; the finest Carlylese is never equal to fine English; and yet it is one of the most potent instruments

ever used by articulate Englishman. And here we see it growing upon him, mastering him, deforming his very thought at last; becoming in the end a fetish to him, a mannerism or habit, as unpleasant as that of cursing or spitting.

The essential thing, perhaps the only thing, about a writer that concerns the public is how he wrote his books. And in this biography we see Carlyle at work, full of zeal and endurance. He was a great and powerful worker. Yet even here let us not exaggerate. Compared with the really great students of the world, Carlyle was almost an amateur. Littré, with his authentic sixteen hours of work each day, an ordinary German professor, scores of scholars and students, much exceed his utmost limits. Indeed, the book gives us rather the impression of very frequent holidays and an immense range of social entertainment. It is the same with his material resources. Carlyle lived and worked in poverty, in most honorable poverty, most nobly accepted and even welcomed. There is nothing finer in literary history than the stern resolution with which he clung to a life of simplicity. Yet here, again, one must not exaggerate. His real difficulties about money lasted at most four or five years. During the greater part of his life he had nearly all that he seriously needed. At no time did his mode of living fall below the standard of comfort to which he had been accustomed to his full manhood. It would have been regarded as luxurious by his father and his mother, his sisters, and his entire family. A man that kept a horse to ride almost all through life; made annual tours to Scotland, at times to Wales, Ireland, Germany, or the Mediterranean; whose friends gave him horses, wine, books, houses, whenever they were needed; to whom the most delightful homes in England were always open; whom so many persons, both friends and strangers, served freely for love, was never in poverty. To those who recall how many men of genius have labored in real want, in absolute neglect, sick, friendless, oppressed, and hungry, it is not pleasant to read these howls of rage and despair from a man that was well fed, well housed, well received, married to a noble woman, welcomed by all that is great, powerful, and cultured, surfeited with all that wealth could offer him, and bored by the attentions of a crowd of devoted friends.

And this miserable tale of his married life is all clear now; neither so sacred and profound as his biographer thinks, nor so

evil as some in their first anger declared. That Thomas Carlyle and Jane Welsh were two people of deep natures, both strong, proud, generous, and sensitive, is most clear; that she had a most acute brain, and he unique genius; that they both vehemently resolved to do their duty in their homes; that both were capable of deep affection; that each had for the other a solid esteem and a keen admiration, deepening perhaps at last into love, and finally, on his side, into a passion of remorse and regret,—all this is clear to all men. Nor is it less clear that their married life from the first day had an unwholesome side; that it was often a kind of torture to one, and sometimes to both; that it was broken by prolonged spasms of jealousy and unhappiness; dimmed by frequent separation, in fact, and by life-long lukewarmness in heart. It is all most plain; he has forced us to stand and listen to his sobs of remorse and pity. It is a cruel story; why can we not be spared? What right or what duty have we to be called in so long after death to sit in judgment on these full hearts beating with such wrath, and poured out with so much hot indignation, to listen over again to the bitter speech, to watch the tragic misunderstanding growing up between two fine spirits that earnestly sought to love and to cherish? Why need we be summoned to the castigation of this posthumous penance? Is it the right of every man who may have written some great books to fling into the street the inner sanctities of his hearth, his wife's letters, diaries, clothes, and marriage bed, his pots and his pans, the rag-basket of his sores, and the scribblings of his ill-humors; calling on men, women, and children to take warning in the name of God's truth and man's shame? And can it be the duty of a friend to whom the revolting office is committed to pour forth this mass of domestic lumber and cast clothing in such quantity that an untrue effect is produced on the reader?

Few are the homes without their skeleton, or the lives that have nothing unseemly within them. And when the skeleton is made to dance before our eyes with wondrous literary juggling, and the unseemly thing is painted by the hand of Spagnoletto or Goya, a moral wound is inflicted on the conscience of men. Let us correct this impression produced by unwholesome art. We have the most certain witness to prove that the married life of Carlyle was not the failure and wreck which these volumes might incline not a few to believe. If it never reached the

highest and most lovely region of married happiness, and at times came perilously close to married misery, it was in the main the worthy effort after happiness of two just spirits, too much resembling each other to be happy in their own marriage, each perhaps too faulty to be perfectly happy in any marriage. It is a tale of millions of homes, somewhat below the chosen few, far above the actual wrecks—*αἰλινον αἰλινον σιπὲ, τὸ δ' εὖ νικάτω.*

What have we to do with this? And yet, perhaps it is as well that now and then the veil should be lifted from the fireside, and from off the human heart of man and wife. It is a mystery that no poet and no romance has ever solved. What depths and infinite windings are there in the heart and life of man! Can we ever hear enough as to the sources of happiness and misery, of love and despair? Do we not learn much when we have the mysteries unbared; when we watch the harsh word and look cutting into the nerves of the other; when we trace the gathering volume of irritation and offense, the wanderings of two hearts, each too proud to speak the little word that would end it all; when we see a good and humane soul blindly groping toward a pit, blundering into undesigned wrong from which certain agony must come? In a book, or on the stage, we follow all this with emotion and almost with delight. In real life it is too horrible, too unfathomable, too humiliating to human nature to suffer us to look on steadily. The real tales of this sort are to be guessed at for the most part. Let us, too, pass reverently, keeping silence even from good words. Such a drama of real life these volumes reveal to us, true and literal, recorded by one of the greatest dramatists in our language, out of things known only to him and to one other. The remorse of Thomas Carlyle is a tragedy more painful than "Œdipus" or "Lear"; it is so homely, photographic, realistic in its incidents. Memory is more potent than imagination; and the memory of one of the most imaginative of modern men is an instrument of terrible power. How a great man and a good woman can torture each other and themselves for the lack of certain humanities, and by reason of certain morbid egoisms,—all this has been told us by a master of literary picturing; a tale clearer to his vision than any beheld in the mind's eye of Shakespeare himself. And oh, the pity of it! that it is one of Shakespeare's kith and kin who thus bares his head in the storm and tears out his own heart for us to see.

It is not art, this. No, nor truth, nor human nature. It needs must be that offenses come, but woe to him by whom they come.

If it be that such an autopsy of the personal and domestic life of our fellow-men is ever desirable, why, we may ask, need the subject be a man that has written famous books? The great writers are seldom great characters; their homes are rarely examples; their surroundings often unworthy. Their mode of existence is usually abnormal, and they do not, as a rule, triumph over its perils. Exaggeration by themselves and by their friends is almost a consequence of their literary distinction. They lead, for the most part, lives unwholesomely stimulated on one side, and these lives are recorded with disproportioned minuteness and needless coloring. It is true that mankind crave for these over-elaborated portraits; but morality and society in no way gain by satisfying the demand for their manufacture.

Truth! truth! what things are done in thy name, as Madame Roland said of liberty. Because a man has written some very extraordinary books, the world craves to know how the writer of them lived. And so they ransack his drawers when he is dead; and every crude word he ever flung upon paper, or growled out in his sulks, is published to mankind. Even the secret thoughts of his wife, the sentences of grief, anger, misunderstanding, wrung from her in tears in the silence of her chamber, become literary property and go through several editions. What right has any man (no leave given) to publish the innermost wailing of a woman's heart, which she herself kept secret from every eye, even from her husband's? And every scurrilous phrase, calumny, or caricature that ever slipped from the eminent writer is to be added to the literature of our country, in the name of truth and to the eternal confusion of cant. Better cant itself than the washings and offscourings of these pots and pans, where the eminent writer flung the orts of his household.

That "a master of gibes and flouts," the greatest, perhaps, in our modern history, should get into the habit of painting caricatures of every man, woman, and child that ever crossed his path, was bad enough. But to publish all these ill-natured scrawls, as soon as he is dead, is hardly a work of moral duty. This man, we read more than once, is a compound of "frog and viper"; that one is an inferior kind of Robespierre; Macaulay is a "squat, low-browed," "commonplace" object; Wordsworth

is a "small, diluted man," a "contemptibility"; Coleridge, a "weltering, ineffectual being"; Keats's poems are "dead dog"; Keble, author of the "Christian Year," is a "little ape"; Cardinal Newman has "not the intellect of a moderate-sized rabbit"; "Pickwick" is "lowest trash"; Charles Lamb is a "pitiful tomfool," a "despicable abortion"; the Saturday Reviewer is a "dirty puppy"; Mill is a poor, frozen, mechanical being, a "logic-chopping engine." The most memorable thing about Grote is his "spout mouth"; about Bright his "cock-nose." Gladstone is "one of the contemptiblest men," "a spectral kind of phantasm," "nothing in him but forms and ceremonies."

And this is Truth! Say rather, that it is serving round a famous man's spittoon. If this mere spittle were in truth Carlyle's mind, one would hold it as rancid and as false as any on record. But it is not his real mind. Carlyle, one of the greatest caricaturists that ever lived, got into a mental habit like that with which we see persons afflicted who, under nervous excitement, involuntarily gibber and make faces at strangers. Carlyle was incessantly making faces at everybody. The professional caricaturist (poor devil) goes about the world scrawling on his shirt-sleeve grotesque sketches of everything he sees. And so this master of nicknames jots down his buffooneries wholesale. But all this is really cant, a vile habit, a trick that became his master and not a little disfigures his veracity.

And that other trick of cursing and befouling the entire human race—man, woman, and child, horse or dog, cock or hen, all that cross the Carlylian orbit, are bespattered with a torrent of Ernulphus's cursing, which begins by being silly, and ends by becoming sickening. A maid-servant is never spoken of but as a "puddle," a "scandalous randy," a "sluttish harlot"; a man-servant is always a "flunkey." The valet that brings him hot water and brushes his clothes is a "flunkey of the devil." This uniform brutality toward servants is a very evil sign. People that are always quarreling with those who serve them in their homes have assuredly something wrong with them—ill-conditioned, we say. The world at large is a "dusty fuliginous chaos"; Europe a "huge suppuration"; society a "festering dung-heap," and so on. "I find emptiness and chagrin," he cries; "I can reverence no existing man." "To how many things is one tempted to say with slow emphasis, *Du galgenaas* ('thou gallows-carrion'). There is some relief to me in a word

like that." Alas! what a melancholy cant is here! A noble spirit, in its musings, fretting itself into a temper like nothing in this world but that of the street Arab or hungry costermonger, whose every sentence contains an oath and names that we only express by a blank. That any human soul could sink to the point of finding pleasure in calling men and things "thou gallows-carrier" is pitiful enough! But solemnly to record it and print it as a typical thought! O Thomas, Thomas, thou wast a rugged, stormy soul in life! But it would be a deep wrong to think this crazy venom, worthy of some literary Quilp, was the truth about thee!

Let us shut up this waste-basket of a great man's spleen; it gives no true picture of his inner nature. As he said himself, "the world will never know my life"; and to his biographer he said, "Forbear, poor fool!" For all the talk about truth and scorn of concealment, there are blanks and reticences and material suppression of important fact. Even in this heap of dirty linen there are things kept covered. It is droll to think what was the line below which outrage, disgust, and public scandal were thought to lie. Thomas Carlyle is strong enough to bear much, and his memory will bear even this. Scores and scores of men that knew him well still walk the earth. They tell us of a generous, hearty, simple man of genius, manly in his bearing, in his happier moods friendly and even dignified. The present writer can remember him in extreme old age, quite a model of courteous and cheery repose, most ready to give, open of access, simple, fatherly, nay, patriarchal. That this venerable and stately elder had had his hours of darkness was indeed most clear. But oh, that, as he said, "his bewildered wrestlings" could have been buried there! We gain nothing new, nothing true in the inner sense. It is like hanging out his old clothes on a waxen image of the man.

What then, in sooth, is the meaning of these strange contradictions? What is the riddle of a nature that seems to have poured forth its last drop only to puzzle us more? Here is a man with poetic gifts of the first rank, a born artist, yet whose art is a perpetual torment to him, having to the last something uncouth and abortive in all its creations. Here is a man with an insight that at times touches that of Tacitus, Bacon, or Goethe, yet whose gift ends in a wearisome knack of caricature. Here is one of the great masters of the English tongue, who

finally settles into a tiresome mannerism. A man, one would think, of really religious nature, whose religion it is hardly possible to put into words, who with "God," "devil," "hell," and "damnation" as often on his lips as on a carter's, appears now to have denied that any of these had practical effect on human affairs in any literal sense. And so one who has written some of the most powerful books of this century, and deeply stirred the mind of the last generation, has passed away without leaving more than a chapter in the history of literature, without founding anything, leaving behind him to carry on his work two or three men that have just learned to mimic his cloudy jeremiads.

We can all see now that he really, in his heart, believed in nothing. All beliefs, demonstrations, certainties of other people he swept away. There were hundreds and thousands, he thinks, of "greater men than Newton." Everything like a system, a set of doctrines, a few coherent principles, even, was all mere cant, windbags, shams, inanities. The old Hebrew belief was "Houndsditch"; the modern belief in realities was atheism. Carlyle, like Descartes, made a *tabula rasa* of all belief. He then interpreted *cogito ergo sum* to mean, "I think, therefore I am; no one else thinks, therefore all others are shams." But Carlyle, being not a philosopher, but a prose poet, could get no further. Having come out of Houndsditch himself, he hugged the rags of Houndsditch to his dying day round his brawny limbs. The Bible continued to serve him with horrible expletives and apocalyptic tropes. Calvinism had bred in him the moody, dogged, mystical temper of the Cameronian peasant. He flung off the creed, but he kept the temper. Metaphysics, of the Kantian or Hegelian kind, he rejected, also, retaining, unluckily, the key to the cloudland, the *Ich* and the *Nicht-Ich*, the bare idea of absolute and transcendental. Hence Carlyle, rejecting at once all theologies, all philosophies, all syntheses alike, and bound by his very ideal to ridicule the possibility of any theology, any philosophy, any synthesis, was forced into a creed that at last got stereotyped into the simple words, "I believe in Thomas Carlyle; which faith, unless a man keep, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly."

And so it was that a man, by nature of noble sincerity and unselfishness, of keen vision and profound yearning after goodness and truth, came, by the power of a gloomy superstition, to reach such heights of maniacal egoism, such depths of corrosive

inhumanity, as he and his friends have scattered through these posthumous volumes. And with all this raving about atheists and unbelievers, Thomas Carlyle stands pilloried on the pedestal that he so laboriously framed for himself, as of all modern Englishmen the one most utterly naked of any intelligible belief. For neither he nor his biographer can get any further in any definite proposition than that this earth was tophet, and Thomas Carlyle the only wise man in it. There is not in these volumes one philosophic, religious, or social doctrine—nothing constructive, directing, or fruitful. There is railing, mockery, and imprecation of a truly Gargantuan kind; but what of real, humane, positive, or systematic? Words, words, pictures, tropes, sublimities enough to make the major and the minor prophets; but nothing to hold on to, to work with, or to teach.

It comes out that this flux of talk about devil, hell, tophet, and heaven, is all allegory or image. Thomas Carlyle never believed that the devil really made the cocks crow or spoiled his porridge, or that his good friends and neighbors would end in everlasting fire. No! nor that God specially interposed for him to enable him to finish his chapter or digest his dinner, or that all the petty trifles of his life were the peculiar work of "His unspeakable mercy." All this was cant, trick of irreverent speech, habit of bilious self-absorption, nothing else. The Immensities and Unspeakabilities come at last to this. One might as well say the Brutalities, and the Self-idolatries, and the Utter Nonsensicalities. For at the close of his long life Carlyle found out at last that God "does nothing." An otiose God, then, surveying unmoved "this dusty, fuliginous chaos," is the residuum of all this furious apostrophizing.

Wreck, failure, hopelessness, these are the words that the faithful disciple inscribes on his master's grave. The greatest will and courage cannot help the man that obstinately defies his fellow-men. The grandest literary genius will enable no man to solve *de novo* by his own single insight the problems of philosophy and life. The most passionate yearning after right will not suffice to him who resolves to seek right by the light of his own unaided conscience. And thus the great brain and the fine nature of Carlyle end in an egoism that comes perilously near to mania. No "thinker" indeed he, if by thinking we mean the coherent working out of complex questions to practical results. None but a few literary dreamers even call him thinker. And it

is not given to poets or to prophets to teach us philosophy, nor duty, nor truth. Nay, the sons of the prophet can do little now but show us how hopelessly their master ended, when he pretended to teach as well as to picture, to astonish, or to stimulate. What a pitiful tale it is !

A grand imagination stinging itself to death, like a scorpion, in its frenzy of self-absorption ; a generous heart turned to gall because it had lost its way, lost all hope of finding a way ; an "influence," a master of speech, a glorious inciter to great things ; an "influence," deeper doubtless than Coleridge, higher than Johnson, but how much lower than the mighty Burke ! Let us think of him sadly and kindly, lying amongst the Annandale peasants from whom he came forth and of whom he was ever one. Compare the cruel storms in the life of this lost soul with the serene humanity of those whom he nicknamed atheists. Read the autobiography of Hume, and see how a really great thinker could die, with sweetness, hope, and love in every tone. Or read the memoirs of Gibbon, or the life of Turgot, of Adam Smith, of Condorcet. Or, lastly, compare these fuliginous railings and wailings with the manly, self-possessed, simple story told by the magnanimous spirit of John Mill. They found peace ; while the wild spirit that in life covered them with his mockery, went tossing down to his last rest in an agony of scorn, hate, and despair. "Wa, wa," he tells us the dying Frankish King cried, "who is this mighty power which pulls down the strongest ?" "Wa, wa," wails Thomas Carlyle, recognizing a power too strong to be resisted. That power is humanity, the human race, which his long life was devoted to deriding, and which now, in his death, still honors him as a brother of rare genius and mighty purpose.

FREDERIC HARRISON.

THE REUNITED UNION.

ALTHOUGH the last gun in the war for the restoration of the Union was fired nearly twenty years ago, and the dead and buried Confederacy has not since then given any sign of life,⁽¹⁾ we have had a Union rather in name than in spirit. At the close of the period of reconstruction, the Northern States claimed for themselves, and to them was cheerfully as well as prudently conceded, a certain ascendancy in Federal affairs other than that of numbers. The Southern States took a back seat in Congress, having no seat at all in any other department of the government. Mr. Carlisle's elevation to the Speakership of the national House of Representatives was a timid step in advance. But even this was rendered possible only by the diversion from sectional politics that attended the discussion of the tariff. The election of Mr. Cleveland to the Presidency sweeps away all sectional distinctions and lines. It brings the South back into the Union and the Administration. It gives it the opportunity, which it ought to embrace, of impressing itself upon the national policy. It invests it with actual power and the responsibility that belongs to power, and bids it show its real character as a political entity and force. On the use it thus makes of its chance for good or ill will depend an answer to the question whether we shall, or shall not, have a revival of sectionalism in our future politics.

As long as the South existed by a species of sufferance, and the North stood at once as the source and resource of nationality, sectionalism—senseless and selfish, insincere and exacting—sprang from the nature of the case, and was inevitable. The temptation it offered to demagogues on both sides of the line could not be resisted. Nothing was easier than the fabrication of campaign material, where the average politician's stock-in-trade consisted of a system of cross-petitions, of indictments

and rebuttals, of crimination and recrimination. It saved to the Cheap Johns of our public life the labor of research, by substituting lurid inventions and quack nostrums for the legitimate objects of legislation. Thus every act of lawlessness in the South was promoted to an affair of state, and a premium was put upon disturbance. It was an exceeding cold day when an insurrection could not be extracted out of a fistcuff. Treason became a locality. The Senator from Oshkosh played his most sectional trump directly into the hand of the statesman from Eureka, who raked in the trick and returned the lead, and then the two, having saved the country, went peacefully down-stairs to luncheon. It is more than surmised by well-informed persons that a most famous debate between two famous party leaders, who respectively dragged the North and South up and down the aisles of the House by the hair of the head, was, as a witty spectator described it, "a simple matter of gate-money." That half a generation of this sort of shamming should have raised up a real hobgoblin in the fears of people who believed it all in earnest, is not to be wondered at. Indeed, to the extent that these mock-heroics occasionally proposed serious measures and involved thoughtful, patriotic, and conscientious statesmen, they worked a positive injury to legislation and society. But their true character may be best shown by their failure to keep the people apart. In spite of them, national assemblies and convocations continued to be held, and it was found that sectional differences existed only within party lines, and those only in opposing party lines, neither party recognizing any sectional distinctions within itself. To Republicans, disloyalty in the South was limited to Democrats. Meanwhile, religious, commercial, scientific, and professional associations, composed of representatives from every part of the country and from all classes, met and deliberated and adjourned without discovering a lack of homogeneity or any signs of public danger. During six consecutive years the national House of Representatives was Democratic. During two years both houses of Congress were Democratic. The country was slowly but surely preparing for a change of parties. It was making a series of trial-trips, as it were, and it must be owned that its experience proved encouraging, for no ill ensued. On the contrary, the closing in of party lines brought the Republicans to a sense of accountability, and produced a long-wanted poise and balance of power.

At last the national campaign of 1884 is over, the election contest has been decided, and Grover Cleveland is conceded the Presidency by all parties. He will be inaugurated without resistance of any sort, or from any quarter, on the 4th of next March. Thus, after twenty-four years' absence, the Democratic party will return to power, and after twenty-four years' possession, the Republican party will surrender an empire to its political adversary. The value of this event to ourselves and our system of government is inestimable. It will strengthen the belief in free institutions and popular forms all over the world. It will give a guarantee of stability and order at home to many generations. It is the crowning triumph, among a succession of triumphs, to the wearing qualities of the Constitution and the solidarity of the Union.

Serious and many have been the shocks that the republic has sustained since "we, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity," abandoned the confederation that served a provisional purpose after the Revolutionary war, and entered the present national compact. Unfortunately, the organic law, as it originally stood, recognized an institution that, logically opposed to all for which the Union professed to exist, was sure, soon or late, to strike a blow at its life. The war of secession was made possible by the very virtues of those who framed the Constitution, and arose out of a weak but patriotic spirit of compromise, which shirked questions that ought to have been settled. The overthrow of the Confederacy saved the Union, but it left the Constitution suspended, like Mohammed's coffin, in mid-air. The measures of reconstruction that ensued put a sharp strain upon the republican system, and a disputed Presidential election came nigh turning the victory of the Union into a national disaster. Rescued from ruin by the Electoral Commission, the Government now, for a third time in its history, survives extreme menace and peril, and gives to nations and the ages conclusive proof of its elasticity and power.

It would be idle to deny and foolish to try to obscure the circumstance that the change of parties has come about largely through the instrumentality of the South, which in 1861 withdrew from the Union, and in 1865 was compelled to return to it

by force of arms. As an isolated fact, this seems strange indeed. It would be stranger still if the real character of the South answered the description honestly believed and maintained by many good people at the North. But in truth it does not. There has been, and there is, a moral no less than a physical revolution in both the old sections of the country. Neither is what it was. In many respects the two are improved in their conditions, political and material, and, there remaining no longer any bar to their perfect union, the lessons of the epoch of misunderstanding and misadventure from which we are emerging will be found not to have been set in vain. Particularly is this true of the South.

The issues that produced secession are all passed away. The men who led the secession movement no longer appear upon the scene. A fresh crop of ideas has sprung up in the South. A new body of public men has come to the front. These were not responsible for the mistakes of their fathers, and, except to be loyal to their fathers' memory and motives, are nowise concerned to defend that which they have no mind to repeat. The North has mistaken a manly and filial sentiment in the South for a covert and treasonable political design. This has been the occasion of a deal of mutual misconception and not a little crimination and recrimination. The South will presently have the opportunity to dispel this error. It will prove itself a conservative bulwark to the Administration, in Congress, in the Cabinet, and throughout the civil service. For the Southern people sincerely love their country. They are true to its free institutions. They feel keenly the stigma that they have been made to bear so long, and their present exultation springs largely from a sense of moral emancipation. At last they think they will be able to give hostages to fortune.

Everybody knows that under the shadow of a belief in the impregnability of the Republican position in the national Government great abuses have intrenched themselves. There being an equal portion of human nature in all political bodies, it could hardly have been otherwise. The circumstances of our last campaign pointed the moral and adorned the tale of these abuses, and the decision that has been reached is the proclamation of a prevailing impression that more danger is to be apprehended from wasteful and dishonest men in office than from men "lately engaged in rebellion." It is a manifesto from

the people to the people, claiming their own again. It is a decree of judgment against the party that had begun to think itself the state, and a warning to those who are intrusted with power not to misuse it. In short, it is both a civil service order and a restoration of the disunited Union, and upon the sincerity with which this construction is put upon it, and the success with which its provisions, actual and implied, are executed, will depend the length of the Democratic tenure.

The end of the late national campaign was signalized by the extraordinary spectacle of a defeated candidate for President assembling his neighbors and friends about him to hear from his lips a passionate exclamation against all who opposed his election. Denuded of oratorical redundancy and translated into plain English, Mr. Blaine's indictment charged that the result of the contest had been achieved by the union of four Northern States, whose loyalty he did not hesitate to question, with a South made solid by the subjection of its negro population. He asserted that the chiefs of the rebellion had regained possession of the Government by a system of intimidation that made the vote of a white man at the South double the value of the vote of a white man at the North. He declared that this unequal state of affairs raised a question that dwarfed all other questions, and he appealed to the manhood of the North to join him in a movement to avert what he described as a great national danger. He did not specify a remedy in detail, but his general plan embraced a solid North against a solid South, and flatly contradicted the pacific policy laid down in his letter accepting the Republican nomination for President.

The unreasonable character, the half statement and false argument, of the sectional delusion have never been put more sharply and clearly than they are in this splenetic outcry of a beaten aspirant. It ignores the facts of current political history with the most child-like disregard of the popular intelligence. For example, in the eleven ex-Confederate States, casting ninety-four electoral votes, there are only three — Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina — in which the negroes are in a majority, so that if Mr. Blaine's assumption were correct, that the negroes are all Republicans, they could not, had they all voted for him, have given him more than twenty-six electoral votes, or ten fewer than New York threw against him, and four fewer than were given against him by Indiana, Connecticut, and New Jersey. The

majority of negroes in Louisiana was in 1880 but twenty-nine thousand in over nine hundred thousand, or but three per cent.; moreover, the negro vote was divided there, and there is not a particle of evidence to show that there was any intimidation. If he had obtained the votes of Mississippi and South Carolina, he would still have lost the Presidency by the votes of disaffected Republicans in the State of New York. As to the complaint that the election of Mr. Cleveland rehabilitates the Southern Confederacy by restoring its chiefs to power, it is to be said in answer that none of those who were directly responsible for the secession movement or its consequences, are now upon the stage of public affairs. If there be one, he is Senator Isham G. Harris, of Tennessee, whom the Republicans of the United States Senate proposed, the Democrats concurring, to elect unanimously to the Presidency of the Senate.

After all, however, these are immaterial suggestions, which spring from a querulous temper, and not from any real apprehension or belief; for no man has cultivated close relations with the persons he assails more assiduously than Mr. Blaine himself. The only question he raises that is worthy of attention relates to the actual political condition of the Southern States, and the remedy he proposes of a solid North against the alleged encroachments and power of the solid South. Unfortunately for Mr. Blaine's argument, it is neither tangible nor original. During ten years we had an application of this sectional policy. There was a solid North. Neither Mr. Blaine nor any one else can hope to make it more solid. The Republican party, representing this solid North, had absolute control, and it did whatever it pleased with the South. The Constitution offered no obstacle to the thorough and radical scheme of reconstruction adopted by the Republican leaders. The Southern States were put under the dominion of the black population, organized and led by a few whites, backed by the whole power of the Government. The responsible, tax-paying elements of society were outlawed. In a word, the bottom was put upon the top of the political edifice. What was the result? Interminable conflict, ruinous corruption; a Moses in South Carolina, a Kellogg in Louisiana. The rotten fabric crumbled and fell of its own weight. It was out of nature and out of joint, and it could not exist. Gradually natural conditions prevailed, and ever since there has been a steady increase of prosperity and decrease of

violence. No civilized community loves crime for its own sake. Nor has the South reached a millennium of peace and quiet any more than the North. But as to law and order, the South can to-day challenge comparison with the North.

Extended to its logical conclusion, Mr. Blaine's argument looks either to the forcible restoration of the negro to rulership in the Southern States, or the destruction of Statehood at the South, and the substitution of provincial forms of government in room of it, with a military governor, a standing army, and martial law for each separate province.

If Mr. Blaine's scheme does not embrace the one or other of these propositions, it has no practical purpose, and his speech may be dismissed as the incendiary harangue of a disappointed applicant for office. In the meantime, it is to be borne in mind by those who seek the truth, that the present relation of the white and black populations of the South is a race, not a political question. In States where the whites are in a great majority, there is no issue at all, and the blacks fare better than they do in any of the Northern States. In the black-majority States, or close States, all issues are decided by race laws. The stronger race will govern; the weaker cannot. The trial was made, and we saw what came of it. Depopulate South Carolina of its whites, repeople it with white men made in the image and in the spirit of Mr. Blaine, and the result will be the same. The savage multitude will assert the power of numbers, the trained minority will meet it with the artifices of civilization, and the savage will go to the wall. Society will find its level somehow, and, until Mr. Blaine can make an African the equal of an Anglo-Saxon, he will not materially change the situation of any community where the blacks outnumber the whites.

The outcry of Mr. Blaine, and the support that a few excited journals have given it, take their origin in partisan arrogance, stimulated by unexpected defeat. It is, in effect, a pretense that the party to which they belong has a prescriptive right to rule the country. It is, by implication, an assault upon the patriotism and capacity of a majority of the people of the United States. In this character it is as great a treason to the spirit of republican institutes as secession was to the Union. If it be true, reconstruction was a blunder and a crime, and the States of the South ought to have been retained as conquered territory, and should be now held by force of arms. If it be

true, there is a radical, generic difference between the people of the North and the South, which will stand as a perpetual obstacle to real union. It is not true, and Mr. Blaine is a living example that it is not. Born in western Pennsylvania, and receiving his first and strongest impression from Kentucky, he has shown himself the most representative and popular citizen of Maine. During thirty years Mississippi's three foremost party leaders were Northern men: Sargent S. Prentiss, from Maine; John A. Quitman, from New York; and Robert J. Walker, from Pennsylvania. One of the most powerful of the secession leaders, John Slidell, went to Louisiana from New York. The government at Washington levied war against the Confederacy for the restoration of the Union. It succeeded, and, unless it stultified its professions and annihilated the republic, it was bound to rely upon the self-governing capacity and the personal integrity of the Southern people. Its reliance was not misplaced. In the coming years the South will contribute the most conservative elements of political thought and action to the Government. The man who has fought for his country knows only half how to value it. To comprehend its full value, he must have lost it.

Many disappointments will follow the election of Mr. Cleveland, who, if he were ten times a statesman, could not fill the expectation of his supporters. This, however, is merely to say that party reverses seldom realize the fears of the defeated, just as party triumphs never attain the hopes of the victors. Two errors the change of parties will undoubtedly expose. The one that the Republican party is alone qualified to govern; the other, that the South cannot be trusted. The incidents of administration may be left to take care of themselves. The Union is itself again.

HENRY WATTERSON.

WILLIAM HERSCHEL'S STAR SURVEYS.

"Coelorum perrupit claustra."—*Herschel's Epitaph.*

AMONG the researches that I should wish to live to see undertaken by astronomers, and especially by the astronomers of America, who have shown so much originality in kindred inquiries, I regard with particular interest the survey of the stellar depths, in accordance with the original ideas of Sir William Herschel, but on principles such as he by no means supposed to be correct when he began his labors. It has been unfortunate for the work of research in this direction, that Herschel's ideas and results during forty years of observation have been dealt with, by astronomers who came after him, as though they had been presented in a single treatise, and indicated his views at some one given time. In a sense, there is something singularly appropriate to the grand subject with which he dealt, in this particular quality of the picture that we have received from his hands. The starlit heavens present a similar diversity in regard to time. We find it difficult, nay, impossible, to conceive that the stars as we see them are not as they actually are, nor even as they were at any given time. We do not see any star in its true place, even after correction has been made for such effects as are produced by atmospheric refraction and aberration of light. For each star is rushing swiftly through space, changing its apparent position in the celestial sphere, and although, owing to the enormous distance of each star, the apparent movement is not perceptible by ordinary eye-sight in less than hundreds of years, yet as light takes many years in reaching us from any star, it remains strictly true that the position apparently occupied by a star is not its real position, but one that it occupied long ago. Again, we do not see any star with its real light at the moment, but with that (by no means necessarily the same, even in amount) which it emitted

many years ago. Even this is difficult to conceive; but this is little. Each star tells us of its history at a particular time, corresponding to its distance. Yonder bright star shows us its position and luster a score of years since; the less brilliant orb apparently close by, lies so much farther off that we must assign the news it brings us to at least a century ago. But many even of the brightest stars lie at such greater distances; while, when we pass to the fainter stars, we must often have to consider light-journeys of many hundreds or even many thousands of years. If we regard the telescopic view of the heavens as the real view presented to the eye,—at least, to the mind's eye of science,—we must recognize, in the case of the faintest stars seen by the most powerful telescopes, such vast distances that light cannot have come to us from those stars in less than hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of years. So that the scientific view of the universe of stars has as wide a range in time as in space. We have no picture of the galaxy as it actually is, or even as it was, but of different parts inextricably intermingled, and at different, and very widely different, periods of time.

But science enables us to correct the mistaken idea that in the stellar heavens we see the universe of stars as it is at this very time. Though the mind may never be enabled to conceive the reality, and is, indeed, hopelessly unable even to approach the conception, yet the reason has been convinced long since that the stellar heavens tell the amazing story of vast realms of space and enormous durations of time, which modern astronomy has in part been able to read.

It is not very wonderful, but it is interesting and significant, that the labors of the man that has done most to bring the great problem of the star-depths before us should have been misinterpreted somewhat as we are so apt to misinterpret the heavens themselves. Writers even so able as Humboldt and Arago take statements from this and that part of Sir William Herschel's long series of papers, and set them side by side in the same page, or even in the same paragraph; nay, I have seen such statements wrought into a single sentence, when in reality they belong to entirely different parts of Herschel's process of inquiry, or even present entirely distinct views on the particular matter to which they relate. Although my chief work has long been to try to put myself in the position of those who are apt to make mistakes, in order that I may be the more successful in correcting

such errors, I had not conceived it possible that so gross a mistake should have been made. Sir William Herschel suggested, in the course of his career as an observer of the stars, two entirely distinct methods of gauging the star-depths. They were so different in character, that — to take but one point of difference — one depended on the use of one and the same telescope throughout, while the other required that a series of telescopes of gradually increasing power should be employed. Yet, not only have superficial readers overlooked the characteristic difference between the two methods, and the reason why one method gave place to the other, but even those that have professedly undertaken the work of analyzing and abstracting the labors of the great astronomer of Slough, have fallen into the same preposterous mistake. I know of only one, Wilhelm Struve of Pulkova, who has clearly recognized and insisted upon the difference between the two systems of space-gauging that were employed by Sir William Herschel at the beginning and toward the close of his marvelous series of observations. Even Struve failed to recognize clearly that Herschel never did more than sketch in outline the results that would have followed from his second method of gauging, interpreted in a way that seemed to him likely to be sound and just. Herschel was too old to do more; and, apart from this, it may be said that he left those who came after him not only to apply the method fully, but even to interpret satisfactorily the few results that he had himself been able to collect.


Every one knows the nature of the system of star-gauging that Herschel at first adopted; in fact, it is the only one about which the great majority of students of astronomy know anything. It was the method suggested originally by Wright of Durham. Supposing all the stars visible in the telescope to belong to a certain system of stars tolerably uniform in size and distribution throughout (our sun being one of them), it is easily seen that if the telescope we use brings into view all parts, even the remotest, of this star-system, we can determine the shape of the system with considerable accuracy. For, in whatever direction we turn the telescope, we shall see a number of stars, greater or less, according as the boundary of the stellar system in that direction is farther or nearer. Wright of Durham applied this method of gauging, with a telescope of moderate power, with results closely resembling those that are presented to this day as among

the chief triumphs of Sir William Herschel's entire series of labors. Wright found so many stars in the direction of the Milky Way, compared with the numbers seen in those parts of the sky that are free from milky light, that he was forced to assign a much greater extension to the stellar system in the direction of the Milky Way than elsewhere. Forced, at least, when we consider the assumption on which his inquiry had been based; for of course there were several other available explanations of the observed facts. Thus Wright was led to enunciate the theory, commonly attributed to Sir William Herschel, that the stellar system has the shape of a gigantic flat disk of stars, tolerably uniform in distribution. The Milky Way being divided into two streams along a part of its course as known to Wright, it was necessary to assume that the disk was cloven throughout half of its extent.

Sir William Herschel, making a more careful survey on the same plan, but with a much more powerful telescope, found that while in a sense this cloven flat disk theory was supported by the results he obtained, it was yet necessary to assign a much more complex figure to the stellar system, so long as the results of his gauges were interpreted in accordance with the assumptions suggested by Wright. It became clear that on these assumptions the bounding surfaces of the flat star-system were by no means smooth. Instead of a section of the stellar system through its center (near our sun) and at right angles to its median plane being bounded by straight lines, the outline must be of the most irregular form. Herschel drew one of these sections, which presented a shape somewhat like that of a long, dentate leaf. He appears not to have been at all struck by the peculiarities of outline thus presented, when he was considering only a section of the stellar system. It is obvious that a system of stars forming a sort of island universe might be expected to present many irregularities of shape, and a section athwart the middle of such a system might as probably be shaped like a toothed leaf as in any other way.

But as the work of survey went on, Herschel began to find that not only the particular cross-sections, but the system itself, presented peculiarities of form, and that these were related in too special a way to the position of the observer on the earth to be easily explicable as really belonging to the system of stars. Consider, for instance, such a case as the following: Over a

certain region of the heavens, nearly circular, Herschel found that his star-gaugings invariably gave high numbers, while over the region all around this nearly circular space they as sys-



tematically gave very low numbers. Thus, if we suppose A, B, D, E to represent such a circular region, having its center at C, Herschel found that within the boundary A, B, D, E he always had fields of view rich in stars; while so soon as he directed the telescope to points outside of A, B, D, E, he found not more than perhaps four or five stars, instead of hundreds, in each field of view. The meaning of this result—if the assumptions adopted by Wright and Herschel are accepted—is obvious. Herschel himself never hesitated in recognizing this meaning; yet those who quote Herschel constantly, and regard with intense disfavor the idea that he could, under any circumstances, have made a mistake about the stellar universe, overlook the direct result of his observations, the result pointed out by himself and frankly accepted.

If within a small circular or roughly rounded space, such as A, B, D, E, many stars can be counted in every field of view, while over the whole space L, M, N, K, outside of A, B, D, E, few stars are seen, and if a great number of stars seen in any direction indicate a correspondingly great extension of the stellar system in that direction, then, of course, it follows inevitably that the stellar system extends toward the region A, B, D, E very much farther than toward any of the region around A, B, D, E. If the stars over the space A, B, D, E were uniformly distributed, the conclusion would be that a cylindrical projection or rod-shaped extension of the stellar system existed in the direction toward C, the center of this rounded, rich region of stars. If, on the other hand, as Herschel found to be almost invariably the case, the stars, though rich over the whole region

A, B, D, E, were much more closely aggregated near the center, C, than toward the edge, the conclusion would be that there was a conical projection of enormous length compared with its breadth, having its axis directed toward C. In neither case could the conclusion be regarded as reasonably likely, scarcely even within the bounds of probability. It would be strange enough to imagine a star-system of vast extent, with long cylindrical or conical projections extending from portions of the central group, the extensions being many times longer than the diameter of the parts of the central mass (the cloven flat disk of stars) from which they sprang. Nay, this would not only be strange, but altogether inadmissible when dynamical laws are taken into account. But if we overlook the strangeness and the unscientific nature of such a supposition, we find another and overwhelming difficulty in the peculiarity that every one of these strangely projecting cylinders and cones of stars must be conceived as having its axis directed exactly toward the solar system, from a member of which we make our observations. Our sun is, by the very assumption on which the system of numerical star-gauging depends, but one among millions of suns forming a system of stars. There is no reason whatever for supposing that he lies at the center of the system, or, indeed, that the system is of such form as to have a "center of figure," which, of course, can only exist in the case of a symmetrical system. On the contrary, there are abundant reasons in the complex form and various degrees of brightness of the Milky Way, and in the general superiority of luster found within its southern portions, for believing that the system of stars (if, indeed, the Milky Way represents its richer parts) is exceedingly complex in shape, and the sun eccentrically placed within its limits. Yet, as seen from this casual star—for in looking from the earth we get, to all intents and purposes, the same view of the stellar depths as if we looked from the sun—all the strange projecting spikes of stars (I can think of no more suitable name) are foreshortened into the appearance of round star-clusters! This is absolutely incredible.

There can be no doubt or question as to the significance of the observed facts, if the assumption on which the star-counting method depended is accepted, and it is scarcely possible to entertain any doubt or question as to the absolute inadmissibility of the result thus obtained. If the greater the number of stars seen

in any field of view, the greater is the extension of the star-system in the direction of those stars, there must be enormous spike-shaped projections of stars wherever clustering aggregations are seen, along the Milky Way or elsewhere; while the existence of such projections, always directed exactly toward the sun, cannot be admitted as possible by any reasoning mind.

Sir William Herschel, at any rate, felt no doubt on the subject. He saw at once, that since the principle he had assumed in the beginning of his star-gauging by the counting method led to a result that was manifestly preposterous, the principle that had seemed so reasonable must be rejected as unsound. Repeatedly we find him saying that a long-continued examination of the star-system has convinced him that the idea of uniformity of distribution, which he had imagined at the beginning, must be given up as inadmissible. He remarks that he has satisfied himself that the stars in the Milky Way are distributed very differently from those in our neighborhood. He understood the real meaning of the clustering aggregations of the stars along the Milky Way, regarding these as manifestly real clusters of stars, not stellar projections.

It would indeed matter little if Herschel had failed to recognize the meaning of what he had himself observed. Had he so failed, we should have found but another instance among hundreds known to us of the inaptitude of even the keenest observers to analyze their observations, and educe the full meaning of what they have discovered. Herschel differed from the rank and file of mere observers—the writing army of science—in the power he possessed in this respect, until approaching the end of his wonderful observing career. But had he in this case failed to reason right—as in later years we find he actually failed—this should in no sense influence our judgment respecting facts that are as clearly before us as they were before him. We know that the assumption he first adopted would compel us to assign to the star-system a shape that is antecedently unlikely even as a shape, and is rendered utterly inconceivable when we take into account the peculiar relation of all its most marked features to the sun. If we saw a number of grains scattered over a surface at random, and found that as they fell they arranged themselves in the form of a star, all the radiations of the star-form being directed exactly toward a certain mark on the surface, we should be absolutely certain that there were

peculiarities in the surface, differences of level, or the like, which brought about this result. It could not possibly be accidental. We should feel as certain that there cannot be multitudinous radiating streams of stars, all extending straight from our sun, unless there is some special peculiarity in our sun to cause this singular conformation of the star-system. And since we know certainly that no such peculiarity exists, we cannot but reject decisively the belief that the star-system is so shaped. It could make no difference whatever in our conclusion that Sir William Herschel had failed to notice the inference directly deducible from his observations. But, as a matter of fact, the elder Herschel accepted the rich clustering regions along the Milky Way as in reality what they appeared to be, that is, as clusters, not as projecting streams of uniformly strewn stars.

Of course, the principle that he had assumed as the basis of this system of star-gauging—the principle of generally uniform distribution—had to be abandoned in at least these special cases. Probably Herschel was not prepared to admit that it must be given up altogether. This seems much clearer in our time, with our vastly increased knowledge about the stars, than it could have been to Herschel, keen though his insight into such matters unquestionably was.

But Herschel went on at this time with a series of sidereal observations of the widest scope and the most diverse character. He had practically the whole field of stellar and nebular research; the universe was all before him where to choose, a noble but truly a bewildering scene. So far as observational work was concerned, he could hardly go wrong, let him undertake what portion of the survey he might. Again and again he sent to the Royal Society the results of fresh series of observations—now a thousand or so of new nebulae discovered by him in his “sweeps” of the mighty dome of the heavens; anon the survey of regions containing hundreds of thousands of stars; then an inquiry into the distribution of nebulae and stars; and all this work went on in company with the observation of sun, moon, planets, and comets, the construction of new telescopes by hundreds, the study of many complex physical problems, and other scientific inquiries of minor importance.

As these labors went on, and clearer ideas of the constitution of the heavens presented themselves, Herschel must have begun to see that the system of gauging the galaxy by counting stars

was utterly inadequate. With all the various orders of star-clusters and nebulous masses, how could he longer imagine that mere numerical wealth of stars, or of points of light looking like stars, indicated enormous extension in the direction of the line of sight toward such regions? Distance, indeed, he felt to be indicated by the close aggregation of multitudinous points of light. But the vast distance that he recognized in some of these clusters of stars was something entirely different from the long array of stars in particular directions that he had originally assumed as the explanation of great wealth of stars in such directions. His original idea of the structure of the stellar universe had not included the conception of star-clusters, either of the larger sort, such as he had found in parts of the Milky Way, or of the smaller kind, rounded, elliptical, irregular, ring-shaped, and other forms of small clusters, which sometimes he was disposed to regard as external stellar universes, at others as fragmentary portions of our own galaxy.

It was a natural outcome of such observations as these, and of the doubts they inevitably cast on Herschel's original method of star-gauging (or rather of the conviction forced upon him that the principle of that method was untrustworthy), that Herschel should be led to devise another method. I wish specially to show that the method he now adopted was entirely different from the other, inasmuch that it is among the marvels of misapprehension that the study of science brings before us that this method should be confounded with the earlier system. But I wish also to show how naturally the new method of star-gauging arose out of the observations on which Sir William Herschel had been engaged since his earlier star-gauging had shown him that the universe of stars is not constituted as at first he supposed it to be.

Let us take the latter point first. Among the *nebulae* Herschel had found all orders of what he called "resolvability." Some of them are clusters so coarse in texture that it was not easy to draw a line of distinction between them and the more clustering portions of the galaxy itself. I may notice in passing a feature that was not known to him, viz., that the *nebulae* of this coarsely clustering type are more numerous upon and in the neighborhood of the Milky Way than over the rest of the heavens. Others, again, are compact clusters, still easily resolved into stars with a telescope of moderate power. Then

there are others so difficult to be resolved into stars, that until powerful telescopes were applied they presented the appearance of round or elliptical cloud-like spots. Yet others are still finer in their starry texture, so that only a few of the most powerful telescopes in the world will resolve them into discrete points of light. And lastly, so far as the nebulae of regular shape are concerned, there are some that have not yet been resolved into stars by any telescope. It is noteworthy that, arranging the nebulae into classes in the order of their resolvability, those most easily separated into stars show the most marked tendency to aggregation along the Milky Way, and are irregular in shape. Those that come next in order are nearly circular, and though still showing a certain increase of wealth toward the Milky Way, are found in tolerable frequency elsewhere over the star-sphere. The nebulae that are resolvable with difficulty, on the other hand, are elliptical, and are absent altogether from the Milky Way. These points are manifestly associated with the great problem of the constitution of our galaxy, though not directly related to Sir William Herschel's observations. In fact, though he noticed the remarkable circumstance that the nebulae cluster near the northern pole of the Milky Way (that is, near the point farthest on the northern heaven from the central line of the Milky Way), he did not recognize the manner in which this peculiarity is associated with the character of the nebulae, and he supposed that the nebulae are rich along a ring-shaped region akin to the Milky Way, but at right angles to it, and formed of star-clouds instead of stars.

Recognizing these diversities in the structure of nebulae, Herschel was naturally led to regard them as due to differences of distance. He supposed the coarser clusters to be the nearer, and the finer in stellar texture to be the more remote. All nebulae might fairly be regarded, at that stage of the inquiry, as farther away than the stars forming our own sidereal system, even to the farthestmost parts of the galaxy. Herschel does indeed speak of the possibility that toward the side of our flat sidereal system, as he viewed it, there might be room for the nearer approach of the parts of a former single great nebula, as though the nebulae seen clustering in great numbers over the wings, shoulders, and head of Virgo might be but the parts of a former nebula of gigantic proportions. But this notion seems not to have been more than a passing idea with him, or to have

much influenced the development of his views. The idea gradually gained force, on the contrary, that in the greater or less telescopic power needed to resolve a nebula, or a group of stars, we may find evidence of the greater or less distance of the object so scrutinized. So soon as this idea had taken firm root in his mind, which was not till toward the end of his observing career, he proceeded to put to use this means (as he supposed) of determining distance. I refrain from saying that he put it to the test, for I have no evidence that he consciously did so. He seems to have taken it for granted that the visibility of a star as a separate point of light, by a telescope of given power, was in itself a test of distance. He stated the principle, and showed how it might be applied to stars, star-groups, star-clusters, and nebulae of various orders; then he proceeded to employ it as a means, first, of measuring the scale on which the stellar system is constructed, then of determining its shape, and lastly, of ascertaining the distances of the nebulae.

And now to show how entirely distinct was this method of gauging the star-depths from that which Sir William Herschel had before employed. We may call the first method star-gauging by enumeration; the second, star-gauging by resolution. In the first method, the same telescope (a powerful one) was to be applied to different parts of the star-depths, the number of stars counted, and, as the number was greater or less, the limits of the stellar system in the given direction were assumed to be farther away or nearer. What was taken for granted in this method was, first, that the stellar system is formed of stars generally uniform in distribution throughout the system; secondly, that the telescope employed was powerful enough (it was eighteen inches in diameter) to reach to the limits of the system; thirdly, that there are no vacant spaces in the system.

In the second method, different telescopes, ranging in power from the weakest in use to the most powerful he could make, were directed to each region examined, until the whole region had, if possible, been resolved into stars well defined on a black background, without any trace of milky nebulosity. What was assumed in this method was, first, that the sidereal system is formed of stars not differing greatly from one another in size; secondly, that in the various clustering regions throughout the sidereal system the average distances between stars are tolerably uniform, or, in other words, that what may be called the stellar

texture of each part of the system is the same throughout, though there may be vacant spaces in some parts, and clustering aggregations of various forms in others; thirdly, that any part of the system that the most powerful telescope he employed failed to resolve, lay at a distance beyond the gauging or fathoming range of that telescope. To bring the two methods more clearly into contrast, note that

In Herschel's first method of gauging, it was essential that one and the same telescope should be used throughout the work.

The comparisons made related to different fields of view, seen with the same light-gathering powers.

The inference deduced related to the extension along the line of sight of the objects connected with the one telescope employed.

In Herschel's second method of gauging, it was essential that a series of telescopes differing in power should be employed.

The comparisons made related to the same field of view, seen with different light-gathering powers.

The inference deduced related to the distance of objects seen with the different telescopes employed.

Had Herschel been a younger man when he thought of the second method of gauging the star-depths, it is probable he would have felt from the beginning that the method was one to be tested before it could be trusted. He would have been prepared to find that while, if his assumptions were sound, his results would have such and such a meaning, it was at least possible that his results might show that his assumptions were altogether inadmissible, and therefore that his new method of star-gauging was altogether unsound. But Herschel was nearly seventy-nine years old when he began to employ his second system of star-gauging, and though he still possessed much of his skill as an observer, he had lost much of that versatility of mind which had enabled him not only to observe skillfully, but so to analyze his results as to see whether they were consistent with the assumptions by which they were to be interpreted. Can we wonder if at that advanced age Herschel was content to work resolutely at the task on which he had entered, without considering very closely or thoughtfully the question whether the principle by which he proposed to interpret his results was sound or otherwise? It had seemed to him so reasonable as to appear almost unquestionable; we do not find a line or a word tending to show that he ever questioned it. The principles on which the first method of star-gauging had been based had seemed to him

equally unquestionable at first; but he had found them to be unsound by noting that his observations interpreted by means of them led to absurdities. The observations made in accordance with the second method of gauging led in like manner, if interpreted by means of the principles on which that system was based, to absurdities. But this, his attention being directed too exclusively to the results themselves, he failed to recognize.

Herschel began this new work of star-gauging by examining individual stars. It is clear that the principle of the method is applicable to a star as readily as to a star-cluster. If we can determine the average distance of those stars that we can just see with the naked eye on a dark and clear night, and stars generally throughout the stellar system have the same mean size (by which I mean that the average for a thousand stars in any one part of the system is the same as for a thousand stars in any other part of the system), then, of course, a telescope increasing the light-gathering power of the eye fourfold will just show a star twice as far away; one increasing that power ninefold will just show a star three times as far away, and so forth. It was by observations made in this way that Herschel was led to the belief that among the stars shown by his most powerful telescopes are some that are thousands of years' light-journey from the earth. Singularly enough, the very evidence that shows in this case that the principle of the new method of star-gauging failed, has shown that the same result can be inferred that Herschel based on that principle. We know now, for example, that many of the brightest stars—as Sirius, Capella, Vega, Arcturus, and Aldebaran—are much farther away than some—as 61 Cygni—that are barely visible to the naked eye on the darkest and clearest night, instead of these being (as they should, if the principle of the new method were sound) fully a hundred times farther off. We cannot, then, any longer assume, as Herschel did, that the faintest stars seen with his largest telescopes, are thousands of times farther away than those forming our constellations. They may be relatively near, and look small because they really are much smaller than their fellows. But while, on the one hand, we cannot now suppose faint stars to be necessarily far away, we are precluded, on the other hand, from inferring that bright stars are necessarily near. Since it is certain that

many of the brightest among the stars visible to the naked eye are really farther away than many of those that are barely discerned, we may infer, with considerable confidence, that the same holds in the case of the field of view of the mightiest telescope yet made. Now, the faintest stars seen in such a field are those that would be the brightest in fields of view obtained by penetrating still more deeply into space. Among them, therefore, must be some farther away than those yet fainter stars; among them, in fact, are probably stars like Sirius, Canopus, and Alpha Centauri, which owe their brightness to real vastness, and lie at depths remoter than the daring conception even of the elder Herschel has suggested.

But it is when we turn to the study of star-clusters that we recognize at once how thoroughly the principle of the new method of star-gauging was disproved, and how important, nevertheless, are the results that Herschel's observations on the new plan established. If he had found that each cluster, whether in the Milky Way or of the nature of a star-cloud, had been resolved by the application of a certain telescopic power, or of powers ranging between tolerably close limits, he might logically have been content to believe that his principle was sound. An easily resolved cluster would be set relatively near, and one resolved with difficulty would be set far away. But as a matter of fact, he met with a very different result in many cases; and a single case of the kind would have sufficed to dispose of the principle he had adopted. He found clustering regions (rounded in form) that were partly resolved by even his weakest telescopes, and more and more resolved on each increase of telescopic power, until he brought into action his very largest telescope; but even with this instrument, milky nebosity still remained. This peculiarity would be limited to a certain rounded space, in some cases not so large as the disk of the full moon.* Nichol says of these regions, "What wonder if even Herschel shrank back appalled in the presence of these unfathomable abysses?" Herschel himself spoke less turgidly. He simply says, "When I have been unable to resolve the Milky

* Herschel himself does not dwell on this particular point, though it could not possibly have escaped his attention; but any telescopist can ascertain for himself that all round the "unfathomable" regions noted by Herschel are regions that even moderate telescopic power will completely resolve.

Way with my most powerful telescopes, it has been because the Milky Way is unfathomable." *

Now, this observation, interpreted by the principle of the second method of star-gauging, leads to precisely the same absurdity to which Herschel had been led by his first method, and still more definitely, though not quite so obviously. All round one of these regions that he found unfathomable, the star-depths were easily fathomed, and therefore in those directions the stellar system had no great extension. But in the direction of these unfathomable regions the star-system had an enormous extension, if the principle of the new method could be trusted. The case is precisely the same as though a surveyor of the depths of ocean found that all over a large area of the sea bottom, save one spot, a few yards perhaps in length and breadth, he reached bottom with a hundred fathoms or so, while at that spot he could not reach bottom with a line of two or three thousand fathoms; except that, marvelous as such a deep and narrow hole reaching straight down two or three miles, but only a few yards across, would seem to the observer taking such soundings, it would be easy to explain, compared with the sidereal phenomenon that Herschel had before him. We can imagine causes for a deep vertical hole in the earth's crust, but we can neither imagine any cause for a straight star-chasm projection of the galaxy in a direction exactly from the sun, nor admit the possibility that such a projection could continue if it had ever existed. That there should be several such projections would be simply impossible, even if we admitted the possibility of the existence of one.

But this result, which thus conclusively proved that the principle of the new method of star-gauging was unsound, established nevertheless a most interesting fact. Since the clustering regions that yielded in part to Herschel's weakest telescopes, but not wholly even to his most powerful instruments, could not

* Struve was led into a singular mistake by this sentence (which I quote from memory, but correctly in essentials). He wrote it out probably in German, "Wenn Ich," etc.; or if not, he simply understood it as if the English word "when" were equivalent to the German "wenn"; for in his *Études d'Astronomie Stellaire* he writes the sentence with the word "Si" for "when," making the statement, which Herschel applied to those parts only of the Milky Way that he could not fathom, relate apparently to the whole of the Milky Way, and suggesting consequently an infinitely extending flat, galactic disk for Herschel's finite one.

possibly be long, straight, projections similarly constituted throughout their length, it follows that they must be clustering aggregations presenting a wide variety of stellar texture. There must be larger stars separated by wide intervals, stars not so large and separated by intervals not so wide, and stars smaller and smaller in real size and set more and more closely, till even with Herschel's most powerful telescope, they could not be separately discerned. In other words, instead of penetrating more and more deeply into space, as he supposed, he was in reality scrutinizing more and more closely the stellar structure of one and the same region of space.

This variety of feature within clustering regions of the Milky Way would have appeared strange to Herschel (in fact, the idea scarcely presented itself to him), but in our time it appears the most natural thing in the world. The analogy of the solar system, as known to us, suggests precisely such variety of structure in the greater system that Herschel was studying. Analyzed by optical powers varying in range from unaided vision to the keenest telescopic scrutiny yet available, the solar system presents a constant increase of complexity. The eyes see sun, moon, and a few planets; the telescope reveals more planets, some really as large as Uranus and Neptune, but faint through vastness of distance; others nearer than Saturn and Jupiter, but looking faint because small; and yet others associated with the larger planets as dependent orbs; more and more bodies come into view with closer and closer scrutiny of the solar domain; yet portions still remain unresolved, such as the Zodiacal region, where astronomers more than suspect that millions of millions of nerolites and meteorites are traveling around the central orb. With this knowledge for our guidance, it seems as strange to the thoughtful student of the heavens in our time to regard the stellar system as generally uniform throughout in texture, as the diversity of texture that we recognize in the solar system would have appeared to Herschel.

Observations of star-clouds regarded by Herschel as external galaxies, should have led him (and doubtless would in earlier years) to a similar conclusion. It is true that in many of these systems there is an apparent uniformity of stellar texture consistent with the idea that they are formed of stars of about the same size, and strewn with general uniformity through the whole region occupied by the star-cloud. Most probably, indeed,

the consideration of these features encouraged Herschel in the belief that our own galaxy is similarly uniform in texture. Moreover, in comparing one star-cloud with another, Herschel was not necessarily led to recognize the possibility that, even as one star differs from another in glory, so the nebulae may differ much from one another in structure, regarding them for a moment as he did, that is, as external galaxies. But there was a simple yet absolutely fatal objection, in the results that he obtained, to the theory that ran through all his work at this time, viz., that not only is the texture of our own galaxy uniform throughout the extent of the stellar system, but the same sort of star-texture exists, with considerable general uniformity, among all the island universes within our ken. Herbert Spencer was the first to note this objection; but it occurred independently to me (it is, indeed, obvious) in 1867, when I had not as yet read a line of his works. That it did not occur to Herschel himself, shows clearly how unready, in his extreme old age, he had become to analyze his results as he had in earlier years. Herschel had found parts of our galaxy unfathomable, which showed that, in accordance with his assumptions, the outermost extensions of the galaxy are beyond the resolving power of his mightiest telescope. But the nebulae, if they are external galaxies, must lie hundreds of times farther away than the outermost parts of our own galaxy. For each one of them, from its observed size, is known to lie at a distance exceeding hundreds of times its own diameter—that is, the diameter of our galaxy, on the assumption that galaxies are all of about the same size. Thus, then, we have this absurd result, that, whereas parts of our uniformly textured galaxy, at a distance of half its diameter, are irresolvable by the most powerful of Herschel's telescopes, many similar galaxies, hundreds of times farther away—corresponding to the diminution of their light tens of thousands of times—are resolvable with telescopes of much smaller power! Manifestly the principle of the second gauging method fails here again for the third time, and most hopelessly. Whether the star-clouds are external galaxies or not, the principle that Herschel had adopted for their interpretation, and in order to bring them into comparison with our own stellar system, must be given up.

But we know now—I venture to speak of it as certain, though many suppose it to be but a theory of my own—that

the nebulae are part and parcel of our own galaxy. Herschel's results went far to prove this, and had he but analyzed them he would have seen as much. Not only does our galaxy differ greatly in texture in its various parts, but it is as varied even in constitution as our solar system, or, rather, it is doubtless infinitely more varied in reality, but presents obviously to us the evidence of only about the same degree of variety. As in the solar system there are large planets and small ones, so in the stellar system there are stars of many orders of real size; as in the former we have streams of tiny bodies, like the asteroids, so in the galaxy we find streams of small stars, as in the Milky Way; as in the solar domain there are meteor-clouds and comets partly or wholly gaseous in structure, so in the great galaxy to which our sun belongs there are clouds of star-dust and mighty masses of nebulous matter (chiefly gaseous), like the Orion nebula.

I may hereafter give a brief sketch here of the evidence respecting the architecture of the stellar heavens already obtained by astronomers. In such a sketch the work of the Herschels would hold a prominent place. I may also show the methods of survey that commend themselves for future employment. My present object has been, first, to show how entirely distinct were the two methods of star-gauging that many who suppose they know something of Herschel's work have hopelessly confounded together; secondly, to point out how thoroughly the application of each disproved the assumptions on which either had been based; and lastly to show how, nevertheless, the results obtained by each method threw useful light on the great problem that Sir William Herschel, first of all men, successfully attacked by observational methods.

RICHARD A. PROCTOR.

AMERICAN LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.

THE organization of labor is a question of massive proportions; that of labor organizations and their character, aims, and purposes, is one of more distinct and limited boundaries. The first belongs to the domain of speculative, evolutionary, and historical philosophy; the latter must deal with such facts as are accessible to the diligent student and inquirer, with the additional obligation of relating them as comprehensively as may be to a movement which, however vague and indefinite as yet in its proportions and properties, embraces issues fundamental to a just civilization and as broad as the very existence of an equitable social order. Such organizations, as distinguished from the more portentous movements that are prefigured to the mental shallowness of the sciolist who ventures to call himself a thinker, or to the affrighted consciousness of the unreflecting conservative, under the terrible names of Socialism, Communism, or that latter phase of horror, Anarchism,—shadows, all of them, that await only the illumination of free and fair debate to make them lose their more formidable aspects,—are almost entirely a product of that Anglo-Saxon civilization which constantly strives to adjust without revolutionary strain and to achieve without destructive violence and disorder.

Germany, the earlier home of the mediæval trade guilds, is permeated with political socialism. The skilled wage-workers of France are but just beginning to turn their attention to efforts at trade organization. "Chambres Syndical," or trades-unions in the English sense, have but recently obtained a permanent foothold among the artisans of that country. Revolutionary and political aspects are still the most prominent features of French industrial discussion. In Spain, the "Black Band," with its programme of overthrow, is the only one of impor-

tance. Italy and Austria have witnessed some efforts in the direction of protection and amelioration, but there is no very great or distinctive force therein. Russia is as yet out of this pale; but it holds forces, active or inert, that set it aside from the general drift of the more limited movement to be discussed in these pages. The *Mir** and the *Artel*† are to be considered from another stand-point. Belgium, of all European countries, is the only industrial community that has really taken hold practically of the labor movement and organization as it is understood, spoken of, and written about in Great Britain, the original home of that system of "labor partnership"‡ commonly called trades-unions.

The American student in this field will find no easy task before him, especially if his inquiries have been preceded by anything like an exhaustive study of the English labor movement. In Great Britain, indifference or active antagonism has been quite thoroughly overcome, and the public opinion of the land is at least intelligent, and has some commensurate idea of the issues involved. The British labor organizations have become a power not to be lightly considered. Thoughtful scholars, sympathetic politicians, and aspiring leaders, all alike find it of interest to debate, consider, or affiliate, with the labor movement and its leaders. But in the United States the whole movement has hardly reached the stage of toleration. It seems difficult for the great body of well-meaning, native-born citizens of mature years, who are not of the wage-earning order, to understand how enormous have been the changes in the very frame-work of industrial life, and in the simplest and most primal facts affecting the social conditions in which the wage-workers, especially of the great cities and manufacturing sections of the land, now find themselves, year by year, more and more completely environed. The successful middle-aged American carries within his memory, as a rule, associations as to his own early struggles quite at variance with those that would now wait on him were he about to enter the arena of competition, armed only with such forces as his natural physical powers, partial training, and moderately developed mental capacities,

* The Russian village and land commune.

† The guilds of artisans and workers that exist in all Russian trades and occupations, outside of agriculture.

‡ See Thorold Rogers's "Work and Wages."

might afford him at this time. Failing to put himself in the other man's place, the matured man of business is almost invariably narrow and unjust in his estimate of the motives and aims of the labor-union organizer. There is also a justifiable feeling against the effort to make metes and bounds in the way of class distinctions.

A little fact passing under my observation will sharply illustrate this. Some years since, while visiting Europe, I made the acquaintance of an American manufacturer. He was an elderly gentleman of great force of character and remarkable business ability. Though a man of the utmost personal kindness, he was absolutely brutal in his hostility to all labor movements. From what he said, there could be no question that he had expended and lost hundreds of thousands of dollars, during nearly fifty years of active business life, in embittered contest with the skilled laborers that he employed by hundreds. Yet he could but acknowledge, as he set forth the grounds of the struggle from his own stand-points, when a deliberate outsider called his attention to the laches he himself acknowledged, that the larger portion would have been wholly avoided by a recognition of the fact that labor was not a commodity to be dealt with as so much pig-iron or bar-lead. Again, he was evidently proud of the fact that his large fortune and extended business sphere had been the product of his own exertions. Indeed, he was the pioneer in, and almost the creator of, a great industry. A few years later the writer met this fellow-traveler again. He had just retired from business, after half a century of constant activity, transferring to his sons his furnaces, forges, and large shops. The value of these was estimated at one million dollars, and he had retired with a fortune of equal amount. In the course of conversation he said that he began life at eighteen on a borrowed capital of twenty-five dollars, employing a younger brother to assist him at the forge. This statement was given in proof of an assertion he was fond of making, to the effect that every man could succeed if he would, in this country, as he himself had done. Setting aside the *non sequitur* contained in the assertion of every man's succeeding, the old gentleman was asked: "What amount would be required nowadays to start a young man in this business, so that he might begin with something like the equality of effort and reasonable enterprise that attended your own earliest venture?"

The question rather confused our friend, but he rallied in a moment, and with amused frankness acknowledged that, with the appliances and machinery now required, nothing less than a capital of one hundred and fifty thousand dollars would be needed to make even a moderate venture possible. How much is expressed in these two sums, and what portentous changes they imply !

That the direct interests of labor, political, social, economic, and ethical, are becoming a matter of the largest public concern, is seen in the fact that, in some form or other, under one or the other shibboleth, the opinions and attitude of the wage-working "industrials" was the chief anxiety felt during the exciting political contest that has just closed. More positively than ever,—though it may be a question with many whether it has been more wisely,—the interests of labor, as a distinct series of issues, have been the one supreme topic of debate. This is a fact to be hailed with great relief by those who clearly perceive that the only way to prevent anarchy is to drag its possible cause into the forum ; that to find remedy for evils affecting the body-politic, or any portion thereof, there must be open debate and amicable consideration. Deep-seated discontent cannot exist without as deep-seated causes. To understand these, we must probe and examine. This, then, is the era upon which we are entering. As a contribution to the greater debate that impends, the following facts and statements are presented, premising, however, that the statistics as to membership, etc., of the organizations under review are, much to the writer's regret, not of that assured authenticity which is required for a complete understanding. This much may be truthfully said of them, that they are within the bounds of fact, that no effort has been avoided to obtain more accurate data, and that they have at least the value of intelligent conjectural and analytical presentation. The difficulty encountered by the writer in his efforts to secure reliable statistics of labor organizations offers a vivid proof of the bitter spirit of antagonism that prevails. The friendly motive with which this information was sought has been acknowledged by all the officers of societies with whom correspondence was had, yet in several of the more important bodies—such as the iron and steel workers, the granite-cutters, or the Knights of Labor—all definite data were refused, on the distinct ground that the publication of their number, funds,

dues, expenditures, etc., would be the placing of weapons in the hands of employers, to be used to the injury of the trades-unionists. In striking contrast with this is the spirit with which such inquiries are now met in England. The great trades organizations therein, numbering in the aggregate, as represented in their annual congress, a membership of over two million persons, are always ready to give information and to make public the facts relative to membership, funds, expenditures, etc. Of course, they do not make their administrative details or policy matters for public oversight, any more than do the directors of a bank give to the enterprising reporter the reason why they may have refused to negotiate a line of loans. However, diligent inquiry has enabled the writer to present the following approximate table and statements, relating to trades and labor organizations within the United States, in the qualified sense employed in this paper:

<i>Trades Organisations.</i>	<i>Membership.</i>		<i>Headquarters.</i>
INTERNATIONAL BODIES.	(o) Official. (e) Estimated.		
Iron and Steel Workers	42,000 (e)	..	Pittsburg, Pa.
Engineers (British)	5,000 (e)	..	New York & London.
Carpenters (British)	7,000 (e)	..	New York & London.
Typographical Union	11,930 (o)	..	St. Louis, Mo.
Seamen's Union	7,000 (e)	..	Chicago, Ill.
Cigarmakers' Union	14,000 (o)	..	New York.
Coopers' Union	7,000 (e)	..	Cleveland, O.
Bricklayers and Masons	12,000 (o)	..	Cincinnati, O.
Granite-cutters	6,000 (o)	..	Quincy, Mass.
Glass-workers	7,000 (e)	..	Pittsburg, Pa.
Furniture-workers	9,000 (o)	..	New York.
Locomotive Engineers	12,200 (o)	..	Cleveland, O.
Locomotive Firemen	12,000 (o)	..	Terre Haute, Ind.
Railroad Conductors	7,000 (e)	..	Not known.
Railroad Brakemen and Employés..	18,000 (e)	..	Philadelphia.
Knights of Labor (Federation)	150,000 (e)	..	Philadelphia.
International Workingmen's Ass'n..	20,000 (e)	..	San Francisco, Cal.
NATIONAL BODIES.			
Iron-molders	14,000 (e)	..	Pittsburg, Pa.
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners.	7,000 (o)	..	New York.
Plasterers	7,000 (e)	..	
Plumbers	3,000 (e)	..	New York.
Tinsmiths	3,000 (e)	..	New York.
Laborers (chiefly building trades)...	25,000 (e)	..	New York.
Horseshoers (includes Blacksmiths.)	19,000 (e)	..	Baltimore, Md.
Boiler-makers & Iron-Ship-builders..	17,000 (e)	..	Not known.

<i>Trades Organisations.</i>	<i>Membership.</i>		<i>Headquarters.</i>
NATIONAL BODIES.	(o) <i>Official.</i>	(e) <i>Estimated.</i>	
Stationary Engineers.....	1,700 (e)	..	New York.
Metal-workers.....	8,000 (e)	..	Philadelphia, Pa.
Ship-carpenters.....	2,000 (e)	..	Not known.
German Typographical Union.....	3,000 (e)	..	New York.
Telegraphers, Operators and Linemen	10,000 (e)	..	
Coal Miners, State and National....	60,000 (e)	..	{ Pittsburg and points in different States.
Progressive Cigarmakers.....	9,000 (o)	..	New York.
Mule-spinners (cotton factories)....	5,000 (e)	..	Fall River, Mass.
Cotton Weavers (cotton factories)..	5,000 (e)	..	Fall River, Mass.
Silk Weavers.....	1,200 (e)	..	Paterson, N. J.
Tailors, N. U.....	18,000 (e)	..	Philadelphia, Pa.
Upholsterers.....	3,500 (e)	..	New York.
Harness-makers.....	1,500 (e)	..	Not known.
Paper-hangers.....	3,000 (e)	..	New York.
House-painters.....	10,000 (e)	..	New York.
Shoemakers, Lasters, etc.....	12,000 (e)	..	Not known.
Bakers.....	2,500 (e)	..	New York.
Brewers.....	2,000 (e)	..	New York.
There are small trades, locally organized, chiefly in the large cities, whose number is difficult to ascertain, and many of whom are federated with trades assem- blies and central labor unions. They may be understated at.....	75,000 (e)		
The Socialistic Labor Party (Amer- ican) and the Social Democrats may be estimated at.....	25,000 (e)	..	Baltimore, New York, and Chicago.
Total estimate.....	611,530		

The foregoing table is not put forward as anything but an approximate statement of the numbers embraced within well-known labor organizations. Some deductions must be made for those who are members of more than one organization, as are, for instance, many of the Knights of Labor, the "Internationale," or the Socialist Labor party. Probably fifty thousand duplications are thus given. But there are numerous bodies, small in number, perhaps, which should fairly come within the scope of an estimate, but about which so little is known that it is preferable to make no statement. It will not be an exaggeration, however, to claim a practical unity, mainly of the direct trades-union character, of at least six hundred thousand members. Leaving out of the count, then, the agricultural laborers,

nearly four millions in number, and also the laboring force employed in commerce, stores, and trading generally, the domestic help and the other miscellaneous wage-workers, the following figures will give all the pursuits with which organizations in the foregoing table are in any way affiliated. They are taken from the Federal census of 1880, and embrace those employed in the occupations that have in some sort come to be associated in the minds of economists and students with the term "industrials," as contradistinguished from agricultural, trading, and domestic employments. According to the census, there were employed at wages in mechanical and manufacturing establishments the following: Males above sixteen years, 2,019,035; males below sixteen years, 181,921; females above sixteen years, 531,639:

In mines, males above 16	195,968
In mines, males below 16	24,507
In quarrying, males above 16	38,945
In quarrying, males below 16	728
In petroleum wells, adult males	11,477
In petroleum refineries, etc., males above 16	9,498
In petroleum refineries, etc., males below 16	346
In petroleum refineries, etc., females above 16	25

RAILROAD EMPLOYÉS RECEIVING WAGES FOR MECHANICAL ENGINEERING AND SUCH OTHER SKILLED LABOR.

Trainmen. Locomotive engineers, adult males	18,977
Trainmen. Conductors, adult males	12,419
Trainmen. Firemen, and all others, adult males	48,254
Trackmen. Layers, repairers, etc., adult males	122,486
Shopmen. Machinists, adult males	22,766
Shopmen. Carpenters, adult males	23,202
Shopmen. Other mechanics and laborers, adult males	43,746
Shopmen. Miscellaneous day-wage men, adult males	51,619

IN NAVIGATION.

Seamen and others employed in United States waters	55,453
Seamen and others employed in State waters	636
Seamen and others employed on canals	722
Telegraph and telephone employés (about one-fourth females) ...	18,286
Total	<u>2,932,785</u>

By the foregoing statistics it will be seen that on a moderate presentation the trades-unions and other labor organizations

embrace fully one in five of the skilled wage-workers engaged in the above-named great branches of industry. This estimate will not, however, cover the ratio of their influence, especially in the large centers of activity. The artisans, mechanics, and laborers that remain without their pale are mainly those employed in the rural districts and the smaller towns, or in those sections and occupations that are but just beginning to comprehend the great changes produced by the transfer of economic forces from an agricultural civilization to one of a more purely industrial character. Such, for instance, are the artisans of the villages, wherein a workman may yet readily pass from being a hired man to a self-employing position; or the operatives in newly opened factory districts like those of the South; or, to come nearer home, of that portion, for instance, of central New York, wherein during a few years past many of the towns and villages have begun their transition from trading-points to factory and mechanical centers. In the larger cities and local centers of industrial life, many of the great trades-unions will be found to have brought nearly every member of the different crafts within their several folds. This is almost entirely true of occupations like the building trades, and of the printers, furniture-workers, etc., in which the laborers are still handicraftsmen, so far as their skill is concerned; or of great pursuits like those of the glass or iron workers, wherein machinery can be employed only as an adjunct to and not a superseder of man and his trained capacity in a given direction. The employments in which protective mutualism finds it difficult to organize effectually, are such as the cotton, woolen, and shoe factories, wherein the use of machinery has made mere human tenders of the operatives employed; or in such industries as the making of garments, wherein light-handed and comparatively unskilled labor, such as that of women and children, embodies the very worst features of an utterly selfish competition, and leaves the workers almost entirely at the mercy of "sweaters" and "middle-men." In other great occupations, like that of mining, the employés of which in England and Scotland are among the best organized, best paid, and most intelligent of wage-workers and trades-unionists, causes are at work within the United States, such as arise from corporate power and monopoly combinations, bringing under one direction the ownership of mines and railroads, transportation and traffic, produc-

tion and distribution, that have heretofore prevented any effectual protective organization of such labor, and which, in all probability, will continue so to do, until the time comes when society clearly perceives the need of its resuming the functions now exercised by irresponsible corporations.

The table already given indicates the existence of organizations differing in character or method, and presumably, in some cases, in aims also. Those grouped as international unions are, with a few exceptions, confined to this hemisphere, and aim only at trades-union results. The exceptions are the local and national affiliates of the amalgamated engineers and carpenters, bodies whose general head-quarters are in England, and whose membership is almost wholly British. The international characteristics of the others, with such exceptions as are indicated, are designed to cover the workers in Canada, Mexico, the West Indies, and Central America.

The glass-workers, whether they are organized as part of the Knights of Labor or in a separate body, have recently made connection with their fellow-craftsmen in Belgium and England. The international organizations that are something more than protective, and look toward ameliorative or reconstructive processes, as remedies for the acknowledged evils of a merely competitive life, embraced within the table, are the Knights of Labor, the International Workingmen's Association,—whether in the "Red," or Karl Marx mold, or in the "Black," or Bakunine form,—and the Social Democratic party, as shaped by Lasalle originally, and having affiliations with the German socialists on the one side, and the British radicals, of whom Hyndman and Morris the poet are now the leaders and representatives, on the other. It is not proposed to discuss the organization, aims, and character of these latter bodies and movements, as they belong to another aspect of this subject, and should be considered under the more ample field of the organization of labor. But they are widely influencing the opinions of intelligent and organized workmen, and in a marked degree affecting the views of many that are not so classified. It will be found, on close inquiry, that the representative men of the International, for instance, in this country, are quite as often lawyers, writers, followers of professional pursuits, or engaged in commercial occupations, as they are affiliates of the wage-working avocations. The Social Democrats have, also, a considerable admixture of the same social grades, while what is

herein classified as the Socialistic Labor party seems to be almost wholly related to the wage-working pursuits. It is confined to a few of the large cities. The International is more widely extended, and one of its chief centers of action is the city of San Francisco, in which a monthly magazine, under the title of "Truth," is published. One, and probably the most extreme publication, in English, of the "anarchist" school, is that of "Justice," a weekly, edited by Mr. Tucker.

Another international body with constructive aims deserves more than mere mention, because its organization and movement is of an American character, and proceeds on the lines that seem to be necessary to our political life and republican spirit. The Knights of Labor is a secret but not oath-bound association. It is both federal and national,—federative by the trades and pursuits it brings under its shield, and national by reason of the extent and purpose of its organization. Its international phase is but just budding, having grown especially out of an affiliated trade, the window-glass-workers, and their efforts to prevent a disastrous competition in wages by the importation of Belgium workers. This was met by organizing local assemblies of this trade in England and Belgium. The exact membership of the Knights of Labor is not given; but about four thousand five hundred local assemblies are reported, and as many of them contain from one hundred to several hundred members, it is not an exaggeration to say that they will average about thirty-five members each. The federal character of the body is obtained, so far as developed, by the unity of different trades under the control of separate district assemblies, and by the general organization, under the same form, of mixed and trades assemblies governed by districts formed through civic and local needs. For instance, the window-glass-workers, wherever located, are all Knights of Labor, and the several local bodies are under the direction of their district assembly at Pittsburg. The shoemakers are also affiliated or federated in this way, the largest body being under a district assembly in Massachusetts. The coal-miners in many sections are similarly organized, and so with other trades. Cigarette-makers are generally enrolled in this body. There are many local assemblies of printers, book-binders, carpenters, bakers, and other occupations, also, not largely related to or connected with trades-unions in the definite sense. Mixed local assemblies are made up of different occupations. All persons that work for a living are eligible to mem-

bership, except lawyers, bankers, and liquor-sellers. The National Assembly, which meets at cities selected by the assembly preceding, has contained in the last two sessions delegates whose occupations embraced medicine, the pulpit, journalism, teaching, manufacturing, trading, and many of the skilled and prominent trades and handicrafts. The present executive body is more distinctly confined to tradesmen, in the labor sense, than others that have preceded it. The order makes no distinction of sex or race. It is actively pushing its organization among the colored workers, and with the woman "industrials" of the cities. It is opposed to strikes, is non-partisan though political (in the agitating sense), and its platform of principles favors coöperation, though at present there is no distinctive movement in that direction. On the contrary, a spirit of hostility toward such efforts has been developed, owing probably to the active endeavors of the State Socialists, who predominate largely in New York City, Chicago, Cincinnati, and San Francisco. Trades-unionism proper has recently become a more marked element and force within the Knights of Labor, the chief success of which has heretofore been found in taking up and organizing the trades and occupations that are somewhat, perhaps necessarily, neglected by the large trade-unions. The value of the order to the labor movement in the United States is in this direction, and also in the manner in which it compels a recognition of a unity of interests among all grades of laborers. The platform annexed covers with sufficient accuracy the general ameliorative demands of all the labor organizations and of leading representatives.

1. To bring within the fold of organization every department of productive industry, making knowledge a stand-point for action, and industrial, moral worth, not wealth, the true standard of individual and national greatness.
2. To secure to the toilers a proper share of the wealth that they create; more of the leisure that rightfully belongs to them; more society advantages; more of the benefits, privileges, and emoluments of the world; in a word, all those rights and privileges necessary to make them capable of enjoying, appreciating, defending, and perpetuating the blessing of good government.
3. To arrive at the true condition of the productive masses in their educational, moral, and financial condition, by demanding from various governments the establishment of bureaus of labor statistics.
4. The establishment of coöperative institutions productive and distributive.

5. The reserving of the public lands, the heritage of the people, for the actual settler. Not another acre for railroads or corporations.

6. The abrogation of all the laws that do not bear equally upon capital and labor; the removal of unjust technicalities of justice; and the adopting of measures providing for the health and safety of those engaged in mining, manufacturing, and building pursuits.

7. The enactment of laws to compel chartered corporations to pay their employes weekly, in full, for labor performed the preceding week, in the lawful money of the country.

8. The enactment of laws giving mechanics and laborers the first lien on their work for their full wages.

9. The abolishment of the contract system on national, State, and municipal work.

> 10. The substitution of arbitration for strikes, whenever and wherever employers and employes are willing to meet on equitable grounds.

11. The prohibition of the employment, in workshops, mines, and factories, of children that have not attained their fourteenth year.

12. To abolish the system of letting out by contract the labor of convicts in our prisons and reformatory institutions.

13. To secure for both sexes equal pay for equal work.

14. The reduction of the hours of labor to eight per day, so that the laborers may have more time for society enjoyment and intellectual improvement, and be enabled to reap the advantages conferred by the labor-saving machinery which their brains have created.

15. To prevail on governments to establish a purely national circulating medium, issued directly to the people, without the intervention of any system of banking corporation, which money shall be a legal tender in payment of all debts, public and private.

It is not to be asserted, however, that compliance with these demands would satisfy. The careful study of the evidence taken in New York last autumn (1883) by the U. S. Senate Committee on Education and Labor, of which Senator Blair of New Hampshire is chairman, will convince one that the larger number of the thinking men in the labor ranks are more or less imbued with such socialist ideas as the Henry George state ownership and control of the land; the Karl Marx assertion of a common property in railroads, telegraphs, and banks, as well as in the land, mines, and waters; or in the Lasalle doctrine of the duty and right of the state to own and organize the great machinery of industrial pursuits, so as to prevent the existence of capitalists as a class and of capitalism as the controlling force in economic life and order.

Another phase of labor organization, and a very marked one, is the tendency toward federation. Early in October, 1884, the fourth annual session of the "Federation of Organized Trades

and Labor Unions" met in Chicago. Article II. of its Constitution sets forth the following objects :

"SECTION 1. The encouragement and formation of trades and labor unions.

"SEC. 2. The encouragement and formation of trades and labor assemblies or councils.

"SEC. 3. The encouragement and formation of State and provincial federations of trades and labor unions.

"SEC. 4. The encouragement and formation of national and international trades-unions.

"SEC. 5. To secure legislation favorable to the interests of the industrial classes."

Its platform, or declaration of principles, is more comprehensive even than that of the Knights of Labor, but does not differ essentially from that document. It demands eight hours as a day's work ; asks for national and State incorporation of trades-unions ; favors obligatory education of all children, and the prohibition of their employment under the age of fourteen ; the enactment of uniform apprentice laws ; opposes bitterly all contract convict labor, and the truck or goods system in payment of wages ; demands laws giving the workman a first lien "upon property, the product of his labor" ; the abrogation of all so-called conspiracy laws ; the establishment of a national bureau of labor and statistics ; the prohibition of the importation of alien labor ; opposes government contracts on public works ; favors the adoption by States of an employers' liability act, and urges all labor bodies to vote only for labor legislators.

This body had representatives, at its last meeting, of the machinists, printers, carpenters, coopers, cigarmakers, iron-molders, lake seamen, masons, granite-cutters, and of local trades assemblies and central unions, as well as of the Knights of Labor. It aims to take the same position in American labor organization that the British Trades Congress does toward labor affairs in that country. Besides this body, which seems to be gradually taking shape as labor's central and national exponent and representative, there are, in all of the large cities, in many important towns, and in some States, deliberative and representative bodies, with legislative powers, in which are embraced many small trades and unions not yet nationalized. The most important of these is the Central Labor Union of New York City, in which nearly one hundred thousand wage-

workers are represented. There are State assemblies in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Illinois, Missouri, Michigan, Wisconsin, and probably two or three other States.

The whole movement is undergoing a rapid and healthy change. It is coming out of the twilight of separatism into the daylight of united action and public discussion. It has a literature of its own, fugitive as yet, perhaps, but of an extent and character that will surprise those who have made no examination of the subject. There are seventeen monthly journals, published by the executives of as many unions and societies. In addition to these special organs, there is one daily, "The Laborer," of Haverhill, Mass.; and several weeklies, "The Craftsman," the "Labor Tribune," and others, published at Washington and Pittsburg, which are distinctively the organs of the great trades, such as the printers, miners, iron and steel workers, iron-molders, glass-workers, etc. The two great organizations of cigarmakers publish monthly journals, and both are remarkably well edited. The locomotive engineers and firemen issue handsome monthly magazines. The Carpenters' Brotherhood also issues a well-edited monthly. The Knights of Labor issue the "Journal of United Labor." In addition to these and others, there are nearly four hundred weeklies that are in sympathy with the labor organizations in some one or all of their methods. Recently a large number of these papers have formed a "Labor Press Association." They do not use the wires as yet, but by a judicious use of the mails are able to supply one another with a great deal of interesting news, much of it of value as showing the condition of labor, the places where the market is crowded, or the trades in which men are needed. All this has grown out of a feeling that the ordinary press is hostile and presents the action of labor from the point of antagonism. There are four German dailies, one each in New York and Philadelphia, and two in Chicago. There is also a weekly supporting the anarchist agitation, and a German monthly published in San Francisco. The internationalist organ is the German "Arbeiter-Zeitung" of Chicago, while that of the Social Democrats is the "Volks-Zeitung" of New York.

In this paper only the facts in relation to American labor organizations have been rapidly and perhaps imperfectly outlined. Enough has been presented, though, to show the character and significance of the labor movement, and to show that it is

and Labor Unions" met in Chicago. Article II. of its Constitution sets forth the following objects:

"SECTION 1. The encouragement and formation of trades and labor unions.

"SEC. 2. The encouragement and formation of trades and labor assemblies or councils.

"SEC. 3. The encouragement and formation of State and provincial federations of trades and labor unions.

"SEC. 4. The encouragement and formation of national and international trades-unions.

"SEC. 5. To secure legislation favorable to the interests of the industrial classes."

Its platform, or declaration of principles, is more comprehensive even than that of the Knights of Labor, but does not differ essentially from that document. It demands eight hours as a day's work; asks for national and State incorporation of trades-unions; favors obligatory education of all children, and the prohibition of their employment under the age of fourteen; the enactment of uniform apprentice laws; opposes bitterly all contract convict labor, and the truck or goods system in payment of wages; demands laws giving the workman a first lien "upon property, the product of his labor"; the abrogation of all so-called conspiracy laws; the establishment of a national bureau of labor and statistics; the prohibition of the importation of alien labor; opposes government contracts on public works; favors the adoption by States of an employers' liability act, and urges all labor bodies to vote only for labor legislators.

This body had representatives, at its last meeting, of the machinists, printers, carpenters, coopers, cigarmakers, iron-molders, lake seamen, masons, granite-cutters, and of local trades assemblies and central unions, as well as of the Knights of Labor. It aims to take the same position in American labor organization that the British Trades Congress does toward labor affairs in that country. Besides this body, which seems to be gradually taking shape as labor's central and national exponent and representative, there are, in all of the large cities, in many important towns, and in some States, deliberative and representative bodies, with legislative powers, in which are embraced many small trades and unions not yet nationalized. The most important of these is the Central Labor Union of New York City, in which nearly one hundred thousand wage-

workers are represented. There are State assemblies in New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Illinois, Missouri, Michigan, Wisconsin, and probably two or three other States.

The whole movement is undergoing a rapid and healthy change. It is coming out of the twilight of separatism into the daylight of united action and public discussion. It has a literature of its own, fugitive as yet, perhaps, but of an extent and character that will surprise those who have made no examination of the subject. There are seventeen monthly journals, published by the executives of as many unions and societies. In addition to these special organs, there is one daily, "The Laborer," of Haverhill, Mass.; and several weeklies, "The Craftsman," the "Labor Tribune," and others, published at Washington and Pittsburg, which are distinctively the organs of the great trades, such as the printers, miners, iron and steel workers, iron-molders, glass-workers, etc. The two great organizations of cigarmakers publish monthly journals, and both are remarkably well edited. The locomotive engineers and firemen issue handsome monthly magazines. The Carpenters' Brotherhood also issues a well-edited monthly. The Knights of Labor issue the "Journal of United Labor." In addition to these and others, there are nearly four hundred weeklies that are in sympathy with the labor organizations in some one or all of their methods. Recently a large number of these papers have formed a "Labor Press Association." They do not use the wires as yet, but by a judicious use of the mails are able to supply one another with a great deal of interesting news, much of it of value as showing the condition of labor, the places where the market is crowded, or the trades in which men are needed. All this has grown out of a feeling that the ordinary press is hostile and presents the action of labor from the point of antagonism. There are four German dailies, one each in New York and Philadelphia, and two in Chicago. There is also a weekly supporting the anarchistic agitation, and a German monthly published in San Francisco. The internationalist organ is the German "Arbeiter-Zeitung" of Chicago, while that of the Social Democrats is the "Volks-Zeitung" of New York.

In this paper only the facts in relation to American labor organizations have been rapidly and perhaps imperfectly outlined. Enough has been presented, though, to show the character and significance of the labor movement, and to show that it is

identified; he cares more to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly, than for all the gorgeous ceremonial of worship and sacrifice. By bringing back ethics to its simplest elements, he also desires to restore religion to its primitive attitude of wonder and awe; he desires to take the shoes from off his feet in religious veneration, while he mixes with his fellow-beings in the every-day garb of sympathy and affection. When religions are reformed, it is usually in pursuance of an ethical idea of the simplest and most catholic character.

For general outlines, this statement will hold true of each of the three great ethical reformers, Buddha, Socrates, and Christ, though more obviously of the first and last than of the Greek moralist. The religious problem was more present to the mind of Buddha and Christ than it was to Socrates, who had to combat the forces of sophistry, skepticism, and dogmatic materialism, as well as the anthromorphic conceptions of Hellenic religion. But Buddha had a purely ethical mission, besides his antagonism to Brahmanical theology; and Christ combined with his attack on Pharisaism and Hebraic ritual the advocacy of socialistic ideas and democratic championship. Absolutely different as were the local circumstances in the midst of which the three reformers appeared, it is curious to note how many parallel points there were in their lives. Gotama, the Buddha, lived about five hundred years before the Christian era; Socrates, a century later. There is all the difference in the world between Gotama's yellow-clad mendicant monks and Socrates's band of philosophical adherents, while the early Christian disciples possessed characteristics alien to both philosophers and monks. And yet they treat their founder's life and character in precisely similar fashion. While the actual Socrates is depicted in Xenophon's "Memorabilia," the ideal Socrates gains his apotheosis in Plato's dialogues. Historical criticism enables us to distinguish between the Christ of the Synoptic Gospel and the central figure of the Johannian Gospel; and in similar fashion the glorified and wonderful Buddha of the "Lalita Vistâra," the standard Sanskrit work of the northern Buddhists, finds his real and more humble counterpart in the Gotama of the Pâli Pitakas.

Socrates has his early mission conveyed to him in the answer of the oracle; Gotama learns to know his task while under the Bo-tree; Christ passes his initiatory ordeal in the

desert. Christ is tempted of the devil after a long fast; Buddha sustains a protracted conflict with Mara, the Prince of Darkness, before the final victory is gained. Gotama promulgates his doctrine in opposition to the official ritualism of the Brahmins; Christ is the free-thinking reformer, as compared with the dead formalism of the Scribes and Pharisees; Socrates has as his foes sophists, demagogues, and those who accused him of "introducing new divinities." All these reformers refuse to incorporate in their systems any physical or metaphysical theories; all alike start with common topics of every-day life, with parables from nature and apologues of unvarnished simplicity. Socrates finds that Critias, his own pupil, consents to his death; Christ is betrayed by his own disciple; Gotama's Judas Iscariot is called Devadatta. The favorite Phædo, with whose hair Socrates is playing, reminds one of John, who leaned on Jesus' heart; and Buddha, too, had his beloved disciple in Aranda. There are points in the death-story of Gotama that remind the reader now of Socrates, now of Christ. He dismisses his disciples at Vesâli, much as Christ sends away his disciples and faces the agony at Gethsemane alone. Not one of the female disciples is near the Master when he is dying, just as Socrates says, "O Crito, let some one lead this woman home," when Xanthippe appears in his prison. "Hearken, ye monks, I say unto you," exclaims Buddha, "all earthly things are transitory." "Strive on without ceasing, watch and pray," says Christ to the chosen three, "lest ye enter into temptation." "Not so, Aranda," says Buddha, "weep not, sorrow not." And Socrates, too, when he has drunk the cup and hears his friends weeping, upbraids them: "What is this strange outcry? Be quiet, and have patience."

It is needless, perhaps, to add the extraordinary resemblance between the subsequent histories of Buddhism and Christianity as religious systems; a fact, of course, to which the Socratic system, not being primarily a religion, can afford no parallel. In later times, Buddha, like Christ, is born of a pure virgin, and becomes a universal monarch. In the course of fifteen hundred years, Roman Catholicism and Tibetan Lamaism, the lineal descendants of Christ and Buddha, have become sacerdotal and sacramental systems; each with its bells and rosaries and images and holy water; each with its services in dead languages, with choirs and processions and creeds and incense, in

which the laity are spectators only. Each has its idols and relics and symbols, its reverence to the Virgin and Child, its shrines and pilgrimages, its monasteries and cathedrals. In the services of each, the priest reverently swallows a material thing, and believes himself to have swallowed a part of the Divine Nature. Each is ruled over by a pope with a triple tiara, the earthly representative of an eternal spirit in the heavens.*

But we are not concerned here with the subsequent developments, so much as with the main characteristics of spiritual and ethical reform at the time when they were first inaugurated. Whatever else they may be or may not be, all reforms possess one common feature: they are all animated by a pure zeal for humanity as such, divested of all those integuments, metaphysical, theological, or scientific, with which man is forever seeking to cover his assumed nakedness. When man first reasoned himself into the belief that he was naked, then was the beginning of woe, the fall from the primal Eden. For then began the slowly wrought edifices of doctrine, that taught man that he needed adventitious aids to work out his own salvation. He was an atom in a resistlessly whirling stream of fates, a plaything in the hands of jealous and omnipotent gods, a single defenseless unit, against which were ranged the forces of nature and an unseen, omnipresent, supra-mundane realm. Before his imagination were ever looming forces and agencies, unknown, terrific, soul-subduing, with whom he must make his peace by whatever means, on pain of some dim, fantastic, immeasurable punishment. And so come on him the locust army of philosophers and priests and metaphysicians, to eat up every green shoot of natural feeling and simple, unreasoned activity. When the ethical reformer appears, his first effort is to recall man to what he is in and by himself as a single spiritual unit; his second is then to attempt to adjust his relations with those around him; his third, to wage truceless war with the official teachers of the time. He cannot help the polemical attitude, for drastic measures are required; and if he does not attack the established authorities they force on the battle, because they see that their privileges are being threatened. But the opposition attitude is only the necessary consequence, and not the essential element, of the reform. The first step is to enable man to see for him-

* Rhys David's "Hibbert Lectures," p. 193.

self, and so knowledge, however understood, is the indispensable prerequisite. Then come the simple maxims of charity and benevolence, the simple duties that are the earliest tasks of a man who knows himself, and knows what he has to do. To give sight to the blind, to heal the broken-hearted, to preach deliverance to the captive, and the opening of prisons to those that are bound,—these are the first words of every new gospel. The special circumstances of the case naturally determine the character of the knowledge to be imparted. When Gotama began his mission he was preaching to born pessimists. The one certain fact in the world was its endless misery. Thereon men had built refinement of torture, in the beliefs that accompanied the early Animism of the Aryan race: that the soul passed from body to body in a course of transmigration. It was not apparently a necessary part of the early creed, which taught that man had a soul; at all events, it seems likely that the Aryans learned the doctrine of metempsychosis after their incursion into the Indian peninsula, though we cannot point to the time when they were not Animists. But the vista of future sufferings that was thus opened before their eyes was a burden too heavy to be borne. It is bad enough for the modern pessimist, who limits suffering to the world we know; but the ancient pessimist was in a worse case, when to the present life was added another and yet another worldly existence, in which the dreary drama of torture was to be enacted anew. Further ingenuities were due to the priests with their complicated ritual of sacrifices and bodily mortifications. From this net-work of pains and penalties, it was Gotama's desire to deliver much-enduring man. All suffering, he said, arises from ignorance: "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free."

Gotama's measures to secure this freedom were drastic enough. No mortifications in the first place, no such belief in soul as the Brahmanical creed involved, and lastly only such limited credence in transmigration as would allow for the lasting effects of conduct and character. (Karma.) The story that details Gotama's antagonism to self-mortification is picturesquely placed at the very opening of his career. In the wood of Urnvelâ, he is said to have lived in the severest discipline, tongue pressed against palate, holding his breath, and denying himself nourishment. But no illumination came. His body is attenuated by self-inflicted pain, but he finds himself no

nearer his goal. So he sees that self-mortification cannot lead to enlightenment, and he takes nourishment again freely, to regain his former strength. Now there were five ascetics living in the neighborhood, who were astonished at his persistence in the faith of asceticism; but when they saw that he had deserted the good cause, they with one consent abandoned him as a cast-away. To these, after the victorious sojourn under the Tree of Knowledge, comes Gotama, and preaches to them the sermon at Benares, which corresponds to Christ's Sermon on the Mount. The sequel is told in the "*Mahāvagga*," I., 6-10 ff.:

"The Exalted One came to Benares, to the deer-park Isipatara, where the five ascetics dwelt. Then the five ascetics saw the Exalted One approaching from a distance. When they saw him, they said to one another: 'Friends, yonder comes the ascetic Gotama, who lives in self-indulgence, who has given up his quest, and returned to self-indulgence. We shall show him no respect, not rise up before him, not take his alms-bowl and his cloak from him; but we shall give him a seat, and he can sit down, if he likes.' But the nearer and nearer the Exalted One came to the five ascetics, the less could the five ascetics abide by their resolution. They went up to the Exalted One. One took from him his alms-bowl and cloak; another brought him a seat; a third gave him water to wash his feet, and a footstool. Then the five ascetics said to the Exalted One: 'If thou hast not been able, friend Gotama, by those mortifications of the body, to attain superhuman perfection, the full supremacy of the knowledge and contemplation of sacred things, how will thou now, when thou livest in self-indulgence, attain such perfection?' Then the Exalted One spake to the five ascetics, saying: 'There are two extremes, O monks, from which he who leads a religious life must abstain. One is a life of pleasure, devoted to desire and enjoyment: that is base, ignoble, unspiritual, unworthy, unreal. The other is a life of mortification: it is gloomy, unworthy, unreal. The perfect one, O monks, is removed from both these extremes, and has discovered the way that lies between them, the middle way, which enlightens the eyes, enlightens the mind, which leads to rest, to knowledge, to enlightenment, to Nirvāna.' (Oldenberg's "*Buddha*," ff. 125-127.)

There is much in this story that runs parallel with the Gospel narratives of Christ. There is the disdain of the ascetic for the mere human being. "The Son of Man cometh eating and drinking, and ye say, 'Behold a gluttonous man and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners.'" There is the contrast with the ascetic John, who came neither eating nor drinking; and there is the justification that wisdom has for her children, "Be ye not of a sad countenance, as the hypocrites." But there is also the further parallel with Socrates: on the one side,

Antisthenes with the Cynics; on the other, the Cyrenaic Aristippus with the doctrine of pleasure; and half-way between the extremes is Socrates, neither ascetic nor voluptuary, with his counsels of σωφροσύνη (sobriety) and μετριότης (moderation), and his life-long exemplification of the Hellenic text μηδὲν ἄγαν (nothing in excess). In this, as in other matters, the ethical reformer is the true humanist.

The two other doctrines of Buddha that have been mentioned may be taken together, as they both seem to have been formulated in direct antagonism to Brahman metaphysics. The older philosophy recognized Âlman, in the same way that German transcendentalism envisages the self, or Ego, or the consciousness. It was the Âlman, for instance, that made the world, much as the understanding makes the world, according to Kant, or the world arises in consciousness, according even to so empirical a thinker as Mr. Lewes. With this Âlman there was an ultimate fusion of the Brahma, or Word, just as the Neo-Platonic Logos both was with God and was God, and the coalition of the two amounted to the one identical, absolute self-consciousness, as it would be phrased by Hegelianism. From all this verbose and mystical metaphysic Buddha turned away. To him there was no Ego in the sense of an underlying unity of consciousness, no self or soul in the autological or religious meaning of the word. Buddha takes up a position on this question that resembles that of Hume in facing the spiritualistic hypothesis of Berkeley's experience, indeed, testifies to states of consciousness that come and go in quick succession; but where shall we find in experience any testimony to the underlying subject? A seeing, a hearing, a conceiving, above all a suffering, take place; but where is the existence that may be regarded as the seer, the hearer, the sufferer? Everything is changing, is in flux, in movement; πάντα ῥεῖ is a truth for Buddha, as well as for his Ephesian contemporary, Heraclitus.

The object of this disbelief in the identity of the self is very probably theological; there can be no doubt that, once granted the existence of the soul as a separate entity, there is large room for theological dogma with regard to its being, its origin, and its destiny. Provision at once has to be made for securing its sanctity by sacrificial offerings and all the ritual of purification; it is held to be contaminated by the body, which is thenceforward regarded as the prison-house of a diviner being. Its fate in a

future world affords endless exercise for ingenious combinations of torture and ecstasy, such as have pleased the theological mind in all ages. But the immediate effect of Buddha's negative doctrine is to throw doubt upon the possibility of that transmigration of souls which was so cherished a doctrine among the Brahmans. For if there be no identical Ego, or personality, how can it be conceived to change from body to body? And if transmigration be denied, is not the morality that is fed by belief in a future life largely impaired?

The device of Buddha was to retain the lasting effects of action and character, while he dispensed with the ordinary theory of metempsychosis. This is the doctrine of Karma, or moral retribution, which is in some respects not unlike the modern doctrine of heredity. "Whatever a man reaps, that also he has sown," may be taken as the text of Buddha's teaching on this point; for actions never lose their proper effects, and if there be suffering now, it must be because, either in the present life or in a past generation, there has been sin. Nature, as we should say, never forgives; sin always entails punishment, not by any theological law, but simply by a natural law. The effects of an action go on in ever-widening circles, a long series of results dates, by the mandate of necessities, from some primal source of good or evil act. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that Buddha seems to have intended to impress upon his hearers. "Do not talk about your soul," he would seem to have said, "its history and its dangers; do not relieve yourself of all responsibility for single acts by believing in a self whose purity can be restored by sacrifice and oblation. And do not picture your soul's destiny in future ages. These are problems that do not come within the sphere of practical ethics. Realize this, however, that no single act you do is devoid of consequences that are incurable. If you are unhappy, it is the fault of certain acts in the past. Do not prolong the dreary chain of suffering by fresh sin; learn to get rid of passion and desire; care not so much for the world's pleasures; know that no peace can be gained except by him who feels that life can offer him nothing to tempt his longing, or feed his active ambition. Come unto me, and I will give you rest."

The difference between such teaching and that of Christ is measured rather by the new religious ideas that Christ set before men, than by any large divergence in the strictly ethical

view. It is true that very different motives for unworldliness are presented by the later teacher. In Christianity the stress is laid upon the necessity of a present duty to be perfect, in preparation for a better world, where there are many mansions; while in the early Buddhism there is the simultaneous recognition that the world is unreal, and that yet there is no other but only Nirvāna. In either case, however, if we confine ourselves strictly to the ethical aspects, the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. The tenets of both are more or less ascetic; the necessity for rest is equally enforced by both; while the restlessness of ambition and of desire are stigmatized in equal terms. Christ told his disciples not to allow themselves to take thought, just as he rebuked Martha for being troubled about many things, and as Paul told his converts to be careful for nothing. And no moralist has painted the workings of lust and passion, vanity and ostentation, more powerfully than is done in the "Sermon on the Mount." The futility of external rites, when desires are as yet unextinguished, is exactly in the spirit of Buddha's diatribe against sacrifice and self-mortification.* In the case both of the Indian and the Christian reformer, the contention is clean against the ethics of theology, the practical outcome being to affirm the sanctity of daily acts, the ineffaceable character of sin, the necessity of pure motives and unselfish desires, rather than the entire annihilation of the present in the view of a stupendous future. Here, too, Socrates has essentially the same lesson. Life, he said, consists not in the abundance of things a man possesses; it is not a continuous grubbing and grasping, an eternal attempt to outdo your neighbor. It is man's duty to get an internal harmony of some kind, a just equipoise of his faculties, so that desire may learn to be controlled by reason. And the same figure is used. Buddha compares the only moral life to a musical instrument, whose strings must not be either too tense or too loose; and similarly the Platonic Socrates, in the first book of the "Republic," compares the just and virtuous man to a musician who will not try to screw his pegs up higher than a rival, but only aim at the just mean.

* In the matter of purity, both make much the same point. "He who looks upon a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her in his heart," says Christ. "The monk that lowers himself to touch a woman's hand with corrupt thoughts, the order inflicts on him degradation," says Buddha.

The problems of life and thought that Socrates had to face were as different as were the characters respectively of Greek and Indian; and yet the one common note of all ethical reforms, that which we have called their essential humanism, is even clearer in his case than in those of Buddha and Christ. Whatever be the sins and sorrows of humanity, deliverance is only reached by the human being's rising to the full height of his humanity, extending his view to every member of the common family, and carefully eliminating the excessive importance of the supernatural factor and the nameless terror of the unseen and unknown. Just as Christ, in a striking text, told his disciples not to say, Lo here or Lo there, for the kingdom of God was within them, so Socrates turned from the recognized agencies of the supernatural sacrifice and augury and superstitious rites to that inwardness of judgment which is the very essence of the modern view of conscience. "Like a chain of blind men," said Buddha, "is the discourse of the Brahmins; he that is in front sees nothing, he that is in the middle sees nothing, he that is behind sees nothing. What then? Is not the faith of the Brahmins vain?"* This anticipates by five hundred years Christ's rebuke of the Scribes, as "blind leaders of the blind." In similar fashion, Plato represented Socrates as discrediting, with bitter irony, the mythology of his country with its crying heroes and lying warriors and adulterous gods. But Socrates is not so much concerned with theology as he is with the scientific and practical thought of the day. The early philosophy of Greece had resulted in the creation of an impersonal nature, which was everywhere dwarfing humanity by the dull iron weight of material necessity and physical law. Especially had the Atomist philosophy of Leucippus and Democritus produced a conception of the Kosmos that reduced everything—life, death, the soul, and the material form—to combinations and dissolutions of primordial atoms. Where, in the ceaseless whirl of warring molecules, could room be found for human thought and will and duty? What, indeed, in this view of things, was morality but convention, as opposed to the drear reality of nature? Right and wrong, good and evil, what were they but the temporary enactment, for base utilitarian purposes, of those states that, in alternate analysis, were themselves nothing but the chance and temporary coagulation of masses of adhering atoms?

* *Cankisultanta* (Majjhima N.).

And in close company with materialism came its twin sister, skepticism, expressing itself in the ingenious analysis of the sophists to show that all morality was relative to the individual, and that whatever seemed to a man to be true was true for him. And after skepticism its handmaid, that debasing cynicism which holds that there is nothing new and nothing true, and it does not much matter; and then—last scene in this eventful history—the inevitable pessimist Hegesias ὁ παρὰ-τὸ-θάνατον, with his Old World plaint that life is not worth living.

It is instructive for a modern age, beset by much the same phantoms, to observe the Socratic procedure. Buddha had declared war with windy Brahmanical metaphysics. Christ would have no discussion with the Scribes on a future state, and referred men back to mundane duties. Socrates professed his entire dissidence with conjectural physics. He had read the doctrines of natural philosophers, but he would have nothing to do with them. Even Anaxagoras, who had made the world depend on intelligence, is rejected by Socrates as soon as he brings in material agencies. For him the pressing problem is man, and ethics the only study. "He would even converse," Xenophon tells us in the *Memorabilia*, "about human affairs, asking what was pious and what impious, what honorable and what base, what just and what unjust, what was self-control and what madness, what was courage and what cowardice, what was a city and what a politician, who was the born leader of men and what the proper way of governing them. When men knew these things, he called them free-born and honorable; and when they knew them not, he thought them rightly styled slaves." For the sophists, with their skeptical disintegration of opinions, and their cynical reference of morals to individual relativity of judgment, he had another method of argument. "Which is most characteristic of humanity," he asked, "its endless diversity of opinions, or those stable judgments that are founded on careful comparison of instances and methodical inferences? How shall we define the human being, by his views and notions and fancies, or by his reason and thought?" If opinion leads to difference among men, let thought show in all men its essential identity. In all opinions, let us find the common ground, the underlying unity, the scientific definition; and so shall we base ethics on sure foundations and make logic the instrument to universal truth. Here, as elsewhere, the reformer is the mediator between men,

the healer of discords, the advocate of unity. He will include in the range of discussion nothing but what has reference to human interests, but he will extend those interests till they include the whole of humanity. If Christ represents the spiritual side of this enthusiasm for humanity, by preaching the common brotherhood of men in view of a common relation to a Divine Father, Socrates represents the intellectual side, by laying stress on the unity of all men in the common ideas of thought and the universal laws of intelligence. The difference between them is not so much a difference of method as the necessity for meeting different problems. Socrates had to cure an intellectual disease, while Christ had to remove the burden of theological intolerance.

Even in logical method, a tolerable parallel might be made out between Socrates and Buddha. Gotama, too, seems to have proceeded by the same maieutic method of dialectics that is usually associated with the name of the Athenian philosopher; and with him, as with Socrates, the interlocutor is generally reduced to simple Yes and No, overcome by the triumphant course of his questioner's argument. The metaphor of the lute has been referred to before, but the story is so Socratic that it may be transcribed in full. Buddha has a conversation with a young man named Sona (*Mahāvagga*, V., 1-15 seq.), who, after trying ascetic observances to the full, and becoming aware of their fruitlessness, is minded to fall back on a life of enjoyment. The story proceeds thus :

"How is it, Sona, were you able to play the lute before you left home?" "Yes, sire." "What do you think, then, Sona, if the strings of your lute are too tightly strung; will the lute give out the proper tone and be fit to play?" "It will not, sire." "And what do you think, Sona, if the strings of your lute be strung too slack; will the lute then give out the proper tone and be fit to play?" "It will not, sire." "But how, Sona, if the strings of your lute be not strung too tight or too slack; if they have the proper degree of tension; will the lute then give out the proper sound and be fit to play?" "Yes, sire." "In the same way, Sona, energy too much strained tends to excessive zeal, and energy too much relaxed tends to apathy. Therefore, Sona, cultivate in yourself the mean of energy, and press on to the mean in your mental powers, and place this before you as your aim."

The moral of the story is clearly the same as that conveyed by the well-known incident of the aged apostle found playing with a tame partridge. In fact, the method of proving spiritual truth by means of analogies drawn from daily life was common

to Buddha, Socrates, and Christ. "I will show you a parable," says Buddha. "By a parable many a wise man perceives the meaning of what is being said." And his parables are often drawn from the same sources as those with which we are familiar in the Gospels. There is a parable of the sower, wherein the teacher declares that the seed he sows is faith, and good works are the rain that fertilizes it. There is a parable of a mustard-seed, though with a different application from Christ's. There is a parable of the tares, which in Buddhist terminology is the *tirana*-grass, so noxious a weed in a rice-field. And there is a parable of the flood that comes down suddenly and carries away the careless sleeper. Buddha's preaching of deliverance is compared to the work of a physician; and an elaborate parable compares the tempter that tries to lure men to false paths, and the deliverer that leads them back to the way of salvation. The following sentences, too, have a curiously familiar sound:

"What men call treasure, when laid up in a deep pit, profits nothing, and may easily be lost; but the real treasure is that laid up by man or woman through charity and piety, temperance and self-control. The treasure thus hid is secure, and passes not away; though he leave the fleeting riches of the world, this man takes with him a treasure that no wrong of others and no thief can steal." "For never in this world does hatred cease by hatred; hatred ceases by love; this is always its nature." "Let us live happily, then, not hating those that hate us; let us live free from hatred among men that hate." "Let a man overcome anger by kindness, evil by good." "Anger, drunkenness, obstinacy, bigotry, deception, envy, self-praise, disparaging others, highmindedness, evil communications,—these constitute uncleanness; not, verily, the eating of flesh." "Neither abstinence from fish or flesh, nor going naked, nor shaving the head, nor matted hair, nor dirt, nor a rough garment, nor sacrifices to Agni (fire) will cleanse a man not free from delusions." "To abhor and cease from sin, abstinence from strong drink, not to be weary in well-doing,—these are the greatest blessing. Reverence and lowliness, contentment and gratitude, the hearing of the law at due seasons,—this is the greatest blessing. To be long-suffering and meek, to associate with the peaceful, religious talk at due seasons,—this is the greatest blessing."

After Buddha had gone, Sariputta (who is the St. Paul, as Aranda is the St. John, and Moggattama the St. Peter of Buddhism) becomes the Prime Minister, and his body-guard are clad in metaphorical armor, such as St. Paul himself described in his Roman prison. The saints are to take earnest

meditation as their breast-plate, continual mindfulness as their shield, patience as a staff, the Dhamma or true doctrine as a sword, and the insight of apostleship as a gem to adorn their helmet. For it was a battle they had to fight, a victory they had to win, under a leader who had himself gone on in front to show the way.

If the death of Buddha seems wanting in dignity, as compared with the tragic deaths of Socrates and Christ, it is yet not devoid of a certain simple pathos, which almost approaches nobility. Buddha, having looked his last at Vesālī, journeys on to Kusinārā, and on the way contracts the sickness that was to terminate his life. Aranda, the beloved disciple, is with him to attend his last hours, and to his ears are communicated the final speeches of the Master :

“ ‘Whoever, Aranda, male disciple or female follower, lay-brother or lay-sister, lives in the truth in matters both great and small, these bring to the Perfect One the highest honor, glory, praise, and credit. Therefore, Aranda, must ye practise thinking, Let us live in the truth in matters great and small.’ But Aranda went into the house and wept, saying, ‘I am not yet free from infirmities, I have not yet reached the goal, and my master, who takes pity on me, will soon enter into Nirvāna.’ Then Buddha sent one of the disciples to him, saying, ‘Go, O disciple, and say to Aranda in my name, The Master wishes to speak with thee, friend.’ Thereupon Aranda went in to the Master, bowed himself before him, and sat down beside him. But Buddha said to him, ‘Not so, Aranda, weep not, sorrow not. Have I not ere this said to thee, that from all that man loves and from all that man enjoys, from that must man part, give it up, tear himself from it? How can it be, Aranda, that that which is born, grows, is made, which is subject to decay, should not pass away? That cannot be. But thou, Aranda, hast long honored the Perfect One, in love and kindness, with cheerfulness, loyally and unwearyingly, in thought, word, and deed. Thou hast done well, Aranda; only strive on, soon wilt thou be free from impurities.’ Buddha, shortly before his departure, said to Aranda: ‘It may be, Aranda, that ye shall say, the world has lost its master. We have no master more. Ye must not think thus, Aranda. The law, Aranda, and the ordinance, which I have taught and preached unto you, these are your master, when I am gone hence.’ And to his disciples he said: ‘Hearken, O disciples, I charge ye; everything that cometh into being passeth away. Strive without ceasing.’ These were his last words.” (“Mahāparinibbāna Sutta,” from which Dr. Olbenberg quotes, p. 202.)

So died Buddha, at the age of eighty years, about four hundred and eighty years before the Christian era; and toward sunrise the nobles of Kusinārā burned his body before the city

gates, with all the honors that are shown to the relics of universal monarchs.

If all this lacks the solemn interest of Socrates discoursing on the immortality of the soul in his Athenian prison, as it certainly falls far short of the tragic grandeur of Christ dying on the cross, it yet illustrates the calmness with which humanity, to those who can understand its nature and limits, can face its own instant dissolution. The appropriate parallel to these last words of Buddha are the words of Socrates to his Athenian judges, in Plato's "Apology," or Christ's discourse to his disciples at the conclusion of the Last Supper. To Buddha, expecting the passionless tranquillity of Nirvâna; to Socrates, wavering between the alternative that death is the seeing of the happy heroes of the olden time, or else a long sleep and the best of sleeps; to Christ, looking back to a completed life's duty with the confidence that "it is finished,"—there could be no sting in death, no victory for the grave. For humanity creates its own terrors, and it is in the power of humanity to banish them or to rise above them.

W. L. COURTNEY.

THE INCREASE OF WEALTH.

WHEN some future historian describes the progress of the nineteenth century, he will doubtless be struck by the enormous increase of wealth, especially in the interval between 1850 and the present date. In a single generation the countries of Europe have doubled their capital, while the increase of population has hardly exceeded thirty per cent. In other words, wealth has grown three times faster than population. It was laid down by McCulloch, in 1825, that nations required sixty years to double their capital, except the United States, which doubled in twenty-five years. Probably if society had remained in the condition that it was in when McCulloch wrote, the increase would not have passed his estimates; but the introduction of railways, steamers, telegraphs, etc., has given such facilities for rapid accumulation, that the United Kingdom has doubled since 1845, France since 1856, and the United States since 1864. To observe the increase more closely, let us take the wealth and population of the three countries at various epochs:

<i>Date.</i>	<i>Wealth in Millions of Dollars.</i>			<i>Population.</i>		
	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>France.</i>	<i>United States.</i>	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>France.</i>	<i>United States.</i>
1830	16,890	10,650		24,030,000	32,100,000	12,900,000
1850	25,800	15,850	8,430	27,200,000	35,700,000	23,200,000
1870	34,400	26,200	35,870	31,300,000	37,800,000	38,600,000
1884	45,300	41,700	51,670	36,200,000	38,200,000	55,500,000

In fifty-four years Great Britain has almost trebled her wealth; while France has very nearly quadrupled hers; and in thirty-four years the United States have seen their capital multiply sixfold. As these three countries have been the greatest accumulators in recent years, it is worth while to study their simultaneous growth in wealth under very opposite cir-

circumstances. The average wealth per inhabitant has been as follows :

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>France.</i>	<i>United States.</i>
1830.....	\$704	\$333	
1850.....	948	443	\$363
1870.....	1,103	703	916
1884.....	1,249	1,092	931

Notwithstanding the calamities of war and phylloxera, France has accumulated more rapidly than Great Britain; but since 1850 the population of the United Kingdom has risen thirty-three per cent., against seven per cent. in France. Moreover, Great Britain has sent out just 6,000,000 emigrants in that interval, of whom 2,100,000 have gone to British colonies, to create new centers of wealth, industry, and commerce, in close connection with the mother country. When these considerations are taken into account, it will be found that the accumulations of the British people have been equal to those of the French. It is manifest that when population increases rapidly, as in Great Britain and the United States, however prodigious the increase of wealth, there may be only a trifling rise in the ratio per inhabitant. Thus we see that the United States have been doubling capital in twenty years; yet the average per inhabitant is only fifteen dollars higher than in 1870, while the rise in France has been almost four hundred dollars a head. It would be easy to prove, nevertheless, that the advance in the United States has been healthier—a fact that few Frenchmen will deny. A country progressing at once in wealth and population must be prosperous, whereas one increasing only in either must be the reverse. In France, wealth accumulates; in Russia, population. If France grew men faster and wealth more slowly, and Russia the reverse, it would be better for both. The annual accumulations since 1830 show as follows :

<i>Period.</i>	<i>Millions of Dollars.</i>			<i>Dollars per Inhabitant.</i>		
	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>France.</i>	<i>United States.</i>	<i>Great Britain.</i>	<i>France.</i>	<i>United States.</i>
1830-50.....	446	260		17	8	..
1850-70.....	490	520	1,350	15	14	44
1870-84.....	780	1,107	1,164	23	29	25

In forty years, ending with 1870, the average accumulations in the United Kingdom showed little change, unless indeed a

slight decline after the adoption of free trade and more general use of steam locomotion. We must, however, make allowance for the Crimean war, which cost England \$350,000,000, and the effects of the cotton famine, which were far more injurious. But how are we to explain an average increment of twenty-three dollars a head in the fourteen years ending with 1884, the period in which we have heard so much of trade depression, falling prices, and commercial loss? Have these complaints been imaginary, or is the increase of wealth fictitious? On this point there is no room for doubt, seeing that the income-tax returns have risen since 1870 from £445,000,000 to £585,000,000, an increase of thirty-two per cent. We are still as far as ever from explaining the causes of such unexampled prosperity. Some may ascribe it to the Franco-German war, or the Suez canal; others to the board schools, or the increased production of coal; others to the greater industry or thrift of the people. But I am inclined to think it is due to the increase of British shipping, British banking, and British colonial industries. The shipping of the United Kingdom (without the colonial) has risen in late years as follows:

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Vessels.</i>	<i>Tons, nominal.</i>	<i>Tons, carrying-power.</i>
1850.....	25,984	3,565,000	3,950,000
1870.....	22,180	5,691,000	9,720,000
1881.....	19,311	6,490,000	18,110,000

The carrying-power* almost doubled between 1870 and 1881, although the nominal tonnage had risen but slightly. Hence we find that in 1881 the British flag carried 63,000,000 tons, out of 129,000,000 tons of sea-borne merchandise. In fact, the carrying-trade of the world is passing into British hands. Great Britain's banking has grown as fast as her shipping. In 1850 she had £260,000,000 of bank capital and deposits, which rose to £840,000,000 in 1882, the average for the latter year being £23 per inhabitant, against £10 in 1850.

The British colonies have powerfully helped to enrich the mother country. Their commerce (without counting India), which was £153,000,000 in 1870, at present reaches £270,000,000, and the amount of British capital profitably invested in Aus-

* Carrying-power allows steamers to count five for one, as it is found they can make three long or eight short passages for one of a sailing-vessel.

tralia and Canada is known to exceed £400,000,000 sterling. The subjoined table shows the amount of British wealth under the principal items:

	<i>Millions of Dollars.</i>			<i>Dollars per Inhabitant.</i>		
	1840.	1870.	1882.	1840.	1870.	1882.
Land.....	8,400	9,400	9,400	323	301	263
Cattle, etc.....	1,900	2,400	2,070	73	77	58
Houses.....	3,850	8,100	11,400	148	258	320
Railways.....	165	2,650	3,850	6	85	108
Shipping.....	115	330	600	4	11	17
Bullion.....	305	590	715	11	18	20
Merchandise ..	350	1,300	1,750	13	43	49
Furniture.....	1,950	4,100	5,700	75	133	160
Loans.....	1,150	3,000	5,300	44	97	149
Sundries.....	1,965	2,530	2,815	76	80	79
Total.....	20,150	34,400	43,600	773	1,103	1,223

France is equally remarkable for the industry of her population and their extreme thrift. The yearly accumulations averaged \$8 a head before the Second Empire, \$14 during the reign of Napoleon III., and \$29 since the disaster of Sedan. The capital wealth of France is much less than that of either Great Britain or the United States, and it would be easy to show that the annual earnings of the people are in like manner less; yet, during the past fourteen years, Frenchmen have saved, per head, more than Englishmen or Americans. This is a phenomenon deserving the study of economists both in Europe and America. Without pretending to explain it, I may call attention to some facts. The ascertained wealth of France is arrived at by comparing the death-rate with the amount of assets proved in the Legacy Court. If, by any chance, the rich people have died faster than usual, and the poor less rapidly than usual, since 1870, we should be overestimating the national wealth. But there is no ground for such a supposition. If the government valuation of landed property be excessive, it would likewise disturb our calculations. There is, however, little room to suppose that the whole nation would tamely submit to pay duties on an exorbitant valuation. But while we admit that the official value is correct, we discover an increase of \$5,000,000,000 in the value of land since 1852, which accounts for one-fifth of the total accumulations

since 1850. This is not an imaginary increase of wealth, for the market value of the land has risen in the interval as follows:

	<i>Value in dollars per acre.</i>	
	1852.	1881.
Vineyards.....	120 to 196	180 to 280
Meadow.	180 to 260	240 to 330
Tillage.....	100 to 180	140 to 240

Another item of increase is railways, which in 1860 represented a value of \$850,000,000, and in 1883 exceeded \$2,550,000,000. This accounts for \$80,000,000 a year. Houses form another valuable branch of savings. Paris, for example, has built \$530,000,000 worth of new houses since 1860, and the average increase of house-property in France is officially estimated at \$160,000,000 per annum. If we compare the wealth of France and that of the United Kingdom in 1882, we find them as follows:

	<i>Millions of Dollars.</i>		<i>Dollars per Inhabitant.</i>	
	<i>France.</i>	<i>United Kingdom.</i>	<i>France.</i>	<i>United Kingdom.</i>
Land	14,930	9,400	393	263
Cattle, etc	1,960	2,070	50	58
Houses	9,500	11,400	250	320
Railways	2,550	3,850	66	108
Bullion	1,520	715	40	20
Movables	5,600	7,450	147	209
Sundries.....	3,640	8,715	96	245
	<u>39,700</u>	<u>43,600</u>	<u>1,042</u>	<u>1,223</u>

None of these valuations include mines, because the mineral is of little value until it is placed above ground. It has been estimated that the peat of Irish bogs, at ten cents a ton, would pay off the national debt of Great Britain. The salt contained in the English Channel is of still greater value, but can hardly be counted as an item of national wealth, although England derives some income from this source.

When we turn to the United States, we find a country of unlimited resources and great industry, yet the annual accumulation is not much more than in the United Kingdom. In fact, if Ireland were excluded, the savings of the British people would reach £5 per head, precisely the same as in the United States.

This is at first disappointing, for we are naturally predisposed to imagine that there is in the United States more affluence, a greater margin over cost of living, than in the crowded island of Great Britain. It is true that from 1850 to 1870 the yearly accumulation averaged \$44 a head, notwithstanding the terrible devastation caused by the war. But in future we cannot expect to see savings exceed \$25, for the Americans seem less disposed to accumulate than to enjoy wealth. If we consider the Union under four great divisions, we find the progress of wealth as follows:

	<i>Millions of Dollars.</i>			<i>Dollars per Inhabitant.</i>		
	1850.	1870.	1880.	1850.	1870.	1880.
New England.....	1,925	4,200	4,935	610	1,202	1,235
Middle States.....	4,320	12,570	16,420	525	1,290	1,430
South (13)	6,110	3,680	4,415	595	325	290
West (14)	6,975	14,920	21,710	730	1,060	1,140
Total.....	19,330	35,370	47,480	615	905	940

In 1860 the New England and Middle States had thirty-two per cent. of the capital of the Union, whereas they now have forty-five per cent. In the same interval the West has risen from thirty-six to forty-six per cent. If we examine the accumulations of the past thirty years, we find as follows:

<i>States.</i>	<i>Millions of Dollars per annum.</i>			
	1850-60.	1860-70.	1870-80.	Thirty years.
New England.....	75	227	74	125
Middle.....	199	825	385	470
South.....	341	*	74	57
West	478	795	679	650
The Union.....	1,093		1,212	1,302

The decade ending with 1880 saw the accumulations of the New England and Middle States decline more than half, while those of the Western States kept almost uniform. In the whole term of thirty years, the Union has averaged a little over \$1,300,000,000 yearly, of which exactly half corresponds to the Western States. Comparing the annual accumulation with population, we find the average per head as follows:

* The Southern States lost \$2,430,000,000 in this decade.

<i>States.</i>	<i>Dollars yearly per Inhabitant.</i>			
	1850-60.	1860-70.	1870-80.	<i>Thirty years.</i>
New England	26	68	19	38
Middle	27	92	35	51
South	37		6	5
West	62	66	41	56
The Union	41	46	27	35

Here we see the reverse of what is taking place in England ; the wealth of the country, or at least the power of accumulation, is tending westward, to the prairies, whereas in England the agricultural capital and farming interests are every year diminishing. Poetic writers are in the habit of telling us that agriculture is the basis of all wealth, that the plow is the emblem of prosperity ; but these sentiments must be received cautiously. It would seem to be in the interest of every nation, and of mankind, that the agricultural or pastoral element should not predominate, but rather the commercial. Merchants are the best statesmen, and mercantile communities the most prosperous and enlightened.

In the meantime the accumulation of wealth goes on from day to day. The American adds seven cents daily to the public fortune, which means that the United States are nearly \$4,000,000 richer at sunset than they were at sunrise. The accumulations of Europe and the United States make up \$11,000,000 daily, and the increase of population, that is, the excess of births over deaths, is 11,000 ; so that for every new-comer into the world there is an addition of \$1,000, to provide for his necessities.

As a natural result of the increase of wealth, the material condition of nations is improving ; not only is the average consumption of meat, coffee, sugar, etc., rising all over Europe ; not only are gas and water supply extended to minor towns and villages ; not only do the savings-banks of Europe show a steady increase of deposits amounting to \$110,000,000 yearly ; but all the appliances of civilization are multiplied ; new harbors and light-houses are constructed for the common benefit of mankind ; as if nations in becoming richer also became more generous, more mindful of the golden precept, "Let no man live for himself."

MICHAEL G. MULHALL.

THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES.

THE senses being the only avenues through which we derive our knowledge of the material world, we are prone to place implicit reliance on their indications, to overlook the part that reason and intelligence play in the interpretation that the mind puts upon the phenomena presented. Indeed, our intuitive interpretations of physical manifestations are generally mistaken for the indications of the senses themselves. Apart from experience, reason, and intelligence, it is very questionable whether the indications of the senses would convey to us any useful and substantial information. The organs of sense were never, in fact, designed by nature as instruments of scientific inquiry; they were never intended to give us direct and accurate information in relation to the physical qualities of matter. These gates of knowledge are always open; but we are not the passive recipients of knowledge. The fable of Proteus is a true picture of the combat between man, eager for knowledge, and the stubborn guardian charged with the preservation of the secrets of destiny. The sea-god changed himself into various shapes before speaking, and yielded only to the hero who, far from being moved by his transformations, bound him with bands of increasing pressure. Such is nature herself; her answers are always true; but, before allowing truth to shine forth, she arrays herself in the garments of error, or hides herself behind the phantoms of illusion, and will only assume her proper shape under the determined pressure of a resolute disciple of science.

When a question arises as to any matter of fact or appearance, what is more common than the observation, "Must I not believe the evidence of my senses?" And yet, no evidence is more misleading and fallacious, and there are no witnesses that require more careful scrutiny and more strict cross-examination

than these very senses. It is true that in some particular applications of them we are compelled to take the testimony, as in our courts of justice, for what it appears to declare. But in any case of doubt, the senses are the most fallible guides that can be selected.

Notable illustrations are afforded by the indications of sight, the sense that is supposed to afford us the most precise and accurate knowledge. All are familiar with the phenomena that accompany the rising and setting of the sun and moon. The impression produced is that of an apparently large orb, vastly larger than when it is near the meridian. Yet nothing is more certain than that the real apparent magnitude of the sun and moon when near the horizon is not only not greater, but, if we adhere to the strict limits of truth, is in fact apparently less than when they are higher in the firmament.

Let any one adopt any convenient method of measuring the apparent magnitudes of the sun or moon in the horizon and on the meridian, and they will be found to be sensibly the same. This may be accomplished by extending two threads of fine silk parallel to each other in a frame; place them in such position, and at such a distance from the eye, that when presented to the sun or moon, in the horizon, they will exactly touch its upper and lower limbs. Let this arrangement be preserved until the sun or moon has risen to the meridian, and then let it be viewed in the same manner. It will be found that the threads will equally touch its upper and lower limbs, and their interval will still measure its apparent diameter. Astronomical telescopes are provided with a system of parallel wires, by which observations of this kind can be made with the greatest accuracy, and the application of this more refined method of measurement leads to the same conclusion.

We can scarcely call this an optical deception, for these very experiments prove that the eye is not deceived; the visual angle in both cases being precisely the same, the size of the image on the retina must have been the same. In fact, in the case of the moon, it is obvious that since she is nearly four thousand miles farther from us when she rises or sets than when she passes the meridian, her apparent diameter in the horizon, instead of appearing greater, ought to appear about a sixtieth part less than when on the meridian. This conclusion has been verified by refined methods of measurement.

Gassendi, a distinguished disciple of Galileo, thought that as the moon is less brilliant in the horizon than in the zenith, the pupil of the eye is opened wider in looking at it in the former station, and that it is for this reason that we see it larger. But for this conclusion to be valid, it would be necessary that variations in the openings of the pupil should produce variations in the dimensions of the image on the retina. This notion is wholly at variance with the principles of optics, which assure us that the size of the image produced in the eye is the same to whatever extent the pupil is dilated or contracted. The error is evidently one of the interpreting mind, and not of the sense of sight.

When objects are beyond a certain moderate distance from the eye, the size of the image on the retina has very little to do with our estimate of their apparent or real magnitude, unless we have reason to believe that the objects whose apparent dimensions are compared, are at the same distance from us. A child two feet high, at the distance of one hundred yards, presents the same apparent size to the organ of vision—subtends the same angle—as a man six feet high at the distance of three hundred yards. Yet no one would mistake the one for the other, however different their absolute distances. In all such cases our estimate of size is the result of a complex mental operation, in which allowance is made for the influence of distance. If circumstances are such that we can form no just estimate of distance, we are liable to be misled. In the case of terrestrial objects, our estimate of distance—and, of course, of size—depends in a great measure upon the number of intervening objects. The dilated size of the sun or moon when seen in the horizon is an illusion of the judgment, in which we estimate the distance of the orb to be much greater, because there are terrestrial objects interposed. Aloft we have no associations to guide us; its isolation in the expanse of the sky leads us rather to undervalue its apparent magnitude. Other considerations besides the interposition of objects enter into the complex mental operations on which our judgment of apparent size is founded; but all of them seem to be related to our estimate of distance. For example, a smoky condition of the atmosphere, by rendering the rising moon much less brilliant, enormously enlarges her apparent size; for, in this case, the obscuration of her brightness is associated with greater distance.

Again, the impression we obtain of the convexity or concavity of bodies is not the result of direct visual perception. There are optical instruments (pseudoscopes) in which objects that are really convex appear to be concave, and *vice versa*. Indeed, the art of painting is in great measure based upon the imperfection of the information conveyed through the medium of sight. This is particularly true of landscape painting. The luminous diverging lines occasionally seen in the air toward sunset, in a sky full of partially broken clouds, sometimes termed "the sun drawing water," are in reality parallel. They are, in fact, sunbeams through apertures in the clouds, partially intercepted and reflected by the dust and vapors suspended in the atmosphere. Sometimes they may be seen to diverge from a point near the western horizon, and to converge toward an opposite point in the east, in a manner analogous to the meridian lines on a terrestrial globe. This apparent deviation from parallelism is the result of the laws of perspective. A similar phenomenon, arising from the same cause, is sometimes presented by parallel bands of fleecy clouds.

In this view of the subject, we certainly cannot be said to see directly the position of a body by a simple effort of sight. By means of the eye we gather a variety of data, which are submitted to a rapid mental analysis. When the body is near, the differential qualities on which our judgment is based are substantial and obvious, so that he who runs may read. As the distance increases, the calculation grows nicer; only a careful scrutinizing eye will notice the delicate touches in outline, proportion, or shading, on which the problem hangs. At still greater distances, it is impossible for any eye or any mind to divine the true position and distance. When this limit is reached, our decision is held by so weak a tenure that the slightest adventitious circumstance, such as the intervention of objects or the greater or less brilliance of the bodies, determines our judgment.

There is another illusion belonging to sight, examples of which may be found in daily experience, which, nevertheless, I have not seen as minutely analyzed as might be desirable. I refer to the apparent motion of a body at rest, and the converse. In both cases the apparent motion is invariably in the opposite direction to the real motion. In the case of the rotation of the earth upon its axis from west to east, we imagine ourselves to

be at rest, while the sun and other heavenly bodies appear to move from east to west. To the passengers on shipboard the shore appears to recede as the ship leaves the land. In like manner, to one riding rapidly along a road, the trees seem to move backward.

On the other hand, if we are in a railway car that is in a state of rest, the motion of a train on an adjacent track is transferred, in our conception (in an opposite direction), to the car in which we are seated; and if the passing train is long, the feeling of uncertainty becomes heightened, and sometimes almost painful. Similarly, if, while we are standing upon the edge of a wharf, a large ship gradually approaches us, as soon as she gets sufficiently near, the motion of the ship is apparently transferred to the wharf; and the impression is so powerful, that most uninitiated persons will absolutely stagger. In like manner, when the external covering of an observatory, consisting of the cylindrical sides and hemispherical dome, is made to revolve while we are within, the motion is almost invariably transferred to the platform upon which we are standing.

The following explanation, which was, I believe, first suggested by Professor Joseph Henry, in 1849, will be found to embrace all possible cases: By long experience, extending back to the period of early childhood, and possibly inherited from untold generations of progenitors, the mind has acquired the habit of inferring, without reflection, that when two bodies are relatively in motion, the motion belongs to the smaller, and that the larger is at rest. This inference is probably inseparably associated with the equally early experience, that it is more difficult to set a large body in motion than a small one. It is not necessary to the effect that one of the bodies should really be the larger, but that, at the time, it should occupy a larger portion of the field of view. Moreover, in order to secure the result, it is absolutely necessary that all concomitant circumstances, unconnected with apparent size, that influence our judgment of the direction of motion of bodies, should be removed. Thus, there must be no fixed objects intervening or visible beyond the body observed, as they might enable us to correct the impression. When these conditions are fulfilled, I believe it will be found to be a universal law that apparent size determines to which of the bodies the motion is referred, on the principle that the apparently smaller body seems to move.

In the apparent diurnal motion of the heavenly bodies from east to west, produced by our actual motion from west to east, the earth seems to us vastly larger than any body exterior to it, and when motion is observed, we insensibly transfer it to the apparently smaller bodies. It is in vain that reason and calculation combine to assure us that the sun is more than a million times the bulk of the earth; he occupies but a comparatively small portion of our field of view, and, in spite of the deductions of reason, he seems to us much smaller than the earth, and we transfer the motion to him. In like manner, in the apparent recession of the shore from an observer on shipboard, the objects on land occupy a much smaller portion of our field of view than the ship on which we are standing; and therefore, in accordance with the principle, our motion is transferred to them. The same is evidently true in relation to the apparent backward motion of the trees in riding along a road.

This principle is equally applicable to the opposite class of phenomena. Thus in the case of the train of cars: the train on the contiguous track is so near to us that all external fixed objects are excluded from our view; and as it occupies a larger portion of the field of view than the car in which we are seated, we imagine the latter to be in motion, because it is apparently the smaller body. The illusion is still more perfect in the case of the revolving dome of the observatory, because the moving body occupies the whole space around the observer.

The following remarkable phenomenon, in which the motion of the observer is not involved, admits of a similar explanation. When large and detached masses of clouds are rapidly passing between us and the moon, provided there are no intervening objects, it is very difficult to resist the impression that it is the moon that is moving. If the clouds are small, no such illusion is produced. It may be objected that, even in case the clouds are small, yet, as they are apparently larger than the moon, the latter ought to seem to move under all circumstances. The answer is, that when the clouds are small we are able to see the stars in the vicinity of the moon, and the apparent invariability of her distance from them enables us to correct the impression, as in the case of fixed intervening objects.

In all the instances heretofore enumerated, it appears that the sense of sight does not give us any positive and direct information; the eye only furnishes the data, from which experi-

once, reason, and judgment rapidly draw the conclusions that are ordinarily ascribed to visual perceptions. But even in the case of colors, which are probably qualities conveyed to our minds directly through the medium of sight, the character of our perception depends, in many cases, upon the previous condition of the organ of vision, as well as many other adventitious circumstances that render the phenomena exceedingly complex and very difficult of interpretation. Thus, if we look steadily, for a considerable time, at a strongly illuminated red object on a black ground, the intensity of the color soon becomes enfeebled; if now the eyes are suddenly directed toward a white surface close beside it, we shall see a green image of the same shape and size as the object. In like manner, if the eye be directed intently upon the disk of the sun at rising or setting, when he is red, on closing the eyelids, a distinctly green image of the solar disk will be perceived. Indeed, when the object looked at is brilliantly illuminated, the accidental colors that manifest themselves on closing the eyes constitute a curious and perplexing succession of complementary color-tints, which will continue to be visible until the retina recovers its state of repose. These subjective sensations of color have been carefully investigated by Plateau, who thereby lost his sight in the cause of science.

Metaphysicians and physiologists have differed widely in relation to the services that ought to be attributed to the sense of touch. Some have greatly exaggerated them, considering it the sense *par excellence*. Anaxagoras ascribed the superiority of man over other animals, and his preëminence in the universe, to the hand. Aristotle and, after him, Galen, termed the human hand the "instrument of instruments." Later, Helvetius revived the idea, "that man is the wisest of animals because he possesses hands." The notion has been expanded by Condillac, Buffon, and many modern metaphysicians and physiologists. Buffon, in particular, assigned so much importance to the touch that he ascribed the superiority of the intelligence of one person over another to his having made a more prompt and repeated use of his hands from early infancy. He therefore recommended that infants should be encouraged to use them freely from the moment of birth. Others have considered the hand the source of our mechanical capabilities. The same answer applies to all these views. The hand can only be regarded as an instrument by

which information of particular kinds is conveyed to the mind, and by which other functions are executed, under the guidance of an intelligent will. The idiot frequently has the sense of touch more delicate than the man of genius, or than the most skillful mechanic; whilst the most ingenious artists have by no means the highest development of the tactile sense.

But it has been asserted that the touch is, of all the senses, the least subject to error, and that it is, therefore, the correcting, the regulating, the geometrical sense. In part only is this substantiated by observation and experience. It will be shown in the sequel that some of the errors of this sense are as striking and grievous as those that happen to the other senses. The sensory apparatus constituting touch is far less specialized than the other organs of sense. As far as known, the same tactile nerves are cognizant of several distinct kinds of sensation. For example, the organ of touch recognizes pain, temperature, titillation, and, with the help of muscular action and motion, size, shape, roughness, and various physical qualities of special materials and objects. On the other hand, the organs of special sensation, such as those of smell, taste, hearing, and sight, receive impressions of a particular kind, in consequence of the peculiar character of the nerves with which they are supplied.

Some physiologists have imagined that the sense of temperature is received through some other channel than the sensory apparatus contained in the integuments; but the most trustworthy experiments afford no adequate ground for the supposition. At present these researches seem to indicate that the several characteristic sensations of touch—pain, heat and cold, and titillation—all arise from affections of the tactile nerves of common sensibility, which are distributed in different portions of the skin. Hence we may infer that the difference of these sensations is to be ascribed to the peculiarity of the impressions received at the peripheral extremities of the tactile nerves. One of the great purposes of the sense of touch is to enable us to judge of the temperature of bodies; and this office it executes alone. It requires no previous exercise; yet how inaccurate, how fallacious, is its appreciation of temperature. This sense is called into action only where there is difference between the temperature of the sensory organ and that of the surrounding medium, or of the substances with which it is

specially brought in contact. The intensity of the impression is determined rather by the relative than by the absolute thermal condition of the body that excites it. Thus, if one hand be immersed for a time in hot water, and the other in ice-cold water, and then both be plunged into tepid water, this will seem cool to the former, and warm to the latter. A person coming out of cold air into an atmosphere of moderate temperature derives from it a feeling of genial warmth; whilst another coming into the same atmosphere from one much hotter complains of its chilliness. So much are our sensations in this respect dependent on the temperature that has previously existed that the comfortable point will be found to vary at different seasons.

During the Arctic voyages made by Parry, Franklin, Ross, Kane, Nares, and others, it was found that a zero temperature seemed quite mild after the thermometer had been twenty or thirty degrees below that point. In like manner, if on a hot summer day we descend into a deep cave, it will feel cold; if we descend into the same cave on a frosty day in winter, it will feel warm; yet a thermometer will prove that it has nearly the same temperature in both seasons.

But even when the state of our body is the same, the sense of feeling will be found equally fallacious as regards the temperature of bodies. When the temperatures of different substances are compared by the hand, the sensation experienced is not so much influenced by the absolute amount of free heat possessed by each, as by its relative power of abstracting or imparting heat to the skin. When bodies are colder than the hand, substances that are good conductors are felt to be colder than those which conduct heat badly, although really of the same temperature, because they abstract heat from the sensory surface more rapidly. On the contrary, if the bodies are warmer than the hand, the best conductors will seem to be the hottest, because their heat is most readily imparted. For a like reason, if we plunge into water that is of the same temperature as the surrounding atmosphere (provided it is below the natural temperature of the body), the liquid will seem to be cold.

Moreover, the sense of temperature is influenced in a remarkable degree by the extent of surface on which the impression is made. Every one is familiar with the fact that hot water in which a single finger may be held without inconven-

ience, will be felt to be intolerable when the whole hand is immersed in it. It has been shown by Professor E. H. Weber that if one vessel of water be heated to ninety-eight degrees (F.), and another to one hundred and four degrees (F.), and the whole hand be immersed in the former, while the finger alone is immersed in the latter, a wrong judgment of their relative temperatures will probably be given.

The interpretation that the mind puts upon the impressions made by external objects upon the tactile organs, is partly the result of intuition and partly of experience. Thus, in cases of amputation, an impression made upon the divided extremities of the nervous trunks is intuitively referred to the parts to which they were originally distributed. In like manner, when our tactile organs are in an unaccustomed position, we still interpret impressions made upon them as if they were in their ordinary relations to each other. For example, in the experiment, mentioned by Aristotle, of rolling a pea between two fingers of one hand, which are crossed instead of being parallel, so that the surfaces usually most distant are brought into proximity with each other, the sensation is that of a separate convex body opposed to each of these surfaces, so that the single body seems to be double. When the eyes are closed, we are completely misled by the fallacious interpretation of the impression produced by the lateral portions of the fingers being brought in opposition, which are naturally in a different situation, and at a distance from each other. There are many similar deceptions. If a book is held between the hands, the palms turned outward, the arms being previously crossed, the edge of the book appears in this case to be bent at an angle. If one hand is passed over its corresponding shoulder, and the other under the arm belonging to it, and a book held between the hands thus placed, the edges of the leaves of the book appear to the one hand to be a continuation of the surface of the back of the book. If the tongue is folded back upon itself, the portion thus placed appears to be a foreign body laid upon the tongue, except that the sensibility of the part thus turned is still perceptible. If the tongue is turned edgewise, and then placed against the teeth, the teeth appear to be inclined instead of vertical.

In a large proportion of other cases, our interpretation of tactile sensations—especially of all those relating to the configuration, density, etc., of external objects—is based upon

experience. Those who have watched the eagerness with which the infant examines by touch every attractive object within its reach are at no loss to perceive how the experience thus early interwoven with the mind, in combination with that derived through the visual sense, causes the tactile and visual perceptions to be so indissolubly associated that each is continually suggesting the other. From observations made upon persons born blind, when the visual power has been first obtained it is certain that the notions of form previously acquired by touch do not aid in the visual discrimination or recognition of objects. For example, if any such person had learned to distinguish a sphere, a cube, and a pyramid by the touch, he would not be able to say which was which by looking at them, until he had learned by experience to associate the two classes of perceptions. In such cases, when the sight is first restored, no ideas are formed of distance, size, or solidity. The blind man of Bethsaida, when his sight was restored, said, "I see men as trees walking." The fourteen-year-old lad who was "conched" by Cheselden, when he first saw, thought all external objects touched his eyes. An amusing anecdote recorded of him shows the complete want, at least in man, of any natural or intuitive connection between the ideas formed through visual and through tactile sensations. He was well acquainted with a dog and a cat by feeling, but could not recognize their respective characters when he saw them; and one day he took up the cat and felt her attentively, and then setting her down, said, "So, puss, I shall know you another time."

It is scarcely necessary for me to dwell on the fallacies of hearing, taste, and smell, as no one is disposed to ascribe an undue degree of infallibility to the impressions furnished through these senses. As regards hearing, the inaccuracies of its indications in relation to the distance, direction, and character of sounds, are proverbial. Indeed, the art of ventriloquism rests upon the uncertainties and inaccuracies of information derived through the organ of hearing. By skillful modifications of the intensity and the qualities of sounds, and by adroitly directing the attention of the hearers to the proper quarters, it is easy for the operator to produce the most complete acoustic illusions.

Certain external agencies are known to excite impressions through several different sensory channels; the sensation being,

however, in each case characteristic of the particular nervous apparatus. The ear is unable to distinguish the slightest difference between luminous and dark objects; neither is the eye able to discriminate between acute and grave sounds; nor can the taste appreciate the most strongly odoriferous bodies. Hence, we may infer that no nerve of special sensation can, by any possibility, assume the function of another.

From a careful consideration of all the facts connected with the exercise of the senses, it must be evident to every reflecting mind that the organs of sense were not designed to supply us with philosophical instruments. The eye, the ear, and the touch, though admirably adapted to serve our purposes, are not severally a microscope or telescope, a sonometer or siren, and a thermometer or pyrometer. It was well observed by Locke that an eye adapted to discover the intimate constitution of the atoms forming the hands of a clock, might be, from the very nature of the mechanism, incapable of informing us of the hour indicated by the same hand. A telescopic eye that would enable us to see the details of structure on the surface of Jupiter or Saturn, would ill requite its owner for that ruder power which guides him through the town he inhabits and enables him to recognize the friends who surround him. We are not the passive recipients of knowledge. There must be an external world of light and of sound, to give impressions to the eye and to the ear; there must also be an active, intelligent mind by which they are molded, combined, and interpreted, so as to constitute substantial knowledge. It is as necessary that thought should be exerted as it is that there should be something upon which it is exerted. Sensation is passive; attention is active. The distinction is manifest by its own nature; and we find evidence of it in the very forms of language. To look is more than to see; to listen or hearken is more than to hear; to feel is more than to touch.

JOHN LECONTE.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXXXIX.

FEBRUARY, 1885.

HOW SHALL THE PRESIDENT BE ELECTED?

THE clause of the Constitution of the United States that prescribes the manner in which the President and Vice-President shall be elected, was adopted only a short time before the adjournment of the convention. It was a substitute for a provision that had, in principle, already received the approval of the body among its earliest acts, and had been re-affirmed in successive reconsiderations of the subject. Nobody can rise from a perusal of the journal of the convention without being thoroughly convinced that that original provision embodied the deliberate judgment of the majority (we may say, perhaps, of the entire body, since the votes were occasionally unanimous) as to the wisest mode of disposing of this difficult subject. At the opening of the convention, late in May, 1787, a series of resolutions was introduced by Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, which formed the principal text of a long-continued discussion of the provisions that the new Constitution ought to embrace. The first clause of one of these was in the following words:

“Resolved, That a national executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national legislature for the term of years.”

Four days later this was adopted, the blank having been filled with the word "seven." Two months later still, in the first draft of the Constitution reported from committee, this provision re-appeared in the following form :

"The executive power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. . . . He shall be elected by ballot by the legislature. He shall hold his office during a term of seven years ; but he shall not be elected a second time."

Another month elapsed, in the course of which the details of the reported Constitution were critically examined ; and on the last day of that month, all matters that had not been finally disposed of, among which was the manner of electing a President, were referred to a committee consisting of one member from each State. It was on the recommendation of this committee that the provision on this subject was adopted which was finally incorporated into the Constitution of 1787—a provision which, with a slight modification not affecting the mode of election, still stands in the twelfth amendment. And it is the unfortunate change thus made in the text of the Constitution as first drawn up which has entailed upon us the perpetually recurring scenes of angry political controversy and wild public excitement that have marked the close of each presidential term. So grave have become these evils, that peaceful citizens are beginning to tremble at the approach of a presidential election ; and men of business hold their breath and curtail their operations, as experienced mariners take in sail in anticipation of a coming hurricane. No consequence could have been more wholly unlooked for than this, by the authors of the provision that has proved to be so mischievous. On the other hand, the plausibility of the proposition to confide the selection of a chief magistrate to a council composed of "the wisest, virtuousest, discreetest, best" of the nation, seems momentarily to have captivated the imaginations and disturbed the judgments of those sages of the Revolution to such a degree, that they actually believed they should be able by this expedient to lift this purely mundane question to a region far above the influence of vulgar human passion. Singularly enough, too, the contemporary generation of their countrymen seems to have accepted this part of their work at the valuation put upon it by themselves ; for, while every other provision of the Constitution

was the subject of very sharp and even condemnatory criticism in one quarter or another, and the acceptance of the entire instrument, long doubtful, was finally secured only with great difficulty, this seems to have received some moderate commendation from those who noticed it at all. In No. 68 of "The Federalist," Mr. Hamilton expresses himself in these words :

"It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. . . . It was equally desirable that the immediate election should be made by men capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements that were proper to govern their choice. A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information and discernment requisite to so complicated an investigation. It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be dreaded in the election of a magistrate who was to have so important an agency in the administration of the government."

This was the theory ; the contrast between the anticipation and the experimental result is almost ludicrous. Had there never been any such thing as political parties in the country, the practice might have corresponded more nearly with the expectation. During Washington's time there were no parties, and at each election in which he was a candidate every Elector gave him his vote. Party nominations were first made in 1800, and the Electors, however well qualified "to analyze" in candidates "the qualities adapted to the station," and to act with "a judicious combination of all the reasons that were proper to govern their choice," very quietly shut their eyes, declined to take the trouble of analysis, and voted for their party nominees. And so have their successors continued to do in every election since. The members of the Electoral College are thus reduced to the ridiculous attitude of mere automata. Ever since 1800 they have exercised no more important or dignified function than that of mechanically depositing ballots already prepared for them. It is evident, therefore, that an amendment of the Constitution is to be desired, if it were only to rid us of this electoral rubbish.

But the Electoral College, useless as it has become as a piece of our political machinery, is at least harmless ; and an amendment that should stop with its abolition would do nothing to

avert those grave evils and even serious dangers which, as experience has proved to us, are of unavoidable recurrence, under our present system, in every closely contested presidential struggle. As examples of these evils may be enumerated the long-continued agitation and excitement of the public mind persisting for months together, embarrassing interruption to the regular operations of business, protracted anxiety on the part of multitudes who have, or imagine that they have, important interests at stake in the contest, attempts to corrupt or intimidate voters or to exclude them from the polls, the fabrication and circulation of false statements on the eve of election, and frauds upon the ballot-boxes. To these may be added the disgraceful practice of trading votes, frequent among the low political intriguers of our larger towns—transactions known in the slang of their own vulgar circles as “deals,” in which a manager accepts one of the candidates of the opposing party for the sake of an equivalent in votes for another on his own ticket; and, finally, the degradation of the political press, which lends itself to the lowest abuse of opposing candidates.

Still another very grave evil is connected with these contests, to which, as it seems to me, attention has not been sufficiently directed, and that is the obstruction that the question of the presidential succession interposes in the way of Congressional legislation. Owing to this, the second Congress in every presidential term is to a great degree paralyzed for usefulness. During the first session of that Congress, every measure of great and general interest is invariably thrust aside, on the ground that a presidential election is impending, and that any action might prejudice the prospects of the party responsible for it. The second session is equally unproductive, for the reason that a presidential election has just taken place, and all such questions must be left to the new administration. Thus, although in the forty-eighth Congress, still in existence, there was a majority in favor of some reform of the oppressive tariff under which the country is suffering, and though the prevalence of this feeling was made manifest in the choice of Speaker, yet the shadow of the approaching presidential contest benumbed the spirit of both parties alike, and deprived them of the courage of their opinions. Even so moderate a measure as that proposed by Mr. Morrison was deemed to involve too serious a hazard, and it failed for lack of support from many who approved it in

their hearts. We are told that we have nothing better to expect during the present session, because there is not time, in the small lease of life that remains to Congress, to mature a measure of such importance. Time is not the thing that is wanting, but courage; and it is a very serious fact, which our people would do well to ponder, that, owing to the reflex action of our vicious system of presidential elections, the national legislature, for two years out of every four, is mentally incapacitated for the discharge of its proper functions.

These are grave evils, but graver still are those angry disputes that have arisen, and are liable continually to arise, over the final count, resulting from real or asserted falsification of the Electoral vote, or from conflicting returns and duplicate certificates from the same States. The danger is that the disappointed party may appeal to open violence in support of their claims, and plunge the nation into civil war. A catastrophe like that was near befalling us in 1876, from which we were saved mainly by the moderation and patriotism of the Democratic candidate. With a defeated competitor as passionate and as self-willed as the soldier President of 1828, the result might have been very different. And in the contest that has just ended, there were many who for a time believed we were very near a similar crisis, though with a pretext far less plausible. If the electoral system is to be retained in form as provided in the Constitution, legislation is necessary to secure the final settlement of controversies in regard to the result of the election in each State, by judicial proceedings within the States themselves; so that the certificates forwarded to Washington shall be conclusive, and nothing shall remain for Congress to do but to sum up the returns and announce the names of the successful candidates. Very judicious propositions to this effect have been laid before Congress from time to time, without receiving the attention they deserved; as, for example, the joint resolution offered in the Senate by Mr. Eaton, of Connecticut, in November, 1877, and the House bill of Mr. Hewitt, of New York, introduced in February, 1882. Better than this, however, the Electors might be appointed directly by the State legislatures. New York, Delaware, South Carolina, and Vermont appointed them in this manner down to 1824; Georgia did the same, except in the single election of 1796, when she resorted to the general ticket; and Connecticut maintained the practice down to 1820. Other States

employed this alternately with other methods. Massachusetts, for example, employed the district-ticket system in the first three elections, legislative appointment in the fourth, the general ticket in the fifth, the legislative in the sixth, the district system in the seventh, the legislative in the eighth, the district system in the ninth and tenth, and she has employed the general ticket ever since. New Jersey practiced appointment by legislature down to 1816, and South Carolina till 1868, in which two years these States resorted severally to the method of general ticket.*

This plan, however, which the fact of so general and so long-continued persistence in it proves to have nothing about it objectionable, and which obviates most of the evils attendant on the mode of election now universally practiced, is nevertheless objectionable equally with that, in the respect that it throws the entire electoral vote of the State in favor of one party, when it may happen that the numerical difference between the two great parties is insignificant, and in case there are minor parties in the field, the prevailing party may be in a minority. This happened in the late election in New York, in which Mr. Cleveland's plurality was only about one thousand, and he was actually in a minority of more than forty thousand. In 1844, the fate of the entire election was determined by the vote of New York; and the vote of New York was thrown for a candidate that was in a popular minority in the State of more than ten thousand votes. The contest was between Mr. Polk and Mr. Clay. The issue was annexation of Texas and extension of slavery on the one hand, and anti-annexation and free-soil on the other. Mr. Clay was anti-annexation and anti-extension, but he was a citizen of a slave State, and he was not an abolitionist. The extreme Free-soilers, therefore, nominated James G. Birney as a third candidate, and the fifteen thousand votes they gave to him, which would otherwise naturally have gone to Mr. Clay, lost New York to the latter by about five thousand votes, and thus gave the election to his competitor. In the last election, had the electoral vote of New York been divided between the parties in the proportion of their voting strength, Mr. Cleveland would have received only seventeen votes, and Mr. Blaine would have received seventeen, while Mr. St. John and General Butler would have had one vote each. It is evident

* I am indebted for these particulars to my young friend, Charles A. O'Neill, Esq., of this city, who has made a study of the subject.

that the application of this principle in all the States might sometimes have the effect to reverse the decision of the Electoral College as given under the provisions of the Constitution; and in fact that it must do so whenever the defeated candidate has heavy popular majorities in the States that support him, while his competitor succeeds in others by light ones.

Presidents have come into power with a popular majority against them. This was true in the election of 1844, when Mr. Polk's vote was 24,000 below that of the united opposition. It was true in the case of General Taylor in 1848, when Mr. Van Buren, the nominee of the Free-soilers, drew off a very heavy body of partisans, so that the successful candidate was in a popular minority of 151,000. In 1856 Mr. Buchanan was elected, though outnumbered in the popular vote by 377,000. Mr. Lincoln came into the Presidency in 1860 (there being three opposing candidates), though failing of an absolute majority by a number nearly as large — 354,000. In 1876 the honesty of the popular vote in several of the States was disputed, but the majority against the successful candidate, Mr. Hayes, was apparently not far from 250,000.

In the election of Electors by State legislatures, the injustice of throwing the solid vote of the State for one party only might be obviated by applying the principle above applied to the popular vote, and dividing the Electors between the parties in the proportion of their strength in the legislature itself. Or, according to a plan suggested some years since by the present writer, the lower house of each legislature might resolve itself into committees, equal in number to the number of Congressional districts in the State, each committee composed of all the delegates from a particular Congressional district and having power to choose one Elector; the Senatorial Electors to be elected by the State Senate, or dispensed with altogether. Though this suggestion was not received with favor, the plan it proposes is entirely feasible, and it is obviously more just than that which was long and very generally practiced, of choosing the entire Electoral College of each State by the entire legislature.

In proceeding to consider whether it is possible to devise any remedy for the evils that environ this difficult question, it is worth while to look back to the proceedings of the Convention of 1787, and inquire what were the expedients then suggested for securing, peacefully and fairly, the appointment of a chief

executive. We find that there were eleven, which may be stated as follows, the name of the proposer being annexed in each case, except where the record is silent in regard to it:

1. By the national legislature. Edmund Randolph, of Virginia.
2. By the State executives. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts.
3. By the Congress constituted as under the articles of Confederation. William Patterson,* of New Jersey.
4. By electors to be chosen by electors to be chosen by the people. Alexander Hamilton, of New York.
5. By electors to be chosen by the people of the States (general ticket).
6. By electors to be chosen by the people in districts. James Wilson, of Pennsylvania.
7. By electors to be appointed by the State legislatures. Oliver Ellsworth, of Connecticut.
8. By electors to be taken by lot from the national legislature. James Wilson, of Pennsylvania.
9. By the national legislature, each State having one vote.
10. By the direct vote of the whole people.
11. By electors to be chosen for each State, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct. Committee of August 31, 1787. Adopted.

To these may be added the following propositions more recently made:

12. Direct election by the people, in districts, without personal electors. Senator O. P. Morton, of Indiana, in 1873.
13. By the people of the States, in general ticket, the electoral votes to be divided in proportion to the voting strength of parties. Proposed above.
14. By State legislatures, the electoral vote to be divided in proportion to the voting strength of parties in the same. Proposed above.
15. By the lower houses of State legislatures in committees composed severally of the delegates from the several Congressional districts. Proposed by this writer in 1877.

I am compelled to avow it as my most profound conviction that the only assured security for the future possible to us against the formidable dangers that surround the question, is to be found in a return to the plan of placing the election of the President in the hands of the national legislature, which commended itself so strongly to the wisdom of the fathers.

The members of Congress possess necessarily all the qualities of fitness that are possible to be looked for in any electoral college; although, as the system works at present, it is of no

* Mr. Patterson proposed a revision of the articles of Confederation rather than a new constitution.

consequence whether Electors are fit or not. Congressmen represent, as the Electors of the present system do not, the people of limited districts, and therefore, when political opinion in a State is divided, the Congressional delegation of the State is divided also, and will not commit the injustice that is now invariably committed, of throwing the entire vote of the State in favor of one party. But in an election by Congress the quality of fitness in the electors would have a significance that it has not under the present system, for the Members of Congress, if not in all cases accomplished statesmen, are nevertheless much more familiar with affairs of state, and much more competent to act on and decide political questions than the average citizen. It may be said that the caucus would replace the convention; but the caucus of the dominant party will in such case become itself the electoral body. Congress affords us an Electoral College in which the theory of the fathers of the Constitution is a reality. Moreover, since it would be impossible, by any process, to bring together an equal number of men more capable of representing the party interests or the party intelligence, it is certain that we cannot expect from any other electoral body, however constituted, a more judicious or satisfactory appointment of a President.

In the cases in which, under the Constitution, an election by the Electoral College fails, examples of which we have had in 1800 and 1824, the choice of President already devolves upon one of the houses of Congress. Had every election from 1788 downward been decided by Congress, especially with the exclusion of the provision that requires the vote to be taken by States, in general the same parties that were actually successful would have prevailed. Whenever a case like that of 1800 or that of 1824 occurs, it happens, under the Constitution as it stands, that the election is made by an outgoing Congress. This, in some points of view, is advantageous, and in others the reverse. It is advantageous in that it finds members free from liability to be influenced by considerations as to their own reelection, a new Congress having been already chosen, and a new term being about to begin. It is an advantage also, that, having been elected more than a year before, they have not been chosen merely *ad hoc*, but their selection has been determined by general considerations of public policy; so that, while they would continue generally to represent the bias of political

opinion among their constituents, they would be untrammelled by any special instructions or pledges. It is a disadvantage, however, that, in case of the occurrence of such a remarkable and sudden change of public opinion as we have occasionally seen, the new Congress might not be politically in harmony with the old, nor, by consequence, with the executive elected by it.

Should the Constitution be so amended as to throw the presidential election into the hands of Congress, it would, therefore, be well to adjust the limitations of the terms of service so that the election may be made by an incoming Congress, and be in fact its first duty after its own organization. The President would thus be secure of a sympathetic legislature, and we should be spared the conflicts that we have seen so often between coördinate departments of our Federal government. Curiously enough, these conflicts have been more persistent and more bitter between Congress and the Presidents that have received the office through the vice-presidency than with those that have been directly chosen. The pitiable histories of the administrations of John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, and more strikingly still of Andrew Johnson, illustrate this remark,—a remark which, but for the prudence and good sense that have distinguished the official life and conduct of our present excellent chief magistrate, might seem to indicate a law. It is greatly to be hoped that, under an improved system of election, whatever it may be, there will be no more successions to the presidency by inheritance. In such cases, at least, let Congress fill the vacancy. Though the President may die, Congress is a body that never dies, and may make a new election without delay. Should even such a calamity befall as the death of the President during the recess, Congress might be called together by telegraph, and re-assemble within a week. A Vice-President would be no longer necessary. The President *pro tem.* of the Senate might also be President *pro tem.* of the United States for the few days of unavoidable interregnum.

The contemporary republic of France has afforded us a felicitous illustration of the working of this principle. Three successive Presidents have been elected by the French Chambers without excitement or danger to the peace, and with the result of maintaining an executive in harmony with the legislative body. The parliamentary and ministerial government of Great Britain furnishes another example, which, in so far as the principle involved is concerned, is equally in point. The Commons do not

make the ministry, it is true, but they unmake it; and all the power of the Queen is not sufficient to make a new one unacceptable to them. And there is not a government in the world in which the transfer of power from one party to another is accomplished more peacefully or more satisfactorily to the people that live under it than that of the British Empire.

These reasons are conclusive with me; yet I am aware that the plan I propose is not likely to find general acceptance. The plan that will probably prove to be most popular, and, if we have any change at all, is most likely to be preferred, is that of election by the people directly. There is something about this plan well calculated to catch the popular fancy, and it will probably be claimed that it is more in harmony with the democratic principle than any other. Senator Morton, in his speech on the subject in the Senate in 1873, advocated this view with great eloquence, and in a manner well adapted to win the approval of the multitude, yet hardly likely to convince thinking men. The Senator's principal argument is this: that, in the choice of a chief magistrate, every citizen has a right to give his vote for the man of his choice; whereas, under our present system, he is compelled to vote for the choice of somebody else, or lose his vote altogether. We may admit this without being able to perceive the hardship. If the man whom an individual voter prefers is not also the preference of several millions of his countrymen besides, his vote is of no avail, and he might as well not cast it. In other words, votes are not worth the paper they are printed on, without organization and united action among the voters. If, by an amendment of the Constitution, the election should be made direct, party conventions will continue to name candidates precisely as they do now, and individuals will continue to cast their votes as completely under dictation as they do at present, unless, out of mere caprice, they choose to throw them away. Senator Morton's argument, therefore, is the flimsiest sort of fallacy.

But Senator Morton argued further that the electoral system operates unjustly to the whole people, in the respect that under it a candidate may fail of election, although having a majority of the popular vote in his favor. This indeed is true, and it has actually happened. But, on the other hand, a popular majority may often be due to a sectional majority, and even to a majority of a comparatively small section, overpowering adverse, though inferior, majorities in the much larger portion of the Union.

To illustrate: in the late election, the single State of Texas gave for the Democratic candidate a plurality of about 135,000 votes over his principal competitor. New York gave a plurality in the same direction of only about 1000. The case is conceivable in which thirty-seven States should give pluralities of 1000 each to a candidate of one and the same party, while Texas should again give 135,000 for the other. In a direct election, Texas, in such a case, would give the nation a chief magistrate by a popular majority of nearly 100,000. It will easily be seen that the plan of electing Presidents by direct popular vote would soon extinguish the last vestiges of State independence; and though to many this result might not be unacceptable, it ought to be regarded with apprehension by the party that, for nearly a century, in its profession of faith, has given to "the resolutions of 1798 and 1799" a place a little above the scriptures of the Old and New Testament.

But the conclusive objection to the plan of direct election is the fact that it leaves all those grave evils that have hitherto attended our quadrennial presidential contests wholly unremedied, if it is not in fact calculated to aggravate them. The disturbance of the public quiet, the conflicts at the polls, the practices of intimidation or corruption of voters, the bargainings, or "deals" between local political managers, the degradation of the press and consequent demoralization of public sentiment, the obstruction to legislation, and all the other evils that attend our elections now would continue unchecked. Only one conceivable advantage can attend the change, but it is one of some importance. A great State, with a majority of, let us say, 100, would no longer be able to overwhelm half a dozen smaller ones with a joint majority of more than 100,000.

F. A. P. BARNARD.

IN the convention that framed the Constitution of the United States nearly a century ago, there was a wide difference of opinion as to the manner of choosing the national Executive. Propositions were made that the election should be by the two houses of Congress; by Electors chosen by the people in separate districts throughout the States; by the executives of the States; by the legislatures of the States; by Electors appointed by

the legislatures of the States; by Electors appointed as the legislatures may direct; by Electors chosen by lot from the Senators and Representatives in Congress; by the Governors of the States, with the advice of their councils; and by direct vote of the people in each State. All of these plans had their supporters, and several of them were adopted only to be reconsidered and defeated. That for election by the two houses of Congress was three times carried, once unanimously, and as often recalled and set aside. Finally, the mode of choice by Electors appointed in such manner as the legislature of each State may direct, the number of Electors to correspond with the representation of the State in Congress, prevailed. The main question was, whether the power should be with the people, or a remove from them. The opposition to the popular mode was strenuous and overwhelming, only one State, Pennsylvania, voting for it. Roger Sherman, of Connecticut, claimed that the people would never be sufficiently informed of the characters of men to vote intelligently for the candidates that might be presented. Charles Pinckney, of South Carolina, was afraid the people would be incited by designing and active demagogues. George Mason, of Virginia, declared that it would be as unnatural to refer the choice of a proper person for President to the people as to refer a trial of colors to a blind man. The extent of the country alone, he contended, would render it impossible for the people to have the requisite capacity to judge of the respective merits of candidates. Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, said a popular election was radically vicious, as the ignorance of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men, dispersed throughout the Union and acting in concert, to deceive them and delude them into the election of an improper person. A cabal would certainly, in every instance, dictate the President, if the election was to be referred to the people. And so on to the end of kindred opposition from other members. The theory of the Electoral College, so called, as established, was, therefore: first, that the people could not be trusted to choose the Chief Executive; and secondly, that the Electoral College, interposed between them and the election, was to exercise independence, with superior knowledge and wisdom, in making the selection. At first the Electors were appointed by the State legislatures, and acted upon their own judgment. They were unanimous in electing and reelecting George Washington

President, while at the same time voting for no less than fifteen different persons for Vice-President. The provision then was that each Elector should vote for two persons; that the one receiving the greatest number of votes, if a majority of the whole number of Electors, should be President; and that, after the choice of President, the one having the greatest number of votes of the Electors, even though not a majority of the whole, should be Vice-President. At the third election, in 1796, the Electoral College was divided between John Adams and Thomas Jefferson for the first office. The result was a vote of seventy-one for Adams and sixty-eight for Jefferson, and they thus became respectively President and Vice-President. At the next election, in 1800, the first organized movement to forestall the action of the Electoral College was made. A caucus of the friends of Mr. Jefferson in Congress put him in nomination for President, and when the Electoral College balloted the votes were found to be a tie between him and Aaron Burr, each having 73. The House of Representatives, after a warm and protracted struggle, elected Mr. Jefferson President, and Mr. Burr Vice-President. It was this electoral tie that induced the adoption of the amendment, still in force, that requires the Electors to ballot separately for President and Vice-President. After 1800, nominations were made by Congressional and legislative caucuses, which grew in strength until their controlling power was recognized and they were crowned "King Caucus." Another crisis came in 1824, when Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams were opponents. Neither had a majority of the electoral votes, as some were given to William H. Crawford and Henry Clay, while John C. Calhoun, having the requisite majority, was elected Vice-President. The House made Mr. Adams President. This ended the reign of King Caucus. The popular sentiment dictated the choice of Andrew Jackson over John Quincy Adams for President in 1828, by an electoral vote of 178 to 83; and the self-assertion of the people had been such that the Legislatures gradually relinquished the power of appointment of the Electors. In 1824, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina, and Vermont were the only exceptions, and in 1828 South Carolina stood alone, as it continued to stand down to the reconstruction of its State government after the close of the rebellion. In 1830 the first political national convention of delegates representing the people was held; and the holding of national nominating

conventions by the different political parties began in 1831-2, and has since continued, being now the firmly established usage. The people not only appoint the Electors directly by their votes, but they perform the very office which, in distrust of their intelligence and judgment, the Electoral College was created to fill, that of selecting the national executive. Beginning at the primary meeting and passing along through the intermediary conventions until the national party council is reached, they direct every movement made in the naming of candidates from among whom the President and Vice-President are chosen. The Electors vote as the expressed will of the people directs, and, under the unwritten law that has supplanted the letter of the Constitution as that instrument was drawn, are without volition. Such is the practice.

The ground upon which the Electoral system was based having long since crumbled away, the system itself should now follow. The conditions that existed in 1787 and caused the Constitutional Convention to reason and make provision as it did, have changed. The number of States has been trebled, the area of the country has been increased tenfold, and the population has been multiplied by fifteen. Yet, by the application of steam upon land and water, by the use of the electric telegraph, and by the revolutions of the power printing-press, all then unknown and undreamt of, distance of travel has been reduced, space in communication has been annihilated, and spread of intelligence has become universal; so that the minds of the sixty millions of population can be almost instantaneously informed and brought to consider any given proposition now, while a like result, with the four millions of population then, would have taken months, if, indeed, possible to be reached at all. The trouble to-day is not with the people, but with the Electoral College. Instead of the candidates for President and Vice-President not being known to the people, it is the Electoral College that is an enigma to them. It would be impossible to present any candidate without having a full history of his life and character spread by the public press before every citizen in every corner of the land within twenty-four hours after his nomination. It would be equally impossible, in the State of New York for illustration, to nominate candidates for Electors who would be known to all the citizens called upon to vote for them. Many people never have an

understanding of the working of the Electoral College, and every four years, as the Presidential election comes round, the public journals are called upon to instruct the risen as well as the rising generation in its mysteries. Some, even among the statesmen of the land, forget their knowledge of it, and confound others by their misunderstanding of its operations.

The Electoral College is not only without utility or value, to the end for which it was created, but it is a dangerous piece of machinery. How much it needs watching in some if not in all of its thirty-eight different parts, the election of eight years ago attests. And now, according to public report, the representatives of the party that won the election of November last have taken the precaution to cause duplicate copies of the Electoral certificates for Cleveland and Hendricks to be sent to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, outside the law, as a check on possible irregularities. It is a sufficient reason for doing away with the Electoral College that it is utterly useless. Its only legitimate function is to do over again what the people themselves do in appointing it. But the power it possesses and wields in the exercise of that function is open and liable to perversion, and therefore it is a standing menace to the integrity of Presidential elections. True, up to the present time it has not, through error or bribery, reversed the will of the people. The pitcher is never broken until the last time it goes to the well. Is it wise to maintain an intermediary that is superfluous at best, until it does some serious damage to call for its destruction? Even as the agency it is, it has obvious imperfections. No positive qualifications are required for an Elector, who may be a citizen or an alien, a man or a woman, an Indian or a Chinaman. There is a prohibition that no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector, and that is all. And the Elector is not only permitted but directed to vote by ballot. This is an anti-democratic provision, which may cause a blunder, and could be easily used to cover a crime. An agent of the people should never be permitted to act secretly in transacting their business, except in cases where the public safety may require. Especially should he never be allowed to cast a ballot in secret for them. What the people can do for themselves in making and administering their government they should not employ an agent to do; much less employ an agent

to do over again what they have already done, as in the case of the Electoral College.

In dispensing with Presidential Electors, no disturbing change need be made. Preserving the autonomy of the States and their proportions of power as measured by representation in Congress, the people of each State would vote for President and Vice-President upon a ballot, precisely as they now vote for Governor and Lieutenant-Governor, and with the same freedom of choice for each separately, which is denied them under the Electoral College system. The candidate receiving the highest number of votes for either office, would have certified for him the proportion belonging to the State — as, thirty-six for New York. The end of election by direct vote of the people is plainly seen and easily understood. The means to it can be readily devised. A uniform day of election, as at present, but different from that upon which State and local officers are chosen; immediate count of the votes after the close of the polls; prompt subsequent canvass by boards of final jurisdiction in all the States alike, and simultaneously; transmission of the returns by State certificate, and determination and proclamation of the result by duly established authority, whether it be Congress or some other tribunal, at Washington; — these are points of detail that can be provided for without difficulty. If to the direct vote of the people should be added provision for a term of six years, with ineligibility of the incumbent for reëlection, the improvement of the article of the Constitution relating to the election of the executive would be as complete as it is possible to make it.

WILLIAM PURCELL.

THERE can be no more fitting time to discuss the infirmities, or weigh the value of existing methods for the election of a chief magistrate than that which follows the subsidence of the excitement of the recent presidential election. It has been the fashion of late to criticise and condemn the Electoral College. The cure has always been an attempt at substitution. It is said of it that: It has departed in practice from the theory of its creation; it is a cumbersome and useless piece of machinery; it had its origin in a distrust of popular government, and stands

between the people and a free choice of their ruler; and it is full of danger. These criticisms are not altogether groundless; but their weight, as against the system, may well be questioned, and the system itself, as against any substitute yet proposed, may well challenge discussion.

It is true that the original idea of the Electoral College was a free choice of the President by Electors chosen, not on previous committals, but exercising after their appointment a deliberate unbiased judgment in casting a ballot for that man of all others in the republic most commending himself to such judgment of the Electors. The fathers expected that the result of the free deliberation of the College, or rather the resultant of the deliberations of the separate Colleges in the several States, would most surely bring into this high position the noblest and best equipped citizen. The practice, however, has come to be, that the Electors are now appointed because of their known preference for some particular individual for the office of President, whose character and fitness are discussed before the public months in advance, not to convince the man who is to be Elector, but to persuade the voter to cast his ballot for one already pledged. This change seems at first thought to be very much for the worse, degrading the College from a high and ideal function to a mere registering machine. But something may be said on the other side. Whatever may have been the dream of the fathers, political parties in this country were inevitable, and were sure to divide on the principles and policies of administration. This division was certain to manifest itself first and strongest in the choice of a chief magistrate. It is better in every way that the merits of this division should be debated before the people themselves in advance, rather than be pressed home upon the Elector between his election and his ballot for President. If he were at liberty to be swayed after his election, debates fierce and wild would attack him, and corruption and bribery would compass him about and beset his footsteps till his ballot had been cast. From all this he is protected by the unwritten law that determines his ballot before he is chosen.

It is difficult to feel much force in the charge that the Electoral College is a cumbersome and useless piece of machinery. If the system were abolished, it would abolish only the meeting of the Electors, now fixed by law on the first Monday of the December after their election. The canvass of the vote in the

different States would still remain, attended with increased difficulty. The method of verification, its transmission to some official in Washington, the opening and counting the votes, and official declaration of the result by some one and in some presence, would be as necessary as ever. To the reflecting citizen there is no part of the machinery of our government whose workings are more simple and impressive than this meeting of the Electors. They are few, selected for their weight of character; they assemble simultaneously at the capitols of their respective States to record with deliberation and dignity, and fitting formality, the verdict rendered a month before amid conflicts and political passions that sometimes rock the republic. The contrast, in the presidential election through which the country has just passed, between the trouble and excitement that agitated the public mind during the first week in November, when the Electors were chosen, and that calm acquiescence out of which has sprung increased confidence in the future, pervading all parties a month later, when the Electors assembled to execute the mandate of the people, is a health-giving influence worth much more than it can ever cost. This did not all come of a foregone conclusion. Under all that the certainty to come had worked on human passions and expectations, when the hour of its coming approached, there was a revived faith in our institutions. The mists had passed away, and the structure appeared to all eyes stronger and grander than ever. Men did not go about talking in this strain, but earnest patriots of all parties felt it and were made better citizens by it.

The Electoral College had its origin, not in a distrust of popular government, as is sometimes charged, but in the distinction between a republic of States and a pure democracy; and any substitute for it not based on this distinction, is out of harmony with the other parts of this remarkable whole, and must fail, or compel a change in them also. It was modeled, though imperfectly, after the legislative power, which consists of the House, representing the people, and the Senate, representing the States. It is true that in the joint action of the Senatorial and other Electors in one body much of the power of the State is merged; yet upon the failure of all the colleges to elect by an absolute majority, the States alone make the choice.

A vote by the people directly for President, which keeps up the distinction now existing in the College, based on a republic

pedo planted in the straits, with which the ship of state may at some time come into fatal collision." It is the height of folly to shut our eyes to this danger. And it is useless to seek in argument a satisfactory answer to these questions. The public mind will always divide upon them. The only safe solution of the problem is their removal by a Constitutional amendment that shall make plain and simple every step in the process, both State and national, and shall also require or create a tribunal in each State competent to settle finally any possible controversy over the appointment of Electors or their action till the record of what they do reaches some national official. And it should create a like national tribunal to settle every question that can thereafter arise.

The provision that requires an election by an actual majority rather than a plurality in the Electoral College, necessitated the designation of some other body to elect in case of failure on that account. The Constitution clothes the House of Representatives, voting by States, with that function. The two occasions in which that power has been exercised have demonstrated the danger with which it is fraught. Happily, its recurrence is not likely to be frequent, else it is a serious question whether the government could long survive the strain thus brought upon it. Doubtless, a President elected by an absolute majority of the College would enter upon his office with greater moral force behind him than one elected by a plurality only, but the latter will stand stronger and breathe a much purer atmosphere all his official days, than he would if he reached the same position through the devious ways and mephitic breath of a Congressional election. It were much better, therefore, that the amendment embrace, also, a provision substituting a plurality for a majority, and leaving the provision in relation to the House of Representatives applicable only to the remote possibility of a tie in the Electoral College. These amendments accomplished, safety will be secured as far as that can be done by Constitutional safeguards. Whether with these changes the Electoral system should also give place to some new method of more direct election by the people, is of little moment if only this weak point in our system be sufficiently strengthened. Let us not be lulled into further indifference by a too great reliance upon that wisdom and patriotism which has once carried the republic safely through this peril.

H. L. DAWES.

By no difficulty developed in the attempt to organize the Federal Government were the authors of the Constitution more perplexed than by the problem how to choose the President and Vice-President of the United States. Various schemes were propounded for the purpose, only to be successively entertained and rejected. For example: election by the people, election by the national legislature, election by the State legislatures, appointment by the State executives. Eventually, on the eve of the adjournment of the convention, the committee of detail reported a plan for the creation of an intermediate college of Electors, by whom the chief executive officers of the nation should be chosen; and the device was incorporated in the fundamental law of the Union as formulated in Article II. of the original Constitution. In the experiment, however, the method of election here prescribed speedily miscarried, and the twelfth amendment was adopted, to avert another such occurrence as convulsed the country in 1800, when Jefferson and Burr had an equal number of votes for President, and the House of Representatives finally chose Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballot. That the existing contrivance is vicious in principle and mischievous in operation, and that the choice of President and Vice-President by the immediate will of the nation, voting as a political unit, is the truer and the safer expedient, are the theses that I purpose briefly to maintain.

In a scientific view, any mechanism, material or moral, is decisively condemned by the fact that it misses the end of its creation; and that the present plan of electing the President and Vice-President fails to fulfill an essential function of its institution everybody sees and nobody denies. One, and a principal function, that the College of Electors was designed to perform, was to preclude the people from any direct agency in the election, for the avowed reason that the people are incapable of exercising so delicate and difficult a power as the choice of the chief magistrates of the nation, and because such an office could be better discharged by a select body of commensurate virtue and intelligence. "It would be as natural," said George Mason, "to refer the choice of a proper character to the people, as it would be to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." And, in No. 67 of "The Federalist," Hamilton indulged the pleasing anticipation that "the process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will never fall to the lot of

pedo planted in the straits, with which the ship of state may at some time come into fatal collision." It is the height of folly to shut our eyes to this danger. And it is useless to seek in argument a satisfactory answer to these questions. The public mind will always divide upon them. The only safe solution of the problem is their removal by a Constitutional amendment that shall make plain and simple every step in the process, both State and national, and shall also require or create a tribunal in each State competent to settle finally any possible controversy over the appointment of Electors or their action till the record of what they do reaches some national official. And it should create a like national tribunal to settle every question that can thereafter arise.

The provision that requires an election by an actual majority rather than a plurality in the Electoral College, necessitated the designation of some other body to elect in case of failure on that account. The Constitution clothes the House of Representatives, voting by States, with that function. The two occasions in which that power has been exercised have demonstrated the danger with which it is fraught. Happily, its recurrence is not likely to be frequent, else it is a serious question whether the government could long survive the strain thus brought upon it. Doubtless, a President elected by an absolute majority of the College would enter upon his office with greater moral force behind him than one elected by a plurality only, but the latter will stand stronger and breathe a much purer atmosphere all his official days, than he would if he reached the same position through the devious ways and mephitic breath of a Congressional election. It were much better, therefore, that the amendment embrace, also, a provision substituting a plurality for a majority, and leaving the provision in relation to the House of Representatives applicable only to the remote possibility of a tie in the Electoral College. These amendments accomplished, safety will be secured as far as that can be done by Constitutional safeguards. Whether with these changes the Electoral system should also give place to some new method of more direct election by the people, is of little moment if only this weak point in our system be sufficiently strengthened. Let us not be lulled into further indifference by a too great reliance upon that wisdom and patriotism which has once carried the republic safely through this peril.

H. L. DAWES.

By no difficulty developed in the attempt to organize the Federal Government were the authors of the Constitution more perplexed than by the problem how to choose the President and Vice-President of the United States. Various schemes were propounded for the purpose, only to be successively entertained and rejected. For example: election by the people, election by the national legislature, election by the State legislatures, appointment by the State executives. Eventually, on the eve of the adjournment of the convention, the committee of detail reported a plan for the creation of an intermediate college of Electors, by whom the chief executive officers of the nation should be chosen; and the device was incorporated in the fundamental law of the Union as formulated in Article II. of the original Constitution. In the experiment, however, the method of election here prescribed speedily miscarried, and the twelfth amendment was adopted, to avert another such occurrence as convulsed the country in 1800, when Jefferson and Burr had an equal number of votes for President, and the House of Representatives finally chose Jefferson on the thirty-sixth ballot. That the existing contrivance is vicious in principle and mischievous in operation, and that the choice of President and Vice-President by the immediate will of the nation, voting as a political unit, is the truer and the safer expedient, are the theses that I purpose briefly to maintain.

In a scientific view, any mechanism, material or moral, is decisively condemned by the fact that it misses the end of its creation; and that the present plan of electing the President and Vice-President fails to fulfill an essential function of its institution everybody sees and nobody denies. One, and a principal function, that the College of Electors was designed to perform, was to preclude the people from any direct agency in the election, for the avowed reason that the people are incapable of exercising so delicate and difficult a power as the choice of the chief magistrates of the nation, and because such an office could be better discharged by a select body of commensurate virtue and intelligence. "It would be as natural," said George Mason, "to refer the choice of a proper character to the people, as it would be to refer a trial of colors to a blind man." And, in No. 67 of "The Federalist," Hamilton indulged the pleasing anticipation that "the process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will never fall to the lot of

any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications"; and asseverated that "it will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters preëminent for ability and virtue." He asserted, furthermore, that of all parts of the Constitution, the scheme of choosing the President and Vice-President was precisely that which most commanded applause. It may not abate anything from our admiration of the sagacity of the statesmen who figured in the convention, but it is an indisputable fact that the expedient upon which they so plumed themselves proved, upon trial, a miserable miscarriage. The virtue and intelligence of the Electoral College have no operation in the choice of President; his election is effected by the undisputed, though not unqualified, volition of the people. The constant probability that the station would be filled by the most eminent personages is resolved into the fact that it is attainable only by colorless character and inoffensive mediocrity. Because, then, the existing contrivance for the election of President fails, and fails utterly in one essential particular, to compass the end of its institution, and operates instead to produce the very result it was projected to prevent, it should be discarded as a solecism and an excrescence in our political system. They present no valid argument for its continued existence who urge that, at the most, it is merely a useless and harmless expedient, and that it no way interrupts the operations of the mechanism with which it is incorporated. Even were it an utter abortion, without function or effect, still the simple fact that it is nugatory, that it is a sham, that it accomplishes the very result it pretends to avert, mars the perfection of the system of which it is a part, and discredits the Constitution in the popular regard. But the present plan of electing the President is not wholly abortive; it accomplishes one of its appointed purposes, and, in fulfilling this specific function, it is productive of positive evil.

The constitution of the Electoral College is committed to the State legislatures, with a single important limitation of their power, which is, that the number of Electors shall be "equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress." Representation in Congress being proportioned to population, a number of Electors equal to the number of Representatives would afford a just



measure of the relative influence of the States in the choice of President; but this natural and equitable ratio is neutralized by the allotment to each State of two Electors who stand for nothing but the sterile abstraction of State sovereignty. Avowedly this provision was designed to destroy the legitimate and just ratio between political power and the number of voters, was intended to arm the smaller States with an influence in the election of President disproportionate to their relative population; and such is its effect. In the recent election, the States of New England cast thirty-eight votes, while but thirty-six were given by New York; and yet the population of those States is one-third less than the population of New York. Furthermore, it has happened repeatedly, that a President has been chosen against the vote of the popular majority; another result of this arbitrary addition to the electoral weight of the States, coöperating with the principle of the system presently discussed. That this provision is, in theory, repugnant to the genius of popular government, is self-evident. The rule of the majority is the fundamental principle of popular government, because it is the only principle that recognizes the equality of men; a postulate upon which all popular government proceeds. And this principle is vindicated by philosophical speculation. Rutherford says:

"It is plainly most consistent with reason, that the sentiments of the majority should prevail and conclude the whole; because it is not so likely that a greater number of men should be mistaken when they concur in their judgment as that a smaller number should be mistaken. And this is likewise most consistent with equity; because, in general, the greater number have proportionately greater interest that the purposes of society should succeed well, and have more at stake if those purposes should miscarry or be disappointed."—"Institutes of Natural Law," II., 1, Sec. 1.

However this may be, certainly the theory of American government reposes upon the principle of the rule of the majority; and in so far as the provision under review challenges and crosses this principle, it is repugnant to the genius of popular government. The important control in the Federal administration that is imparted by the provision to the smaller States, is evident upon a view of the powers of the executive—its qualified veto upon legislation, its prerogative of appointment to office, and its treaty-making power. The effect of the arrangement in giving to the smaller States a factitious weight in the election of President, will doubtless commend it to the judgment of the sticklers

for State sovereignty; but independently of this provision for an equal Senatorial representation in the Electoral College, the smaller States are already armed with an adequate power of self-protection and a disproportionate influence upon the operations of government. By their equality of representation in the Senate, of which they cannot be deprived but by their own consent, they have an equal weight in legislation with the larger States, to the full effect of which consideration it is requisite to remember that the Senate may exert an absolute negative upon legislation. Then, too, by virtue of this equal Senatorial representation, the smaller States participate equally with the largest in all the executive and judicial powers of the Senate, in the appointments to office, in concluding treaties, and in the determination of impeachments. In respect of all these important matters, Nevada stands on a level with the imperial commonwealth of New York. It is, then, a frivolous apprehension to object that the interests of the smaller States would be endangered by depriving them of their artificial and unequal weight in the election of President.

Another principle of the electoral system, which, in coöperation with the arbitrary allowance of two votes to each State, without reference to population, has been indicated as contributing to the defeat of the popular will in the election of President, is this: in the election the States vote as political units, so that the minority vote in each State is annihilated, and is ineffectual to influence the general result. Thus it might happen that the Southern States, voting with New England and Indiana for the same candidate, and giving him a bare plurality of the popular suffrage, would elect him, against the competition of another candidate supported by all the other States with an overwhelming majority of the popular vote; and so the President of the United States would represent a comparatively small minority of the whole people. But this result would not occur if the event depended upon the vote of the entire nation; for then the minority vote of each State would weigh in the balance of the total suffrage. The present mode of electing a President involves the method of voting by composite units, a principle of which the tendency is to defeat the operation of the numerical principle. The device was not original with the authors of the Constitution, but had been successfully employed in the *Comitia Tributa*, and

under the Constitution of Servius, to neutralize the vote of the mass of Roman citizens, and to insure the ascendancy of favored classes. It had been found efficient, too, in the councils of Constance and Basle, to defeat a decision by the numerical majority. The same principle was incorporated in the Confederation of 1781, and legitimately enough, because the Confederate States were in no sense a nation, but a league of sovereign commonwealths, and it was logical that in the general council the vote of each State should operate with the weight of an independent unit. But now we are a nation, and the voice of the entire nation should be audible and potent in the election of the executive chief of the nation. *A*

In each State the Electors may be chosen in any way the State legislature may be pleased to prescribe. Wherefore, whatever interest or oligarchy might chance for the time to be prevalent in the legislature of a State, would have the power, as it certainly would have the will, to make such provision for the choice of Presidential Electors as would promote any occasional interest of class or object of party, however incompatible with the general welfare of the nation. The history of New York furnishes an instance of the possible subserviency of State legislatures to party intrigue in the choice of electors, in the attempt, made on the suggestion of Hamilton, to alter abruptly the mode of their appointment to serve the interests of a defeated faction—an attempt that, but for the incorruptible integrity of John Jay, would have been successful. A plan of choosing the chief magistrate of the republic, which depends upon the State legislatures to determine the constituency by whom ultimately he shall be elected, which may be worked in subserviency to partial and transient interests, to the national detriment, and which leaves with the legislatures of the States power even to deprive a State of any participation in the election of President,—such a scheme, independently of its experienced effects, cannot survive the *a priori* logic of a sound political philosophy.

If, then, the existing method be indefensible in theory and pernicious in practice, it should be replaced by a plan, if such can be devised, more in harmony with the genius of our institutions, and more conducive to the public welfare. And it results from the principles on which this criticism proceeds, that the true and the expedient mode of choosing the chief

magistrate of the nation is by the popular vote of the nation. As an officer of a distinct and independent government, his appointment should not be contingent upon the will or action of the States. As a representative of the might and majesty of the American people, he should be the immediate elect of the American people. Exposed, as the executive must be, to encroachment on its prerogatives by legislative usurpation, he should be sustained by whatever moral power may be imparted by the declared confidence and support of the people. As the representative chief of the nation in its unity, he should embody the national will in its unity. Since the rule of the majority is an equivalent term for popular government, and since, in the American system of political philosophy, the voice of the majority is the voice of all, his election should be suspended on the event of the majority vote, unaffected by any arrangement inconsistent with the effectual expression of that majority. And so thought the sages of the Convention; the present contrivance for the choice of President being the desperate makeshift of discordant interests and counsels; while Morris, Madison, Wilson, Dickinson, and Carroll favored the election of President by the people.

ROGER A. PRYOR.

A SUGGESTION is making itself felt in the public mind as to the propriety of repealing the Electoral system. The Constitution of the United States has been in existence nearly one hundred years, and within that period almost every feature of it has felt the friction of actual experience, sufficient to test its strength and its fitness. The Electoral system of choosing a chief magistrate has been subjected to this test more frequently perhaps than any other feature of the Constitution about which any question has been made. Twenty-two Presidents have been chosen under it, several of them twice. Although it was conceived and inaugurated so long ago, in the golden age of American patriotism and simplicity, when there were but thirteen States in the Union, possessed of only 820,000 square miles of territory, and occupied by not more than 3,000,000 people, it has been operative through our amazing increase in wealth, our vast growth in population, our mighty enlargement of ter-

ritory, and all the revolutions of our society. So it may be said that it has been thoroughly tested by all phases of our politics. Yet in no case has it been seriously impeached, in no instance has it ever been accused as the cause of any of our troubles or dangers.

The charge that it is a useless and unnecessary piece of political machinery, at first blush appears to be true. It would, indeed, seem to be a superfluous thing to vote for a man in order to have him in turn vote for the President of your choice, when you could seemingly as well vote for him directly yourself. But our ancestors were not guilty of this folly. The Electoral College is not now, by any means, the thing that they designed it to be. The original purpose was to make it an independent body, with absolute power to select a President and Vice-President of their own choice, by their own wisdom, without reference to the wishes of parties or any one else. The debates in convention and cotemporary criticism, as well as the first few years of the government's existence, show this.

The anxiety of the Constitution-makers seems to have been so to provide for these elections as to avoid the tumultuous passions of the mob on the one hand, and, on the other, the corrupting influences to which, it was supposed, a smaller body would be subjected. The chief propositions as to the manner of electing the President were, first, by the people directly, then by the House of Representatives, then by the whole legislative body, and lastly, by Electors chosen by the States for that purpose. Many and serious objections were made to all these methods; but finally, after much hesitation and many changes of opinion, the present plan was adopted. Many precautions were taken to make their choice free and unbiased. The Electors were to be chosen by the States in such manner as each State should direct; they were forbidden to have any official connection whatever with the United States; they were to be chosen for the sole and special purpose of electing a President and Vice-President, and they were themselves to expire officially the moment that duty was performed. They were to assemble, for that purpose, in the capitols of their respective States, on the same day, and cast their votes immediately, without consultation, or the opportunity therefor, with the Electors of any other State. In this view, it cannot be truthfully said that our fathers provided a useless or absurd

institution. They gave us, on the contrary, a very wise and well-guarded arrangement for the selection of chief magistrate. The departure came in a manner entirely unlooked for by them. It is a striking commentary upon their undoubted wisdom, that they should have failed altogether to foresee the most palpable and inevitable of all the results of their contrivance, the one that now furnishes the pretext for its repeal, and that was the almost immediate drifting away from their original purpose of selecting independent, highly empowered Electors, and the modern conversion of them into mere registers of the popular will. So far as I can perceive from the debates, they made no prediction whatever of the rapid growth and power of parties in our politics, and of the force of that fierce democracy which was to burst through all forms and restraints in the assertion of its will. Now, though every line and word of the Constitution in regard to this matter stands just as the fathers left it, the candidates for Electors in all the States have the names of the proposed President and Vice-President for whom they are to vote inscribed above their own on the popular ballots; and they would no more think of voting for any other candidates than they would think of committing suicide.

It is this reduction of the Electoral College to the condition of being the mere mouth-piece of the majority that makes the system appear useless. But is it worth while to abolish it for no other and better reason? Is not this call for a change simply the utterance of the practical and direct spirit of the times? Should we yield to that spirit, without some cause over and above the mere business instinct? Are all forms hurtful and useless? Is it not possible that a day may come, and come soon, when the safety of the republic may require the assertion of the original, independent powers of the Electoral College? And should that day never come, is that other day likely to arrive when the Electoral College, as at present used, can possibly do us any harm? In my opinion, the forms instituted by the framers of the Constitution are something more than mere forms. They are important aids in the organization and continuity of the functions of government. Like the many ceremonials and indirections of the common law, which were all founded on good and sufficient reasons, those of the Constitution were based on some supposed necessity of free government. Generally, all checks upon hasty, or corrupt, or in anywise im-

proper legislation or political action, are of essential service to good government. They are eminently conservative; with us they are adjuncts to stability, if not stability itself. I believe it highly probable that our future may produce occasion for the interposition of the independent powers of dispassionate Electors to prevent anarchy or despotism. From the closing of a fierce presidential contest, to the time of the meeting of the chosen Electors, there always comes a great calm, a blessed cooling-time. At such a moment reason and patriotism would have opportunity to rally and do their saving work, should the republic be in danger. Here, in many cases easily supposed, these temporary repositories of popular power might save our country from disruption, and bloodshed, and anarchy. The Electoral College is an anchor that may yet hold the ship when all other cables have parted. That possibility surely makes it worth the space it occupies on the deck. So long as it is used as it has been for the past sixty years, as the mere instrument for announcing the will of the majority, it cannot possibly be deemed any restriction upon popular suffrage, or have the slightest effect in preventing the full force of a single ballot. For if it should be abolished, as proposed, the effect and weight of each individual vote would neither be increased nor diminished. There is no proposition, that I remember, to change the influence of the States by consolidating the total votes of the Union, abolishing all State lines, and making an election depend upon a majority of this aggregated vote. Such a proposition would be absolutely inadmissible, and I presume is not seriously entertained by the most extreme consolidationist.

We should be very careful how we change any of these original provisions, even those that appear to be mere forms. The ceremonials intended either to secure or celebrate the liberties, valor, or wisdom of a people, are the last things they will surrender. The consuls, the great chief magistrates of Rome, represented the majesty of the people of the republic established by the elder Brutus, after the expulsion of the kings. They continued to be regularly elected and inaugurated long after their functions had been usurped by the emperors, and the office was but a shadow. "But the tradition of ancient dignity," says Gibbon, "was long revered by the Romans and barbarians, . . . and at the end of a thousand years two consuls were created by the sovereigns of Rome and Constantinople, for the

sole purpose of giving a date to the year and a festival to the people." So conservative at heart are the masses.

The Electoral College was given us by the wisest and purest statesmen connected with our country's history; to them, more than to all others, we have been taught to attribute the chief glory and excellence of our institutions; and, unless it can be shown that it is hurtful to the people's liberties, it ought to be many a year before it is abolished to appease a senseless clamor. The real and ever-present danger to our country's peace lies in the methods of ascertaining and pronouncing what Electors are actually chosen by the people, and not in the Electors themselves. This, it is needless to say, is the business of the States, to the honesty and accuracy of which they should look all the more vigilantly because, though their Electors are in the strictest sense State officers, yet they, more than all others, nearly concern the whole people of the Union.

Z. B. VANCE.

HOLMES'S LIFE OF EMERSON.

A LIFE of Ralph Waldo Emerson by Oliver Wendell Holmes is an event in the literary world too remarkable to be passed over by the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW without immediate notice. The biographer unites in himself all the accomplishments that fit him for the work of love which he has undertaken. He was the neighbor and the frequent companion of Emerson, having with him a friendship without reserve. Holmes himself is one of the remarkable men of his generation, and, high as his place is in our literature, he holds a still higher one in personal worth and efficiency in active life. The public willingly accords to him any praise which it perceives that he deserves, though it does not at once hold in its view all his merits. Holmes, in the first place, is a man of science; then, he is great in his profession, in which he has gained distinction as a professor in the university and as an author; and again, he is one of our most popular poets, discoursing in his verse on everything, from that which can raise the beginning of a gentle smile through all the gradations of the cheerful to the inimitable expression of the most complete mirth, and yet knowing how to take up the sternest lesson of morality, and make the castaway shell on the sea-shore teach the individual and the nation to press forward in the career of improvement, or forfeit the purpose and beauty of life. Nor must it be left out of view that Holmes, under the guidance of his father, whose name is held in high respect by all the students of his country's history, was not only well grounded in the annals of America, but, aided by heredity through a splendid line, was thoroughly well trained in the very best lessons of Connecticut orthodoxy. Besides this, he has after a fashion of his own reproduced the system of pleasing instruction by dialogue. But in each of these he appeals in some degree to a special public, and no one of these separate

parts of the public knows him entirely. He is like a man who has three or four estates of land lying out of sight of each other, and none but his friends take cognizance of the vastness of his possessions. Or his merits are as stars in different constellations, which no telescope can bring into one field of vision. Every one of these acquisitions—his science, his public spirit, his poetry, and the rest—goes with him to his work on the life, writings, character, and influence of Emerson. And here comes again into view a quality of Holmes,—instead of seizing the brilliant opportunity for the display of himself, he brings all his powers to be used exclusively for the task he has in hand, and steadily directs the attention of his reader, not to himself, but to the man of whom he is writing. And more than this; he has not allowed his mind to be biased by his affection and personal esteem; he writes, disguising nothing, palliating nothing, concealing nothing; but in the expression of his judgment he is always gentle, urbane, and tender-hearted, giving praise where it is due, but making no overstatement. It may be a surprise to those who do not know him, to find him so perfect in his metaphysics; but he follows Emerson through all his trains of thought, and states them concisely and clearly, with such completeness and exactness that he could not have done better if he had passed all his life in the chair of a professor of philosophy.

Our illustrious biographer, who knows very well that by the right of descent the genius of a Brahmin whom Alexander the Great, after he had passed the Himalayas, might have conversed with, may re-appear in the brain of a pupil in a New England town school, begins by giving us a long array of ancestors among whom one must search for those through whom Emerson was born to be what he became. Among them he rightly distinguishes Emerson's grandfather, who more than a hundred years ago was the minister of Concord. When Emerson, more than forty years ago, accompanied me on a visit to the town school-master of the olden time, who was still alive, in excellent health, of vigorous mind, and with a ready recollection of the deeds he had witnessed in his early days, we encouraged him to tell his story of what happened in Concord on the 19th of April, 1775, but took care not to ask him a question or in any way to interrupt or disturb him in his narrative. The messengers that went in advance of the British to sound

the alarm through all the villages on their way, reached Concord some hours before the enemy. The bell of the town meeting-house was at once set a-ringing, and the school-master, as he told of the instant gathering of the minute-men, related that our Emerson's grandfather, the minister of the town, came at the alarm from his house to join the men of his congregation, bringing with him his gun and ammunition. At the words announcing that he came armed, the bluest of blue eyes in my companion shone with a mild radiance of surprise and delight and pride, for he had not before heard this special circumstance that the minister came bearing arms. The Emerson of that day further bequeathed to his descendant a deep insight into the meaning of facts, for in April, 1775, he entered in his almanac, which was his diary: "This month is remarkable for the greatest events of the present age."

Emerson came into the world with an enduring constitution, so that he lived to be within one year of fourscore. He had excellent organs of digestion, and in mature life could "eat pie" like a school-boy; he slept well at night, and during sleep kept a window open, even in midwinter; but he complains more than twice of his want of power of voice and "a commanding presence"; so that the reader of his life is led to indulge in a surmise what he would have become if he had had "a commanding presence" like Webster; or if to the question, "Whose voice is music now?" he could have claimed a right to place himself by the side of Henry Clay. Whenever he exercised his mind on public affairs, he did so with judgment and courage.

Emerson went through school and our Cambridge College without exciting remark; for his livelihood after leaving college he taught a school in Boston, enlivening the toil by writing exquisite poems; thought a moment of becoming a lawyer, for which profession he was wholly unfit; studied divinity; visited the South; and at twenty-five was settled in Boston as colleague of Henry Ware, who in life and thought was one of the purest men that ever lived, and totally free from extravagance or waywardness. Emerson was soon most happily married, and life seemed to open upon him in the full promise of occupation, peace, and happiness. But ere long his days were overclouded; he lost the wife of his youth; and, while he had not the least inclination to skepticism, the uncontrollable range of his mind soon brought him at variance with the sober-

mind men of the society to which he had become the minister. He disliked the form in which the communion was administered in the Congregational churches of New England, and he grieved at the distinction that was made between members of the church and other members of the congregation. The people of his society thought otherwise, and this was his answer :

"It is my desire, in the office of a Christian minister, to do nothing which I cannot do with my whole heart. Having said this, I have said all. I have no hostility to this institution ; I am only stating my want of sympathy with it. Neither should I ever have obtruded this opinion upon other people, had I not been called by my office to administer it. That is the end of my opposition, that I am not interested in it. I am content that it stand to the end of the world, if it please men and please Heaven, and I shall rejoice in all the good it produces." (Emerson's works, xl., p. 28.)

And so he parted with his congregation, and was left without wife, or child, or fixed occupation.

Hardly was Emerson liberated from service, when he visited Sicily, Italy, France, and England, and saw Coleridge, Wordsworth, Landor, and De Quincey. The biographer of Carlyle gives us an account of the light and joy that Emerson brought to the recluse and his wife in their remote solitude in Scotland. They were blessed days for Carlyle, for, through Emerson, Carlyle, before he had obtained distinction in England, established a reputation in America which reacted on England ; and Emerson, by his zeal and his labor and his influence, secured him for a time in America the copyright which our country still fails to concede to the foreigner. Nothing better could be asked for than the characterization and contrast of the two by Holmes. (Pp. 82, 83.)

The young American philosopher preached in Great Britain, charming by the consummate beauty of his language and the dignity and simplicity of his manner. He made no war on any form of Christianity ; he could go into a rhapsody on the sublime thought and poetic beauty of the book of Psalms, and praised the *Te Deum* of the established church as the grand "hymn which had come down through the ages, voicing the praises of generation after generation." Returning home, he soon became a resident of Concord, of which he that will know the loveliness must read the delightful description by Holmes. (P. 70.)

He liked and extolled in Christianity the institution of preaching ; and now, bound in the spirit to continue the prac-

tice of addressing his fellow-men, he sought his audience through the lecture-room or the press. The character of his mind, as he found himself in solitude in his native town, was to see the whole universe in its unity, all as one effluence of the same great and infinite and universal spirit. "The feeling that truth and beauty and virtue are one, and that nature is the symbol that typifies it to the soul, is the inspiring sentiment." (Pp. 74, 75.) So he selected Michael Angelo for the first subject of an illustrative discourse, because to him the sublime workman had no country of his own, and was a friend to every one of the human race who acknowledges the beauty that beams in universal nature and seeks to approach its source in perfect goodness.

Emerson, in the choice of the next hero over whom he was to shed the luster of his praise, was equally guided by his own nature. In spite of all his gracefulness and reserve and love of the unbroken tranquillity of serene thought, he was by the right of heredity a belligerent for the cause of freedom, of which John Milton, among all the great English poets, was the foremost champion. From the inmost core of his character Milton was the herald of rightful liberty and its ever-ready warrior where it fell into danger. He wrote in sublime and impassioned prose for liberty of mind, of man, and of the state. He has furnished to the English-speaking world the best epic, the best ode, the best elegies, in the mood of joyousness and in the mood of meditation; sonnets full of high thought, expressed in the strongest and noblest words, and the most delightful mask for representation in the social circle. In advanced life, when all his hopes for the political reform of England had been wrecked, he writes the best tragedy that has ever been written in modern times according to the rules of the Greek drama, and in it paints in perfection the comeliness and the reviving power of men who, "armed with celestial vigor and plain, heroic magnitude of mind," make a glorious revolution in behalf of the liberty of mankind; and then, mindful of the sorrows that had fallen on himself and his associates, is driven for consolation to remember that

"Patience is more oft the exercise
Of saints, the trial of their fortitude."
(*"Samson Agonistes,"* lines 1268-1291.)

Such a hero had a right to find a resting-place on Emerson's breast; and this is what he writes of him: "It is the preroga-

tive of this great man to stand at this hour foremost of all men in the power to inspire. Virtue goes out of him into others. Better than any other he has discharged the office of every great man, namely, to raise the idea of man in the minds of his contemporaries and of posterity, exhibiting such a composition of grace, of strength, and of virtue as poet had not described nor hero lived." No "philosopher in England, France, or Germany communicates the same vibration of hope, of self-reverence, of piety, of delight in beauty, which the name of Milton awakes." (Pp. 75, 76.)

The year 1835 was an auspicious one for Emerson; he formed a second happy marriage. In due time a family sprung up about him, giving him companionship more than care. In the same year the people of Concord called on him to pronounce a discourse on the history of his native town for the period of two hundred years, and he who in his philosophy treats facts as the glorified representations of the infinite, and cannot always draw with sharpness the outline of his thought, went to work with zeal and unwearied research to write the history of a New England village. His toil had its reward; he produced a discourse marked by accuracy in detail, the justest judgment, and a style of perfect simplicity and clearness; while his philosophy, coming without observation, underlies every line. Had it fallen to his lot to become a historian, he would have had no superior in fair-mindedness, persistent study, vividness of narrative, and the most sacred fidelity to truth. Again, in the next year, at the celebration of the 19th of April, he wrote verses that will remain in memory as long as the deeds that drew them forth.

In the following years Emerson found pleasure in meeting the young men of the country at the period of their education in the universities, and from time to time delivered addresses that were greatly admired when they were pronounced, and are preserved in his works. In an oration delivered before the members of the Phi Beta Kappa Society of our Cambridge, on the day after commencement in 1837, he spoke to a crowded audience in this wise:

"The problem of restoring to the world original and eternal beauty is solved by the redemption of the soul. Thought is devout, and devotion is thought. Deep calls unto deep; but in actual life the marriage is not celebrated. There are patient naturalists, but they freeze their subject under the wintry light of the understanding. Is not prayer also a study of truth —

a sally of the soul into the unfound infinite ! No man ever prayed heartily without learning something. The invariable mark of wisdom is to see the miraculous in the common. When the fact is seen under the light of an idea, the gaudy fable fades and shrivels. We behold the real higher law. To the wise, therefore, a fact is true poetry, and the most beautiful of fables. These wonders are brought to our own door. You also are a man. Every spirit builds itself a house, and beyond its house a world, and beyond its world a heaven. Know, then, that the world exists for you. For you is the phenomenon perfect. All that Adam had, all that Cæsar could, you have and can do. Adam called his house heaven and earth ; Cæsar called his house Rome ; you perhaps call yours a cobbler's trade, a hundred acres of ploughed land, or a scholar's garret. Yet, line for line, and point for point, your dominion is as great as theirs, though without fine names. Build, therefore, your own world. As fast as you conform your life to the pure idea in your mind, that will unfold its great proportions." (Emerson's works, i., 77, 78, 79.)

In midsummer of the following year he uttered more startling words. The mind of the country was very widely agitated by the endeavor to prepare the way for the universal acceptance of the multitudinous and ever-increasing revelations of science, by eliminating from the public mind the host of traditional errors that clung to it like barnacles to good ships that return from a long cruise. Invited by the Senior Class in Divinity College to deliver an address before them on a Sunday evening in July, 1838, he spoke of the "defects of historical Christianity," while at the same time he accepted the principles of Christianity as absolute truth—truth from the beginning, and truth that was sure to remain forever. His biographer, with a thorough knowledge of the nature of the questions that were brought into issue, has analyzed the address and stated its meaning with accuracy and precision. When Emerson was met by manifold objections, both to the form of statement that he had chosen for utterance and its inappropriateness to the place in which it had been delivered, to the question why he and his ideas were there, he could only answer for himself and his ideas in the language of his own Rhodora :

"I never thought to ask, I never knew ;
But, in my simple ignorance, suppose,
The self-same power that brought you there brought me."

And when he found some of those whom he greatly esteemed, as well as those to whom he was indifferent, were bent on

making him out to be a heretic, he refused to offer "to make good his thesis against all comers," saying: "I delight in telling what I think, I shall go on just as before, seeing whatever I can, and telling what I see"; and he persistently adhered to the rule which he had established as the rule of his life:

"Lowly faithful, banish fear,
Right onward drive, unharmed."

(Emerson's works, ix., 217.)

Bitter controversy could not be avoided. Emerson in the earliest part of his life had declared of Christianity that "Miracles are not its evidence to us, but the doctrines themselves," yet he took very little part in the strife which broke out and which ended for him in a signal triumph. One of the very ablest writers in New England, the head of a school in theology, himself in private life one of the most estimable of men, sounded a loud clarion and took the field. He was perhaps the unfittest man to take up arms against Emerson, for he admitted none of the special tenets of orthodoxy, not even the theory of the will as defined by Jonathan Edwards with the clearness of light, and now accepted by Huxley with all or most of his brothers in science, as well as by Calvinists of the new school and the old, and he had taken care through the press to let it be known by all his circle that he had reasons for not believing in the Trinity. He planted himself on the assertion that, "Miracles recorded in the New Testament are the only proof of the divine origin of Christianity." (Frothingham's "Life of George Ripley," p. 100.)

In the good old times of orthodoxy, more than a hundred years ago, the church-member was not asked for a belief in Christianity from its historical evidence, but whether he had an inward experience of its truth. The opinions of the deists of the eighteenth century found no home in New England. Edwards used to say that the more the truth of Christianity was discussed purely on historical grounds, the greater was the spread of infidelity; and to show the folly of resting the truth of religion on narratives of the performance of miracles, he puts forward this supposition: A Christian missionary goes out to India to convert its heathen, and when he is asked for his proof of the truth of his religion, answers that its founder performed miracles. "Miracles!" the East Indian would instantly

answer; "my religion had for its proof a hundred miracles to your one."

Ripley had an easy task of it to refute the argument of his opponent; and the strife awakened Theodore Parker to go abroad like a raging Hercules armed with a club. Ripley more quietly persisted in making the American mind familiar with that of the philosophers in the countries of Leibnitz and of Bossuet, and superintended the publication of translations by himself and his friends of works of Cousin and Jouffroy, Benjamin Constant, and others. The series was well received in Boston and through the country. It naturally touched a chord in Paris. Cousin was moved to write over to a friend then residing in Boston, for a copy of the works of Jonathan Edwards. Opinion began to rise, and after many years ripened in Paris, that under the auspices of Emerson there had been a revival of philosophy in and around Boston. It reached the Institute of France. A vacancy occurring in the Academy, of which the admirable Mignet was the perpetual secretary, its members looked the world through for the proper person to fill it, and on account of this influence of Emerson on thought and of the exquisite beauty of his style and the simplicity and integrity with which he had treated philosophical subjects, he out of all candidates in the world was selected as the fittest to receive the appointment to the vacant arm-chair.

In 1847 Emerson published his first and best volumes of poems. Is he to be considered one of the greatest poets? Will he be cherished by the people? Will his fame and his song be transmitted to the latest generations? "The bard," he himself says,

"Must smite the chords rudely and hard,
As with hammer or with mace;
That they may render back
Artful thunder.
Leaving rule and pale forethought,
He shall not his brain encumber
With the coil of rhythm and number."

(Emerson's works, ix., 106, 107.)

No one, therefore, can be surprised if Emerson is sometimes unmelodious. He makes it the primal duty of the orator, and it is equally so of the poet, "to translate a truth into language perfectly intelligible to the person to whom you speak." (Pp. 285,

286.) The verses of Emerson are sometimes difficult to be understood. He finds the subjects of poetry only in nature, whereas the highest poetry leads us into the secret of the passions, relations, and actions of living men and women. Homer treats of men and women, of love and war, of heroes and demigods, and of the gods themselves, is always melodious, and is always clear even to a child. And yet Emerson, though so different from Homer, was a poet; that which he has done best, and which will live longest, is in verse.

"Emerson," so writes Holmes, "is always seeing the universal in the particular; is a citizen of the universe; deals with symbols too vast, sometimes too vague; sees the hidden spiritual meaning of things as Cayley and Sylvester see the meaning of their mysterious formulæ; finds in every phenomenon of nature a hieroglyphic. Others measure and describe the monuments; he reads the sacred inscriptions. How alive he makes Monadnoc! Without the help of tools or workmen, Emerson makes 'Cheshire's haughty hill' stand before us an impersonation of kingly humanity, and talk with us as a god from Olympus might have talked. This is the fascination of his poetry; the sense of the infinite fills it with its majestic presence; he has also a keen delight in the every-day aspects of nature. If Emerson is a careless versifier and rhymers, still in his verse there is something which belongs, indissolubly, sacredly, to his thought. All his earlier verse has a certain freshness which belongs to the first outburst of song in a poetic nature. If in the flights of his imagination he is like the strong-winged bird of passage, in his exquisite choice of descriptive epithets his subtle selective instinct penetrates the vocabulary for the one word he wants." (Pp. 321, 322, 323.)

Thus far our biographer. If we turn to special poems, we find "The Problem" a bit of autobiography. In whatever year it may have been written down, it expresses the thought of Emerson when in his earliest manhood he was still teaching a school in Boston. The ancients have a story of a demigod who as he entered the world was stopped at a cross-road by two personages who, in rivalry with each other, sought to direct him in the choice that he was to make between the two roads for his journey through life. The one offered him the goblet filled to the brim with pleasure; the other, the stern virtues of self-sacrifice for the welfare of his fellow-men. In like manner

Emerson brings back the moment when on his entrance to life two inward voices plead with him. To hear and decide between them, he places himself seemingly before a prelate, one of the most liberal that ever lived — Jeremy Taylor, "the Shakespeare of divines." He must choose whether he will be a seer or a priest; whether he will aspire to the Divinity by intuition, or through the portals of an established church; and Emerson, having in his mind the beautiful, no less than the good and the true, recounts the struggle and his choice in living words that came directly from the soul. Among the fragments of the poetry written by philosophers of antiquity, whether Greek or Roman, nothing of the kind has come down to us that is so good.

Emerson, without entering upon deep scientific researches, gladly received the new teachings of our century.* Tyndall, the man of science, cites from Emerson four lines that excel in beauty of statement and in their truth:

"Thou canst not wave thy staff in air,
Or dip thy paddle in the lake,
But it carves the bow of beauty there,
And the ripples in rhyme the oar forsake."

In like manner our all-observant biographer does not fail to point out how Emerson, many years before the publications of Darwin on the descent of man, wrote:

"The youth reads omens where he goes,
And speaks all languages the rose.
The wood-fly mocks with tiny noise
The far halloo of human voice.
The perfumed berry on the spray
Smacks of faint memories far away.
A subtle chain of countless rings
The next unto the farthest brings,
And, striving to be man, the worm
Mounts through all the spires of form."

These lines find their place in the midst of the most glowing description of the changes wrought in nature when the marble sleep of winter is broken and the happy spring brings all her dowry. They keep their place in the new London edition of

* Tyndall's "Lectures on Light," p. 54.

Emerson's works.* They are left out from their place in the American edition of Emerson's works (ix., 145), perhaps because some of them have been prefixed to one of his prose essays; but that is no reason for excluding them from their original place, unless Emerson of himself, in the full strength of his mind, gave other directions.

On all occasions the mind of Emerson turned to that which was general, to that which concerned the whole. When returning from an excursion into the forest he first learned that telegraph wires had been successfully anchored under the ocean, "the new-found path for thought," he declares,

" Shall lift man's public action to a height
Worthy the enormous cloud of witnesses,
When linked hemispheres attest his deed."

(Emerson's works, ix., 167.)

And it may be that by the closer connection of nations slavery will be abolished, rulers compelled to avoid making themselves the enemies of the human race, and respect for the rights of the half-civilized and the uncivilized find better anchoring-ground in the hearts of mankind.

The criticisms of our wise biographer on Emerson are throughout candid and instructive. As last words of criticism we cite: "We may not be able to assign the reason of the fascination which the poet we have been considering exercises over us; but this we can say, that he lives in the highest atmosphere of thought; that he is always in the presence of the infinite, and ennobles the accidents of human existence so that they partake of the absolute and eternal while he is looking at them; that he unites a royal dignity of manner with the simplicity of primitive nature; that his words and phrases arrange themselves, as if by an elective affinity of their own, with a *curiosa felicitas* which captivates and enthralls the reader who comes fully under its influence; and that through all he sings as in all he says for us we recognize the same serene, high, pure intelligence and moral nature." (Pp. 341, 342.)

It is a matter of interest to know the political opinions of Emerson; and here are those which he held in the years just preceding the year 1840: "Of the two great parties which, at

* Macmillan's edition of Emerson's poems, vol. iii. of his works, and pp. 195, 196.

this hour, almost share the nation between them, I should say that one has the best cause, and the other contains the best men. The philosopher, the poet, or the religious man will, of course, wish to cast his vote with the Democrat, for free trade, for wide suffrage, for the abolition of legal cruelties in the penal code, and for facilitating in every manner the access of the young and the poor to the sources of wealth and power. But he can rarely accept the persons whom the so-called popular party propose to him as representatives of these liberties. On the other side, the Conservative party, composed of the most moderate, able, and cultivated part of the population, is timid, and merely defensive of property. It indicates no right, it aspires to no real good, it brands no crime, it proposes no generous policy, it does not build nor write, nor cherish the arts, nor foster religion, nor establish schools, nor encourage science, nor emancipate the slave, nor befriend the poor, or the Indian, or the immigrant. From neither party, when in power, has the world any benefit to expect in science, art, or humanity, at all commensurate with the resources of the nation." (P. 187.)

When, in the struggle between slavery and free labor, Senator Sumner was struck down by violence, and strong and combined efforts were made to force slavery upon Kansas against the will of its people, Emerson threw aside all the reserve of private life to rouse the people to observation and resolute action. One party set up for its candidate for the presidency a man who had not sufficient force of character to have formed an effective government; and the other, a man who could not be depended upon to resist promptly the movements toward disunion. Emerson, as clearly as any one, perhaps more clearly than any one at the time, saw the enormous dangers that were gathering over the Constitution. At a meeting held in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 10th of September, 1856, he spoke in this wise :

"The hour is coming when the strongest will not be strong enough. A harder task will the new revolution of the nineteenth century be than was the revolution of the eighteenth century. I think the American Revolution bought its glory cheap. If the problem was new, it was simple. If there were few people, they were united, and the enemy three thousand miles off. But now, vast property, gigantic interests, family connections, webs of party, cover the land with a network that immensely multiplies the dangers of war. Fellow-citizens, in these times full of the fate of the republic, I think the towns should hold town meetings, and resolve themselves into com-

mittees of safety, go into permanent sessions, adjourning from week to week, from month to month. I wish we could send the sergeant-at-arms to stop every American who is about to leave the country. Send home every one who is abroad, lest they should find no country to return to. Come home and stay at home, while there is a country to save." (Emerson's works, xi., 248.)

It would certainly be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find any speech, made in the same year, that is marked with so much courage and foresight as this of Emerson. More than five years later, when an officer of the army attempted to open the eyes of the government to the all but infinite difficulties that lay in its path and the vastness of the preparations that were needful for success, he was held to be wild and extravagant in his demands. Even after the inauguration of Lincoln, several months passed away before his Secretary of State or he himself saw the future so clearly as Emerson had foreshadowed it in 1856. He lived to see an end of slavery throughout our land; and in a great old age fell finally asleep, with his wife and with children for his survivors, and with the love and veneration of all who had known him.

When he was established in a home of his own, it became the home of his mother; and the regard he showed her was marked by a singular mixture of veneration and affection, as if he had always in mind the very tender memory of their sorrows in the time when she alone bore all the burden of her orphan children. How he could love a brother is recorded for us in the poem in which he bewails a brother's death; how intense was his tenderness as a father, by the words in which he poured forth his sorrows at the death of one of his sons. He never failed a friend; he never forgot his duty to any human being. He held that men were made to do good to one another; it was no burden to him to receive good offices; and he was never weary of ministering to the wants of others, often with a too lavish generosity. In public affairs his nearest object of affection was that of his town, and he knew how, when he pleased, to guide its councils at its meetings. His next love was his State; next came the Union; and next the federation of the many nations of the human race.

In his principles he did not change throughout his life, and there never was a moment in which he was not true to them. He knew how to "obey the voice at eve obeyed at prime." His

own peace he secured by a tranquillity of mind which never could be disturbed except by wounds that reached his affections. He was an optimist, always full of hope, finding skyborn music in everything, and a power in nature to lift better up to best. He lived always in the enjoyment of universal esteem. While still in the vigor of manhood he had obtained celebrity throughout the nations that lead the culture of the world. Germany was familiar with him through his own works and the able and earnest and most friendly interpretations of them by Herman Grimm. In England his prose and his verse gained alike an ever-increasing audience, and were read and admired in every class of society. The Institute of France showed him honors such as the Academy in elder days had tendered to Benjamin Franklin. At death no one was left alive who was hostile to his good fame or unwilling to extol his virtues. To complete the measure of his happiness, Oliver Wendell Holmes, a favorite with the cultivated English-speaking peoples of two hemispheres, has risen up to be his biographer, and finds that he had no office but to relate how perfect Ralph Waldo Emerson was in sincerity, in the love of justice, and in devotedness to truth, to the beautiful, and to the good.

GEORGE BANCROFT.

NEW DEPARTURES IN EDUCATION.

IF quantity and mechanism are the standards of merit in education, our country excels all others. The American child uses three or four times as many pages of text-books in a year as the European child. In the average excellence of our school-buildings; in the remarkable order and discipline of our school-rooms; in the consummate perfection of our marking systems, by which not only the lesson-getting but often the conduct of the largest classes is graded on a scale so fine and long that no two pupils are alike; in the size of our educational meetings and number of papers read; in the number of our educational journals, now over sixty; in the number of educational publishing houses and the bulk of their productions; in these respects Columbia beats all creation. "At this moment," said the superintendent of schools in a certain large city, taking out his watch, "so many thousand children here are reciting their grammar lesson, and in so many minutes they will all turn to arithmetic." A Sunday-school authority lately declared that as the sun moved across our land, one day in every seven, about seven million children and adults, with little distinction of age or method, would be "on Abraham's sacrifice." Growth in bigness of these many sorts, with statistical illustrations, is the theme of many school reports, addresses, etc., and horizontal expansion has its inspirations. Although, compared with other lands, we almost never have the best in education, we rarely have the worst. But the very vastness, uniformity, and average mechanical excellence of our school system as a whole, admirable as it is in itself, and indispensable as it is for all higher developments, make it less plastic than it should be to the rapidly deepening apprehensions of the very complex conditions of setting children to learn what humanity has toiled to discover and striven to do and be in the world. Our printed courses of study, often so detailed and

exiguous as to destroy all the teacher's freedom and initiative, and our examination papers and exhibitions, which too often more than make up for lack of thoroughness by the number of studies begun, show off the children so well that we forget that many of our schools are, as has been said, working out here the problem that China has solved so well, viz., how to instruct and not develop. Worst of all is the attempt of the so-called philosophy of this mechanism to meet the rising demand that the school shall do something for morals, by so distinguishing between the functions of church, state, family, and school, that only the above-named methods seem proper for the latter; when the fact is, the only thing that can ever undermine our school system in popular support is a suspicion that it does not moralize as well as mentalize children. This antiquated philosophy of education has no open questions, except into which pigeon-hole, in a predetermined system, new facts and ideas shall go; and it quite forgets that rudiments of the studies are not first principles (at least save in exact sciences, and rarely there), and that the logical order in which subjects are best apprehended by the adult or scientific mind is very different from, and often inconsistent with, the arts of adaptation. This is what we now mean by the "old" in education. It has done great things for us in the past, and is an indispensable basis for future progress. Its danger is complacency and routine; and when we reflect on the sad fatality by which everything in education always tends to gravitate toward the worst, without great and unremitting effort and enthusiasm,—a worst that involves national decay and even calamity,—it may be well to ask ourselves whether such a system is not, on the whole, better adapted to educate henchmen of political and other bosses, civil and religious, than freemen, and to enfeeble moral and muscular fiber, and breed actual distrust for books and mental culture by cram.

The new education, on the other hand (if we may venture to indicate roughly the ever-shifting line between the old and the new in this field), holds that there is one thing in nature, and one alone, fit to inspire all true men and women with more awe and reverence than Kant's starry heavens, and that is the soul and the body of the healthy young child. Heredity has freighted it with all the accumulated results of parental well and ill doing, and filled it with reverberations from a past more vast than science can explore; and on its right development

depends the entire future of civilization two or three decades hence. Simple as childhood seems, there is nothing harder to know; and responsive as it is to every influence about it, nothing is harder to guide. To develop childhood to virtue, power, and due freedom is the supreme end of education, to which everything else should be subordinated as means. Just as to command inanimate nature we must constantly study, love, obey her, so to control child nature we must first, and perhaps still more piously, study, love, obey it. The best of us teachers have far more to learn from children than we can ever hope to teach them; and what we succeed in teaching, at least beyond the merest rudiments, will always be proportionate to the knowledge we have the wit to get from and about them.

Every important advance or reform in the history of education has been in large measure due to new insights into the nature of childhood, dispelling the mazes of error that are spun with such strange persistence and abundance through the minds of adults about it. There is a partition that insensibly rises between the adult and the child, as between the educated and the uneducated mind, which must be laboriously broken down. Pestalozzi dressed, washed, combed, aired, and slept in the midst of his pauper school-children, shared all their joys and sorrows, and effected his reforms because he had at last come to live in their world, and learned and told something new of childhood. Locke, Froebel, Herbart, Hamilton, Bell, Lancaster, Stowe, Wilderspen, Necker, and most of the teachers whose work and words it is worth our while to ponder in the history of education, studied children, often in a systematic way, as a naturalist studies the instincts of insects and animals; and their exhortation is to follow, observe, adapt to the nature of childhood. Knowledge of the subject to be taught, though so commonly defective, is only the beginning of the teacher's wisdom, especially in all primary and intermediate education. He must look solely at the pupil, and sacrifice, if need be, any method or logical order to the law of exigency, which requires instruction to be given whenever, wherever, and however interest is hottest and curiosity most alert. Premature, belated, ill-adapted information, given without determining just how much knowledge can be presupposed as the point of departure, this is the cram that makes bad, collapsible mental tissue, because not thoroughly digested and assimilated, and originates that worst product

of artificial methods, a dislike of study and knowledge. All possible, or at least all common errors liable to arise in childish minds at each point of each study, or the great source of ignorance as it may be called, should be carefully studied. To secure some practical knowledge of this kind of juvenile psychology, which should determine the matter as well as the method of teaching, is the object of the graduate courses in pedagogy, or of the almost gratuitous year of probationary apprenticeship now required in several European countries before even the best scholars are allowed to teach. It also explains the partial truth of the monitorial system, that those could teach a subject best who had just learned it, and who also knew the style and language of the learners.

The new education of to-day looks at quality rather than quantity, and has chiefly in view two things: first, methods that are natural, and secondly, educational values—the highest of all kinds of value in the world. When we speak of truth for its own sake, apart from all utilities, we mean its purely educational value. In this sense it is well said that all sciences, religions, states, etc., exist and are good only because and in so far as they develop man. It is plain that the wisest of the founders of our political institutions realized far more than most of us do, that in a country so free and so new, and without authority, precedent, or tradition, only intelligence could control the conditions of human development. Narrow as their views of education were, they felt that in a peculiar sense it must be no less fundamental in a republic like ours than in Plato's, where all problems were ultimately educational ones. The chief specialty of our country must be education, if she is to maintain her place among the powers of the civilized world. Here the wisdom of true statesmanship must culminate. The law-givers that will rule our land in the next century should and must study well the problems of education. Scientifically, too, the next problem is, undoubtedly, man and his faculties, first to know and then to control the conditions of his development—a most important aspect of the whole problem. The question how high a development man can reach, the fundamental question of civilizations, is likely, or at least ought, to be solved more consciously, and with more design and intelligence here than elsewhere; and hence, too, the great and peculiar significance of our very few educational institutions of highest rank.

One of the most hopeful things in education is the dawn of better and more objective ways of studying the mind and its growth. The old-fashioned philosophies on which so many present methods of teaching are based, which are still well intrenched in most of our normal schools, seem imposing with their vast generalization, but are too introspective for youth, are formal, and where most absolute, least harmonious among themselves. They have done great good, and it is not needful here to point out their grave defects. But better and more modern methods of research into the phenomena and laws of the soul, more consonant with the demands of modern and especially American life and thought, as specialized and coöperative as science, slowly doing over again the work of the great thinkers of the past century, and without losing their positive result, removing their limitations, enriching and applying their insights—these are now slowly but surely working out a true natural history of man's nascent faculties. Here is the heart of the pedagogy of to-day and of to-morrow, where the science and philosophy of education join friendly hands with the practical teacher, and here he who would speak with authority and be heard in the new departure already ripening, must study with patience and love the psychology of the growing, playing, learning child and youth. Thus alone we can, in the language of Socrates in the *Laches*, make the education of the children our own education.

As thus the questions that were once thought settled by the old philosophy slowly open, it becomes every day plainer that he will do most for the education of the future who can make original contribution to the anthropology of childhood; for, imposing as any school system may be, it is good and will endure only as it represents and fits the nature and needs of children. Even in discussing such questions as the form, slant, and height of seat in school, the lighting, heating, ventilation, and size of rooms, the duration and frequency of recess, the number of studies, the length of lessons, the best part of the day for study, the best form and size of type and script, the best position in writing, the best size of classes, etc.,—points that are now much in debate,—it is to the physical nature of childhood that we must ever turn for a solution, to which he alone makes real contribution who brings new facts about juvenile physiology and hygiene. It is most readily granted that the tact, skill, and insight of those few who are born lovers and leaders of children and youth, like

Socrates, may be always trusted to make these observations by rapid intuition and adapt their work to juvenile nature by instinct. This is true genius, and always does its work better than any rules or methods that art can prescribe; but, though found in nearly all ranks and places, it is too rare, too suspected, and too often intimidated to be relied upon to keep our vast system *en rapport* with the real needs of children. Froebel recommended that when a child was born, each parent should open a "life-book," in which should be recorded the stages of its physical and mental growth, good and bad influences and qualities, all striking incidents, experiences, and peculiarities, and the parents' own endeavors, motives, fears, hopes, and plans in rearing the child; and that this book should be kept without the child's knowledge, to be given to him at maturity as a guide to aid his choice of profession or calling, physical regimen, etc. The study of child life has already produced a series of valuable pamphlets, mostly by foreign scientific men, containing records of their observations on their own infants, in a few cases carried on into the second decade of life. The same individual and objective method is already in use in the study of idiots, the blind, the deaf, criminals, and the insane, where detailed monographs devoted to a single individual or family are of much value. Applied to animals, it has in the past ten years taught us more of the habits and instincts of beavers, spiders, bees, ants, birds, etc., than all that was known of them before. Most of the writings of Francis Galton and Candolle are in this line, and those interested in anthropology find before them a field as wide as it is new.

As, after all, comparatively little of what is now being done has found its way into print, it may be of interest to say that already, in this country, many teachers are carefully exploring, by many ingenious ways, with due precautions against both harm to the child and error in the results, the minds of individual children of all ages, one after another; carefully noting all important points in the environment, with a view to get at last, when hundreds of records are carefully compared, a better and more objective picture of the inward growth of our faculties, serviceable alike for science and for the practical work of teaching. One observer makes a specialty of the plays and games of children, favorite toys, play-house architecture, play-ground rounds, the romances spun about dolls, pets, charms, flower oracles, jargons, etc., or gathers all the literature of the subject;

assuming that, in a way, the amount of play-instinct measures the capacity for culture, and with, perhaps, the ulterior question in view, how this instinct can be made more educative. Another questions teachers, and yet another circulates questions for older pupils to answer in writing; and thus much useless but always some valuable matter is collected. Several parents preserve with care, and unknown to the child, every attempt at graphic representations, with pencil or pen, made by their children before positive instruction begins, dated and kept in order in a portfolio or scrap-book. Others make careful studies of child vocabularies; and in the schools of one of our largest cities, the teachers are obliged to keep a record of all the errors in English, including spelling and pronunciation and syntax. Others observe and record everything illustrating the childish sense of justice, or truth and honesty, or friendship and affection, or even cases of conscience, etc. Teeth, eyes, hearing, physical measurements of several sorts, including weight, height, girths, strength, school athletics, school and college journalism,—all these rubrics and more are exciting specialized attention. Many parents keep more general records of the ways and words of their children, with no method or order, but sure to be of value to this new line of interest. Some work of this sort should be required of every normal-school pupil, and when its methods are fully organized it will do much toward making education more of a science, or rather, which is far better, a profession.

By such methods as this, greatly elaborated and perfected by the study of modern psychology, the history of education, and anthropology, we shall know better than now the lines of strongest interest and curiosity in children during each of the main periods of immaturity, and in what order, directions, and rapidity their capacities unfold and may be safely set to work, and how much. Without more knowledge of this kind, the vast power that our school-machinery gives over the development of the child is dangerous. It is acquisition along the lines of least resistance thus ascertained that makes education truly "liberal," whether elementary or advanced. It is this that makes our colleges so much more effective under the elective system, which makes its way wherever the increased expenditure for instructors can be met. To some taste of such truly liberal education every child has a right, and without it, however

schooling, he knows nothing of the exquisite joy of rapid mental growth. By it the evils of forcing and overwork will become less grave. In this way only is it safe to keep on widening the sphere of culture, utilizing the instincts of play, industry, imitation, fancy, and emulation, and turning everything to educational account. We question whether a modern Socrates would try to repress rather than to utilize and direct the Greek-letter fraternities, athletics, journalism, etc., that are sometimes apparently regarded as the noxious bilge-water of American colleges. For the average collegian, such non-examinable elements do probably more for life than what is derived from the curriculum. Parents regard these things too lightly, and the easy-going, non-paternal system of college government either carefully ignores it, often to the grave moral and mental harm of students, or if it interferes, does it with so little knowledge of human nature at this most peculiar stage, that the whole institution is unsettled. As the unforced opinions of young men are said to be the best materials for prophecy, so it is the voluntary interests that determine all academic ideals. On these interests and spontaneities of youth, all our educational establishments float as on a sea. If they fail, any one of them, these are stranded, and our wisdom is to study well in order well to navigate these still mysterious and propulsive tides. A good method of recommending knowledge to the young, and thus of teaching, is one of the most effective bulwarks against a slow relapse to barbarism, because by it knowledge and all its benign influences slowly filter more effectively down from the higher to the lower intelligences. But all methods, curricula, and programs perish with their representatives, if persisted in from habit or convenience, after the all-controlling needs of childhood have found a better way. Hence, the danger for institutions and men of being left behind, which was never greater in this country than to-day, where progress in these directions is so rapid.

There is now a demand for teachers of education, that is not likely to grow less, in a number of our best colleges, the presidents of which have taken up the lantern of Diogenes in earnest, and, it is to be hoped, not in vain. The work of public-school superintendence has lately become more professional in many parts of the country, and is also increasingly lucrative. Great educational progress is sure to be made in the near future in most of the Western States, where the interest is now far deeper

and more intense than ever; while the South is about to open to new departures to which hitherto she has been a comparative stranger. Within the domains of psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, medical and sanitary science, and jurisprudence, and even religion, various aspects of education and even of child-study are now recognized special departments. In view of these facts and many more, the writer is of the opinion that there is now no line of intellectual work to which a young baccalaureate can devote himself with greater certainty that industry and ability will find their reward in usefulness, reputation, and position than to the professional study of the theory and history and institutions of education.

G. STANLEY HALL.

THE CERTAINTY OF ENDLESS PUNISHMENT.

THE chief objections to the doctrine of endless punishment are not Biblical but speculative. The great majority of students and exegetes find the tenet in the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures. Davidson, the most learned of English rationalistic critics, explicitly acknowledges that "if a specific sense be attached to words, never-ending misery is enunciated in the Bible. On the presumption that one doctrine is taught, it is the eternity of hell torments. Bad exegesis may attempt to banish it from the New Testament Scriptures, but it is still there, and expositors who wish to get rid of it, as Canon Farrar does, injure the cause they have in view by misrepresentation. It must be allowed that the New Testament record not only makes Christ assert everlasting punishment, but Paul and John. But the question should be looked at from a larger platform than single texts — in the light of God's attributes, and the nature of the soul. The destination of man, and the Creator's infinite goodness, conflicting as they do with everlasting punishment, remove it from the sphere of rational belief. If provision be not made in revelation for a change of moral character after death, it is made in reason. Philosophical considerations must not be set aside even by scripture." (Last Things, pp. 133, 136, 151.)

So long, then, as the controversy is carried on by an appeal to the Bible, the defender of endless retribution has comparatively an easy task. But when the appeal is made to human feeling and sentiment, or to ratiocination, the demonstration requires more effort. And yet the doctrine is not only Biblical but rational. It is defensible on the basis of sound ethics and pure reason. Nothing is requisite for its maintenance but the admission of three cardinal truths of theism, namely, that there is a just God; that man has free will; and that sin is voluntary action. If

these are denied, there can be no defense of endless punishment — or of any other doctrine, except atheism and its corollaries.

The Bible and all the creeds of Christendom affirm man's free agency in sinning against God. The transgression which is to receive the endless punishment is voluntary. Sin, whether it be inward inclination or outward act, is unforced human agency. This is the uniform premise of Christian theologians of all schools. Endless punishment supposes the liberty of the human will, and is impossible without it. Could a man prove that he is necessitated in his murderous hate and his murderous act, he would prove, in this very proof, that he ought not to be punished for it, either in time or eternity. Could Satan really convince himself that his moral character is not his own work, but that of God, or of nature, his remorse would cease, and his punishment would end. Self-determination runs parallel with hell.

Guilt, then, is what is punished, and not misfortune. Free and not forced agency is what feels the stroke of justice. What, now, is this stroke? What do law and justice do when they punish? Everything depends upon the right answer to this question. The fallacies and errors of Universalism find their nest and hiding-place at this point. The true definition of punishment detects and excludes them.

Punishment is neither chastisement nor calamity. Men suffer calamity, says Christ, not because they or their parents have sinned, "but that the works of God should be made manifest in them." John ix. 3. Chastisement is inflicted in order to develop a good but imperfect character already formed. "The Lord loveth whom he chasteneth," and "what son is he whom the earthly father chasteneth not?" Hebrews xii. 6, 7. Punishment, on the other hand, is retribution, and is not intended to do the work of either calamity or chastisement, but a work of its own. And this work is to vindicate law, to satisfy justice. Punishment, therefore, is wholly retrospective in its primary aim. It looks back at what has been done in the past. Its first and great object is requital. A man is hung for murder, principally and before all other reasons because he has voluntarily transgressed the law forbidding murder. He is not hung from a prospective aim, such as his own moral improvement, or for the purpose of deterring others from committing murder. The remark of the English judge to the horse-thief, in the days when such theft was capitally punished, "You are not hung be-

cause you have stolen a horse, but that horses may not be stolen," has never been regarded as eminently judicial. It is true that personal improvement may be one consequence of the infliction of penalty. But the consequence must not be confounded with the purpose. *Oum hoc non ergo propter hoc.* The criminal may come to see and confess that his crime deserves its punishment, and in genuine unselfish penitence may take sides with the law, approve its retribution, and go into the presence of the Final Judge, relying upon that great atonement which satisfies eternal justice for sin; but even this, the greatest personal benefit of all, is not what is aimed at in man's punishment of the crime of murder. For should there be no such personal benefit as this attending the infliction of the human penalty, the one sufficient reason for inflicting it still holds good, namely, the fact that the law has been violated, and demands the death of the offender for this reason simply and only. "The notion of ill-desert and punishableness," says Kant (*Praktische Vernunft*, 151. Ed. Rosenkranz), "is necessarily implied in the idea of voluntary transgression; and the idea of punishment excludes that of happiness in all its forms. For though he who inflicts punishment may, it is true, also have a benevolent purpose to produce by the punishment some good effect upon the criminal, yet the punishment must be justified, first of all, as pure and simple requital and retribution: that is, as a kind of suffering that is demanded by the law without any reference to its prospective beneficial consequences; so that even if no moral improvement and no personal advantage should subsequently accrue to the criminal, he must acknowledge that justice has been done to him, and his experience is exactly conformed to his conduct. In every instance of punishment, properly so called, justice is the very first thing, and constitutes the essence of it. A benevolent purpose and a happy effect, it is true, may be conjoined with punishment; but the criminal cannot claim this as his due, and he has no right to reckon upon it. All that he deserves is punishment, and this is all that he can expect from the law which he has transgressed." These are the words of as penetrating and ethical a thinker as ever lived.

Neither is it true, that the first and principal aim of punishment is the protection of society and the public good. This, like the personal benefit in the preceding case, is only secondary and incidental. The public good is not a sufficient reason for

putting a man to death; but the satisfaction of law is. This view of penalty is most disastrous in its influence, as well as false in its ethics. For if the good of the public is the true reason and object of punishment, the amount of it may be fixed by the end in view. The criminal may be made to suffer more than his crime deserves, if the public welfare, in suppressing this particular kind of crime, requires it. His personal desert and responsibility not being the one sufficient reason for his suffering, he may be made to suffer as much as the public safety requires. It was this theory of penalty that led to the multiplication of capital offenses. The prevention of forgery, it was once claimed in England, required that the forger should forfeit his life, and upon the principle that punishment is for the public protection, and not for strict and exact justice, an offense against human property was expiated by human life. Contrary to the Noachic statute, which punishes only murder with death, this statute weighed out man's life-blood against pounds, shillings, and pence. On this theory, the number of capital offenses became very numerous and the criminal code very bloody. So that, in the long run, nothing is kinder than exact justice. It prevents extremes in either direction—either that of indulgence or that of cruelty.

This theory breaks down, from whatever point it be looked at. Suppose that there were but one person in the universe. If he should transgress the law of God, then, upon the principle of expediency as the ground of penalty, this solitary subject of moral government could not be punished—that is, visited with a suffering that is purely retributive, and not exemplary or corrective. His act has not injured the public, for there is no public. There is no need of his suffering as an example to deter others, for there are no others. But upon the principle of justice, in distinction from expediency, this solitary subject of moral government could be punished.

The vicious ethics of this theory of penalty expresses itself in the demoralizing maxim, "It is better that ten guilty men should escape than that one innocent man should suffer." But this is no more true than the converse, "It is better that ten innocent men should suffer than that one guilty man should escape." It is a choice of equal evil and equal injustice. In either case alike, justice is trampled down. In the first supposed case, there are eleven instances of injustice and wrong; and in the last sup-

posed case, there are likewise eleven instances of injustice and wrong. Unpunished guilt is precisely the same species of evil with punished innocence. To say, therefore, that it is better that ten guilty persons should escape than that one innocent man should suffer, is to say that it is better that there should be ten wrongs than one wrong against justice.

The theory that punishment is retributive honors human nature, but the theory that it is merely expedient and useful degrades it. If justice be the true ground of penalty, man is treated as a person; but if the public good is the ground, he is treated as a chattel or a thing. When suffering is judicially inflicted because of the intrinsic gravity and real demerit of crime, man's free will and responsibility are recognized and put in the foreground; and these are his highest and distinguishing attributes. The sufficient reason for his suffering is found wholly within his own person, in the exercise of self-determination. He is not seized by the magistrate and made to suffer for a reason extraneous to his own agency, and for the sake of something lying wholly outside of himself—namely, the safety and happiness of others—but because of his own act. He is not handled like a brute or an inanimate thing that may be put to good use; but he is recognized as a free and voluntary person, who is punished not because punishment is expedient and useful, but because it is just and right; not because the public safety requires it, but because he owes it. The dignity of the man himself, founded in his lofty but hazardous endowment of free will, is acknowledged.

Supposing it, now, to be conceded, that future punishment is retributive in its essential nature, it follows that it must be endless from the nature of the case. For, suffering must continue as long as the reason for it continues. In this respect, it is like law, which lasts as long as its reason lasts: *ratione cessante, cessat ipsa lex*. Suffering that is educational and corrective may come to an end, because moral infirmity, and not guilt, is the reason for its infliction; and moral infirmity may cease to exist. But suffering that is penal can never come to an end, because guilt is the reason for its infliction, and guilt once incurred never ceases to be. The lapse of time does not convert guilt into innocence, as it converts moral infirmity into moral strength; and therefore no time can ever arrive when the guilt of the criminal will cease to deserve and demand its retribution. The reason for retribution to-day is a reason forever. Hence, when God disciplines

and educates his children, he causes only a temporary suffering. In this case, "He will not keep his anger forever." Ps. ciii. 9. But when, as the Supreme Judge, he punishes rebellious and guilty subjects of his government, he causes an endless suffering. In this case, "their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." Mark ix. 48.

The real question therefore, is, whether God ever punishes. That he chastises, is not disputed. But does he ever inflict a suffering that is not intended to reform the transgressor, and does not reform him, but is intended simply and only to vindicate law, and satisfy justice, by requiting him for his transgression? Revelation teaches that he does. "Vengeance is mine; I will repay, saith the Lord." Rom. xii. 19. Retribution is here asserted to be a function of the Supreme Being, and his alone. The creature has no right to punish, except as he is authorized by the Infinite Ruler. "The powers that be are ordained of God. The ruler is the minister of God, an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil." Rom. xiii. 1, 4. The power which civil government has to punish crime—the private person having no such power—is only a delegated right from the Source of retribution. Natural religion, as well as revealed, teaches that God inflicts upon the voluntary transgressor of law a suffering that is purely vindictive of law. The pagan sages enunciate the doctrine, and it is mortised into the moral constitution of man, as is proved by his universal fear of retribution. The objection, that a suffering not intended to reform but to satisfy justice is cruel and unworthy of God, is refuted by the question of St. Paul: "Is God unrighteous who taketh vengeance? God forbid: for how then shall God judge the world?" Rom. iii. 5, 6. It is impossible either to found or administer a government, in heaven or upon earth, unless the power to punish crime is conceded.

The endlessness of future punishment, then, is implied in the endlessness of guilt and condemnation. When a crime is condemned, it is absurd to ask, "How long is it condemned?" The verdict "Guilty for ten days" was Hibernian. Damnation means absolute and everlasting damnation. All suffering in the next life, therefore, of which the sufficient and justifying reason is guilt, must continue as long as the reason continues; and the reason is everlasting. If it be righteous to-day, in God's retributive justice, to smite the transgressor because he violated the

law yesterday, it is righteous to do the same thing to-morrow, and the next day, and so on *ad infinitum*; because the state of the case *ad infinitum* remains unaltered. The guilt incurred yesterday is a standing and endless fact. What, therefore, guilt legitimates this instant, it legitimates every instant, and forever.

It may be objected that, though the guilt and damnation of a crime be endless, it does not follow that the suffering inflicted on account of it must be endless also, even though it be retributive and not reformatory in its intent. A human judge pronounces a theft to be endlessly a theft, and a thief to be endlessly a thief, but he does not sentence the thief to an endless suffering, though he sentences him to a penal suffering. But this objection overlooks the fact that human punishment is only approximate and imperfect, not absolute and perfect like the Divine. It is not adjusted exactly and precisely to the whole guilt of the offense, but is more or less modified, first, by not considering its relation to God's honor and majesty; secondly, by human ignorance of the inward motives; and, thirdly, by social expediency. Earthly courts and judges look at the transgression of law with reference only to man's temporal relations, not his eternal. They punish an offense as a crime against the State, not as a sin against God. Neither do they look into the human heart, and estimate crime in its absolute and intrinsic nature, as does the Searcher of Hearts and the Omniscient Judge. A human tribunal punishes mayhem, we will say, with six months' imprisonment, because it does not take into consideration either the malicious and wicked anger that prompted the maiming, or the dishonor done to the Supreme Being by the transgression of his commandment. But Christ, in the final assize, punishes this offense endlessly, because his All-seeing view includes the sum-total of guilt in the case; namely, the inward wrath, the outward act, and the relation of both to the infinite perfection and adorable majesty of God. The human tribunal does not punish the inward anger at all; the Divine tribunal punishes it with hell fire: "For whosoever shall say to his brother, Thou fool, is in danger of hell fire." Matt. v. 22. The human tribunal punishes seduction with a pecuniary fine, because it does not take cognizance of the selfish and heartless lust that prompted it, or of the affront offered to that Immaculate Holiness which from Sinai proclaimed, "Thou shalt not commit adultery." But the Divine tribunal punishes

seduction with an infinite suffering, because of its more comprehensive and truthful view of the whole transaction.

Again, human punishment, unlike the Divine, is variable and inexact, because it is to a considerable extent reformatory and protective. Human government is not intended to do the work of the Supreme Ruler. The sentence of an earthly judge is not a substitute for that of the last day. Consequently, human punishment need not be marked, even if this were possible, with all that absoluteness and exactness of justice which characterizes the Divine. Justice in the human sphere may be relaxed by expediency. The retributive element must, indeed, enter into human punishment; for no man may be punished by a human tribunal unless he deserves punishment—unless he is a criminal. But retribution is not the sole element when man punishes. Man, while not overlooking the guilt in the case, has some reference to the reformation of the offender, and still more to the protection of society. Civil expediency and social utility modify exact and strict retribution. For the sake of reforming the criminal, the judge sometimes inflicts a penalty that is less than the real guilt of the offense. For the sake of protecting society, the court sometimes sentences the criminal to a suffering greater than his crime deserves. Human tribunals, also, vary the punishment for the same offense—sometimes punishing forgery capitally, and sometimes not; sometimes sentencing those guilty of the same kind of theft to one year's imprisonment, and sometimes to two.

But the Divine tribunal, in the last great day, is invariably and exactly just, because it is neither reformatory nor protective. Hell is not a penitentiary. It is righteous retribution, pure and simple, unmodified by considerations either of utility to the criminal, or of safety to the universe. Christ, in the day of final account, will not punish wicked men and devils (for the two receive the same sentence, and go to the same place, Matt. xxv. 41), either for the sake of reforming them, or of protecting the righteous from the wicked. His punishment at that time will be nothing but retribution. The Redeemer of men is also the Eternal Judge; the Lamb of God is also the Lion of the tribe of Judah; and his righteous word to wicked and hardened Satan, to wicked and hardened Judas, to wicked and hardened Pope Alexander VI., will be: "Vengeance is mine; I will repay. Depart from me, ye cursed, that work iniquity." Rom. xii. 19;

Matt. xxv. 41 ; vii. 23. The wicked will reap according as they have sown. The suffering will be unerringly adjusted to the intrinsic guilt: no greater and no less than the sin deserves. "That servant which knew his lord's will [clearly], and did not according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not [clearly], and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes. As many as have sinned without [written] law, shall also perish without [written] law; and as many as have sinned under [written] law, shall be judged by the [written] law." **Luke xii. 47, 48 ; Rom. ii. 12.**

It is because the human court, by reason of its ignorance both of the human heart and the true nature of sin against a spiritual law and a holy God, cannot do the perfect work of the Divine tribunal, that human laws and penalties are only provisional, and not final. Earthly magistrates are permitted to modify and relax penalty, and pass a sentence which, though adapted to man's earthly circumstances, is not absolute and perfect, and is finally to be revised and made right by the omniscient accuracy of God. The human penalty that approaches nearest to the Divine is capital punishment. There is more of the purely retributive element in this than in any other. The reformatory element is wanting. And this punishment has a kind of endlessness. Death is a finality. It forever separates the murderer from earthly society, even as future punishment separates forever from the society of God and heaven.

The argument thus far goes to prove that retribution in distinction from correction, or punishment in distinction from chastisement, is endless from the nature of the case. We pass, now, to prove that it is also rational and right.

1. Endless punishment is rational, in the first place, because it is supported by the human conscience. The sinner's own conscience will "bear witness" and approve of the condemning sentence, "in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ." **Rom. ii. 16.** Dives, in the parable, when reminded of the justice of his suffering, is silent. Accordingly, all the evangelical creeds say with the Westminster (Larger Catechism, 89) that "the wicked, upon clear evidence and full conviction of their own consciences, shall have the just sentence of condemnation pronounced against them." If in the great day there are any innocent men who have no accusing consciences, they will escape hell. We may accommodate St. Paul's

words, Rom. xiii. 3, 4, and say: "The final judgment is not a terror to good works but to evil. Wilt thou, then, not be afraid of the final judgment? Keep the law of God perfectly, without a single slip or failure, inwardly or outwardly, and thou shalt have praise of the same. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid." But a sentence that is justified by the highest and best part of the human constitution must be founded in reason, justice, and truth. It is absurd to object to a judicial decision that is confirmed by the man's own immediate consciousness of its righteousness. And, as matter of fact, the opponent of endless retribution does not draw his arguments from the impartial conscience, but from the bias of self-love and desire for happiness. His objections are not ethical, but sentimental. They are not seen in the dry light of pure truth and reason, but through the colored medium of self-indulgence and love of ease and sin.

Again: a guilty conscience expects endless punishment. There is in it what the Scripture denominates "the fearful looking-for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries" of God. Hebrew x. 27. This is the awful apprehension of an evil that is to last forever; otherwise, it would not be so "fearful." The knowledge that future suffering will one day cease would immediately relieve the awful apprehension of the sinner. A guilty conscience is in its very nature hopeless. Impenitent men, in their remorse, "sorrow as those who have no hope." 1 Thess. iv. 13; "having no hope, and without God in the world." Eph. ii. 12. "The hope of the wicked shall be as the giving up of the ghost." Job xi. 20. "The hypocrite's hope shall perish." Job viii. 13. Consequently, the great and distinguishing element in hell-torment is despair, a feeling that is simply impossible in any man or fallen angel who knows that he is finally to be happy forever. Despair results from the endlessness of retribution. No endlessness, no despair. Natural religion, as well as revealed, teaches the despair of some men in the future life. Plato (*Gorgias* 525), Pindar (*Olympia II.*), Plutarch (*De sera vindicta*), describe the punishment of the incorrigibly wicked as eternal and hopeless.

In Scripture, there is no such thing as eternal hope. Hope is a characteristic of earth and time only. Here in this life, all men may hope for forgiveness. "Turn, ye prisoners of hope." Zech. ix. 2. "Now is the accepted time; now is the day of sal-

vation." 2 Cor. vi. 2. But in the next world there is no hope of any kind, because there is either fruition or despair. The Christian's hope is converted into its realization: "For what a man seeth, why doth he yet hope for it?" Rom. viii. 24. And the impenitent sinner's hope of heaven is converted into despair. Canon Farrar's phrase "eternal hope" is derived from Pandora's box, not from the Bible. Dante's legend over the portal of hell is the truth: "All hope abandon, ye who enter here."

That conscience supports endless retribution, is also evinced by the universality and steadiness of the dread of it. Mankind believe in hell, as they believe in the Divine Existence, by reason of their moral sense. Notwithstanding all the attack made upon the tenet in every generation, by a fraction of every generation, men do not get rid of their fear of future punishment. Skeptics themselves are sometimes distressed by it. But a permanent and general fear among mankind cannot be produced by a mere chimera, or a pure figment of the imagination. Men have no fear of Rhadamanthus, nor can they be made to fear him, because they know that there is no such being. "An idol is nothing in the world." 1 Cor. viii. 4. But men have "the fearful looking-for of judgment" from the lips of God, ever and always. If the Biblical hell were as much a nonentity as the heathen Atlantis, no one would waste his time in endeavoring to prove its non-existence. What man would seriously construct an argument to demonstrate that there is no such being as Jupiter Ammon, or such an animal as the centaur? The very denial of endless retribution evinces by its spasmodic eagerness and effort to disprove the tenet, the firmness with which it is intrenched in man's moral constitution. If there really were no hell, absolute indifference toward the notion would long since have been the mood of all mankind, and no arguments, either for or against it, would be constructed.

And finally, the demand, even here upon earth, for the punishment of the intensely and incorrigibly wicked proves that retribution is grounded in the human conscience. When abominable and satanic sin is temporarily triumphant, as it sometimes has been in the history of the world, men cry out to God for his vengeance to come down. "If there were no God, we should be compelled to invent one," is now a familiar sentiment. "If there were no hell, we should be compelled to invent one," is equally true. When examples of great depravity occur, man cries:

"How long, O Lord, how long?" The non-infliction of retribution upon hardened villainy and successful cruelty causes anguish in the moral sense. For the expression of it, read the imprecatory psalms and Milton's sonnet on the Massacre in Piedmont.

2. In the second place, endless punishment is rational, because of the endlessness of sin. If the preceding view of the relation of penalty to guilt be correct, endless punishment is just, without bringing the sin of the future world into the account. Man incurs everlasting punishment for "the things done in his body." 2 Cor. v. 10. Christ sentences men to perdition, not for what they are going to do in eternity, but for what they have already done in time. It is not necessary that a man should commit all kinds of sin, or that he should sin a very long time, in order to be a sinner. "Whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all." James ii. 10. One sin makes guilt, and guilt makes hell.

But while this is so, it is a fact to be observed, that sin is actually being added to sin, in the future life, and the amount of guilt is accumulating. The lost spirit is "treasuring up wrath." Rom. ii. 5. Hence, there are degrees in the intensity of endless suffering. The difference in the grade arises from the greater resoluteness of the wicked self-determination, and the greater degree of light that was enjoyed upon earth. He who sins against the moral law as it is drawn out in the Sermon on the Mount sins more determinedly and desperately than the pagan who sins against the light of nature. There are probably no men in paganism who sin so willfully and devilishly as some men in Christendom. Profanity, or the blaspheming of God, is a Christian and not a Heathen characteristic. There are degrees in future suffering, because it is infinite in duration only. In intensity, it is finite. Consequently, the lost do not all suffer precisely alike, though all suffer the same length of time. A thing may be infinite in one respect and finite in others. A line may be infinite in length, and not in breadth and depth. A surface may be infinite in length and breadth, and not in depth. And two persons may suffer infinitely in the sense of endlessly, and yet one experience more pain than the other.

The endlessness of sin results, first, from the nature and energy of sinful self-determination. Sin is the creature's act solely. God does not work in the human will when it wills

antagonistically to him. Consequently, self-determination to evil is an extremely vehement activity of the will. There is no will so willful as a wicked will. Sin is stubborn and obstinate in its nature, because it is enmity and rebellion. Hence, wicked will intensifies itself perpetually. Pride, left to itself, increases and never diminishes. Enmity and hatred become more and more satanic. "Sin," says South, "is the only perpetual motion which has yet been found out, and needs nothing but a beginning to keep it incessantly going on." Upon this important point, Aristotle, in the seventh book of his *Ethics*, reasons with great truth and impressiveness. He distinguishes between *ἀκολασία* and *ἀρπαγία*; between strong will to wickedness and weak self-indulgence. The former is viciousness from deliberation and preference, and implies an intense determination to evil in the man. He goes wrong, not so much from the pull of appetite and passion, as purposely, knowingly, and energetically. He has great strength of will, and he puts it all forth in resolute wickedness. The latter quality is more the absence than the presence of will; it is the weakness and irresolution of a man who has no powerful self-determination of any kind. The condition of the former of these two men, Aristotle regarded as worse than that of the latter. He considered it to be desperate and hopeless. The evil is incurable. Repentance and reformation are impossible to this man; for the wickedness in this instance is not mere appetite; it is a principle; it is cold-blooded and total depravity.

Another reason for the endlessness of sin is the bondage of the sinful will. In the very act of transgressing the law of God, there is a reflex action of the human will upon itself, whereby it becomes unable to perfectly keep that law. Sin is the suicidal action of the human will. A man is not forced to kill himself, but if he does, he cannot bring himself to life again. And a man is not forced to sin, but if he does, he cannot of himself get back where he was before sinning. He cannot get back to innocence, nor can he get back to holiness of heart. The effect of vicious habit in diminishing a man's ability to resist temptation is proverbial. An old and hardened debauchee, like Tiberius or Louis XV., just going into the presence of Infinite Purity, has not so much power of active resistance against the sin that has now ruined him as the youth has who is just beginning to run that awful career. The truth and fact is, that sin, in and by its own nature and operation, tends to destroy all virtuous force, all holy

energy, in any moral being. The excess of will to sin is the same thing as defect of will to holiness. The human will cannot be forced and ruined from without. But if we watch the influence of the will upon itself; the influence of its own wrong decisions, and its own yielding to temptations; we shall find that the voluntary faculty may be ruined from within—may surrender itself with such an absorbing vehemence and totality to appetite, passion, and selfishness, that it becomes unable to reverse itself and overcome its own inclination and self-determination. And yet, from beginning to end, there is no compulsion in this process. The transgressor follows himself alone. He has his own way, and does as he likes. Neither God, nor the world, nor Satan forces him either to be, or to do, evil. Sin is the most spontaneous of self-motion. But self-motion has consequences as much as any other motion. And moral bondage is one of them. "Whosoever committeth sin is the slave of sin," says Christ. John viii. 34.

The culmination of this bondage is seen in the next life. The sinful propensity, being allowed to develop unresisted and unchecked, slowly but surely eats out all virtuous force as rust eats out a steel spring, until in the awful end the will becomes all habit, all lust, and all sin. "Sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death." James i. 15. In the final stage of this process, which commonly is not reached until death, when "the spirit returns unto God who gave it," the guilty free agent reaches that dreadful condition where resistance to evil ceases altogether, and surrender to evil becomes demoniacal. The cravings and hankerings of long-indulged and unresisted sin become organic, and drag the man; and "he goeth after them as an ox goeth to the slaughter, or as a fool to the correction of the stocks—till a dart strike through his liver." Prov. vii. 22, 23. For though the will to resist sin may die out of a man, the conscience to condemn it never can. This remains eternally. And when the process is complete; when the responsible creature in the abuse of free agency has perfected his moral ruin; when his will to good is all gone; there remain these two in his immortal spirit—sin and conscience, "brimstone and fire." Rev. xxi. 8.

Still another reason for the endlessness of sin is the fact that rebellious enmity toward law and its Source is not diminished, but increased, by the righteous punishment experienced by the impenitent transgressor. Penal suffering is beneficial only when it is humbly accepted, is acknowledged to be deserved, and is

penitently submitted to; when the transgressor says: "Father, I have sinned, and am no more worthy to be called thy son; make me as one of thy hired servants." Luke xv. 18, 19; when, with the penitent thief, he says: "We are in this condemnation justly; for we receive the due reward of our deeds." Luke xxiii. 41. But when in this life retribution is denied and jeered at; and when in the next life it is complained of and resisted, and the arm of hate and defiance is raised against the tribunal, penalty hardens and exasperates. This is impenitence. Such is the temper of Satan; and such is the temper of all who finally become his associates. This explains why there is no repentance in hell, and no meek submission to the Supreme Judge. This is the reason why Dives, the impenitent sensualist, is informed that there is no possible passage from Hades to Paradise, by reason of the "great gulf fixed" between the two; and this is the reason why he asks that Lazarus may be sent to warn his five brethren, "lest they also come into this place of torment," where the request for "a drop of water" — a mitigation of punishment — is solemnly refused by the Eternal Arbitrator. A state of existence in which there is not the slightest relaxing of penal suffering is no state of probation.

3. In the third place, endless punishment is rational, because sin is an infinite evil; infinite not because committed by an infinite being, but against one. We reason invariably upon this principle. To torture a dumb beast is a crime; to torture a man is a greater crime. The person who transgresses is the same in each instance; but the different worth and dignity of the objects upon whom his action terminates makes the difference in the gravity of the two offenses. David's adultery was a finite evil in reference to Uriah, but an infinite evil in reference to God. "Against thee only have I sinned," was the feeling of the sinner in this case. Had the patriarch Joseph yielded, he would have sinned against Pharaoh. But the greatness of the sin as related to the fellow-creature is lost in its enormity as related to the Creator, and his only question is: "How can I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" Gen. xxxix. 9.

The incarnation and vicarious satisfaction for sin by one of the persons of the Godhead demonstrates the infinity of the evil. It is incredible that the Eternal Trinity should have submitted to such a stupendous self-sacrifice, to remove a merely finite and temporal evil. The doctrine of Christ's vicarious atonement, logically,

stands or falls with that of endless punishment. Historically, it has stood or fallen with it. The incarnation of Almighty God, in order to make the remission of sin possible, is one of the strongest arguments for the eternity and infinity of penal suffering.

The objection that an offense committed in a finite time cannot be an infinite evil, and deserve an infinite suffering, implies that crime must be measured by the time that was consumed in its perpetration. But even in human punishment, no reference is had to the length of time occupied in the commission of the offense. Murder is committed in an instant, and theft sometimes requires hours. But the former is the greater crime, and receives the greater punishment.

4. That endless punishment is reasonable is proved by the preference of the wicked themselves. The unsubmitive, rebellious, defiant, and impenitent spirit prefers hell to heaven. Milton correctly represents Satan as saying: "All good to me becomes bane, and in heaven much worse would be my state"; and, also, as declaring that "it is better to reign in hell than to serve in heaven." This agrees with the Scripture representation, that Judas went "to his own place." Acts i. 25.

The lost spirits are not forced into a sphere that is unsuited to them. There is no other abode in the universe which they would prefer to that to which they are assigned, because the only other abode is heaven. The meekness, lowliness, sweet submission to God, and love of him, that characterize heaven, are more hateful to Lucifer and his angels than even the sufferings of hell. The wicked would be no happier in heaven than in hell. The burden and anguish of a guilty conscience, says South, is so insupportable that some "have done violence to their own lives, and so fled to hell as a sanctuary, and chose damnation as a release." This is illustrated by facts in human life. The thoroughly vicious and ungodly man prefers the license and freedom to sin which he finds in the haunts of vice to the restraints and purity of Christian society. There is hunger, disease, and wretchedness in one circle; and there is plenty, health, and happiness in the other. But he prefers the former. He would rather be in the gambling-house and brothel than in the Christian home.

The finally lost are not to be conceived of as having faint desires and aspirations for a holy and heavenly state, and as feebly but really inclined to sorrow for their sin, but are kept in hell contrary to their yearning and petition. They are sometimes so de-

scribed by the opponent of the doctrine, or at least so thought of. There is not a single throb of godly sorrow or a single pulsation of holy desire in the lost spirit. The temper toward God in the lost is angry and defiant. "They hate both me and my Father," says the Son of God, "without a cause." John xv. 24, 25. Satan and his followers "love darkness rather than light," hell rather than heaven, "because their deeds are evil." John iii. 19. Sin ultimately assumes a fiendish form and degree. It is pure wickedness without regret or sorrow, and with a delight in evil for evil's sake. There are some men who reach this state of depravity even before they die. They are seen in the callous and cruel voluptuaries portrayed by Tacitus, and the heaven-defying atheists described by St. Simon. They are also depicted in Shakespeare's Iago. The reader knows that Iago is past saving, and deserves everlasting damnation. Impulsively, he cries out with Lodovico: "Where is that viper? bring the villain forth." And then Othello's calmer but deeper feeling becomes his own: "I look down towards his feet — but that's a fable: If that thou be'st a devil, I cannot kill thee." The punishment is remitted to the retribution of God.

5. That endless punishment is rational, is proved by the history of morals. In the history of human civilization and morality, it is found that that age which is most reckless of law, and most vicious in practice, is the age that has the loosest conception of penalty, and is the most inimical to the doctrine of endless retribution. A virtuous and religious generation adopts sound ethics, and reverently believes that "the Judge of all the earth will do right," Gen. xviii. 25; that God will not "call evil good, and good evil, nor put darkness for light and light for darkness," Isa. v. 20; and that it is a deadly error to assert with the sated and worn-out sensualist: "All things come alike to all; there is one event to the righteous and the wicked." Eccl. ix. 2.

The French people, at the close of the last century, were a very demoralized and vicious generation, and there was a very general disbelief and denial of the doctrines of the Divine existence, the immortality of the soul, the freedom of the will, and future retribution. And upon a smaller scale, the same fact is continually repeating itself. Any little circle of business men who are known to deny future rewards and punishments are shunned by those who desire safe investments. The recent un-

common energy of opposition to endless punishment, which started about ten years ago in this country, synchronized with great defalcations and breaches of trust, uncommon corruption in mercantile and political life, and great distrust between man and man. Luxury deadens the moral sense, and luxurious populations are not apt to have the fear of God before their eyes. Hence luxurious ages are immoral.

One remark remains to be made respecting the extent and scope of hell. It is only a spot in the universe of God. Compared with heaven, hell is narrow and limited. The kingdom of Satan is insignificant in contrast with the kingdom of Christ. In the immense range of God's dominion, good is the rule, and evil is the exception. Sin is a speck upon the infinite azure of eternity; a spot on the sun. Hell is only a corner of the universe. The Gothic etymon denotes a covered-up hole. In Scripture, hell is a "pit," a "lake"; not an ocean. It is "bottomless," but not boundless. The Gnostic and Dualistic theories, which make God and Satan or the Demiurge nearly equal in power and dominion, find no support in Revelation. The Bible teaches that there will always be some sin and some death in the universe. Some angels and men will forever be the enemies of God. But their number, compared with that of unfallen angels and redeemed men, is small. They are not described in the glowing language and metaphors by which the immensity of the holy and blessed is delineated. "The chariots of God are twenty thousand, and thousands of angels." Ps. lxxviii. 17. "The Lord came from Sinai, and shined forth from mount Paran, and he came with ten thousands of his saints." Deut. xxxii. 2. "The Lord hath prepared his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom ruleth over all." Ps. ciii. 21. "Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory." Matt. vi. 13. The Lord Christ "must reign till he hath put all enemies under his feet." 1 Cor. xv. 25. St. John "heard a voice from heaven as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of a great thunder." Rev. xiv. 1. The New Jerusalem "lieth four square, the length is as large as the breadth; the gates of it shall not be shut at all by day; the kings of the earth do bring their honor into it." Rev. xxi. 16, 24, 25. The number of the lost spirits is never thus emphasized and enlarged upon. The brief, stern statement is, that "the fearful and unbelieving shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone." Rev. xxi. 8. No metaphors and amplifications are added to make

the impression of an immense "multitude which no man can number."

We have thus briefly presented the rational defense of the most severe and unwelcome of all the tenets of the Christian religion. It must have a foothold in the human reason, or it could not have maintained itself against all the recoil and opposition which it elicits from the human heart. Founded in ethics, in law, and in judicial reason, as well as unquestionably taught by the Author of Christianity, it is no wonder that the doctrine of eternal retribution, in spite of selfish prejudices and appeals to human sentiment, has always been a belief of Christendom. From theology and philosophy it has passed into human literature, and is wrought into its finest structures. It makes the solemn substance of the *Iliad* and the Greek Drama. It pours a somber light into the brightness and grace of the *Æneid*. It is the theme of the *Inferno*, and is presupposed by both of the other parts of the *Divine Comedy*. The epic of Milton derives from it its awful grandeur. And the greatest of the Shakespearean tragedies sound and stir the depths of the human soul by their delineation of guilt intrinsic and eternal.

In this discussion, we have purposely brought into view only the righteousness of Almighty God, as related to the voluntary and responsible action of man. We have set holy justice and disobedient free-will face to face, and drawn the conclusions. This is all that the defender of the doctrine of retribution is strictly concerned with. If he can demonstrate that the principles of eternal rectitude are not in the least degree infringed upon, but are fully maintained, when sin is endlessly punished, he has done all that his problem requires. Whatever is just is beyond all rational attack.

But with the Christian Gospel in his hands, the defender of the Divine justice finds it difficult to be entirely reticent and say not a word concerning the Divine mercy. Over against God's infinite antagonism and righteous severity toward moral evil there stands God's infinite pity and desire to forgive. This is realized, not by the high-handed and unprincipled method of pardoning without legal satisfaction of any kind, but by the strange and stupendous method of putting the Eternal Judge in the place of the human criminal; of substituting God's satisfaction for that due from man. In this vicarious atonement for sin, the Triune God relinquishes no claims of law, and waives no

rights of justice. The sinner's Divine Substitute, in his hour of voluntary agony and death, drinks the cup of punitive and inexorable justice to the dregs. Any man who, in penitent faith, avails himself of this vicarious method of setting himself right with the Eternal Nemesis, will find that it succeeds; but he who rejects it must through endless cycles grapple with the dread problem of human guilt in his own person, and alone.

WILLIAM G. T. SHEDD.

THEORIES REGARDING THE SUN'S CORONA.

PROBABLY most of our readers know that during a total solar eclipse, when the moon for a few moments interposes herself and replaces the dazzling disk of the sun by an inky blot upon the heavens, then, surrounding it appears the "corona," the loveliest and most impressive of all celestial objects; a wonderful glory of silvery light and streaming radiance, revealed to our admiration for an instant, and then immediately withdrawn; accessible to observation and study only for a few minutes in a century. It is no mere structureless luminosity of fog or haze, but is built up of various elements. There are in it brilliant hair-like filaments closely and curiously intertwined; long, bright radiating streamers like comets' tails, and forms like the petals of some luminous flower; all floating in a filmy nebulousity, which here and there is scored by straight, dark rifts cutting clear down through everything to the very edge of the moon, like shadows cast by a gas-light in a dusty air, or like the dark rays one often sees in a summer afternoon reaching outward from the sun before a shower. For the most part, the coronal forms are rather indefinite and uncertainly outlined, confused in dazzling brightness at the base, and fading out insensibly, at a distance that depends much on the clearness of the air and the keenness of the observer's eye. At least, this is true of most of the longer streamers, for often there is a rather surprising degree of sharpness in some of the lower outlines, so that the corona is sometimes described as nearly square, or a five or six rayed star, or like a head with parted hair, according to occasion—never twice alike exactly.

It is obvious that if the corona is really at the sun, it must be of enormous dimensions, extending many hundreds of thousands of miles, and even millions, from the central globe; an object of cosmical importance, to be ranked with nebulae and

comets. If, on the other hand, it can be shown to be due to the lunar atmosphere, and still more if it should turn out to belong to the earth's atmosphere, or, in other words, to be a purely optical phenomenon, then, however beautiful and impressive it may be, it drops to a lower rank, and takes its place with rainbows and halos, and sunset glows. At the outset, the writer may as well affirm his complete conviction that the corona is mainly solar, to be thought of and respected as such, but that purely atmospheric and optical effects contribute more or less to the phenomenon as we see it. At the same time, there are high authorities in solar physics who would dissent from the "mainly solar," and would ascribe a much greater relative importance to the atmospheric and optical elements.

No one at present seems to credit the moon with much influence in the matter, except as a mere screen or shadow-casting body; there is no lunar atmosphere of such extent and character as to account for the corona. At least, this is the almost universal belief of astronomers; and yet it is perhaps not quite impossible that there may really be some exceedingly rare gaseous envelope around our satellite, not dense enough to be perceived at any other time, though still sufficient to become visible under the circumstances of an eclipse. But even if this should turn out to be the case, it may be considered certain that the lunar element of the corona is relatively unimportant.

The explanation that immediately suggests itself to one looking at the matter superficially is undoubtedly that which would refer the corona to the action of the earth's atmosphere. We are so used to seeing illumination around the edge of any object that has a brilliant light behind it, that it is most natural to think of the corona as caused in the same way. Whenever a beam of sunlight is transmitted through air, a portion of the light is diffused into the surrounding space, so that to an eye situated a little one side the air in the path of the beam is intensely luminous. There are curious questions whether this diffusion is due to the air itself, or to minute particles of foreign matter in the air, since the clearer the air the less the illumination; but the diffusion always takes place to a greater or less extent. But when we come to consider the circumstances of an eclipse, it is at once evident that the corona cannot be accounted for in this manner. At the middle of a total eclipse the observer is in the center of a

great shadow, from fifty to one hundred and fifty miles in diameter, so that the air in the region of the sky near the sun is as much in the dark as he is himself; the sun does not shine upon it at all, and it cannot therefore by any possibility send him any sunlight. But if there is any real solar or lunar corona, then of course the action of the earth's atmosphere would diffuse the light of this corona just as it would true sunlight; and so, though it cannot cause the phenomenon, the air must modify it, rendering the glory more extensive, softening its sharper outlines, and enveloping them in a luminous haze. And since the air between the eye of the observer and the dark disk of the moon is exposed to the coronal light, this atmospheric illumination must extend inward from the edges of the lunar disk, as well as outward. It does so, making the moon to stand out like a globe, instead of looking like a flat disk; and this illumination of the moon's disk is a fair measure of the atmospheric element in the corona, which is thus shown to be comparatively trifling, though real.

In some way the objections to the atmospheric origin of the corona escaped the notice of even eminent astronomers for a while, and the theory was warmly supported until, and even after, spectroscopic observations settled the matter in 1869 and 1870 by showing that the coronal light is not simple reflected sunlight. If it were, its spectrum would contain all the peculiar dark markings (the Fraunhofer lines) that characterize sunlight; while, in fact, the only conspicuous feature of the spectrum is a brilliant green line, due to some unknown gas. Bright lines due to hydrogen are also present, and there are besides certain other bright lines in the violet and ultra-violet portions of the spectrum, which, though they affect the eye only feebly or not at all, are yet more efficient upon the photographic plate than even the green line. A few of the dark Fraunhofer lines have also been seen occasionally upon a faint background, showing that although reflected or diffused sunlight is not the main constituent of the coronal luminosity, it is still present to some extent. It is to be noticed, moreover, that the bright streamers and other similar markings of the corona seem to give principally a smooth, continuous, unlined spectrum, as if they consisted of incandescent particles, solid or liquid, while the bright green line and the hydrogen lines seem to be due rather to the nebulous light that bathes and permeates the whole. This green

line, by the way, is often referred to as "the corona-line," and sometimes as "1474," because upon Kirchhoff's map of the solar spectrum, which was in ordinary use in 1869, it occurs at that number on the scale that is printed alongside the spectrum as a means of reference.

The presence of these bright lines in the spectrum of the coronal light demonstrates two things: that the corona is not luminous by the mere reflection and dispersion of ordinary sunlight by mist, or cloud, or anything of that nature; and further, that the light does come, in considerable measure, at least, from luminous gases at the sun. (We assume that every reader knows that bright-line spectra come only from glowing gas.) This demonstration that the corona is really of solar origin, and not a phenomenon of the lunar or terrestrial atmosphere, is borne out and confirmed by photographic evidence. In 1871 three fine series of photographs of the corona were obtained by observers many hundred miles apart. One station was at Bekul, on the western coast of India, another in northern Ceylon, and still a third on the island of Java. It took the moon's shadow nearly half an hour to traverse the line, and of course the atmospheric circumstances were more or less different at each station. But all the photographs agree with curious precision in all the main features, and even in most of the finer details of the corona. In fact, there are no evident discrepancies whatever, such as must have occurred if there was anything local in the appearance. Since 1870 other similar series of eclipse photographs have been obtained (notably in 1878), and they all tell the same story of the solar nature of the corona.

The hypothesis that seems to meet most of the conditions thus far indicated, and until very recently has commanded the almost unanimous assent of astronomers (and probably does so still), is substantially as follows:

It is supposed that the sun is surrounded by an envelope of mingled gases, in which hydrogen and the unknown substance to which the green line is due are specially predominant. In many respects this gaseous envelope is analogous to the atmosphere of the earth, and so it is often spoken of as a solar atmosphere, but always with the implied reservation that the extreme difference between the solar and terrestrial conditions must necessarily impair the analogy in numerous and important particulars. In this "coronal atmosphere," as Janssen has called it, there are

filaments and streamers and other forms that are probably not gaseous, but composed of mist and dust; some of them may be of meteoric origin, and some composed of matter ejected from the sun, while others perhaps are due to the condensation of vapors in the "coronal atmosphere," as clouds are formed in the air. As to the straight, dark rifts, they are more difficult to explain than anything else, but perhaps may be compared to the dark channel in the center of a comet's tail behind the nucleus. The relation of the streamers and filaments to the poles of the sun suggests the operation of forces analogous to those that produce the aurora borealis in our own upper air. At one time, indeed, when the bright line of the corona spectrum was first discovered, the line was supposed to be identical with one of the lines in the spectrum of the aurora; and an attempt (for which the writer was largely responsible) was made to identify the two phenomena, both in respect to the materials concerned and the nature of the forces that produce the characteristic forms. But it did not require any long period of observation to show that the imagined identity of spectra was a mistake; the gaseous elements of the aurora and of the corona are certainly not the same; and while no evidence has been brought to show that magnetic forces on the sun may not be influential in forming and arranging the coronal streamers, just as the earth's magnetism unquestionably does give shape and arrangement to our auroral beams, yet it must be admitted that no progress has been made in establishing the analogy.

If this theory — that the corona is really a solar envelope — is true, then evidently it is an affair of stupendous dimensions. The average width of the luminous ring is at least 15' on all ordinary occasions, and this implies an average elevation of more than 400,000 miles above the solar photosphere. But many of the streamers extend four or five times as far; and during the eclipse of 1878 some of them were traced, in the clear air of Colorado, to a distance of fully 6°, or more than 9,000,000 miles. If the sun is always really surrounded by such a magnificent nebula, may we not hope to reach the vision of it at some other time than during the few brief moments of eclipse, and in some way to map out its outlines and watch its changes from day to day? The spectroscopic method, which succeeds with the brilliant, cloud-like flames of hydrogen that lie on and close above the solar surface, breaks down with the

corona. The spectroscope does indeed, any day, without much trouble, show the bright 1474 line at the edge of the solar disk ; but only at the edge, never at any height. Though we can study at our leisure, and with delightful satisfaction, the forms and behavior of the hydrogen prominences, not a glimpse can be obtained of the more delicate, but not less beautiful, texture that lies at the base of the corona, nor of the grander features of the fainter outlying nebulosity.

But it will be remembered that spectroscopic observations at the time of an eclipse have shown that the coronal halo is rich in rays that belong to the ultra-violet. This fact suggested to Dr. Huggins the idea that it might be possible to render visible by photography the coronal forms that do not reach the eye. By the use of a reflecting telescope, with arrangements and appliances that we cannot here describe, he has attained what looks like a success, although it is not so evident and decided as to warrant very positive assertion. Screening off the image of the sun itself from the photographic plate, and taking all possible precautions to prevent the irregular reflection and scattering of light, he obtains, around the circle where the sun's image would be if not screened off, a ghostly phantasm of faint outlines that certainly most closely resemble and simulate what is conspicuous at an eclipse. The shadings are so faint and so indefinite that one naturally fears the effect of his imagination in their interpretation ; but nearly all who have seen them agree as to their reality and nature. The plates, moreover, seem to prove that some of the coronal features are quite persistent, lasting for months, and coming round regularly into the same aspect at each solar rotation.

The past year has been so unfavorable for this sort of work, on account of the strange haze that has filled the air, that little, if any, new advance has been made in the investigation. An observer, with suitable apparatus, was sent to the Riffelberg, in Switzerland, last summer, in hopes that the mountain air would prove more transparent and less reflecting than that of the lower regions, thus giving a darker background for the shadowy forms. But, as has been intimated, the newest plates, so far as yet heard from, excel those made by Dr. Huggins two years ago only very slightly, if at all. It is still quite possible to accept them as actual, though feeble, portraits of a real solar nebula, or to reject them as showing to an unprejudiced eye nothing more

than such slight inequalities of light and shade as always appear upon a photographic plate when subjected to a prolonged and forced development. Until something more conclusive is obtained, it is likely that opinions will continue to differ in regard to them.

But there are serious difficulties in the way of accepting the idea of a solar atmosphere and a solar nebula as the true explanation of the corona, and there are phenomena that seem to point in a different direction.

The principal objection to the nebula-theory of the corona, if we may call it so, lies in the undeniable difficulty of supposing so deep an atmosphere to surround the sun, consistently with the known intensity of solar gravity, and the ascertained fact that in several cases comets have rushed through the coronal regions with a velocity of from one hundred to three hundred miles a second, and yet have experienced no sensible retardation of their motion; their orbits have shown no change. Granting that the solar atmosphere is governed by the same laws as the terrestrial, it is easy to show that if at the elevation of one hundred thousand miles its density were one-millionth that of the air at the earth's surface, then at the sun's surface it must be many million times denser than lead. The objection, however, is less formidable than at first it looks; because, to begin with, it is not certain, or even likely, that at solar temperatures the same laws of gaseous compression hold as at terrestrial temperature; and besides, the phenomena of comets' tails render it almost indisputable that the sun somehow exerts upon certain forms of matter a powerful repulsive force, which opposes and may neutralize or even overpower gravitation. We have therefore no right to assume that the downward increase of density in the solar atmosphere follows any such rule as holds good upon the earth. And as regards the resistance to comets' motions, it is a gratuitous assumption that the density of the coronal atmosphere is anything like one-millionth that of the air at the earth's surface. The phenomena of Crookes's tubes show that a gas of this low density, even in quantities of only a few cubic inches, can produce light of extreme intensity. It is obvious, therefore, that all the luminous phenomena of the corona, considering the enormous depth of every line of sight drawn through it, could be accounted for by an atmosphere of a density millions of times below that in any vacuum tube ever

constructed. One molecule to each cubic inch would probably answer every purpose, so far as the optical phenomena are concerned, while according to the estimates of Professor Johnston Stoney, with which other physicists are in substantial agreement, the number of molecules in each cubic inch of atmospheric air at the sea-level is about twenty thousand millions of millions of millions (20,000,000000,000000,000000). It may be added, that whatever may be the theoretical difficulties in the way of supposing the solar atmosphere to extend to an elevation of one hundred thousand miles, yet the phenomena of solar prominences, and the forms and motions of the hydrogen at their summits, show the actual presence of a surrounding medium (invisible in the spectroscope, of course) comparable in density with the visible hydrogen itself. Other objections, and somewhat serious ones, are drawn from the peculiar polarization of the light in different parts of the corona, which is thought by many to be inconsistent with the nebula-theory. Still another objection, the last we shall mention, lies in the fact that the appearance of the corona is that of something flat. It is very difficult to imagine any arrangement of streamers upon a globe which would look like what we actually see, and the dark straight rifts are especially awkward to explain.

These difficulties, and a few others, which we have not space to discuss here, have led Professor Hastings of New Haven to propose a new theory of the corona, which reduces it to a mere diffraction phenomenon, an optical effect produced by the passage of light from the edges of the solar disk near to the edge of the moon. It is not reflection nor refraction; it implies no action of the terrestrial or lunar atmosphere; but it belongs to the same class of optical effects as the so-called "Grimaldi fringes" at the edge of a shadow, the colors of a soap-bubble, and the iridescence of mother-of-pearl, all of which are due to what is known as the interference of light, *i. e.*, to the combination of overlying and opposing waves under certain peculiar conditions. The idea that the corona might be due to diffraction is not new, but previous mathematical investigations of the matter had shown that, assuming the usual equations of light, the explanation breaks down; no considerable quantity of light could be bent into the moon's shadow. By assuming, however, what is very probably true (for reasons that we cannot here discuss), that at different moments the phases of the light-waves change,

in such a way that they no longer form a continuous periodic series, Professor Hastings makes the equations present a different aspect, and it appears quite probable that considerable luminous disturbance might be propagated inside the moon's shadow, so as to give to an observer the impression of a bright fringe around the moon. Any irregularities in the edge of the moon, or in the brightness of different parts of the edge of the sun, would then give rise to straight radial streaks, bright or dark as the case might be, though they could hardly account for the curved forms that are still more common. If this theory is true, the corona ought to be much wider on the side where the edge of the sun is least deeply covered. Professor Hastings proposed this as a crucial test of his theory, and during the eclipse of May, 1883, in the South Pacific, he verified his idea by observations with an ingenious apparatus devised and constructed by himself expressly for the purpose. When the eclipse first became total, the 1474 line was visible on the eastern side of the sun (just covered) to a distance of 10' or 12', while on the western edge the extent was barely 3' or 4'. Just before the close of totality, the conditions were reversed. The only different explanation for this change yet proposed attributes it simply to diffusion of light by our air. The lower part of the corona is so much brighter than the upper, that it scatters light much more widely. Professor Hastings gives strong, if not absolutely conclusive, reasons for rejecting this explanation; and if we renounce it, it will be difficult to avoid admitting the substantial correctness of his theory. One who wishes to understand his ideas fully will find it best to consult the original report, which is just published in the second volume of the "Transactions of the National Academy of Sciences."

To the writer it does not seem that the new theory excludes the old. It may be true that diffraction diverts light coming from points very near the limb of the sun out of its straight course, and causes it to enter the lunar shadow; but this does not negative the idea of a solar atmosphere of considerable extent. The objections urged against the existence of such a nebulous solar envelope, though certainly involving serious difficulties and demanding consideration, do not appear conclusive. Of course, if the corona photographs of Dr. Huggins are accepted, and if they should hereafter be confirmed by new ones of greater clearness, that would close the discussion.

The December number of "The Observatory," which has come to hand since the above was put in type, contains an important letter from Mr. C. Ray Woods, the observer who was sent to the Riffelberg last summer by the Royal Society. His earlier results, as already mentioned, were not much in advance of those previously obtained in England; but later, after a little experience, he seems to have overcome all the most serious difficulties, to have gained the full advantage of his superior atmospheric conditions, and so to have reached unqualified success. We have not space to quote his detailed account of apparatus and methods, and his explanation of the photographic and other principles involved, but only to give his conclusions. He says:

"As would be expected, the results are better than had been obtained in England, in spite of the red haze which has always been present round the sun, and which visitors to Switzerland have commented on in several of the scientific journals recently. Results on the same day are almost, if not quite, alike, both with the disk and without. The corona varies more or less from day to day. The clearer the day, the better the results. The series extends over a period of two months, one month's results being free from effects that require elimination."

C. A. YOUNG.

SHALL CLERGYMEN BE POLITICIANS?

THE clergyman in politics is by no means a novel or modern figure. He has always been familiar in Rome; and in France, Germany, England, every country that has had a state church, he has often played a prominent part. But in our own country, where the church and the state are constitutionally separated, his position is necessarily somewhat different. His appearance is doubly significant. He represents theories and tendencies that, although familiar to us in history, are as yet foreign to us in experience. He has a prophetic importance. And therefore it may not be improper to endeavor to set forth briefly, in an abstract and impersonal way, some of the principles and truths that apply to him in this present age, and under this non-sectarian government.

In the first place, all clergymen are men,—except those few that are women, and they are hardly numerous enough to count. As men, they have the same duties, rights, and privileges as all other citizens. These may be briefly enumerated, with regard to political questions, under three heads. First, they have the right of free thought and free speech, sacred, inalienable, inestimable; second, they have the duties of obedience to law, loyalty to government, and the exercise of their active powers for the highest welfare of their country; third, they have the privilege (which is also a duty) of voting on all questions of public interest, in accordance with the dictates of their reason and conscience, with none to molest or make them afraid. Of these rights and obligations no professional restrictions can rob them; and the church that attempts to obstruct or hinder its ministers in their exercise has no farther claim upon the protection of a republican government.

In the second place, all clergymen are bound by the responsibilities of their office, and by the definite instructions of the

Bible, publicly to support and exalt "the powers that be," in the exercise of lawful authority. They must preach the Christian duties of obedience, order, and loyalty. They must pray with their congregations for the chief magistrate and all others that bear the staff of rule. They must endeavor to enforce, with the holy sanctions of religion, the precepts of that inspired law of life which commands men in the same sentence to "fear God" and "honor the king."

These are clear and positive principles. They can hardly be denied by any one who takes a candid view of the obligations of citizenship and has an intelligent faith in the doctrines of holy Scripture. If they were honestly followed and applied, they would make all the clergy faithful, earnest, and eminently useful citizens. I think they are sufficient, and at the same time I think they are exhaustive. They cover and sum up, within their sphere, the whole duty of the clergyman. Beyond this he has no business, no calling, no place. As a man, he may do what he pleases, within the limits of the law. But as a clergyman, an office-bearer and representative of a church, claiming, or at least exercising, an influence by virtue of his sacred profession, carrying with him the more or less venerable titles of Reverend and Doctor of Divinity,—as a member of a class that derives whatever power and authority it may have from its separation from the world and its peculiar connection with religion, he ought not to enter publicly and officially into party politics; he ought not to mingle in the active strife and petty conflict of an ordinary political campaign; he ought not to weaken the force of his loyalty to the general Government by violent advocacy of a particular party; he ought not to misuse the official authority that has been given to him by the church for a higher purpose, in attempting to control the decision of purely economic and personal questions upon which the church, as the Kingdom of Christ, has, and can have, no opinion. Remembering, then, that we do not now speak of the private action of individuals, nor of the conduct of those men (often of the largest talents and widest usefulness) that are virtually separated from the distinctive office of a clergyman (which is the oversight and instruction of the church), we may sum up what remains to be said under three points.

The clergyman in politics is superfluous. He has no special fitness or training for this sphere of activity. In fact, we may

question whether he is not actually unfitted for it. And certainly his frequent and absurd mistakes, when he attempts it, have often given occasion to the pious to mourn, to the ungodly to scoff, and to the politicians to swear. Why should the clergyman attempt to tell you how to vote? He is not a master of political economy. He has no angelic intuition in regard to questions of fact. The only ground on which he can assume a peculiar right to instruct or control any one in these matters is the theory that a spiritual father must also be a temporal director; and this is a theory against which, I think, the majority of the American people have an unconquerable prejudice.

The clergyman in politics is disloyal. The government under which he lives affords a generous and impartial protection to all forms of religious faith and worship; it does not discriminate between them. The official or judge who should be influenced in his decisions by denominational considerations, saving all his favor for the Protestants as against the Roman Catholics, or perverting justice to serve the Baptists rather than the Methodists, would be worthy of universal execration, and probably he would receive it. As men, of course, the officers of government may belong to any religious body they may prefer; but as officers they are bound to be impartial. The same principles apply to clergymen as officers of the church. Reciprocity is essential in toleration. A non-sectarian state implies a non-partisan church. If you destroy one you destroy the other. If you bind any particular church to the support of any political party, rather than to the larger loyalty that knows no parties, the result is inevitable, though it may be slow. You are binding that party to the support of that particular church; you are undermining the foundations of civil and religious liberty; you are unconsciously preparing the way for the worst kind of union between church and state, a union in which the word "church" shall be synonymous with a sect, and the word "state" synonymous with a section. If such a result should ever come to pass,—and it is not beyond the bounds of possibility,—it is morally certain that the favored church in a democracy will be that which can cast the largest vote. None of the younger denominations can possibly compete with it in a race of this kind. It would be a bitter but not an unjust humiliation, if the members of those distinctively Protestant communions which have always professed to cherish the principles of religious lib-



erty, equality, and toleration, grasping in an evil hour the sword of political interference, should in the end perish by that same sword. Let the clergyman that flings himself and his church into a strife manifestly partisan and secular, reflect whether he is not thereby weakening and impairing that sacred allegiance which he owes first of all to the country at large, and to the Government in its highest conception, not as an instrument of sectional triumph, but as an embodiment of that supreme power and authority which God has delegated to human rulers.

The clergyman in politics is injurious. When he lowers the pulpit to the level of the stump, when he turns the worship of God into what is virtually a political caucus, when he attempts to lead the church as a religious organization into the train of any candidate for office, he is doing a great and irreparable harm to the cause of religion. I endeavor to write guardedly; I would not accuse any man of consciously doing these things. But it cannot be denied that there are tendencies in this direction; and in time these tendencies, if not checked, will result in a more or less complete demoralization of the clergy and secularization of the church. That will be a fatal day. We shall then see ministers of the gospel indulging in the vituperation that a recent writer in this REVIEW has so sharply denounced as the most shameful feature of our modern politics. "Party discipline" will teach them to condone immoralities on their own side, and to repeat slanders against the other side. A lack of worldly experience, combined with a professional habit of rhetorical statement, will produce an *odium politicum*, compared with which the traditions of the extinct *odium theologicum* will seem like the stories of a Golden Age. We shall see the stewards of the bread of life waiting for the crumbs that fall from Cæsar's table, and hear the notes of the gospel trumpet blending with the blare of political brass bands. We shall have churches constructed on party lines, where none shall enter unless they vote the right ticket, where the acts of the candidates will be expounded more frequently than the Acts of the Apostles, where the great revivals will occur in every fourth year, and the most urgent question will always be (with an eye to the main chance), "What shall the harvest be?"

May that evil day be far distant! May an enlightened Christian sentiment, and that sense of reverence for the church

in the purity of her ideal life which still exists, not only among the clergy, but also (and perhaps even more generally) among the wise and thoughtful laity, protest against these tendencies, and call a halt upon every man who would take even a single step in this direction. The kingdom of Christ must not be brought down to the level of the kingdoms of this world. Its mighty influence must not be imperiled for the attainment of secular ends. Its purity must not be sullied, its divine independence must not be sacrificed, by political alliances. Within its walls there must be neither Republican nor Democrat, Barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free, but all must be one in Christ Jesus. And all its energies must be devoted to the great work of redeeming and purifying human lives. I believe that the interests of religion are supreme above all other interests. I care more for the honor and power of the holy church of Christ than for any other cause on earth. And I had rather see all political parties buried together in a common grave than suffer one blot to fall upon the purity of the church, or see her sway over the hearts of men impaired or weakened by a single degree. May my right hand forget her cunning and my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth when I am drawn by allurements from without, or driven by dictation from within, to swerve by a hair's-breadth from the preaching of religion, or to range the royal, blood-stained banner of Christ among the flags and ensigns of a political procession.

HENRY J. VAN DYKE, JR.

THERE are two orders of Christian ministers — the hierarchical and the fraternal. The fraternal minister has influence simply by what he is in original endowment and by education. Like men in all other professions, his influence is the legitimate influence of his personal character and his professional skill. All this the hierarchical clergy have; but over and above all natural talent, they receive, by virtue of ordination, an authority directly from God, to announce truth, and to convey through ordinances certain invaluable graces and spiritual gifts that come to men only through such channels. Such divine special endowments lift them above their fellow-men. They constitute

a spiritual nobility. In all matters of religion they are to men as the voice of God.

Now, though it is quite possible to imagine that in common affairs, not within the sphere of revealed religion, they may have a place as citizens, and may take part and lot in the ordinary duties and privileges of citizens in a free country, yet it is difficult to prevent the imagination of men from conceiving that a priest is still a priest while acting as a citizen, and that he is unfair, in that he brings the authority of the religious sphere to bear upon politics and civil administration. And this impression is intensified from the fact that the church and the state in other lands have been, and still are, united. It has been a prudent practice in America that priests should not carry their priestly influence into politics. This has been the prevailing practice among Catholic priests and among Episcopal clergymen. Setting all these aside, and not entering into the question whether in our day and under our institutions the priest may not profitably strip himself of his priestly character, and like the unconsecrated citizen take a full share of political action, we wish to point out how utterly without any professional excuse are all Protestant clergymen who renounce the sacramental theory, and who regard themselves in no sense as a class set apart from common men, other than is the lawyer, the physician, the artist, the engineer, or the mechanic.

In theory, Protestant clergymen are moral teachers, whose influence depends upon their original endowment, their education, their moral influence, and their wisdom. They are simply men among men. They are above men by no ordination. They receive no prerogatives of God. Their whole force lies in the wisdom and goodness of their lives. It was Paul and Barnabas that cried out at Lystra, "We also are men, of like passions with you." It was Paul that declared of his moral power, "We have this treasure in earthen vessels." While the clergyman is a consoler, a counselor, a nurse to the young, a guide to morality, he is, before all things, and professionally, a teacher, a moral teacher; and it is in this view that his rights and duties must be discussed.

There are several things that must be taken for granted in discussing the right and duty of the American clergyman to take part in politics. It is to be assumed that he has common sense; that each man is at liberty to determine the best method

of employing his influence, whether by private conversation, or by preaching from the pulpit, or by his pen, or by public speech from the platform. It is taken for granted that a clergyman knows enough to discriminate between the aims of political action and the mere instruments by which those aims are sought to be accomplished, and that he has the ordinary prudence that guides men in selection of time and place and other circumstance. With these preliminaries I would argue:

First. That all procedure which puts clergymen into a class and pretends to elevate them above their fellow-men, and by reason of their holy function frees them from contact with the ordinary duties of humanity, is most pernicious, both in its philosophy and its morality, and nowhere so emphatically as in America and under our Government. No man is to be known before the law, in our land, as a member of any class, and though in fact there are exceptions, they are wrong, and should be abrogated. The clergyman, in the eye of the law, is simply a citizen, as is the physician, the lawyer, the teacher, the engineer. Public convenience may demand that doctors and teachers should not be subject to military service; but it is not for any reason in them, but because their functions involve the safety of large portions of the community. The law wisely regards simple citizenship, and not the occupation of the citizen. Of all ungracious pleas for exemption, that is the most pernicious that pleads the sanctity of the clerical office, as if there was a holiness in it that relieved the clergyman from the common duties of citizenship.

Second. With all the more force will these views apply to the clergyman in a land where the body of citizens have laid upon them the solemn responsibility of determining the laws, of securing their execution, of electing the magistrates and executive officers, and of forming the whole policy of the state. No man has a right to be an exempt. No man has a right to put contempt upon the political duties of the citizen, least of all the clergyman! Certainly there are many disagreeable things demanded of a patriotic citizen. He must act upon an equality with his fellow-men, however plain or even low or vulgar they may be. Before the ballot-box, as before the altar, all men are equal—the drunkard and the temperate, the judge and the vagrant, the coarse and the refined, the educated and the ignorant. To separate one's self from one's fellows may be allowable in many social relations, in the sanctuary of home, and in

groups gathered by elective affinity. But all the more important is it that all those duties which bring men together in common duty, common citizenship, and common humanity, should be vigorously maintained. If by reason of superior endowments, advantages of wealth, attractions of refined leisure, or relish of literary or philosophical pursuits, men grow unwilling to mingle with their fellow-men or to take up political tasks and burdens, refusing to perform amply and continuously their political duties, they do in fact remit to the less fit, and to the positively unfit, the whole care of the state, its politics, magistracy, and morality. This is distributive treason. When this long procession of selfish men—the rich man, in his self-indulgence; the artist, in his daintiness; the scholar, in his literature; the fashionable and the indolent, in their glittering selfishness—are seen moving away from politics, it will only need a robed and recreant clergyman at their head to form a band of infamy, trampling under foot the very life of their country!

Third. Because he is by profession a moral teacher, the clergyman should be an example to his flock, of conscientious, patient duty performed, and from him they should receive both incitement and instruction. The man that preaches only an abstract gospel is but a pulpit cypher. It is the gospel applied that clergymen should preach. Christian ethics is the very soil out of which all graces of spirituality grow. Modern notions of the dignity of the pulpit have well-nigh disrobed the pulpit of its legitimate power. The man in the pulpit should be a man from among men, in full sympathy with his fellow-men, not ignorant of their trials and stumbling difficulties, and able to fortify men against the temptations peculiar to every walk of life. His parishioners are not in half so much danger of falling into false theology as into false weights and measures, into selfishness, animosities, revenges, and all forms of unjust conduct. There would have been fewer Christian men in the penitentiary to-day if the pulpit had succeeded in establishing in men's minds a clearer idea of what is safe and lawful in business. Less dogma, more morality! The world to come must be reached by a wise walking in the world that now is. In like manner a minister should instruct his people in political duty and in their political dangers. Two elements are needed to exalt politics from the low level at which it now exists: the influence of woman, and of a faithful pulpit. Such themes as these, at suitable times, should be discussed as belong-

ing to Christian ethics: 1. The meaning of citizenship, its responsibilities and duties. 2. The sin of bribery. What is bribery? and what are the kinds and shades of it? 3. The vote, its meaning and value. The purchase of votes, the throwing away of votes. 4. Shadrach, Meshach, and Abednego types of Christian men walking in the fierce fires of a political canvass. 5. Injustice and slander in politics, and all forms of revenge. 6. The distinctions between principles and policies in the state. 7. The sin of withdrawing from all participation in politics. 8. Clergymen are the guides of their people in the ethics of daily affairs. 9. Race question — the duty of superiors to inferiors. 10. The hindrance or the destruction of the weak by the strong is of the very essence of a malignant infidelity, a crucifying of the very heart of Jesus. If it be said that clergymen are ordinarily unfitted to discuss such themes, then, in our age and in our country, they are unfit to preach the gospel.

Fourth. It would be well for ministers of religion if they studied the life of Christ more and theology less. Jesus was no dainty teacher in professional robes. Born to poverty and labor, he never forsook his mates. He lived among them; he ate and drank with them; he preached to them of their special sins and special duties; he refused the dignity of rabbiship, and to the end was a man among men. He rebuked rulers; he exposed hypocrites and pretenders in high places; he meddled with the temple, the altar, the officers thereof; and in Galilee and in Judea, alike among peasants, fishermen, and scholars, he laid down the great ethical laws on which should be built a sound practical morality. Little like him will be his professed preachers that talk long and loud of philosophy and theology, but whisper softly in muffled pulpits of the duties of morality of every-day life, and think themselves holy in proportion as they neglect Christ's example of life and teaching. If ever there was a stern and practical moralist, it was John the Baptist. Christ's criticism of him is significant. What went ye out to see? a reed shaken in the wind, a pulpit marvel, a tremulous, an incessant quivering novelty? A man clothed in soft raiment? a robed, cushioned, fashion-loving priest, teaching the respectabilities of fashionable society? No, a prophet, a stern teacher of rigorous morality in all its phases and applications. Yea, more than a prophet, a man that loved righteousness and hated all shams and elegant dishonesties.

Fifth. The example of American clergymen in the Colonial days, through the Revolution, and afterward, until the mephitic gas of slavery had well-nigh suffocated the pulpit, is instructive. Ministers in New England were the counselors of the magistrates. They were expected to teach their people what were their political duties, as before them, in England, the Puritan clergy had aided in establishing civil liberty upon religious foundations. To-day the pulpit is regaining its old American tone. In single instances it may work harm; but no harm of injudicious men can be half so harmful as a pulpit without a message to common people about their daily duties, their common temptations, and above all, without a word of instruction to men as citizens fulfilling their sublime duties to the laws, to the magistracy, and to the policy of this great nation.

It is objected, that a practical union of church and state is likely to result from meddling ministers. No more than from meddling lawyers, meddling doctors, meddling school-masters. On the other hand, the very way to induce the evils feared is by erecting into a privileged class men who assume to be too holy to meddle with affairs that belong to common citizens.

It may be said, that the minister has an unfair advantage; that his audience cannot reply; that he can exert a partisan influence which will offend, divide, and break up a church. All this is quite true; but it could only happen to one without skill, prudence, or tact. It is an argument against the misperformance of duty, and not against the imperative duty. If a clergyman waits till sides are taken, till men's passions are aroused, and then assails or defends, he will show an utter want of common sense. He must instruct his people in the duty of citizens, as part of his yearly task; he must educate them to a conscience in all political action; he must exalt the duties of patriotism; must make distinction between good men and bad, long before riot and turbulent times arise. As a general thing, instruction from the pulpit upon political duty should not be given on the eve of an election. When the lines are drawn, and the air is fired and torrid, the pulpit should be silent, and the clergyman should exert his influence through some other channel. In tranquil times, between great political campaigns, if ministers would give to their people such discussions as abound in Dr. Francis Lieber's *ex books*, there would be neither complaint nor disturbance.

HENRY WARD BEECHER.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXL.

MARCH, 1885.

FUTURE RETRIBUTION.

THE publication of book after book on the subject of future retribution shows that it is a question of inexhaustible interest to many thousands. The immense variety of opinions respecting it in the minds of deeply religious men shows, further, that it is one which occupies the border lands of Christian doctrine, and cannot be brought under the domain of rigid dogma. The fact that many clergymen in the highest positions of the church have expressed, unassailed and unimpugned, that "larger hope" for the great mass of mankind beyond the grave which would once have been visited with penal disabilities, is a decisive indication that during the past few years there has been a great modification of Christian opinion. It is not my purpose in this brief paper to enter into any elaborate arguments about the punishment of the guilty beyond the grave. Those who desire any contribution that I could offer to the general discussion will find it in the Westminster sermons on "Eternal Hope," and in a reply to Dr. Pusey, called "Mercy and Judgment," which has led me into a fuller and closer examination of this question and the views of the church respecting it in different ages. With

those books I am quite content to close my share of the controversy, and I am deeply and thankfully sensible that they have had their share in disencumbering the current theology of a multitude of religious teachers from a frightful and fatal incubus of false opinion, which rested on no better basis than the accretions of corrupt opinion in ages of ignorance and darkness. Mistaken conceptions that can plead a long prescriptive toleration are apt to put on the airs of abstract right. They would fain pose as the sole orthodoxy, as the decision of councils, as the *norma fidei*, as the voice of the church. Those who have accepted them without examination, and who see them shattered to pieces, have vainly tried to brand with the stigma of heresy the destroyers of their subjective idols. It has been shown that half of the assertions about everlasting torments for all but an insignificant fraction of mankind, rest on assumptions that are about as valid as the Donation of Constantine, or the Decretals of Isidore. It has been proved, beyond possibility of reasonable dispute, that no council of any authority whatever has ever identified the popular theology with prescribed dogma; that the doctrine has been one respecting which churches widely differ; that while most fathers, schoolmen, and divines have apparently believed in an endless hell in its crudest form, and have done so most unanimously and most unreasoningly in ages when the vast masses both of the clergy and of the laity were sunk into their deepest torpor of blind traditionalism, yet many divines of the most splendid eminence—and among them Origen, one of the greatest, noblest, and most laborious scholars that the church ever produced, and St. Gregory of Nyssa, a canonized saint, the president of an œcumenical council, the sole theologian except St. John to whom the church has ever allowed the title of “the Divine,” and one who had a share in the fixation of the Nicene Creed—have taught a milder view. It has been proved further by a long catena of authorities that many of those whose names are most highly honored in the Universal Church of God, while they have not seen it to be their duty to brave the insolence of theological hatred, or the tyrannies of the secular arm that priests were able to direct, have proved that their acceptance of the common teaching was only nominal, by dropping hints and using expressions entirely irreconcilable with it. Further than this, the pretended defenders of “the horrible decree” have of late, though only of late, been so eager to limit its incidence, to soften its horror, to mitigate its application, and to open doors of hope

for the misery of mankind in other directions, that their views, except for the recurrence of a few phraseological shibboleths, show but little appreciable difference from those of their brethren who occupy a more advanced position. Still further, there is one significant sign that, though many still prefer to believe in the coarsest and most sweeping denunciations of fire and brimstone, and "obscene threats of a bodily hell," either their belief is simply verbal or else they are shamefully false to their own convictions. For what are the facts? Scores of sermons are yearly published by men who prefer to hold these doctrines, or wish it to be believed that they do, and who yet either do not in their published sermons make any allusions to them at all, or only in the most distant and conventional language, and with an infrequency and an inadequacy that are startlingly disproportionate to their terrific importance. The ignorant slander of those who seem to think it a merit to "lie for God" has again and again charged me with "denying hell." The simple truth is, that if by "hell" be meant the solemn law and fact of retribution both here and hereafter, I think few living clergymen have dwelt upon it more often or more strongly than I. If it be true that one of the Caroline divines, preaching at Whitehall, told his audience that "if they abandoned themselves to their irregular appetites they must expect to receive their reward in a certain place which 'tis not good manners to mention here," even this wretched euphuism had in it more of sincerity than the reticence of those who, professing to believe that the majority of their fellow-creatures are dropping day by day, like a shower of agonized rain-drops, into an endlessness of inconceivable and flaming torture, never in whole volumes of homilies make any use of their belief. And why do we scarcely ever, in these days, hear sermons of the Jonathan Edwards stamp? For these reasons among others: because, even in his own day, Jonathan Edwards disgusted, offended, and stunned the greater number of his adherents by utterances that he himself entirely believed, but which we now read with shudders of inexpressible abhorrence; and because the wider knowledge of mankind, the revelations of science, the more vivid apprehension of Christ's revelation of God as a God of love, the deeper hold upon the meaning of the incarnation, the atonement, and the resurrection, the destruction of the degraded fetishism of a letter-worship, that stopped short at the letter of Scripture without attempting to understand it; these and other influences of the

dawn have so educated the moral sense of congregations, that they revolt at teachings which they feel to be false to all that is likeliest God within their own souls. In the thirteenth century it was possible to believe in such a hell as that which Dante describes, although the horror of the conception was quite indefinitely mitigated to the popular conception by the concurrent belief in purgatory, and therefore in the ultimate happiness of the great majority of baptized Christians. But the hell of Dante, in all its vilest details, with its gross physical torments, its indecent fiends, its injustice, partiality, and eternal despair, had been created by long nightmares of sacerdotal dogma in ages of ever-deepening ignorance and corruption. Into its Malebolge and Niagara of blood, and lakes of Stygian slime, had disembogued the drugs of rabbinic fancy and monastic self-torment during dreary epochs in which the very idea of Scripture exegesis had been radically perverted, and in which masses of doctrine were built like inverted pyramids on the narrow apex of misinterpreted metaphors. How far Dante himself meant his vision to be taken as a counterpart of real things must remain uncertain. Hell to his great and glowing soul was the concrete form assumed by its own burning indignation against wrong. This intensity of a heart lacerated by so fierce a spirit of hatred against contemporary crime magnetized his theology. In those days it was as much as a man's life was worth to question the dominant dogmas, nor was there, indeed, any desire to do so, for they were strong enough to strangle for centuries the instinctive movements of the soul, and to render impossible the spiritual estimate or honest examination of assertions which the reason scarcely ventured to approach, but on which, in their one aspect of truth, the fancy exercised all its power. There are sufficient evidences even in Dante's "Inferno" to show that the belief in such a hell as he depicted had reacted most unfavorably upon himself, and that it would have been fatal to his moral nature if it had not been counterbalanced by the holier forms of imagination. It is also clear that he felt himself compelled to smite back as with a bar of iron all the incipient questionings of an agonized moral sense. But beliefs that were possible in the thirteenth century are not possible in the same form in the nineteenth, when they are seen under the light that shines on so patiently, and wherewith "God shows all things in the slow history of their ripening."

Nothing could have manifested more strikingly the gradual but certain change of Christian opinion than Dr. Pusey's answer to "Eternal Hope," in the book called "What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment." It was the only answer to my book that seemed to me to be worthy of a moment's notice, or to which with any self-respect I was able to reply at all. However strong might have been his original conviction that my teaching was "mischievous,"* he wrote with the knowledge of a theologian, and in the spirit of a gentleman and a Christian. But when I read his book I felt that my own work was practically done; I believed him, indeed, to be demonstrably wrong in many historic details and in many special arguments. In the necessarily dry and minute reasonings and references of "Mercy and Judgment," I have given my grounds for thinking so. But such details were comparatively unimportant, and all controversy respecting them might safely be left to the decision of time. It was not so as to the main conclusions in the only points that seemed to me of overwhelming importance. Here I felt that, wide as might be the verbal divergences between us, and different as might be the aspects from which we approached the question, a theologian whose opinions received, from his age, his dignities, his learning, his character, his already published opinions, and his historic position in the church, ten times the weight of anything that I could say, was in substantial agreement with me on everything that I held to be of primary significance. I wrote to him that, as regards the main question, he maintained hardly anything that I impugned; and he wrote to me that I advanced hardly anything that he denied, and that if I could substitute the idea of future development for that of future probation, he thought my views would be in accordance with those of the whole Christian church.†

* In a letter published in the "Life of the Rev. James Skinner."

† In a letter to me, dated July 30, 1880, Dr. Pusey says: "If I had had time I would have rewritten my book, and would have said, '*You seem to me to deny nothing which I believe.*' . . . I would have been glad to begin with what we believe in common, and so to say there is no need then to theorize about a new trial." In another letter, dated August 3d, he says: "It is a great relief to me that you can substitute the conception of a future purification for those who have not utterly extinguished the grace of God in their hearts. This, I think, would put you in harmony with the whole of Christendom."

But I had no need to "substitute" anything. On referring to "Eternal Hope," I found that I had said little or nothing about future probation. I do not think that I had once used the word. My object had solely been to repudiate certain hideous excrescences and accretions to the doctrine of future retribution as commonly taught, which accretions appeared to me to be as unauthorized by the Scriptures as they were revolting to the conscience. I had never tried to explain, or desired to scrutinize, the how or the why of God's future dealings with the human soul. My only desire had been to cut the free soul of religion loose from the corpse of a decaying traditionalism. And I found that Dr. Pusey had practically conceded everything that I desired. He repudiated the notion that it was "of faith" to believe that the vast majority of men had been ever doomed to an endlessness of agony. He admitted that it was not "of faith" to accept the current descriptions of material torments. He held, as I held, the possibility of a penal purification beyond the grave which might be called by the name of "purgatory," if that word did not convoke a number of views that we both rejected. He accepted, if I mistake not, the admissibility of prayers for the dead, which *ex vi termini* involve the conception of possible ameliorations in the state of their hereafter. Our differences reduced themselves to these: He thought that there was in death an almost sacramental efficacy, and that, in the very hour and agony of death, multitudes of souls might be saved whose fate was, to all human appearance, hopeless. His language on this subject seemed to me so startling that I was amazed at the small notice it attracted, and it seemed to lay open his own views to the very charge as to the "dangers" of removing the safeguards of fear that he himself had urged so strongly against me and others.*

If my views were to be stigmatized as lax, because I thought that the door of hope might not be closed forever to all who, at the moment of death, had shown no visible signs of repentance,

* "Take the case of one falling in a duel, but repenting, for the love of God, after he had been mortally wounded. Or that (which made much impression) of an unbeliever who had lately been inculcating unbelief, and who rose from an adulteress's bed to fall back and die in the arms of the adulteress." Dr. Pusey asks even of these, and of Absalom, Nebuchadnezzar, Antiochus Epiphanes, etc., whether they may not have repented, and so become salvable *in articulo mortis*. ("What is of Faith," pp. 12-14.)

it seems to me a view infinitely more lax to hold with Dr. Pusey that "a soul dying immediately upon the commission of a deadly sin" may still die "in a state of grace." The only other difference was this: He held that for some, even from the moment of death, there was an endless hell; that is, an endless exclusion and alienation from the presence of God. I had never denied that this might be so, although I did not think that the church had ever demanded such a belief, or that we were justified in laying it down dogmatically as being "of faith." But on one very essential truth I had insisted quite as strongly as Dr. Pusey, and perhaps even more distinctly than Origen, or St. Gregory of Nyssa, namely, that "without holiness no man can see the Lord"; and that the impenitent permanence of a sinful individuality was in itself a hell; and that until sin, and the desire for sin, had been, in whatever way, washed or exorcised from the soul of man, it could never be at unity with the Eternal Goodness, nor could it, even in a physical heaven,—if that were possible,—find the heaven of peace with God.

Views are often rejected on the sole ground that they are popularly branded as "dangerous." The procedure is immoral, and shows a want of faith in God. God is a God of truth, and if we have any belief in him at all, we shall never believe that error is needed as a safeguard of morals. It is historically absurd to argue that the belief in such a hell as that painted by Tertullian or Mr. Spurgeon or Furniss is any protection against the temptations to individual crime. Even when such a belief was unquestioningly accepted, the belief in the atonement, the belief in the possibility of repentance, might, if men chose, be sufficiently "dangerous" to make the fear of hell, even in the basest natures, a wholly ineffectual barrier against sin. It is only the basest natures that can be acted on by fear, and a soul that became virtuous solely from fear of hell-fire is an impossible conception, for such a soul would simply not be virtuous at all. Even Horace saw that it is only by the love of virtue, not by the dread of punishment, that a man can be good. And since the Middle Ages the grotesque descriptions of physical torment have been infinitely more dangerous than nobler, purer, and truer teaching. They have been, in multitudes of acknowledged instances, a direct excuse for infidelity. They have been rejected by the incredulous abhorrence of mankind, and have dragged the vital truths of religion into the same rejection. If there be

danger in the rejection of every element of fear, the vulgar view of hell, being secretly disbelieved even by many who were supposed to teach it, led directly to such false security. But when a true fear—the fear of an induced state, not of a material flame—the fear of inevitable laws, not of arbitrary inflictions—the fear of the displeasure of a God who loves the sinner even amid his sins—the fear of that which we call his wrath as expressed in the working of stern laws that are beneficently intended to teach us what is his will,—such a fear—the noble fear of doing wrong because it is wrong, because God by the structure of his whole revelation, alike in nature and conscience and in Scripture, has shown it to be wrong—is an element in a wise and earnest life. And this element is not in the least weakened by larger hopes for the destiny of mankind; nay, it is indefinitely strengthened; for in proportion as we emphasize the truth, and press home the appeal of God's love, do we teach every true soul to dread a disobedience that involves the resultant misery that we call his anger. Let no man suppose that milder views of the future are of any rose-pink or Della-Cruscan character. They have sprung mainly from the instinctive sense of justice, and from that idea of God which results from many confluent lines of revelation. It is only the rage of theologians awaked from the deep slumber of decided opinion that has thought it witty or becoming to impute to a "mawkish sentimentality" the repudiation, with every muscle and fiber of our moral being, of doctrines that represented the God of love as a Moloch even more cruel than the abomination of the children of Ammon. That repudiation sprang from the study of Scripture, from the growth of criticism, from the widening of knowledge, from the comparison of religions, from the history of doctrines, from truer and juster thoughts of all that man is and all that God is, from a fuller sense of all for which Christ died, from a deeper estimate of the true dignity of redeemed humanity, from a tracing of late ecclesiastical traditions to their corrupted source, from an acquaintance with the liberty that has on this subject been always accorded to Christian opinion, from a contemptuous disarming of

"Blind Authority, beating with his staff
The child that might have led him."

Nevertheless, we relax no nerve of righteous indignation; we not only offer no impunity to the four classes whom God most

hates,—murderers, adulterers, hypocrites, and liars,—but we point them to a more just, a more natural, a more certain, and a less imaginary punishment. So far from weakening the majesty of God's two great angels of Duty and Conscience, we add a deeper awfulness to their looks of calm yet intolerable indignation. We convince bad men that they are what they make themselves, and that this is hell; that there is no outer darkness so deep as that of a self-darkened and alienated soul; that if a man would be at one with God, he must put on Christ and put off his own polluted self. Do we, then, make void the law? Yea, we establish the law! But, though we remove no safeguard of honorable fear, there are certain things which we do, and these, in conclusion, I would briefly mention.

First. There are many who have accepted what they call the doctrine of "Conditional Immortality," the old rabbinic belief that the hopelessly wicked are first tortured, then annihilated. We do not accept this view. We do not, indeed, either condemn it as a heresy, or withhold communion from those who have adopted it. We frankly admit that something like this seems to have been the opinion of Irenæus and of Justin Martyr, and that it may derive a certain apparent sanction from the letter of Scripture literally interpreted. But for ourselves, we believe in the immortality of the soul, on the grounds on which it has been held by the vast majority of Christians, and, indeed, of mankind in all ages, and we do not feel ourselves justified in holding that some souls are, and some are not, immortal.

Second. We refuse to dogmatize about a multitude of details respecting which rabbis, and fathers, and scholars, and theologians have dogmatized incessantly, but respecting which the views of Christian antiquity have differed, and the voice of the church is absolutely silent.

Third. We insist on the wise old rule of theological reference that *theologia parabolica non est demonstrativa*. We see clearly that a very large part of the teaching that assimilates the Christian to the Buddhist and the Mohammedan hell, has been simply based on the oriental metaphors, on popular expression, and on the graphic scenery that surrounds the central meaning of parables; and that from such sources no such conclusions can be drawn.

Fourth. We reject many of the current proofs that have been so inexcusably perverted from their proper meaning to be pressed into a controversy with which they have no connection.

The rejection applies especially to the greater number of passages adduced in this controversy from the Old Testament. Any one who, at this time, can still quote so totally irrelevant a phrase as, "Where the tree falleth, there it shall lie," simply puts himself out of court, proves only his own incompetence to understand the simplest conditions of any scriptural argument.

Fifth. We refuse to give to fluid popular expressions, to current phrases of a vague meaning that varies with the context, —like the Hebrew *sheol*, the Greek *αἰώνιος*, and the English "eternal,"—a rigid significance, which is partly excluded by the only light thrown in Scripture upon their usage, and partly expresses a conception to which those who originally used them had never attained at all.

Sixth. We refuse to ignore the fact that there are in Scripture distinct autonomies of teaching on this subject, which only confirms the impression that we derive from the whole course of human history and the gradual progress of human knowledge, that God never intended to draw the curtain from the details and the secrets of the world beyond the grave. If one set of expressions in Scripture point to the annihilation of the wicked, and another set of expressions may, by the liberal help of inference, be interpreted to imply an endlessness of torment, and another set of expressions, taken in their own plain sense, and in common with the arguments into which they are introduced, indicate an apparent final restoration of the whole universe into the blessedness of the divine life,—then it is clearly beyond our power to dogmatize with any confidence upon the whole subject, but we fall back with perfect faith upon the certainty that the Judge of all the earth will do right, and meanwhile we are true to the best we know when we guide our whole lives in accordance with his eternal moral laws, and take our conception of his sovereign attributes of love and mercy from the revelation of himself which all of us believe that he has given to them in the Son of Man, the Saviour of the world.

F. W. FARRAR.

THE MORAL ASPECTS OF VIVISECTION.

THE very word is sharp. It is smooth and highly polished, with a keen, cutting edge. It tells of a helpless, suffering creature under the steady hand of a pitiless dissector. The skin is flayed away, the quivering flesh carved off, the nerve trunk pierced with needles, the bare bone sawed asunder. The cries of bitter agony are unheard by the stern operator; the resisting struggles have been foreseen and forestalled. The ghastly work goes steadily on, until, after a while, a long, long while, the silver cord is loosed and the golden bowl broken, and then at last all is silent and still. I hate cruelty. It fills me with horror and disgust. It tramples on the divinest instincts—

My dear madam, if you please, stop a moment. This is very shocking, and your seething indignation is natural and truly amiable; but as there is just now no dripping knife, or smeared table, or writhing victim actually before your eyes, or screams of pain actually piercing your delicate ears, let us be calm, let us think a little. You hate cruelty. So do I. You hate it hotly. I hate it with a hate so cold and deadly that its vent might prove cruel. But we must not let our feelings judge. A vast surplus of feeling has been expended on this matter, and many bitter things have been said and written. Rather, let us quietly take our seat on the bench, and summon vivisection to the bar. Do not join in denouncing this "cruelty of cruelties" until you see clearly your ground. Before you undertake to strike a reptile, be sure that it is a reptile, and then that you hit it so hard that it cannot strike back, else you may have cause for regret.

When we who are outside the laboratories try to ascertain just what this vivisection is, we meet with some difficulties. Its practitioners and advocates describe it as an important method of physiological research by the dissection of living animals. It

seems that practical physiology has four branches,—the histological, chemical, physical, and vital,—and that vivisections occur only in the latter department. Even here they form but a very small part of the experiments, for much the larger number involve neither cutting nor pain. In cases that would otherwise involve pain, chloroform is usually given, and the animal is killed before it recovers from the anæsthetic. It is evident, then, that the term vivisection has a much narrower meaning than practical or experimental physiology, and is properly applicable only to special cases that are comparatively few.

But when we examine the reports in the medical journals—for instance, in “The Lancet”*—we find that painful experiments are not at all infrequent. The opponents of the practice collect the telling cases, and describe them as sawing across the backbone, dissecting and irritating the great nerves, driving catheters along the veins and arteries, inoculating with dreadful diseases, cutting out parts of the intestines, stewing and baking in a stove, pouring boiling water into the stomach, boiling or freezing to death, and by mechanical processes reducing the brain to the condition of “a newly plowed potato-field.” Moreover, they point out that an eminent authority disapproves of the use of anæsthetics, as “an experiment is much more satisfactory when the animal exhibits signs of pain.” Often the animal is not left even normally sensitive, but raised to a frightful condition of morbid sensitiveness by the motor-nerve paralyzer, but sensory-nerve excitant, called *curari*. This drug is administered to “keep the animal quiet” under the operation. Claude Bernard, the prince of physiologists, describing one of his experiments, says: “A dog was first rendered helpless (by *curari*) and incapable of any movement, even of breathing, which function was performed by a machine blowing through a hole cut in its windpipe; but its intelligence, its sensitiveness, and its will remained intact, a condition which, under the opera-

* See, for instance, the number for September 17, 1881, giving an account of some experiments of M. Richet in electrical tetanus. The article says: “If the animal is kept cool by artificial means, it may bear for more than two hours extremely strong currents, which cause severe tetanus (lock-jaw), without dying for some days.” See, also, the “British Medical Journal” for May 5, 1877, December 14, 1878, and June 11, 1881; and the “Journal of Physiology” for January, 1882. There are said to be about thirty physiological laboratories in Europe and Great Britain.

tion, was accompanied by the most atrocious sufferings that the imagination of man can conceive."*

As to the number of animals dissected alive, we learn that M. Paul Bert describes a series of experiments up to No. 286; that Schiff is calculated to have used 14,000 dogs and about 50,000 other animals during his ten years' work at Florence; that Flourens told Blatin that Magendie had used 4000 dogs to prove Sir Charles Bell's theory of the motor and sensory functions of the nerves, and then 4000 more to disprove it; and that he (Flourens) had proved Bell was right by sacrificing 1000 more. This is enough. It is needless to repeat the oft-told tale of horrors contained in the works of Claud Bernard (to whom the English physiologists proposed in 1878 to erect a statue), of Paul Bert, Brown-Séquard, and Richet in France, of Goltz in Germany, of Mantegazza in Italy, and of Flint in America. The British physiologists are accused of like atrocities, and we are told that a glance at their record "makes the soul sick as with a whiff and an after-taste from a moral sewer."†

At the meeting of the British Medical Association at Norwich, in 1874, M. Magnan, a French physiologist of high repute, exhibited some experiments on live dogs. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals prosecuted the assistants of M. Magnan. The magistrates dismissed the case as not coming under the Cruelty Act, but agreed that the experiments were nevertheless cruel and useless.‡ Public opinion was deeply moved, and parliamentary inquiry demanded, which resulted, in 1875, in the appointment of a royal commission of forty-five members. Many eminent medical men were examined as experts,

* See his article in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" for September 1, 1864. The following indicates the extent of this practice: "Curari is now employed in a vast number of experiments as a means of restraining the animals. There are but few observations the narrative of which does not begin by stating that they were made on a curarized dog." (*Leçons de Physiologie Opératoire*, p. 168.)

† See especially a strong article by Miss Cobbe in the "Contemporary Review" for April, 1882. Any one who wishes to sup full of horrors is referred also to "Vivisection (in three) Prize Essays" (London, 1881), to M. Scholl's "Ayez Pitié," and to M. von Weber's "Folkerkammer der Wissenschaft."

‡ The Academy of Sciences at Paris, at the annual meeting, after the Norwich trial, testified its approval of M. Magnan's researches by awarding him a prize of 2500 francs.

and many opponents of the practice. The "Report," covering 388 pages of the Blue-Book, was made in 1876, and Parliament thereupon passed the Vivisection Act, prohibiting experiments on living animals except under stringent regulations. It seems that the English physiologists acquiesced in the law, or at least strictly conformed to it, and that public agitation subsided.

In the midst of this stir, the Victoria street Anti-vivisection Society was started, with Lord Shaftesbury as president, and Lord Chief Justice Coleridge, Cardinal Manning, Lord Mount Temple, and the Bishop of Winchester as vice-presidents. At first the society asked only for a restrictive law; but, when this was obtained, it was not satisfied, and proceeded to demand absolute prohibition. In May, 1881, its organ appeared, the "*Zoöphilist*," which recounted its reasons as follows:

"1st. Because vivisection is the most cruel of cruelties, and the laboratories where it is practiced are places where torture is not an accident but a business. 2d. Because, while other cruelties are dying out before the advance of civilization, vivisection is becoming a new vice. 3d. Because it not only involves most pain to brutes, but is most demoralizing to men, because most conscious and deliberate. 4th. Because the Society is convinced it is scientifically worthless, a misleading method of physiological research."

The manifesto concludes:

"Not on this last issue, however, the worthlessness of vivisection, do we for a moment consent to rest our cause. A practice inseparable from the great offense of cruelty does not become lawful, even should it chance to prove useful. . . . We repudiate the whole rotten system of morality to which such arguments belong, and maintain that if the gain to science and the healing arts to be obtained by vivisection were as real and substantial as it is vain and visionary, it would fail to justify the infliction of torments on brutes, or the degradation of men into tormentors."

In August, 1881, the International Medical Congress met in London, numbering three thousand members, by far the largest and most widely representative assembly of medical men the world has ever seen. During the session, vivisection was much discussed. The famous Professor Virchow took it as the subject of his address at St. James's Hall, declaring that none of those who attacked vivisection as an aid to science have any conception of the true importance of science, or of the value of this means of acquiring knowledge. The English restrictive law was generally condemned by the Congress, and on August 9 the following resolution was unanimously passed:

"Resolved, That this Congress records its conviction that experiments on living animals have proved of the utmost service to medicine in the past, and are indispensable to its future progress. That, accordingly, while strongly deprecating the infliction of unnecessary pain, it is of opinion, alike in the interest of men and of animals, that it is not desirable to restrict competent persons in the performance of such experiments."

Two days afterward the British Medical Association, at a special and crowded meeting, with only one dissenting voice, approved this resolution.*

The resolution acted like a red rag. John Bull went mad. Everywhere, and by everybody, the subject was fiercely discussed. It became once more, and more than ever, a burning question. Professor Ferrier was prosecuted. The zoöphilists vowed their determination to force through Parliament a prohibitory act. Placards with hideous pictures of the great abomination were posted at all crossways; pamphlets fell like fire-flakes; the newspapers teemed with vindictive paragraphs; and the heavier metal of the monthly reviews resounded throughout the United Kingdom. The physiologists defended themselves generally with dignity, if not with efficiency. While the medical faculty in general sided with them, they were assailed on every hand by bishops and clergy, lawyers and politicians, novelists and penny-a-liners, officers of both army and navy, jockeys and spinsters, lords, ladies, and laymen generally, and finally (*et tu, Brute!*), the Dublin College of Physicians. The clamor was loud and long, reminding us of our antislavery times. Gradually, however, it abated; the agitators seemed at last to be weary of it, and unwilling to pay the price, "eternal agitation."

The sword-play which the literary remains of this contest exhibit is certainly very entertaining, but not at all decisive. Like the ghostly heroes of Walhalla, the combatants hew one another into pieces, only in a twinkling to be reunited and again engaged in the bloodless encounter. While the battle was raging, our partisan feelings were enlisted, but now that it has subsided, we may, in the interval of comparative quiet, calmly

* In the opening address, Professor Humphrey said: "Almost every advance in our knowledge of the human body has been made through vivisection." During the Congress, a statue of Harvey was unveiled at Folkestone, August 6, and the address on that occasion, by the venerable Professor Owen, warmly advocated vivisection.

examine the question, it being one on which every thinking man desires to have a clearly correct and fixed opinion. Happily it has not been generally agitated among us, nor is it desirable that it should be; and therefore we avoid home cases, and look abroad for facts. But a reasonable consideration of the subject is desirable, in order that a healthful public opinion may be formed, one that may save us from being caught unawares by agitators, and plunged, perhaps, into unwise legislation.

At the outset it is needful to clear away some misapprehensions. It would seem superfluous to point out that the question before us is not one of physiological science, were it not that many scientists claim that it belongs solely to their own exclusive domain, and is to be judged of only by experts. The unscientific world is haughtily forbidden to have an opinion in the matter, except so far as they adopt that of their betters, much less to promulgate one, still less to legislate thereon.* This is a queer confusion of thought; for evidently, while the question concerns scientific matter and the practice of scientific men, it is nevertheless wholly, strictly, and exclusively ethical. It is merely a question of right and wrong, simply this: Is it right to perform painful experiments on animals? In deciding this question, it is clear that we must look to the physiologist alone for the facts, believing they will be given without retrenchment or distortion. We expect from him such as are fairly representative, and must not allow a partisan opponent to fright us with an assorted string of horrors worked up with blood-curdling rhetoric. We must rely exclusively upon the physiologist for an estimate of the proportion of pain-giving experiments,

* Here is a deliverance of a professor in the Paris School of Medicine, furnished by one of his pupils: "The true ground of our vindication is that if once we permit moralists and clerics to dictate limitations to science, we yield our fortress into their hands. By and by, when the rest of the world has risen to the intellectual level of France, and true views of the nature of existence are held by the bulk of mankind, now under clerical direction, the present crude and vulgar notions regarding morality, religion, divine providence, deity, the soul, and so forth, will be swept entirely away, and the dicta of science will remain the sole guide for sane and educated men. We ought, therefore, to repel most jealously and energetically all attempts to interfere with the absolute right of science to pursue her own ends in her own way, uninterrupted by churchmen and moral philosophers, forasmuch as these represent the old and dying world, and we, the men of science, represent the new."

and of the degrees of pain involved, so far as these points may concern the question. We must accept without demur his judgment of the importance of this method of investigation, to general science and to the medical arts, both retrospectively and prospectively; for he alone can judge of the true relation of what he knows to what he hopes to know, this judgment being a sort of trained instinct of whose process no account can be required. Medicine is still in its cradle; but it has already strangled some serpents, and it is reasonable to expect a herculean growth. So, when we hear such savants as Pasteur and Virchow, Owen and Huxley, Humphrey and Foster, Simon and Fraser, Paget and Carpenter, unitedly affirming that "the remarkable advance in medical science and art during the past twenty years is due to experiments on the lower animals," we give no heed at all to the dogma of Cardinal Manning, that "it is a detestable practice, not attended with scientific results," or to the opinion of Chief Justice Coleridge, that "the practice is displeasing to Almighty God." In this case we will take counsel, not of the priest, nor of the Levite, but of the good Samaritan.

With the facts and their estimated value thus laid before us, we may proceed to consider the questions: Is it right? Shall it be allowed? The first is a question of ethics, of casuistry, a pure case of conscience. The second is a question of social order. It is absurd for scientists to forbid us common folk to judge and determine these points. It is absurd for them to warn us off this ground; for here we are upon our own ground, and will surely hold it. We might fairly retort, that if experts alone are to be heard, then those alone competent in this case are not at all the experts in physical science, but the experts in ethical science, and the experts in political science; those who have made a special study of rights and duties, and those who have studied the best means of enforcing them. As the question before us is not physiological, but ethical, so, on the other hand, it is, though ethical, not at all sentimental. It is a very common and a very great error to consider ethical questions to be questions of sentiment, and I know of no more notable case than the present. The horrors of vivisection are emphasized by the zoöphilists as decisive. Our sympathy with our suffering fellow-creatures is aroused, our pity is painfully stirred by highly wrought descriptions of frightful tortures, and then, with an appeal to our humanity and piety, we are asked if these

things are not an outrage upon the best impulses of our nature, and an offense to the loving God who made us all.

Let it be distinctly understood that questions of morals are not to be settled in this way. We cannot decide the right or wrong of vivisection by the abhorrence it naturally excites. The butcher's trade is revolting, but we pay him well. We shudder and turn sick when we pass by the anatomical dissecting-room, but it is now licensed. The physiological laboratory is perhaps questionable, but the horrorized sentimentalists must stand aside if they will not listen to reason. That the sight of agony is shocking, that cries of pain are distressing, that we look with abhorrence on the shedding of blood, and turn with loathing and disgust from torture, are all according to natural order, and in their place have excellent working as impulses to relief. But these feelings should be controlled until judgment is rendered. Primarily they excite attention, subsequently they impel to action, but, unless suspended meantime, they becloud and embarrass investigation. It cannot be too strongly said that feeling is no guide for judgment, and especially that it cannot settle for us important questions of right and wrong, of justice and injustice, of humanity and cruelty. Questions of morals require calm, cold reasoning on clearly recognized and admitted principles. In the light of these, conduct that seems detestable should be examined, and its moral quality determined, with no more feeling than what is needful to press the search. So, in the present inquiry, we must suppress the sentiment that hinders and obscures it, in order to judge freely and truly. Let us, then, be as heartless as Magendie himself in dissecting this throbbing subject.

Can the right or wrong of vivisection be determined by the principles of the utilitarian ethics? The utilitarian scheme maintains that whatever conduct tends to promote the happiness of mankind, to add to the sum of pleasures or diminish pains, to increase the enjoyment of life, is, from that cause alone, righteous conduct. Nothing is right or wrong in itself apart from its consequences; it is only so because of its consequences. It is not that the consequences throw light upon the moral quality, but that they determine it. Expediency does not merely prove justice, it makes justice. Actions having beneficial results are right by virtue of the results; actions that do harm are wrong, simply because they do harm. Evidently we

have here the confusion that a remote effect is the direct cause of a quality in its cause; but we pass that. ✓

When we attempt to apply the principles of this scheme to the question of vivisection, we encounter at once, in an aggravated form, what may be called its characteristic difficulty, the weighing of pleasures and pains. Obviously, if we regard the welfare of man exclusively, the opinion of the savants that vivisection is advantageous determines that it is right, unless the physical benefits be counterpoised by demoralization. We grant that any actual demoralization would turn the scale; but while the physical advantage is a fact, the demoralization is only a dream, or at best a prophecy. It is generally admitted, however, that we should take into consideration the pains of the brutes. But what measure have we of pain, and especially of brute pain? What is its unit? Are the light sufferings of many to be accounted equal to the intense suffering of one? Moreover, supposing the quantity of pain in a given case of brute suffering were justly measured and found equal to the quantity in a given case of human suffering, are these equal quantities to be accounted of equal value? If not, what ratio subsists between them? These are hard and perhaps unanswerable questions. But, until they be answered, how can we decide the right or wrong of vivisection on the principle of utility? It is complained that the amount of suffering inflicted is out of all proportion to the benefits accruing to mankind, but this so-called disproportion has clearly many elements of uncertainty.* Other difficulties arise on a little considera-

* Dr. Gerald Yeo, F. R. C. S., Professor of Physiology in King's College, London, in defending vivisection as practiced in England, attempts an estimate, as follows: "We thus learn from the reports that in one hundred vivisections we should find the following numbers, arranged to show the amount of pain inflicted:

Absolutely painless	75
As painful as vaccination	20
As painful as the healing of a wound	4
As painful as a surgical operation	1

Pain forms, then, but a rare incident in the work of a practical physiologist in England; and when it is necessary that any be inflicted, every precaution is used to reduce it to a minimum." ("Fortnightly Review," March, 1882.) But we have the authority of Sir James Paget for saying that the sensibility to pain among men is as various as the "ear for music"; and M. Charles Richet says: "Il n'y a de douleur que s'il y a conscience et réflexion

tion. It is evident that the utilitarian scheme of morals assimilates the principle that the end justifies the means, or rather that it sanctifies the means, at least whenever the good attained is greater than the injury through which it is reached. If the greater good that may come of it makes it right to dissect living animals, would not also the greater good that may come of it make it right to dissect living men? Compulsory vaccination is very near to human vivisection. The experiments of Heinrich and Dworzak on themselves, under the direction of Professor Schroff, and the test of the ordeal poison of Calabar, by the late Sir Robert Christison, which nearly cost him his life, are something nearer. And now, to the consternation of *La Ligue Anti-vivisectionniste* of Paris (of which M. Clovis-Hughes is an active and eloquent member), Madame Astié de Valsayre offers herself to M. Pasteur as the subject of any experiments he may choose to perform in *rabies*. Why not? If such acts are allowable, what good reason had Celsus for denouncing as atrocious the vivisection of Roman slaves, and the experiments on condemned felons at Alexandria? In the interest of science we give the bodies of executed criminals to the anatomists; why not, before execution, hand them over to the physiologists? Professor Ferrier, who has been obliged to content himself with monkeys, would surely be glad to dissect a series of living human brains. The utility to science and medical art would be inestimable, and we should have the additional utility of increasing the terrors of the law. Then, why not? I believe the utilitarian has no answer.

Again, by the principle of utility a present act must look to the future for its moral quality. But who knows the future? We need to know what is right beforehand; afterward comes too late. The theorist says that murder and theft are wrong, and healing and honesty right, because of their effects, and we know these by the experience of ages. But concerning vivisection we have no experience of ages, but only the doubtful experience, perhaps, of a single age. Grant that great benefits

sur cette douleur. Plus on est intelligent, plus on peut souffrir. Les animaux inintelligents sont incapable d'éprouver dans toute sa plénitude cette sensation que nous appelons la douleur. Leurs nerfs sont moins excitables, et surtout leur cerveau est moins susceptible de cette nette perception de soi sans laquelle il n'y a guère de douleur." ("Revue des Deux Mondes," February 15, 1883, p. 840.)

have resulted, this is no guarantee for the future. The mine may be exhausted. Besides, what justified the first vivisectors? They need to have lived until now to find the answer of a good conscience. A utilitarian is unavoidably an evolutionist in morals. For him right or wrong is slowly developed in consequences, and it is impossible, without prophetic foresight, to ascertain the moral quality of a new case. He must wait on its effects.

It is very instructive to a student of ethics to observe how completely the principle of utility fails in a new case, how completely it has broken down in the present case. The English debate necessarily took an ethical turn, although few recognized and some denied the essentially ethical character of the point at issue.* Without distinct avowal, it proceeded on the low ground of utility, a principle that has infected English morals from Hobbs to Spencer. True, the "Zoöphilist" declared: "We repudiate the whole rotten system of morality to which such arguments belong," but nevertheless it went on to use them. The question mainly disputed was one of more or less pain. Mr. Colam "was engaged for some sixteen years in investigating the question of how much pain was given by physiologists." The charge of inflicting the most atrocious tortures was met in an apologetic tone by softening down the facts, by relegating the worst cases to the continental laboratories, and by diluting the remainder with mild instances. The dispute was about a comparative degree, not about a governing principle. The question was not and could not be settled thus. It still smoulders, ready to flame out again, a signal example of the practical insufficiency of the utilitarian theory.

The intuitional scheme of morals maintains that certain conduct is right or wrong in itself, regardless of consequences.

* Several articles appeared with the title, "Ethics of Vivisection," one of the ablest being that of Dr. Carpenter. Generally, the writers forgot the title, and discussed medical points. But Dr. Wilks did not forget, and, curiously enough, he concludes his article thus: "To endeavor to make vivisection a question of ethics, when moral considerations are altogether and confessedly ignored in a thousand other instances, is clearly illogical, and obviously prompted by an undue bias. In other words, the selection of the so-called standard of 'morality,' or of the 'rights of animals,' by which to measure the permissibility of psychological experimentation, is undeniably a prejudgment of the real point at issue." ("Contemporary Review," May, 1882, p. 30.)

It starts with a moral principle that is affirmed to be pure truth, immediately known to every man, and incapable of proof and not needing it. From this principle men easily and clearly infer that murder and theft are wrong, that healing and honesty are right, without considering their effects, such actions being right or wrong in their own nature. In an obscure case, a consideration of consequences may help us to ascertain the intrinsic moral quality of an action, but does not at all, as in the utilitarian scheme, constitute or objectively determine its moral quality. The moral principle is recognized also as a law, a categorical imperative, conferring obligation and commanding unconditional obedience in complete disregard of all ends. This scheme repudiates the doctrine that the end sanctifies the means in any sense in which these terms can be used. Nothing can justify murder, nothing can authorize theft. The mere intent to do either, no matter for what end, is heinous guilt. But there is a large class of actions in themselves indifferent—as giving money—that acquire moral quality from the intent with which they are done, as charity or bribery. Here the purpose, not the effect, determines the moral quality.

Without attempting to formulate the moral law in all its comprehensive generality, it is sufficient at present to point out that it recognizes in man certain inherent rights, all rights being equally sacred, though of various extent; that the notion of a right carries with it the notion of possible trespass; and that the law, in its negative form, may therefore be taken to be, *Thou shalt not trespass*. In general, it is the right and duty of every man to seek his own welfare and that of his fellows. He has a right to use any and every means not wrong in itself. In human relations, an act wrong in itself, in its own nature, is so because it involves trespass on the rights of another, and this alone is strictly forbidden. Hence, in society the rights of individuals limit one another, and therefore vary with circumstances. So far, all is clear and unquestionable. Great practical difficulties frequently arise, as all litigation shows, in fixing the exact boundaries of rights limiting one another, and in determining in complex cases what is trespass.

Passing beyond this scheme of morals, we raise the question, *Have brutes rights?* Mr. Lecky tells us in his "*History of European Morals*," that this question made its appearance for the first time during the past century. So eminent a thinker

as Dr. Hickock says: "The animal can possibly possess no rights." * If so, then the vivisectionist commits no trespass, does no wrong, has a right to pursue his experiments, and whoever hinders him commits a trespass on him and does wrong. For my part, I prefer the opposite doctrine, and agree rather with Bentham, that the brute has rights "simply because it is sentient," and that its rights are as sacredly inviolable as human rights. No man can trespass on the right of a brute without grievous wrong-doing, the more flagrant because of its helplessness. I think it needless to discuss the point. Let it be remarked, however, that the brute having rights relative to man, man has correlative duties to the brute, primarily the negative one not to trespass. On the other hand, man has rights relative to the brute, but the brute, being destitute of moral sense, has no correlative duties, and man maintains his rights simply by force. To determine the limits of the rights of man and brute is, no doubt, in many cases extremely difficult, but in general it is obvious enough that the welfare of the brute should give way to the welfare of man. Without endeavoring to discover the principle involved, it is sufficient to observe that this is universally allowed. "The animals are given for our use," said Lord Erskine, in advocating the Cruelty Act, "but not for our abuse. Their freedom and enjoyments, when these cease to be consistent with our just dominion and enjoyments, can be no part of their natural rights; but whilst they are consistent, their rights, subservient as they are, ought to be as sacred as our own." The pious, gentle, and genial Cowper is equally clear:

"The sum is this: If man's convenience, health,
Or safety interfere, his rights and claims
Are paramount, and must extinguish theirs;
Else they are all, the meanest things that are,
As free to live, and to enjoy that life,
As God was free to form them at the first,
Who, in his sovereign wisdom, made them all."

This is in strict conformity with the law of kindness: Be kind to your kind. It is quite plain that according to the common sense, piety, and practice of mankind, to sacrifice the welfare of

* "System of Moral Science," revised by President Seelye, p. 36.

the brute to the welfare of man is not wrong, for it is not a trespass on its rights, they having in that relation shrunk away.*

Let us endeavor to apply these principles specifically. We observe that the prime charge against vivisection is cruelty. The charge abounds, and no clear denial of it appears, but rather a justification and palliation, on the ground of utility. Now cruelty, in my conception of it, cannot be justified on any ground whatever; nothing can palliate or excuse it. Cruelty is essentially a trespass, a wrong in itself, a monstrous wrong, comprehending many forms of odious vice and crime. Certainly there are degrees in cruelty, from mere indifference, through wanton cruelty, up to the nameless form that finds pleasure in pain.† Still, in its mildest degree it is wholly loathsome and vile in itself, apart from its deeply demoralizing influences. But what is cruelty? The word is much used and much abused, and is sadly in need of clear and distinct definition. It implies pain. Is it cruel to give pain? No; the sur-

* In an admirable article in the "Revue des Deux Mondes" for February, 15, 1883 (already referred to), M. Charles Richet, under the title *Le Roi des Animaux*, defends his practice of vivisection. He says, in effect: The right of life and death over brutes results neither from caprice nor reasoning. It is a primordial law of nature, imposed on us before we could comprehend or even recognize it. It is an element in the general struggle for existence. "La lutte qui est perpétuellement engagée entre tous les êtres vivants, est une lutte sans merci, et nulle pitié n'est réservée au vaincu. Si, des clameurs confuses que soulève dans l'univers ce conflit sans fin, quelque cri se dégage, c'est bien le fameux cri du vieux Brennus, quand il jetait son épée dans les balances du Capitole: *Vae victis!* Malheur aux vaincus!"

† The physiologists have been accused of this devilish disposition. Truc, Mantegazza says: "These, my experiments, were conducted with much delight and extreme patience for the space of a year." M. De Cyon (in "Methodik," p. 15) says: "The true vivisector must approach a difficult vivisection with a joyful excitement. He who shrinks will never be an artist in vivisection. The true feeling has much in common with that of a sculptor." M. Renan describes Claude Bernard as standing like an august priest at the sacrifice, and so absorbed in the hallowed function of burying his long fingers in the wounds he has made as to forget the cries of his victims. This has reference to a passage in M. Bernard's "Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine" (p. 180), which says: "The physiologist is no ordinary man. He is a scholar, a man who is seized and entirely absorbed by a scientific idea. He does not hear the pain-wrung cries of the creatures. He is blind to the blood that flows. He has nothing before his eyes but his idea, and organisms that are hiding secrets from him which he means to discover." Surely, this is not to take pleasure in pain, but the enthusiasm of a scientific investigator. It is the pleasure of the chase, the most delightful and justifiable of all, the pursuit of knowledge.

geon is not cruel, nor is it cruel to punish. Commonly it is defined as the giving of needless or unnecessary pain; but this is negative and vague. Let us define it positively and precisely: Cruelty is pain-giving trespass. This seems simple and clear, and to contain all the essence of cruelty. It is worthy of note that it is the pain-giving element that makes it shocking, harrowing, and damnable in the sight of pitiful folk. This may come of a tender heart, but not of a tender conscience. For it is the trespass alone, not at all the pain-giving, that makes cruelty morally wrong, vicious, wicked. It is the trespass that should stir reprobation; and, indeed, unless there be trespass, there is no cruelty. If vivisection be cruel, it is wrong; nothing can justify it, and civil law should forbid it. But is it cruel? That it often gives "atrocious pain" is admitted. Beware, now, of feelings; let us be calm, and remember that it is not at all a question of pain-giving, more or less, but a question of trespass. If not a trespass, it is not wrong. If it be a trespass, it is a pain-giving trespass, that is, a cruelty and a crime. But is it a trespass? When the brute's ordinary right to welfare, including exemption from inflicted pain, confronts man's right to welfare, it shrinks to zero and disappears. We enslave, lash, emasculate, and butcher domestic animals for service and food; we ruthlessly extirpate others when they become a nuisance, and nobody's conscience revolts, for these acts are not trespasses.* Hence, if it appear that human welfare, in yet higher respects, is dependent on vivisection, then *a fortiori* it is not a trespass. Let us see.

Physiology is the science of the functions of the various organs and textures of the body in its normal state, of the healthful working of the animal economy. It is the rational basis of pathology, or the science of disease, and of therapeutics, or the art of healing. These together make up medicine. From the time of Albert von Haller, who only a century and a half ago laid the foundations of physiology, a rational view of medicine has more and more prevailed, and the scientific element is steadily gaining ground on the purely empirical. Marvelous discoveries and applications, in a continuous series, have assuaged an untold amount of human suffering and prolonged innumerable lives; and we have the almost unanimous testimony of the medical profession, the only competent witnesses, that vivisections have

* No reference is made to the field sports, hunting and fishing, because as mere sports they seem to me to be a relic of barbarism, both cruel and demoralizing, and should, were it possible, be suppressed.

largely contributed to this brilliant and beneficent progress of physiology in the near past, and that, in their opinion, further experiments are essential to its future progress. Indeed, it is evident enough that the advance and applications of every physical science depend on experimental investigation, and any purblind layman may see that, since physiology is a science of functions, the physiologist must observe and experiment on functions in play, on living actions, and that it is only when he thus knows precisely what the right actions are, that he can promptly detect any deviation from them, and rationally undertake to deal with causes of derangement. It seems, then, that the vivisection of brutes is a most important channel of human welfare.*

Moreover, man's greatest need is to know; knowledge is the very essence of his excellence, the chiefest end of his being. I do not say useful knowledge,—though, indeed, all knowledge is useful,—but pure science; for, leaving out all thought of its practical application, this of itself is in the highest degree conducive to the perfection of humanity. Man lives for the unfolding of his faculties, the full and harmonious development of his powers, the perfecting of his character. Even if we adopt the orthodox doctrine that man is for the glory of God, still it is true that only in the accomplishment of his own perfection can he as a creature manifest the glory of his Creator. Now, the practical physiologist is in pursuit of knowledge, he is seeking to add some fragment of truth to the temple of science, and so is certainly on the way to promote human welfare. If, then, knowledge be our highest welfare, and if in the pursuit of knowledge the brute stands in the way, all its rights vanish.

The conclusion seems clear that, before such stupendous advantages to the human race, the right of the brute to exemption from inflicted pain becomes null. Hence vivisection is not a trespass, and so is not cruel and not wrong. As a merely pain-giving operation, it belongs fairly to the class of actions that are in themselves morally indifferent, and has its moral quality determined by the intent with which it is done.

* "What has Vivisection done for Humanity?" is the title of an article in the "*British Medical Journal*," for January, 1875, by Dr. J. G. McKendrick, Lecturer on Physiology at Edinburgh. It cites twenty-two discoveries of the highest scientific and practical value as due to vivisection. But the list is far from exhaustive. It omits, for example, Magendie's method of hypodermic injection, and the important fact that nearly all the most valuable new remedies added to the pharmacopœia since 1864, among which are the anæsthetics, chloral-hydrate, and nitrite of amyl, are due to vivisection.

Supposing always the vivisector to be a scientific investigator in pursuit of valuable knowledge, it follows that his conduct is righteous. Sound logic leads us further. Whatever is right is duty. It is not merely the privilege of the physiologist to practice vivisection, it is a duty that he owes to society. Having accepted or assumed the burden of his important vocation, he is under obligation to do everything in his power for the increase of human knowledge, the prolongation of human life, and the mitigation of human suffering. He must remember "how much better is a man than a sheep," and the words, "Ye are of more value than many sparrows." If it be true that "mercy but murders, pardoning those that kill," then the tenderness that would spare the brute is cruelty to mankind. And this cuts both ways. For whoever hinders the physiologist in his duties by exciting public odium commits a trespass on him and on society at large, in whose interest he is laboring, and so does a multiplied wrong; and should this hindrance be pushed to legal oppression or prohibition, the shambles may rejoice, but the wronged hospitals will surely take up the wail of Antigone: "Neither God nor Justice sat in council at the making of those laws."

Nevertheless, restrictions need to be imposed. Even the most thoroughly justifiable vivisections are on the verge of cruelty and crime. Of this the physiologists are themselves fully aware, and voluntarily accept stringent limitations. In 1871, the British Association resolved as follows: First, that "no experiment which can be performed under the influence of an anæsthetic ought to be done without it"; second, that "no painful experiment is justifiable for the mere purpose of illustrating a law or fact already demonstrated"; and, third, that "whenever, for the purpose of new truth, it is necessary to make a painful experiment, every effort should be made to insure success, in order that the sufferings inflicted may not be wasted."* These resolutions are signed by the President of the College of Physicians, the President of the College of Surgeons, and many others, and are generally approved and observed by English physiologists. The Vivisection Act, which has been already referred to, is much more stringent. By it all experiments on living animals are prohibited, except they be performed under a license granted by the Secretary of State, and done in a registered place, with the exclusive object of making such dis-

* "Report of the British Association for the Advancement of Science," 1871, p. 144.

coveries as shall be "useful for saving or prolonging life, or alleviating suffering." Moreover, "the animal must, during the whole of the experiment, be under the influence of some anæsthetic of sufficient power to prevent its feeling pain," and be killed before it recovers. The experiments must not be used to illustrate lectures or to attain manual skill. Exemption from these restrictions, in special cases, may be granted by an authorized scientific commission; but the public exhibition of any experiment likely to cause pain is absolutely prohibited. The English physiologists complain bitterly of this Act as the product of a spirit of persecution, as oppressive and tyrannical, and as so hindbersome in its operation as to be practically preventive of their work. By it Dr. Brunton's study of cobra poison was stopped. He was seeking an antidote for the relief of the twenty thousand persons who, in India, annually die of this venom. Pasteur's inoculations for the mitigation of the cattle plague, beneficent to brutes, encouraged by the French Government, and applauded by the civilized world, could not have been performed in Great Britain. There it is permitted freely to vaccinate infants, but not rats. This, if no more, is clearly much too much; the restriction needs restriction.

It is always hard to hit exactly between too much and too little. It would seem wiser, however, to license, not the experiment, but the experimenter, and him only upon the recommendation of some recognized college of medical men, he being then left by law entirely free to work in his own way and to whatever extent he finds needful, but limited to scientific investigation. He should be left in this to his own conscience and compassion, and to the good or bad opinion of his professional peers, who alone are competent to judge his working, and whose restraining judgment he dare not disregard. The law should prohibit all public exhibition, and all mere demonstration as distinguished from investigation. Such limitations would protect animals from being dealt upon by untrained and incompetent persons, they being amenable to the laws against cruelty, and would guard the public from shocking and demoralizing spectacles. But it is impracticable now to argue these suggestions, or to enter upon detail. I am emboldened in venturing to make them by the belief that they are in accord with the views of the medical faculty, and would, if enacted, fairly satisfy all the reasonable demands of a humane public.

NOAH K. DAVIS.

BUDDHIST CHARITY.

My dear friend, the late Dean of Westminster, once said: "I remember the time when the name of Gautama, the Buddha, was scarcely known, except to a few scholars, and not always well spoken of by those who knew it; and now—he is second to One only." This shows that we are not standing still, that our horizon is growing wider, and our hearts, I believe, growing larger and truer. There was a time when it was almost an article of faith that you could not be a true believer in your own religion unless you also believed that all other religions were false; and false not on certain points only, but altogether false, altogether mischievous, the very work of the devil. They might teach the same doctrine, they might use almost the same words, still the one voice was supposed to come from heaven, the other from the very opposite region. Nor was this prejudice peculiar to Christians only. As they divided the world into true believers and heathens, the Aryas of India looked upon themselves only as twice-born, or regenerate, upon all the rest of mankind as Sûdras and Mlekkhas. The Jews knew of one chosen people only, all the rest were Gentiles; while the Moham-medans spoke of all, of Hindus, Jews, and Christians, as mere Kafirs or unbelievers, and declared that they only were the true Muslim, that is, the people who trust and submit.

At present, all the great religions of the world, all the dialects in which man has tried to speak of God and to God, are treated with perfect equality. The stronger the faith in one's own religion, the stronger also the readiness to judge of other religions with kindness and tenderness, and almost with indulgence. This strikes me as one of the most characteristic tendencies of our century—I might almost say, of our age. Formerly a student of theology was expected to have read the Old and the New Testament, and possibly, if he was very

learned, he might try to read the Korán. But as to reading the sacred books of other religions, the Vedas, the Avesta, the Tripitaka, the Kings of the Chinese, it was never dreamt of, and to suppose that they could teach us anything would have been considered an insult. The University Press at Oxford has just finished the first series of translations of the "Sacred Books of the East," consisting of twenty-four large octavo volumes; and as the result, so far as the interest of the public is concerned, has not been discouraging, a second series has been started, which is to comprise as many volumes again. Surely there is an increasing purpose perceptible in all this, and we may feel that we have not altogether labored in vain. We all believe in the duty and the delight of charity. But we are not satisfied to know what Christ taught on charity. We want to know whether we stand alone in our belief in charity, whether Christianity alone inculcates that sacred duty. It is not that we have any doubt as to the supreme duty of charity, but, knowing that the same heart beats in all human breasts, we want to know what the Buddha taught on alms-giving, what Mohammed taught, what the best among the Greeks and Romans taught. And we want to know all this, not as a matter of mere curiosity, but as a matter of the deepest human concern. ✕

If men had been originally wild beasts, then, no doubt, it would have required an angel from heaven to persuade them to give up a bone they were gnawing and to share it with their starving fellow-creatures. Then, no doubt, that religion only would be true which, by some supernatural authority, could frighten human beings into doing what is so unnatural. But if the witness of truth was present in the hearts of men at all times and in all places, in the hearts of the lowest savages as well as of the highest sages, then this general recognition of the duty of charity in all religions serves as a confirmation of our own faith, or, at all events, as an admonition to fulfill a duty so universally recognized as charity, more faithfully and more zealously than the followers of any other faith.

So much has been written of late on Buddhism, that I ought to make it quite clear that, when I speak of Buddhism, I mean real, historical Buddhism, not esoteric, exoteric, or any other kind of fashionable Buddhism. Historical Buddhism took its rise about five hundred years before Christ, and it can be

studied in historical documents, the date of which admits of little doubt. We have, first of all, the inscriptions that King Asoka had graven on rocks and pillars scattered all over India, from Afghanistan to Orissa. These records date from the third century B. C., and are as intelligible now as the old Latin inscriptions of the Scipios. Nothing can shake their historical value as attesting the existence of Buddhism as the state religion in the kingdom of Asoka in the third century B. C. Secondly, we can study historical Buddhism in its canonical books, which exist in two collections, the one written in a peculiar kind of Sanskrit, the other in one of the Prākṛit, or popular dialects of India, commonly called Pāli. The Pāli canon was reduced to writing during the reign of Vatta-Gāmani, who began to reign in 88 B. C.* Before that time, the sacred books had been preserved by oral tradition only. We are told that the first collection of the doctrines of the Buddha was made at the First Council,† and shortly after the death of Gautama in 477 B. C. During the century that elapsed between the death of the Buddha and the Second Council, 377 B. C., considerable additions had been made to the sacred literature of the new religion, and whatever could claim canonical authority was collected, at the Second Council, in what is called the "Three Baskets," the Tripitaka, the Bible of the southern Buddhists. By southern Buddhists I mean chiefly the Buddhists of Ceylon, Burmah, and Siam. A second collection of sacred writings was made by the northern Buddhists, those who spread their doctrines from India to Thibet, China, Mongolia, and Japan. It is written in Sanskrit, partly in prose, partly in poetry, and often in very corrupt dialects, commonly called Gāthā dialects. The date when this collection was made is more difficult to determine, but as we know of Chinese translations of some of its books dating from the first century after Christ, we may safely suppose that some kind of canon of the northern Buddhist Bible also existed before the beginning of the Christian era. It should be remembered that the southern and northern canons share much in common, whole chapters sometimes being literally the same, a fact that seems to point to the existence of a body of sacred texts previous to the compilation of these collections.

* See "Sacred Books of the East," vol. xiii., p. 35. † Ibid., p. 12.

Buddhism, no doubt, has changed enormously, according to the character of the people by whom it was adopted, and to whose intellectual capacities it readily adapted itself. The Buddhism of the metaphysical Hindu is not the Buddhism of the matter-of-fact Chinaman, or of the stolid Mongolian, any more than the Christianity of Bishop Berkeley is the Christianity of a plowboy who can neither read nor write. Still, whenever we speak of historical Buddhism, we mean one Buddhism only, namely, that which in its two aspects of southern and northern Buddhism can be studied in its recognized canonical writings, as we study historical Christianity in the New Testament, and historical Mohammedanism in the Korán.

To my mind, having approached Buddhism after a study of the ancient religion of India, the religion of the Veda, Buddhism has always seemed to be, not a new religion, but a natural development of the Indian mind in its various manifestations, religious, philosophical, social, and political. I purpose now to consider Buddhist charity, which is, as it were, the full bloom of that more ancient charity that was preached in the Veda, and practiced during the Vedic age. It has always struck me as exceedingly strange that in a country like India there should be any call, any room for charity. Nature in India is so kind a mother, and man is a child so easily satisfied there, that one wonders how anybody could have been poor. In ancient India anybody might have land who would clear it. The game belonged to him who stuck his arrow into it. The rivers were full of fish, the trees full of fruit. There was enough and more than enough for everybody, and yet there were the poor begging at the doors of the rich. Just think that, even at present, with all the new artificial wants that have sprung up, a man in an Indian village may live decently on a shilling a week, and a woman on even less. Fancy a married couple living contentedly on £5 a year! And yet with their small wants—say a mud cottage, a few rags for clothing, some rice, milk, and, as a great luxury, butter—the Hindus from the times of the Veda to the present day have always complained of poverty, and always praised liberality or charity as one of the first duties, and one of the highest virtues. Among the hymns of the Rig Veda there is one (x. 117) ascribed to Bhikshu. Bhikshu means a beggar, and is the name assumed in later times by the Buddha himself, and by every member of his

brotherhood. In that hymn it is said that the gods do not wish that men should die of hunger, but that the rich should give to the poor. He who is charitable, the poet says, will never know want. Men are reminded that fortune changes, and that we are meant to be different. This at least seems to be the purport of the last verse, which says :

“Even the two hands, though the same, do not act in the same way :
Two cows of the same mother do not yield the same milk :
Even twins have not the same powers :
Even close kindred do not give the same gifts.”

The same idea runs through the whole Veda. He who gives liberally is beloved by the gods; he who does not give is actually called impious, an unbeliever, a heretic. Nothing perhaps shows so clearly the difference between our modern society and the society of ancient India as that with us begging is punished by law, while the beggar in India was recognized as a legitimate member of the community, protected by the law, nay, watched over by the gods. No doubt we should remember that we know very little of the state of society in India during the Vedic period, except from sacred or priestly sources. Whatever we see, we can see through Brahmanic glasses only, and we have not even the means to correct their angle of vision, except by a kind of general skepticism. But, for all that, we may look on ancient Vedic law-books, which have lately been discovered, and which are certainly anterior to the so-called Laws of Manu, as giving us, if not a faithful record of human failures in India, at all events the ideal of what, according to the notions of their authors, life ought to be. And for a true insight into a man's character, are not his ideals often far more instructive than his failures? If I dwell for a moment on this ideal of ancient Vedic society, as supplied to us in the ancient law-books, it is because I hope to show that Buddhist society, as we know it from the sacred writings of the Buddhists, is far more the fulfillment than the denial of the ancient schemes and dreams of the Brahmanic law-givers.

Society, at least in the twice-born, the regenerate, and, in our sense, the upper classes, consisted in ancient times of four stages, called āsramas. The first stage was that of the pupil. When a boy had reached the age of eight, he was initiated, or appren-

ticed to a Brahman, lived in his house, and was educated and taught by him. The boy was under the strictest moral discipline, and had to perform every kind of menial service for his master. What is important for our purpose is that every day the pupil had to go round the village begging for food, which he handed to his master before he was allowed to touch it. This was charity, but hardly voluntary. It was, in our sense, an educational rate levied not only on the parents of the children, but on the whole community. When his education was finished—hardly ever before the age of twenty—the young man was expected to marry and found a household. During this second stage the householder was still under very strict religious discipline. He had to perform constant sacrifices, every one of which involved charitable gifts to the Brahmans; and one of the five great sacrifices, which had to be performed every day, consisted in charity and hospitality to all who wanted it. Even animals had a right to daily gifts. This stage lasted till a man's children had grown up and his own hairs had become gray. Then, according to the old law, the father was expected to retire from the village into the forest, with or without his wife. His property went to his family. He himself was released from performing any but the simplest sacrifices, but he was expected to mortify the flesh by the most painful penances, and to meditate on the highest problems of life. During this third stage, the dweller in the forest, the *Vânaprastha*, or *Vaikhāṇasa*, was entitled to receive charity if he wanted it, but he was likewise expected in his humble way to show hospitality to all who claimed it. The final stage was that of the hermit, the solitary saint, or, as he was also called, the beggar, the *Bhikṣu*, who had no longer any fixed home, not even in the forest, except during the rainy season. He knew nothing of the world, and, while engaged in meditation on the vanity of all earthly things, he looked forward to death as the moment of release. It is important to observe that, like the Buddhist mendicant, the *Bhikṣu*, or beggar, was expected to shave his head, and that he also depended for his life on the charity of the people.

This was the Brahmanic ideal of life, which depended entirely on the recognition of the duty of charity in every stage. We may doubt whether this ideal was ever fully realized during the ancient Vedic period, but what we cannot doubt is that Buddhism achieved, in one sense, the full realization of this

Brahmanic ideal. I have already pointed out how during the first and second stages of life the pupil and the householder were both completely under priestly sway. Every word of the Veda that the pupil learned from the mouth of his teacher was to be accepted as revelation; every sacrifice that the householder was expected to perform was considered as the fulfillment of a divine command. But as soon as a man entered on the third stage, as soon as he left his village, his house, his family, to dwell in the forest, first as an ascetic, and finally as a hermit, all was changed. He was not only released from nearly all sacrificial and ceremonial fetters, but he was expected to know the vanity, the uselessness, or even the mischievous nature of all ceremonies and sacrifices. And when all sacrifices and prayers, addressed to the gods with a hope of reward, had once been recognized as selfish acts, productive of evil rather than of good, the old belief in the numerous gods of the Veda also had to be surrendered, at first for a belief in one god, *Pragâpati*, the lord of all living, and at last for a belief in what we should scarcely call a god, the Brahman, or the highest self. We should think that a system apparently so self-contradictory could hardly be maintained for any length of time. Yet it is presupposed during the whole of the Vedic period. And what to my mind proves its historical reality more than anything else is this, that the whole social system of Buddhism is evidently built upon its ruins. Even during Vedic times we hear the murmurings of an approaching storm. Thinkers, both young and old, asked the question, "Why, if all the gods of the Veda are mere names, if all discipline is unnecessary torture, if all sacrifices are a deceit, all domestic cares and affections a snare, all penance mere cruelty, why should the best part of our life on earth be wasted on such things? Why should we not enter at once into the freedom of thought which all who have entered on the third and fourth stages praise as the highest blessing on earth?" Answers of various kinds were given. First of all it was said to be impossible for the human mind to perceive the highest truth before the body had been disciplined, the passions subdued, and the mental atmosphere rendered calm and serene. Secondly, the domestic cares and affections, though for a time drawing away our thoughts from the highest objects, were represented as a debt due to our forefathers, and as a necessary condition of the continuance of human society. The belief in a number of per-

sonal gods was defended as harmless, because all these mythological names were really intended for the one God, or for that which is even beyond all gods.

Such explanations may have answered for a while, but the doubts of the few and the dissatisfaction of the many grew stronger and stronger, till at last the old dams and dykes of Brahmanism were swept away by that strong tidal wave that we call Buddhism. Buddhism, in one sense, was simply the carrying out, or the practical realization, of the half-uttered thoughts of Brahmanism. If sacrifices, particularly those that involve the killing of animals and extravagant expenditure, are not only useless but mischievous, Buddha said, "Let them be forbidden." If the Vedas have no claim to a revealed character, let them be treated like any other book, but do not waste your whole youth in learning them by heart. If the Vedic gods are mere figures and names, let us look for something that is more than figure and name. If penances, particularly those excessive penances of the dwellers in the forest, benefit neither the spirit nor the flesh, but produce only bodily decrepitude and spiritual pride, let them be abolished, or at all events rendered less severe. Lastly, if he who leaves home, and wife, and children, or who never knew what a home was, is nearer to heaven than the best of householders, let all who can, leave their homes as soon as possible and become "homeless," the very name that Buddha gave to the members of his fraternity.

It is true that Brahmanism already tolerated certain exceptions. A pupil, if he did not wish to marry and become a householder, might remain as a perpetual pupil and under strict discipline in the house of his master. Now and then, also, we hear of a householder who, without passing through the penances of the third stage, became at once a hermit, fully enlightened, fully emancipated from all fetters. But what formed the exception before became the rule when the Buddhist fraternity had once been established. That fraternity was a new society. It was open to all, though it did not condemn those who refused to enter, if only they were willing to support the fraternity by regular alms, as they had formerly supported the mendicants, whether as students or as hermits. Here we see the Buddhist solution of the old social problem. All who were poor, miserable, heavy-laden, were welcome to enter the fraternity. No brother

or friar possessed anything, and even the rich young man who wished to follow Buddha had to give up all his wealth and all outward distinctions before he could become a real disciple. We see from the large numbers that flocked to join Buddha's new brotherhood how much poverty, how much misery, wretchedness, and sin must have existed in that country that seemed to us an earthly paradise. Rules had soon to be laid down to guard the brotherhood from unworthy applicants, but once admitted, his head having been shaved, a man was safe in his yellow dress. He belonged, not only to a new society, but to a new state within the state, recognized by the state and supported by the people at large. Once or twice a day the friars were allowed to go from house to house collecting alms. These collections were a kind of voluntary tax for the support of the poor, and as every kind of contribution might be given, from a handful of rice to large tracts of land, the wealth of the Buddhist fraternities all over India became very considerable.

This social side of Buddhism is but seldom taken into account, though the social revolution it represents has few parallels in the history of the world. Most people are attracted by the doctrines of Buddhism, by its moral code, its parables, and its metaphysical teaching. But as one of the many solutions of the problem of poverty, or as an attempt at constructing a society in which no one should stand alone or feel himself forsaken, in which each neighbor should love his neighbor as himself, not only in word but in very deed, I think it deserves the attention of all who are interested in the historical development of charity. In one sense, Buddhism and charity are synonymous terms. The Buddhist brother lives on the charity of his brotherhood, or of the monastery or college to which he belongs. The brotherhood lives on the charity of what we may call the laity, the *Upāsakas*, those who, though they do not join the brotherhood, support it as a religious duty by their alms. Charity, therefore, is the very life and soul of Buddhism; or, as it has been expressed by a Buddhist, "Charity, courtesy, benevolence, unselfishness, are to the world what the linchpin is to the rolling chariot." But charity with the Buddhists is not confined to giving alms; charity with them is one of the six, or ten, highest perfections, what they call *pāramitās*, and then becomes complete self-surrender, carried to such an extreme

that to our western minds it is unreal and almost grotesque. The *pâramitâs* are: charity, morality, long-suffering, earnestness, concentration, wisdom, and prudence.

Buddhism is very fond of parables; in fact, most of the fables and parables of European literature come from the East. Instead of long philosophical or moral discussions, the Buddhist Scriptures constantly give us a short parable. And there is a very peculiar class of parables called *Gâtakas*, or stories of former lives. Strange as they seem to us, they are quite natural in Buddhism. No Hindu, whether Brahman or Buddhist, was ever so foolish as to imagine that his real existence began with this life of his on earth. While much of our moral teaching is based on a belief in rewards and punishments in a future life, the Buddhist morality was based on a belief in rewards and punishments in this life. When we ask, and ask in vain, why a man whom we know to be good is overwhelmed with misery, while another whom we know to be bad enjoys every blessing that life can give, the Buddhist is never at a loss. It is so, he says, because the man had done good or evil in a former life, which is now bearing fruit. It cannot be otherwise, according to the Buddhist views of the world, and according to the Buddhist views of the continuity of good and evil for all time. And the moral effect is much the same. The unhappy man is told that he is suffering here justly for his former misdeeds, and that, knowing now the wages of sin, he must strive continually to lay up a better store for the life to come. A happy man is told that, having once tasted the happiness that can only be the reward of good works, he ought to strive all the more to secure his further progress toward the highest perfection. No one is exempt from the law of cause and effect, not even the Buddha himself, at least before he became Buddha, that is, "fully enlightened." Before he could reach Buddhahood, which is a rank higher than that of all the gods, he had to work his way from the lowest to the highest stage, and had to pass through many existences before finding himself, or his true self, and thus reaching the highest beatitude.

The Buddha, when fighting on earth his last fight with the powers of darkness, with *Mâra*, the lord of death, the spirit of evil, challenged *Mâra* by saying: "To me now belongs the throne that was occupied by former *Bodhisattvas* after they had practiced the ten perfections. Or canst thou produce any

witness as to thy having practiced the high virtue of charity!" Then the spirit of darkness stretched out his hand and called upon his followers, saying, "All these are my witnesses." And a shout arose from the people, crying, "We testify, we testify!" Then Māra, the evil spirit, said, "And thou, Siddhārtha,* who can bear witness to thy acts of charity?" The Buddha replied, "Thou hast living witnesses here. I have none. But I call upon the earth, though she is unconscious, to bear witness that during my last existence, I, as Vessantara, performed seven hundred great acts of charity, to say nothing of acts of mercy performed in earlier existences." Then he drew his right hand from under his cloak and stretched it forth to the earth. And a voice arose from the earth, saying, "I can bear witness to thy charity." And such was the thunder of that voice that it crushed the host of the enemy. The followers of Māra fled, and heavenly voices shouted, "Māra, Death, is conquered! Prince Siddhārtha has triumphed!"

The story of the Buddha's last life as Vessantara, to which the Buddha himself here appeals as the crowning achievement in his endeavors to become a Buddha, is one of the most popular with the Buddhists in all parts of the world. It exists in the northern and in the southern canon. We see it represented on some of the earliest Buddhist sculptures, and we shall probably not be wrong in looking upon it as the earliest attempt at telling the history of the Buddha, previous to his last life on earth. The story is rather long, and I shall have to shorten it. In spite of eastern fervor and eastern extravagance we can easily discern behind the theatrical veil the high ideal of charity that enlightened the minds and warmed the hearts of the early followers of the Buddha, as it enlightened the minds and warmed the hearts of the early followers of Christ.

"There ruled in remote times in the city of Gayatūrā (the capital of the Siwis) a king called Sanda. His wife, Phusati, had desired for many years to become the mother of a Buddha. At last she had a son, whom they called Vessantara. From the moment of his birth (for he could speak at once) he gave proof that his heart was full of charity. When he had arrived at manhood, he married the beautiful princess Mādrī. His father ceded the kingdom to him, and during the few years of their happy married life two children were born to them, called Gāliya and Krishnāginā.

* The name given to the Buddha by his parents. It means "he in whom or by whom all desires are fulfilled."

"At this time there was a famine in Kalinga, and the king of that country, hearing that Vessantara possessed a white elephant that had the power to cause rain, sent eight Brahmans to ask for it. When they arrived, King Vessantara was just riding on the white elephant on his way to the public alms-hall to distribute the royal bounty. He asked the Brahmans what they wanted, and when he heard their request he expressed his regret that they did not ask for more; for his eyes and his very life would have been at their service, if by such generosity he might in the future become a Buddha. The people, however, were displeased at the departure of the white elephant, and requested the father of King Vessantara to punish his son for his reckless generosity. The father consented, and the next morning King Vessantara was banished to the rock Vankagiri. The young king accepted his punishment gladly. He told his wife that she might remain at court to watch over their children; but his wife declared she would rather die than leave him. They then collected all their treasures and distributed them among the beggars. Their treasury was thrown open to the people, who swarmed in like bees flying to a forest covered with lotus-flowers newly blown. When the king and queen had given away all their valuables, elephants and horses, jewels and pearls, they took leave of their parents and departed toward the north in a chariot, the young queen taking her daughter in her arms and her son by the hand. The queen-mother sent after them a thousand wagons filled with useful and valuable things, but they gave them all away.

"Soon after their departure two Brahmans, who knew of Vessantara's charity, came to ask alms from him, and when they found he had left the city they followed him and asked him for the horses of his chariot. Vessantara gave them at once, but Indra, the king of the gods, immediately replaced them with four divine horses. They had gone but a few steps further, when another Brahman beggar cried out, 'Sir, I am old, sick, and weary; give me your chariot.' Vessantara descended from his chariot, gave it to the beggar, and proceeded with his wife and children on foot. Though the road was rough, and they had now to live on the fruits of trees and water from the ponds, their minds were full of happiness, from the remembrance of the alms they had bestowed on the beggars.

"On their way north they had to pass through the kingdom of the father of Mâdri, Vessantara's queen. They were persuaded to stay with him seven days, enjoying all the luxuries of his court, but they then proceeded further on their painful journey to the rock Vankagiri. When they had arrived there, they found two huts, built for them by the architect of the gods. They now assumed the dress and adopted the life of ascetics. Vessantara dwelt in one hut, his wife and children in the other. Only when the mother went into the forest to collect fruits, the two children came to stay with their father.

"When they had thus spent seven months in the solitude of the forest, an old Brahman, who wanted a slave for his young wife, came to Vessantara's hermitage. During the night, while the old Brahman was in hiding in the forest, the mother had a frightful dream. She saw a black man, who cut off her arms and tore out her heart. The next morning she went, as usual, though with a heavy heart, to gather fruits for the children, and while

she was away the old Brahman came to Vessantara, demanding as an alms his two children. The father rejoiced at this new sacrifice. True, he first tried to persuade the Brahman to wait till the mother had come back to bid a last farewell to her children, and he then asked him to take the children to his father's court, where they would be ransomed with boundless treasure. But when the Brahman insisted on carrying off the children as his slaves, the father yielded assent. The children, on hearing the conversation, became frightened, ran away, and hid themselves under the leaves of a lotus growing in a pond near their cottage. The Brahman accused the father of having himself sent the children away. Then Vessantara cried aloud, and when the little boy heard his father's voice, he said: 'The Brahman may take me; I am willing to become his slave. I cannot remain here and listen to my father's cries.' He then tore the lotus-leaf that covered him in two. His sister did the same, and both children stood crying and clinging to their unhappy father. At last the father, seeing that thus only he could become a Buddha and save all beings from the misery of repeated births, poured water on the head of the Brahman, thus delivering the children to be his property and his slaves."

More harrowing scenes follow. The children escape from the old Brahman and run back to their father. The boy wants to see his mother once more; and then he wishes to go alone, because his little sister is too tender and unfit to walk on the hard stones. Soon, however, the old Brahman, looking like an executioner, returns and claims the children once more, ties them together by a withy, and drives them along with a stick. When the father sees the blood trickling down their backs, his heart begins to fail him once more; but it is too late. The poet now describes how the children passed along the shady places where they had often played together, and the cave in which they had been accustomed to make figures in clay, and the trees growing by their favorite pond. "Fare ye well," they said, "ye trees that put forth your beautiful blossoms, and ye pools in whose waters we have dabbled; ye birds that have sung us sweet songs, and ye nymphs that have danced before us and clapped your hands. Tell our mother that we have given you all a parting farewell. You dear spirits, and ye animals with whom we have sported, let our mother know how we have passed along this road."

Enough of this, for even much worse is to follow. The poor mother, frightened by her dream and by other ominous signs, returns home, rushes into her husband's cottage, and asks, "Where are the children?" The father remains silent for a time, but at last he has to confess that he has given the children

away because a Brahman has demanded them as an alms. On hearing this, the mother falls to the ground senseless. Her husband sprinkles her with water, and at last she revives. Then her husband explains to her that even the surrender of his children was necessary for obtaining the Buddhahood; and she exclaims: "The Buddhahood is better than a hundred thousand children; only let the reward for this act of charity be shared by the whole world." Husband and wife were now left alone in the forest, and the very gods began to be afraid of what might follow, namely, that Vessantara, if asked, would part even with his beloved wife. Indra, therefore, the chief of the gods, assumed the shape of a Brahman mendicant, and begged Vessantara to give him his wife to be his slave. Husband and wife look at each other, and say: "Yes, let it be so, if thus only Vessantara can become the Buddha, the saviour of the world." Then the earth shook, and Indra showed himself in his real character, telling Vessantara that his wife was to remain with him, and that as she now belonged to another—namely, to Indra—he had no right ever to part with her.

After this, of course, all ends well. The old Brahman dies from overeating. The children, Vessantara's father and mother, all their old friends, even the white elephant, come to the hermitage to conduct the two hermits back to their capital and their throne; and, after a prosperous reign, Vessantara ascends to the world of the Blessed, to be reborn once more only, as Gautama, the Buddha, the founder of what we call historical Buddhism, in the fifth century B. C.

Here we see what the Buddha meant by charity, not simply giving of alms, not simply giving out of our abundance, giving, in fact, what we ourselves do neither want nor miss, but a readiness to give up everything, even what is dearest to us; not only our jewels and our land, but our life, nay, even more than our life, our wife and children, that so we may obtain what is called Buddhahood, and be able to save ourselves and our brethren from ignorance, misery, sin, and eternal transmigration. I have said that Buddhism and charity are synonymous. It was charity, as preached and practiced in his last life, that enabled Gautama to reach the highest perfection in his life, when he preached and practiced the law. There is one more Buddha to come, who is called Maitreya, the teacher of Maitrī or Love. That love is described in the following words:

"As a mother, even at the risk of her own life, protects her son, her only son, so let there be love without measure among all beings. Let love without measure prevail in the whole world, above, below, around, unstinted, unmixed with any feeling of differing or opposing interests. Then the saying will be fulfilled: 'Even in this world holiness has been found.'"

Will Buddhists ever learn that this Buddha of the future, this Maitreya, this teacher of love, not of the law, has appeared? Or is it really true that he has not appeared yet, and that we ourselves are living, like Gautama, five hundred years before Christ? Buddhism teaches in the very words of Christianity that we should love our neighbors as ourselves. And why? Not from any enthusiasm of humanity, but simply because they are like ourselves; because they suffer as we suffer, and rejoice as we rejoice. The Indian philosopher, however, goes a step further. He would show that we are all mere sparks or rays of light from one common source, perceptive glances of one common mind; that we all are one as soon as we know ourselves, and have found our true self in the highest self. Having reached that point, we recognize ourselves in others, and others in ourselves. We not only love our neighbors as ourselves, we know them as ourselves.

But even as a mere social duty, as a solution of social difficulties, charity, as enjoined by the Buddha, has its deep significance for us. Poverty and misery must have reached the same climax in India in the days of the historical Buddha that they have reached with us. On the one side absurd wealth, on the other hideous, hopeless penury. We read of a man who, when he wanted to buy a piece of land to present to the Buddha, was able to cover every inch of it with a gold coin. We read of beggars who came to the Buddha asking for a rag and a few grains of rice. What was the Buddha's remedy? He did not invent poor-laws, or work-houses, or outdoor relief. He did not say to the poor, "Might is right," "Property is theft," "Take what you can." He turned to the rich and said, "Give! Give not only one tithe; give not only what you do not want; but give all that is wanted to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, to teach the ignorant, to nurse the sick, to save the sinner. Give, because nothing belongs to you, nothing can belong to you, neither land nor treasure, not even your own body. Give, because life is a fleeting shadow, which will soon pass away from you with all that you now call your own. Give, because what you leave to

your own children, and not to all, is more often a curse than a blessing to them."

We all admit that the present state of things, what we see every day in our clubs and in our slums, in St. James's and in St. Giles's, cannot be right, and cannot last. Social philosophy and political economy stand by the death-bed of society, and with all their statistics and all their learning they stand helpless. They have nothing more to prescribe. Is there no remedy, then? Do the words that "the poor shall never cease from the land" really mean that there must always be squalor, starvation, and sin on one side of the street, and gorgeous extravagance, sensuality, and hypocrisy on the other? Was this life really meant to be nothing but a struggle for life, in which might is right, and the weakest are trampled under foot? Buddha saw what we see, Buddha saw what Christ saw, and he knew that there was a remedy for all this misery, the misery of the rich quite as much as the misery of the poor. One of the Buddha's many names was the Good Physician. And what did he prescribe? Something that required one grain of faith in another and a better world, one grain of love, or, as he called it, pity for those who are our neighbors, our brethren, nay even more than our brethren, one grain of nobility to feel that the hoarding of unnecessary wealth is mean, and one grain of wisdom to see that a bow bent too far will snap. The medicine that he mixed out of all these ingredients was called Charity, and if we may judge by the number of those who have taken that medicine, or by the new life it once instilled into a dead or dying society all over Asia, charity, and charity alone, true Buddhist charity, true Christian charity, will be, I believe, the remedy for all the evils from which our society suffers. We have heard its bitter cry. In England that cry may be hushed by royal commissions, in Germany it may be stifled by a state of siege. But there is one sweet remedy for that bitter cry—royal charity, such as was practiced by the young and fair prince of Kapilavastu whom we call the Buddha, and Christian charity, such as it was preached by Christ himself, though few of his disciples have had the courage to interpret his words as he meant them.

F. MAX MÜLLER.

THE REVIVAL OF SECTIONALISM.

WHEN Abraham Lincoln and Stephen A. Douglas had their famous Senatorial contest on the stump in Illinois, the question discussed was whether slavery should be rigidly excluded from all the Territories of the United States. Upon this proposition Lincoln, who often had occasion during the debate to show that he was not an abolitionist, but a slavery restrictionist, took the affirmative. Douglas advocated squatter sovereignty, or that the people who first held possession of the soil of a Territory, making their homes upon it, should be free to manage their own domestic institutions, slavery included, in their own way. The aggressive antislavery men were dissatisfied with Lincoln, because he did not make war upon slavery within the States, with a view to its ultimate destruction. The vehement proslavery men declared hostility to Douglas, and demanded the recognition of the doctrine that the Constitution carried slavery throughout the Territories; that the holders of slaves had the right under the Constitution to call upon the authorities of the United States to protect them in their peculiar property, save within the free States, where they were entitled only to the return of fugitives.

It was the recognition of the wise moderation of Lincoln, aided by certain local advantages and strokes of generalship in the management, that caused the nomination that was made by the Chicago National Republican Convention of 1860. It was the antagonism of the slavery extensionists to Douglas, who was held to be unsound from the Southern point of view, because he would allow the squatters to exclude slavery from the Territories, that disrupted the Charleston Convention, caused the Democratic conventions held in Baltimore, and placed two Democratic Presidential tickets in the field, preparing the way for the election of Lincoln to the Presidency. Mr. Lincoln's election was strictly upon the ground of opposition to the na-

tionalization of slavery. The Democratic party had divided, and so provided the conditions of defeat, on the question whether it should take the position that slavery was national and freedom sectional.

The representatives of the political power of slavery in the Charleston Convention were in the habit of saying that they regarded the form abolitionism took with Douglas quite as offensive as that which it assumed with other abolitionists, and it was one of their favorite expressions that they had no choice between men who refused them the constitutional protection of their property; and this was always coupled with the declaration that they would not allow their reserved rights to be disregarded in any case. They implied that it was no less their purpose to withdraw from the Union upon the election of Douglas, than in the event of the election of one who had still further developed the antislavery fanaticism. It is difficult to believe they were in earnest about this; but it was the logic of their attitude. They had for some years been threatening the dissolution of the Union by State secession in various contingencies, and the great mass of the people of the United States did not realize that they were terribly in earnest. Indeed, the eyes of the people did not seem to be opened until the bombardment of Fort Sumter. Then the opinion was formed that the programme of the secessionists had been carefully arranged with the view to disunion; that the action of the extreme Southern delegations in the Charleston Convention, which resulted in adjournment to Baltimore and final division and defeat, was caused by conspiracy; and that the Southern disunion element had promoted the election of Lincoln, that an excuse might be found for the call of conventions of States, that, in the phrase of the day, they might exercise their highest sovereign capacity in the adoption of ordinances of secession.

Throughout the Presidential campaign of 1860, the charge that was incessantly hurled at the Republicans was that they were a sectional party. The fact that they declared that slavery should not be made national, and that slavery was a despotism that permitted no discussion within its boundaries; that there was no such thing as freedom of speech, or press, or suffrage, in slave States; the fact that slavery was a tyranny that was utterly implacable, and insisted upon the "irrepressible conflict"; that intolerance was its vital principle,—by no means mitigated

but rather sharpened and emphasized the violence with which the reproach of sectionalism was directed upon all who were not submissionists to slavery.

An effort was made during the war to weaken the national in behalf of the sectional cause, by appealing to the local pride of the North-west and seeking to arouse the West to antagonize the East. This was so complete a failure that it has hardly made a place for itself in history, but it should have recognition as the meanest and most vicious shape taken by Northern sympathy with the Southern rebellion. There are traces in some of the speeches of public men of Ohio and Indiana—who were opposed to the United States in the war—of the theory that there was a community of interest in the States of the Mississippi valley and that they should take care of themselves in common; but these are marks of dishonor blacker than distinct treason in waging war against the Government, for they meant a diversion, under false pretenses, against those who were fighting for the nation. There was no sectionalism that was not of slavery, and there is no sectionalism not peculiar to the territory where slavery existed and that is not a crop raised from the seed of that institution.

Surely the solid South represents no principle that can be defined in the business affairs of the country. It is the result of rebellion against the establishment of manhood suffrage. It is Democratic on account of the criminal intimacy of the relations between the Democratic party and the rebellion of the slaveholders. It ignores the unparalleled generosity of the victorious people of the United States when the Southern revolt was overcome by force of arms. It assumes the broad and equitable acts of reconstruction to have been impositions and insulting to a fallen foe. It disfranchises more than a million citizens, and complacently boasts of the powers by which the gravest obligations are evaded, and the registration in legal form of a ruling class is substituted for the fair return of the popular majority. It has come to this, that the most certain Democratic States in the Union for presidential purposes are those that are best known to contain a large majority of Republicans.

The work of reconstructing the conquered territory, when the armies of the rebellion had succumbed and dispersed, was one of the greatest delicacy. Perhaps it overtasked our statesmanship. There was an overpowering Northern sentiment in

favor of giving those who had been defeated good terms. The very completeness of the victory that had been gained, and the enthusiasm aroused, caused the greatest anxiety that "our friends the enemy," under bayonet rule, should be dealt with in the large-hearted spirit of Republicanism. It was assumed that slavery was gone forever, and with it all its train of horrors and disabilities, including sectionalism in politics, and that we must show ourselves worthy of so mighty a triumph by dealing gently with those who had erred and surrendered. There was intense impatience with the delays in completing the structure of freedom and crowning the edifice. It was a painful thing that the gallant Confederates—of whose good qualities as soldiers there was an awful sufficiency of evidence—should not have the right of suffrage, and immediately enter upon their duties as citizens of the great republic, free at last from shore to shore.

This was the spirit of the North in the hour of unqualified victory, entering upon the work of rehabilitating the shattered States that had attempted secession. After the war was over, no atonement of blood was exacted. The martyrs to political principles in the South ever since, black and white, have been the friends of the nation. The perplexity was as to the colored people. The question was whether those who had been emancipated should be enfranchised. The people of the United States who had reëstablished over every part of the national domain the authority of the general Government, had acquired all the rights over the restored States that successful war ever gave anybody. If not, what was the use of the war at all? The assumption that the use we had for the Southern Confederates was to call them back at the point of the bayonet to resume under new auspices the old function of the representatives of the slave power to govern us, according to their interpretation of the Constitution and of their own importance that had forced the war, may be asserted, but can hardly be maintained.

Naturally those who had been distinguished as antislavery men were, in the transition state of the country following the war, highly influential, and the basis of their principles was the steadfast observance of the rights of man. It was their doctrine that, of all men, the poor man most needed the ballot. It was his right, his defense, his weapon. It was the one thing needful for the security of those who had yesterday been slaves.

Men were not disfranchised in the great free States for ignorance, or on account of complexion or race or color. Why should there be discrimination against the poor man in the South, in the land where he had been oppressed? Were his wrongs reasons why he should be left without political force to help himself? And here two great currents ran together: the enthusiasm for the magnanimous treatment of the whites of the South, who had participated in the rebellion and lost their political rights, and the sentiment that favored placing the millions of slaves delivered from bondage by the military arm upon the solid ground of unqualified citizenship. The flood could not be restrained by those who thought dangers were discernible, and the policy of reconstruction that carried was that of universal amnesty and impartial suffrage.

The Confederate overcome by force of arms, and the freed-man whose fetters had been severed by the sword, were joined together as citizens. This was the controlling consideration of the treaty of peace between the warring sections that was written in the amendments of the Constitution, and the execution of the policies defined was in the nature of a treaty obligation binding upon all American citizens. Under the system thus established we have had twenty years' experience. It cannot be truthfully said that all has been right on one side of a line, and all wrong on another. The problems before the Southern people have not been easy of solution. Indeed, they have combined almost all the elements of difficulty known among men in the constitution of society and the administration of government. The chances are there would have been better solutions than seem now to be at hand, if it had not been for the demands of partisan spirit, particularly the unprincipled character of the Democratic party, which left it free to encourage any prejudice that would give it aid, and to enter upon all intrigues for the accumulation of forces in an obstinate struggle for power, looking only to the spoils, the revenges, and the gratified vanities and conceits that success would bring. The party was ready for any mischief, and has accomplished that which is an immense misfortune.

The States that maintained slavery until the emancipation that the sword gave received in the adjustments of reconstruction thirty-seven representative electoral votes, and one old slave State became two free States, so that the political power

of the South as a section was increased to an extent greater than that of the greatest of the States, New York. This was the representation of the enfranchisement of the freedman, and compensation for the restoration of all the rights of citizenship to those who had been in rebellion. The solidification of the South for the Democratic party has been achieved by disregarding the political rights and personal wishes of the colored citizens, and this very vote, thus conferred upon the South, has by the wrong described, which is a violation of the treaty obligation that closed the war and ended the military occupation of the conquered country, resulted in the election of a Democratic President and a majority of Democrats in the next House of Representatives.

The Union has not been reunited, as claimed by Mr. Watterson in his paper in the January number of this REVIEW, but sectionalism in its worst form has been revived. The terms in which the claim has been made that the unity of the country has just been reestablished are full of insult and menace. They imply that the susceptibilities of the South, her provincialisms, localisms, and peculiarities must be humored, cultivated, and extended, made the core of our nationality, and confessed alone to impart its true flavor. Just as in other days it was the habit of the advocates of the divine right of the slave power to rule the land, to charge upon those who held that the freedom of the Territories should be maintained, that they were the enemies of the Union and the disturbers of the peace,—that they were sectional politicians and narrow-minded wretches, who were breeders of war and destroyers of commerce,—so it is to-day the fashion of the bosses of the solid South and their serfs to assail all who object to the methods by which the South is solidified, and to the inequalities of citizenship and of States that follow, and assert that they are carrying on a sectional warfare and are to be held responsible for the revival of sectionalism. The misdemeanor of sectionalism belongs to the section that was unhappily distinguished for slavery and rebellion and the war caused by the aggressiveness of the politicians who represented the survival of barbarism into our times. The Democratic party rests upon this section, and upon the fraud that controls in one mass 153 electoral votes; and it cannot fail to be subordinated to that fraud, which is one of such stupendous proportions that all others in our history are dwarfed in comparison.

If these things are denied, it must be upon the presumption that we should never have opposed the extension of slavery, and never should do anything to cause the displeasure of the master class of the South. Before the war this class held millions of slaves, and wanted the run under the Constitution of all the Territories for the making of more slave States, that the slaveholders might be the ruling caste of the nation. If the present attitude of the Democratic party is right, the opposition to the rule of the slaveholders has been wrong from the first; and every step the Republicans have taken, from the election of Lincoln to the defeat of Blaine, has been a crime.

It is not disputed in the old strongholds of the slave oligarchy, where the fire-eaters were bred in fiery politics to interpret the Constitution as a slavery-preserving and slavery-extending instrument, that the fundamental doctrine to-day is, that this must be a white man's government, with all that the phrase signifies; and it means, among other things, that the emancipated slaves are enfranchised only so far as the whites please to permit. They may vote the Democratic ticket, but, in the States actually contested, that is as far as they can go.

Senator Brown, of Georgia, said in his speech at Atlanta, rejoicing over the election of the Democratic candidate for the Presidency :

"If the Republicans had not given the ballot to the colored race, and the Southern States had not acquiesced in it, the South would have had a smaller number by thirty-seven in the Electoral College than she now has. This would have turned the scale in the present election, and, instead of the general rejoicing over the Union in our Democratic success, the Republicans would have been exulting over the success of their candidate."

And yet not one colored citizen from Pennsylvania to Mexico cast a vote that had an appreciable influence upon the choice of a single Presidential Elector.

It may not yet be offensively sectional to assume that it is of importance to assert the great Republican doctrine of fair play among men, and maintain the equality of the capacity of the citizens of the several States in the affairs of the general Government. Even if the doctrine were established that the war was constitutional only on the part of the Confederate States, it would be hard to sustain the proposition that citizens who took up arms to destroy the Union should have twice as much power

in the election of Presidents and Houses of Representatives as those who fought to preserve the Union. There are striking points of similarity between the States of Georgia and Ohio, and comparisons have often been made between them. In Ohio, at the Presidential election of 1884, the average popular vote for each Presidential Elector was 37,371, and in Georgia 14,284. Such inequality apparent in several States, and year after year having such momentous consequences as determining Presidential elections and the political complexion of the popular house of Congress, must ultimately raise what has been termed "the primal question of manhood." The non-voting percentage of voters in Georgia, computing by the census tables and the election returns, is sixty-one; in Ohio, twelve. The application of the fact is made by the statement of it, and it is not worth while to multiply illustrations. The rectification of the wrong through which the Democracy gain the chief magistracy and the majority of the House of Representatives, cannot fail to be the burning issue before the American people all the time until justice is done by the establishment of the equal rights of the people who did not go into rebellion with those who did.

The political evil to the country of slavery itself was not as far-reaching, deplorable, and desperate as the solid Southern system would be, if tolerated until fixed in the public habit. That the people of the free North should be expected to sit down contented under an outrage upon them so gigantic as the turning of the votes of the enfranchised blacks against the national cause, and restoring the old Southern boss politicians to their ancient supremacy, is not reasonable.

The South is made solid for the Democratic party by the methods, and, as largely as the lapse of time permits, by the persons, employed in solidifying the same section in behalf of rebellion. The majority of the Southern white people were not rebels when the defense of rebellion was forced upon them by the ruling class of the section, and they are not bulldozers now; but the injustice that is done the colored people by depriving them of that share of their political rights which is especially precious and important, has a formidable tendency to increase and aggravation; and no agitation can be so dangerous as that an evil that rises up to overrule the nation shall be allowed to acquire the position and settled ways of authority and victory. The most hateful and injurious pretension of the

times is that the whole South is and of right should be the property of the unprincipled and unscrupulous Democratic party. A sectionalism so degraded as is implied in this theory would be a threatening disgrace to the nation.

If it is to be accepted as history that under a Republican administration the country has labored under a long-continued dissolution of the Union, and that we could only have a "re-united Union" under Democratic auspices, it must be assumed that the election of Abraham Lincoln was a sectional aggression and defiance that the South was bound to resent; that the war was, in the language of Senator Bayard, "inaugurated by Abraham Lincoln and his Cabinet," and was unconstitutional; that the invasion and conquest of the Confederate States were high crimes against mankind and in flagrant disregard of "the compact" of sovereign States, which was all that the Union could claim to be; that negro suffrage was an insulting imposition on the South, which the whites are justified in circumventing by all the means in their power—by the superiority of the blood and brain of the race, as has been so often recently asserted; that the capture of the fifty-three Electoral votes that would be Republican with free voting and honest counting in the South, is a fair retaliation upon the Republicans for the increase of the political power of the South by the thirty-seven Electoral votes added on account of the enumeration of the blacks as citizens; that everything that has been done by the Republican party is unconstitutional. There could be no doctrine more revolutionary and destructive. If it is not to be permitted to speak freely of these things now, if it is sectional to proclaim the doctrine of the freedom and equality of all citizens of American nationality supreme over all States and sections, then there is never more to be free speech or fair play in America, and slavery is already restored in its most debasing influences; and the hideously vulgar despotism, broken by the war, is reestablished by the first Democratic Presidential victory.

The Democratic victory must be considered an episode, and not accepted as a settlement. Southern sectionalism will be outgrown and finally overcome by the weight of that part of the country whose soil was not poisoned with slavery and stained by rebellion. The statistics of the election of November last in the thirteen Southern States are not wanting in cheering indi-

cations. The table following shows the Democratic pluralities in the Southern States in 1880 and 1884:

<i>State.</i>	<i>Hancock's.</i>	<i>Cleveland's.</i>
1. Alabama	34,964	33,529
2. Florida	4,239	3,735
3. Georgia	48,085	46,064
4. Kentucky	42,762	34,839
5. Louisiana	27,051	16,193
6. Maryland	15,191	11,233
7. Mississippi	40,896	33,001
8. Missouri	55,042	33,059
9. South Carolina	54,241	48,157
10. Tennessee	21,892	9,180
11. Texas	108,835	132,168
12. Virginia	44,337	6,141
13. West Virginia	11,148	4,221
	508,683	411,520

Decrease of Democratic plurality, 1884, from 1880..... 97,163

The following shows the differences of the increase and decrease in the total of the Democratic and Republican vote in 1884 in the States named, as compared with 1880:

<i>State.</i>	<i>Dem.</i>			<i>Rep.</i>	
1. Alabama	Increase	1,788	..	Increase	3,223
2. Florida	Increase	3,841	..	Increase	4,345
3. Georgia	Decrease	7,961	..	Decrease	5,940
4. Kentucky	Increase	3,893	..	Increase	11,816
5. Louisiana	Decrease	2,527	..	Increase	8,331
6. Maryland	Increase	3,226	..	Increase	7,184
7. Mississippi	Increase	760	..	Increase	8,655
8. Missouri	Increase	27,379	..	Increase	49,362
9. South Carolina	Decrease	42,422	..	Decrease	36,338
10. Tennessee	Decrease	3,689	..	Increase	16,401
11. Texas	Increase	68,881	..	Increase	35,248
12. Virginia	Increase	17,521	..	Increase	55,717
13. West Virginia	Increase	9,926	..	Increase	16,853

In Delaware, there was a decline in the Republican vote. In Arkansas, Blaine received 8,000 votes more than Garfield, and in North Carolina 10,000 more. The Tennessee Republicans have made their great and beautiful State the most interesting politically in the Union. They elected fifty members of the General Assembly and three members of Congress, and they carried

their ticket for Railroad Commissioners by a majority of 8,602. The Republican Executive Committee claim that their State will be the first to break the crust of the solid South, and the following figures of the result in November justify the claim:

In 1880 Hancock received a majority of.....	16,132
In 1884 Cleveland received a majority of.....	7,092
Showing a decrease in the Democratic majority of.....	9,040
In 1880 Garfield received a vote of.....	107,677
In 1883 Blaine received a vote of.....	124,078
An increase in the Republican vote of.....	16,401
In 1882 Bate and Fussell for Governor had a vote of.....	123,420
In 1884 Bate for Governor had a vote of.....	132,103
Decrease in Democratic majority for Governor of.....	25,965
In 1882 Hawkins for Governor received a vote of.....	90,660
In 1884 Reid for Governor received a vote of	125,308
Increase of Republican vote for Governor of.....	34,648

Next to Tennessee, the most promising Southern States politically are the two Virginias and Missouri. These are the border States of the solid South, as they were of the Southern Confederacy, and the feeling of those uppermost is that they are voting as they shot, for the supremacy of the section, and that their satisfaction must always be preliminary to peace. Kentucky will perhaps be the slowest in regeneration of the States whose pride is in low latitude and high temper and temperature. Her movement is gradual, and several Presidential elections are likely to take place before she becomes doubtful. The hottest places of the solid South in politics are not on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, but on the Kentucky bank of the Ohio river. It is there that the election of Cleveland is held as proof that they have but to go right on as they have begun, to Southernize the nation and conquer the world.

It is impossible that the republic should be made permanently the political property of the minority class of the minority section. How shall the change that is unavoidable and essential to the peace and salvation of the Government and the people at large, be made? It can be promptly and peaceably done if they who have placed themselves in the wrong, and presumed that they have the rights of rulers, and that opposition

to them is treason, do not adopt some of the methods of resistance that were tried in 1861. A critical point will be reached when in Missouri and Tennessee the Republicans carry those States as they carried Virginia a few years ago. There are reasons to hope that the Republicans in the Southern States, where a majority of them are white men, will not acquiesce in demonstrations that are meant to establish reigns of terror.

The hope that the South will cure herself of the secondary form of the disease of slavery is marred by the success of the Democratic party in the late Presidential election. The old sectionalism is inflamed, and sinister ambitions that had slumbered have been awakened. The task upon the country will not be as easy, so far as the South is concerned, as if there had been an unbroken succession of Republican administrations, but the experience before us will quicken the cause of Republicanism in the South, and forbid the further indulgence of the personal follies and the factious weaknesses that were so flagrant and pernicious through the late campaign. There should never again be a doubt of the defeat of a Presidential candidate for whom, without reference to any known principle or policy that could be avowed, the solid South is arrayed.

It is a safe presumption that the Independent Republican diversion of the campaign closed in November will not be repeated. When the lesson of the gentlemen engaged in that fantastic movement is finished, there will be a coincidence between the completion of their education and their career, and those encouraged to follow their example will be cranks exclusively. Political prohibition as a national question has been made odious, and there are no sinners so repentant as those who threw away votes, on men who were bringing reproach upon the cause of temperance, that would have saved the country from the demoralization of the Democratic accession to power. The division of the Irish vote was caused by enlightened influences that will endure, and upon lines of principles that have abiding force.

The South cannot be maintained solidly for the Democratic party. The false cries arousing race issues cannot continually prevail. The old bosses, bred in slavery and rebellious war, are entering upon their last lease of power. What is to happen before the races live peaceably together in the enjoyment of equal political rights, one should not venture to say crudely, or

without acknowledgment of the exceeding gravity and embarrassing nature of the matters involved. We may be sure that the rights of manhood will make their way. If we are to include within our boundaries a British India, in the presence of a dominant and a subject race, the few must not vote for the many and, through a representative system based upon the enumeration of all as equals, make other States as well as their own, and whites and blacks alike, their subordinates, and assume the mastery of the continent. The theory that they can do so, and that to resist class rule in a section is the highest of political offenses, and must be denounced as the solemn crime of sectionalism, is preposterous.

Possibly the Southern race troubles may be adjusted by the drifting of the population into communities in which one race or the other would have overwhelming preponderance, and finally into white and black States. Whatever takes place, the solid South, as a partisan body, under the control of the reminiscences of slavery and the revenges of the war, must pass away before the progressive development of the nationality of the American Republic. It may be by the conversion of the border States to Republicanism, or by the process of the growth of black and white States by the natural tendencies of the races, if the extreme Southern whites are right about it that they cannot live together as political equals; and it may be that the contrast between the professions and performances of the Democratic party will prove sufficient warning to the people at large to make the hereafter of the party hopeless until it is reformed away to appear in better shape. But if there is not in these things the efficacy claimed, we look west and north for the fairer skies that are to shine over the future.

The solid South is flanked forever on the Pacific Coast. All beyond the Rocky Mountains is Republican. Kansas, the disputed territory when the question arose whether freedom or slavery was to be national, ranks with Pennsylvania and Iowa as a Republican State. Southern pride and prejudice are on the retreat in Missouri. Colorado stands like a Republican sentinel in the heart of the continent, the child of the centennial year, national to the marrow, and free to the finger-tips. Between Lake Superior and the Pacific Ocean railroad construction has ceased, the work accomplished, and State-building is far advanced. There are the Dakotas and Montana, Wyoming and

Washington, soon to complete the magnificent arch of Republican States from ocean to ocean. The superb space from the greatest of the lakes to the broadest of the seas is all Republican, as the November majority of fifty thousand in Dakota splendidly proclaimed. It is in the glory of this broadly based and generous Republicanism, invincible and luminous with liberty spanning the continent, that the darkness of the cloudy corner of the country shall at last fade; and then there will be light upon all the land.

MURAT HALSTEAD.

MIND IN MEN AND ANIMALS.

TO THE August number of this REVIEW I contributed a short article entitled "Man and Brute," wherein I endeavored to sketch the lines through which the human mind has probably been evolved from minds of lower types. My argument was that up to a certain point the psychology of man runs parallel with that of animals; emotions, instincts, and reason all corresponding each to each in the two orders of mind so far as they are common to both; it being, therefore, only an unparalleled growth in certain lines in the psychology of man that the evolutionist has to explain. This unparalleled growth, I further argued, might be shown to arise from a gradual development of the sign-making faculty, as this undoubtedly occurs in animals. That is to say, in animals as in ourselves, there is obviously a "logic of feelings," and in them also to a certain extent there is obviously the power of translating this logic of feelings into the "logic of signs." Usually the signs employed are those of tone and gesture; but in the only animals that happen to possess the power of articulation, the talking birds, I have evidence to show that the signs employed for the purpose of communicating desires and ideas of objects, qualities, and actions, may be articulate. In what respect, then, it will be asked, does the mind of a parrot differ from the mind of a man? The bird has instincts, emotions, and a faculty of ratiocination, all the same in kind as those that obtain in ourselves; while in its power of translating the logic of its feelings into a logic of articulate signs, the bird further presents (in a rudimentary stage of development, indeed, but none the less of like kind) the faculty of the *Logos*. Given these things, and all psychologists would be agreed that the high powers of abstraction that are the only distinctive features of the human mind, might very probably have been developed by the mutual influence of language and thought.

In what respect, then, does the mind of a parrot differ from the mind of a man? The difference consists in the power of predication. An intelligent parrot is able to denominate an object or a quality; it is not able to predicate the quality as belonging to the object. In other words, the nominative stage of even spoken language does not extend to the power of making a proposition. At this stage of spoken language, words are nothing more than vocal gestures. A particular word, or a particular phrase, is learned by association, as the appropriate designation of a particular object, quality, action, or desire; but there is no power of spontaneously forming new sentences. At this stage in the evolution of language, whether in the parrot or in the child, words stand as signs that are stereotyped into special phrases, wherewith to signify particular things or states that the talker has previously associated with them; there is as yet no power of handling words as movable types wherewith to construct a proposition *de novo*. In order to pass from the nominative to the predicative stage of language or sign-making, two things are requisite. In the first place, the talker must have a general idea of beings in the abstract, else he could not supply the essential part of a proposition, the copula. In the next place, the talker must have a general idea of his own personality as distinct from that of all other beings, else he could not supply the essential meaning of a proposition, a judgment. When we make a proposition, we not only affirm a truth, but we affirm a truth perceived as true. We not only know that the grass is green (an animal knows this), but in predicating the greenness of the grass we prove that our knowledge is itself a matter of knowledge. We know that we know that the grass is green. This power of knowledge to know itself arises from the power that the human mind displays of introspection, or of turning inward upon itself, so as to make some of its states objective to others. And this power presupposes the faculty of self-consciousness, or the faculty of separating in thought the ego from the non-ego. Thus, in order to understand fully the probable genesis of predication, it is needful to consider the probable genesis of self-consciousness.

My proposition in this paper will be that, given the protoplasm of the sign-making faculty so far organized as to have reached the nominative stage of language, and given also the protoplasm of judgment so far organized as to have reached the stage of stating a truth (the mind not yet being sufficiently

developed to be conscious of itself, and therefore not able to state to itself a truth as true), by the confluence of these two protoplasmic elements an act of fertilization is performed, such that the subsequent processes of mental organization proceed apace, and soon reach the stage of differentiation between subject and object. In all that is to follow I am in no way concerned with the philosophy of this change, but only with its history. On the side of its philosophy I am in complete agreement with the most advanced idealist, and hold that in the datum of self-consciousness we each of us possess, not alone our only ultimate knowledge, or that which alone is "real in its own right," but likewise the only mode of existence that the human mind is capable of conceiving as existence, and therefore the *conditio sine qua non* to the possibility of an external world. With this aspect of the matter, however, I am not here concerned. Just as the functions of an embryologist are confined to tracing the mere history of developmental changes, and just as he is thus as far as ever from throwing any light upon the deeper questions of the how and the why of life, so in seeking to indicate the steps whereby self-consciousness has arisen from the lower stage of physical development, I am as far as any one can be from throwing any light upon the intrinsic nature of that the probable genesis of which I am endeavoring to trace. It is as true to-day as it was in the days of Solomon, that "as thou knowest not how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child, thou knowest not what is the way of the spirit."

If it is only in man that self-consciousness is to be found, clearly it is only to man that we can look for any facts bearing upon the question of its evolution. And inasmuch as it is only during the first years of infancy that a human being is destitute of self-consciousness, the statement just made implies that only in infant psychology need we seek for the facts of which we are in search.

It will, I suppose, be admitted that self-consciousness consists in paying the same kind of attention to inward psychical processes that is habitually paid to outward physical processes. It will be further admitted that in the mind of animals and in the mind of infants there is a world of images standing as signs of outward objects;* and that the only reason why these images are not attended to unless called up by the

* See the chapter on "Imagination," in "Mental Evolution in Animals."

sensuous association of corresponding objects, is because the mind is not yet able to leave the ground of such association, so as to move through the higher and more tenuous medium of introspective thought. Nevertheless, the images, in the case of the higher animals, are not restricted to the mere reproduction in memory of particular objects of sensuous perception; they admit of undergoing that amount of mental elaboration which entitles them to be termed simple concepts. Further, it is of still more importance to observe that of these ideal constructions a large constituent number have reference, not to objects of sense or to general qualities of such objects, but to the mental states of other animals. That is to say, the logic of feeling, even in animals, is enough to enable the mind to establish true analogies between its own states (although these are not yet the objects of separate attention, or of class as distinguished from implied knowledge) and the corresponding states of other minds. I need not dwell upon this point, because I take it to be a matter of simple observation that animals habitually and accurately interpret the mental states of other animals, while they also well know that other animals are able similarly to interpret their mental states, as is best proved by their practicing the arts of cunning, concealment, hypocrisy, etc. From these considerations we reach the general conclusion that intelligent animals recognize a world of ejects as well as a world of objects. Mental existence is already known to them ejectively, although, as may be conceded, never thought upon subjectively.*

It is important further to observe that at this stage of mental evolution the individual, whether an animal or an infant, so far realizes its own personality as to be informed by the logic of feelings that it is one of a kind. I do not mean that at this stage the individual realizes its own or any other personality as a personality, but merely that it recognizes the fact of its being one among a number of similar though distinct forms of life. Alike in conflict, rivalry, sense of liability to punishment or vengeance, etc., the outward truth is continually being

* The mental states of one individual cannot be known to another individual, either objectively or subjectively; they are known by a process of inferring their resemblance to one's own mental states. We eject our own mental states upon what is otherwise to us the blank screen of another mind.

borne in upon the mind of an animal that it is a separate personality, and this though the animal may never be able, even in the most shadowy manner, to think about itself as a personality. In this way arises what Chauncey Wright has termed an "outward self-consciousness," which differs from true self-consciousness only in the absence of any attention being directed upon the inward mental states. This outward self-consciousness is known to us all, even in adult life, it being but comparatively seldom that we pause in our daily activities to contemplate the mental processes of which these activities are the expression.

We have seen, then, that self-consciousness consists in paying the same kind of attention to inward psychical processes that is habitually paid to outward physical processes; that in the mind of animals and infants there is a world of images standing as signs of outward objects; that at this stage of mental evolution we have not merely simple concepts, but also the recognition of an ejective no less than of an objective world; and that here also we have the recognition of personality, as far as this is dependent upon "outward self-consciousness," or the consciousness of self as a feeling and active agent, apart from self as an object of thought.

Such being the conditions precedent to the rise of self-consciousness, we may next turn to the growing child for evidence of all subsequent stages in the gradual evolution of this faculty. All observers are agreed that, for a considerable time after a child is able to use words as expressive of ideas, there is no vestige of true self-consciousness. Even its own organism at a year old is not known to the child as a part of the self, or, more correctly, as anything related to feelings. Professor Preyer observed that his boy, when more than a year old, bit his own arm just as though it had been a foreign object. Later, when the "outward self-consciousness," already explained, has begun to be developed, we find that the child, like the animal, has now learned to associate its own organism with its own mental states, in such wise that it recognizes its own body as belonging in a peculiar manner to the self, so far as this is recognized by the logic of feelings. Next the child begins to talk, and, as we might expect, the first translation of the logic of feelings into the logic of signs having reference to self, reveals the fact that as yet there is no true or inward self-consciousness, but only the outward. As yet, the child has paid

no attention to his own mental states, further than to feel that he feels them; and, in the result, we find that the child speaks of himself as an object, *i. e.*, in the third person, or by his proper name. The change in the child's phraseology, from speaking of self as an object to speaking of self as a subject, does not usually take place till the third year. When it has taken place, we have definite evidence of true self-consciousness, though it is still in a rudimentary stage.

Let it now be observed that, long before any words are used indicative of even a dawning consciousness of self as self, the child has already advanced so far in its use of language as to frame implicit propositions. On this point I may adduce the impartial and highly competent testimony of Mr. Sully, who writes :

"When a child of eighteen months, on seeing a dog, exclaims 'Bow wow,' or on tasting his food, exclaims 'Ot' (hot), or on letting fall his toy, says 'Dow' (down), he may be said to be implicitly framing a judgment: 'That is a dog,' 'This milk is hot,' 'My plaything is down.' . . . The boy was first observed to frame a distinct judgment when nineteen months old, by saying 'Dit ki' (sister is crying)."

Hence we see that a child expresses implicit judgment before there is any evidence of his presenting the faintest rudiment of true self-consciousness. "Dit dow yu" is a proposition in every respect, more in the significant absence of the copula, which means that at this stage the mind is not able to state to itself as true a truth which it states to other minds. The child here perceives a certain fact, and expresses the perception in words in order to communicate information of the fact to other minds, just as an animal under similar circumstances will use a gesture or a vocal sign; but the child is no more able than the animal to think "is," or consciously to make to its own mind a statement that it makes to others.

Given this stage of mental evolution, and what follows? The child, like the animal, is supplied by its logic of feelings with a world of images standing as signs of outward objects, with an ejective knowledge of other minds, and with that kind of recognition of self as an active, suffering, and accountable agent which we have spoken of as outward self-consciousness. But over and above the animal, the child has at its command the more improved machinery of sign-making, which enables it to signify to

other minds the fuller contents of its knowledge. Among these contents is the child's perception of the mental states of others as expressed by their gestures, tones, and words. These severally receive their distinguishing names, and so gain clearness and precision as ejective images of the corresponding states experienced by the child itself. "Mamma pleased to me" would have no meaning as spoken by a child, unless he knew from his own feelings what is the state of mind that he thus ejectively attributes to another individual. Therefore we cannot be surprised to find that at the same age a child will also say "Dodo pleased to mamma." Yet it is evident that we are here approaching the borders of true self-consciousness. "Dodo" is no doubt still speaking of himself in objective phraseology; but he has advanced so far in the interpretation of his own states of mind as clearly to name them, and so to fix these states before his mental vision as things that admit of being denoted by verbal signs.

Obviously the step from this to recognizing "Dodo" as not only the object but also the subject of mental changes, is not long. The mere fact of attaching verbal signs to inward mental states has the effect of focusing the attention upon those states; and when attention is thus habitually focused, we have supplied the only further condition required to enable the mind, through its memory of previous states, to compare its past with its present, and so to reach that idea of continuity among its own states in which the consciousness of self essentially consists.

GEORGE JOHN ROMANÉS.

THE USE AND ABUSE OF TITLES.

LAST year the colleges of this country were much interested in the discussion of the comparative merits of classical and scientific education. Academic degrees are now under scrutiny. President Eliot, in his address at Baltimore, brought forward the requisites for the degree of Bachelor of Arts. Since then, President Woolsey, in a paper partly historical and partly suggestive of reform, has discussed the bestowal of honorary degrees; and Professor Bryce, in his essay on an ideal university, has boldly expressed the opinion that "degrees are nowise indispensable." Other kindred writings might be mentioned, but these are enough to show that the subject is of considerable importance. It is but a branch of the subject of titles in general.

Americans are sometimes spoken of as addicted to titular honors, and at other times are regarded as heedless about them. But Americans do not differ in this respect from the people of other nations. They know that titles have their uses, and they use them; and that titles may be abused, and they abuse them. So do Europeans. Nevertheless, republics are exposed to some troubles in respect to titles that are not felt in monarchies. There are no acknowledged original sources of honor, except the people; no sovereign, no court, no herald's office, no established church, no royal academy, no limitation as to the chartering of universities; and even the right to bear arms has carried with it the right, in the militia, to win any military rank. There was trouble on this matter when Congress first met in 1789. Monarchical usages came into collision, in many ways, with democratic tendencies. For several weeks the House and the Senate were at variance as to the title of the chief executive officer. A committee of Senators favored the phrase "His Highness, the President of the United States of America, and Protector of their Liberties," which had a half-royal, half-Cromwellian sound; but,

owing to the dissent of the lower house, the Senate, instead, adopted this resolution :

“From a decent respect for the opinion and practice of civilized nations, whether under monarchical or republican forms of government, whose custom is to annex TITLES of respectability to the office of their chief magistrate, and that, on intercourse with foreign nations a due respect for the majesty of the people of the United States may not be hazarded by an appearance of singularity, the Senate have been induced to be of opinion that it would be proper to annex A RESPECTABLE TITLE to the OFFICE of PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES: But the Senate, DESIROUS of PRESERVING HARMONY with the House of Representatives, where the practice lately observed, in presenting an address to the PRESIDENT, was without the addition of TITLES, think it proper for the present to act in conformity with the practice of that house ; Therefore,

“RESOLVED, That the present address be to the PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES, without addition of TITLE.” *

Thirteen years before, at the beginning of the war, Washington had been obliged to exact from the British commanders the recognition of his official title ; and on one occasion he declined to receive from General Howe a letter that was addressed to “George Washington, Esquire, etc., etc.,” saying that although “the *et ceteras* implied everything, they also implied anything.” That is the trouble with many titles besides *et cetera* ; they imply everything, and they imply anything. In the century that has passed since Washington became President and the designation of his office was formally agreed upon, simplicity has been the dominant principle in speaking of or in speaking to the highest office-bearer of the nation ; but in regard to other dignitaries usage has varied. The tendency has been to vulgarize the titles of honor. Near the frontier “Colonel” is a common salutation to a well-dressed man who looks as if he would fight ; and “Judge” is applied to those of a more intellectual aspect. “Bishop” has come down from Apostolic times, with a traditional dignity not easily degraded ; but the title sounds oddly enough as one hears it in Salt Lake City, applied to Mormon leaders who are completely at variance with the Christian Church. The prefix “Honorable” has been sadly abused. If it had been reserved for persons in the highest official stations, its usage would have been commendable, but now it is only trouble-

* The small capitals are those given in the original journal, as printed in New York, 1789.

some. The question might even be raised whether eagerness to enter public life in this country is not due to the pleasure of being called Honorable, rather than to the love of limited power and limited compensation. If the writer is correctly informed, one department of the Government, the Department of State, has shown a commendable conservatism respecting titles. Its dispatches are addressed without any prefix to the personal name but "Mr.," or with the addition of "Esquire," supplemented by an indication of the station to which the diplomatic agent is accredited. All such handles as "Governor," "Judge," "Colonel," or "Professor" are wanting in its superscriptions. In the newspapers, there is a growing disposition to prefix titles to all personal names. We see not only Secretary Frelinghuysen, Senator Bayard, Representative Findlay, and Speaker Carlisle, but such objectionable usages as these: Editor A, Millionaire B, Ship-chandler C, Detective D, Pork-merchant E, and so on, to Policeman X, and such feminine forms as Mrs. ex-Congressman Y. College titles have shared in this vulgarization. When there was but one professor at Harvard and none at Yale, "Professor" might have been a title to be enjoyed; but how is it now! Once "Doctor" meant something; what does it mean now?

In view of these tendencies, the question is naturally raised, whether in a republic there are any principles that should govern the use of titles. Probably the following propositions will be conceded:

First. Titles are always troublesome. They differ in different lands; they are used in the same country in differing senses; they seem to many sensible people like worn-out finery; they introduce vexatious questions of precedence and lead to needless jealousies and heart-burnings.

Second. Titles cannot be eradicated even from a democracy. People may rebel against them (as did the French in the Revolution), but they will recur to them. Some ready mode of describing a person, and saying to what genus he belongs, will somehow or other be devised.

Third. Titles should be regulated by the body, or order, or society to which they appertain, and outsiders should conform to usages thus prescribed, and should not employ irregular appellations. Thus, civil titles should be fixed by the authority of the state, military by the army, naval by the navy, ecclesiastical by churches, and academic by universities. As for the titles

that are purely social (Mr., Madame, Esquire, etc.), the usage of good society must be decisive.

Fourth. Titles honorably bestowed are incentives to praiseworthy action. Many modest or diffident men have been encouraged by the reception of some unexpected honor; many have been led to put forth their best efforts in the hope that titular recognition would be their reward.

Fifth. Conversely, titles won by entreaty or sycophancy, by the detraction of others, by any form of meanness, or by any false pretense, are more tasteless than apples of Sodom.

Sixth. Descriptive titles (to be placed after one's name, rather than before it), on a visiting card, or a title-page, or a society's roll, are a great help in facilitating acquaintance among strangers, and are heartily to be encouraged.

Seventh. To sum up, titles fitly regulated, notwithstanding their liability to abuse, are convenient, traditional, wide-spread, indispensable, remunerative appellations, not foolishly to be desired, not lightly to be condemned.

From republicans in general, we turn to the republic of letters. The usage of bestowing honors upon scholars is very old. Indeed, it is hard to imagine the existence of a society of advanced teachers and pupils, *universitas magistrorum et discipulorum*, without offices, ranks, and grades—or, in other words, degrees. In the theory of a liberal education, one principle which stands unshaken amid all controversies, and will stand unshaken to the end of time, is order, sequence, system. That which is fit at one period of life, at one stage of advancement, with one purpose in view, is not fit at another. There must be steps or degrees, more or less formally indicated by rules and by-laws. So it has always been. The usage varies in different countries, and at present there is a great deal of discussion as to the detailed requirements essential to academic honors. It takes a volume of several hundred pages to exhibit the peculiarities of the various German universities. It requires a book almost as large to bring out all that pertains to examinations for the degrees in medicine in different countries. It takes a score of pages to indicate the gowns and hoods that custom demands in different British institutions. All this indicates a diversity that approaches controversy. But closer study shows that the differences are in detail rather than in principle. In general, all the countries of Christendom; excepting the United States of

America, are agreed in protecting academic degrees by regulations that no one can with impunity transgress; and consequently in Europe academic titles have a definite significance which gives them great value. Americans, on the other hand, have shown a deplorable disregard for usage and precedent. They have vulgarized these and other titles. Instead of restricting the degree-giving power to a few comprehensive universities, Americans have allowed it to be exercised by hundreds of weak and inefficient colleges.

Thus, instead of limiting the number of charters bestowed on colleges, the supply of charters has always been equal to the demand. Again, instead of acting conservatively under charters thus recklessly bestowed, many colleges have been careless in the extreme, and especially so in respect to honorary degrees, which ought to be high distinctions, and medical degrees, which ought to be rigidly guarded as the seals of life and death. Hence it has come to pass in this country that ordinary academic degrees have been given on such different terms that when we hear of a B. A. or an M. A. we have no certainty what is implied by these distinctions, unless we happen to know what college gave the degree, and not always then. Within the writer's acquaintance, a youth entitled to call himself a Bachelor of Arts in one college could not enter the lowest classical classes in another; and a youth that had been graduated in one institution, and was about to become its mathematical teacher, was unable to follow intelligently the lowest mathematical classes in another college to which he had resorted. Honorary degrees, especially those of LL. D. and D. D., are bestowed in extravagant profuseness, without any respect to the academic standing of the recipient. New varieties of degrees are manufactured with an inventive skill that is truly characteristic of Americans. From the report of the United States Commissioner of Education, for 1882, we have compiled, with severe mortification of our patriotism, the following list of academic degrees conferred in the United States during 1882. We begin with modifications of the old Baccalaureate degree:

Bachelor of Arts.
Bachelor of Letters.
Bachelor of Science.
Bachelor of Philosophy.
Bachelor of Laws.

Bachelor of Scientific Agriculture.
Bachelor of Mechanic Art.
Bachelor of Mining Metallurgy.
Bachelor of Engineering.
Bachelor of Chemical Science.

Bachelor of Divinity.	Bachelor of Surgery.
Bachelor of Sacred Theology.	Bachelor of Painting.
Bachelor of Music.	Bachelor of Pedagogics.
Bachelor of Civil Engineering.	Bachelor of English.
Bachelor of Mining Engineering.	Bachelor of English Literature.
Bachelor of Agriculture.	Bachelor of Domestic Art.

Then there are degrees devised by those who seem to think there is some incongruity in giving young ladies the title of Bachelor, viz. :

Licentiate of Instruction.	Proficient in Music.
Laureate of English Literature.	Maid of Philosophy.
Laureate in Arts.	Maid of Science.
Laureate of Science.	Maid of Arts.
Graduate in Liberal Arts.	

There are also the old degrees of Master and Doctor, and the many special degrees that are supposed to indicate advanced attainments, viz. :

Master of Arts.	Mechanical Engineer.
Doctor of Philosophy.	Dynamic Engineer.
Doctor of Science.	Analytical Chemist.
Master or Mistress of Science.	Pharmaceutical Chemist.
Master of Laws.	Master of Accounts.
Master or Mistress of Philosophy.	Principal of Pedagogics.
Civil Engineer.	Master of Letters.
Mining Engineer.	Doctor of Music.
Civil and Mechanical Engineer.	Doctor of Dental Surgery.
Topographical Engineer.	Doctor of Dental Medicine.
Surveyor.	

Together with titles feminine to match some of the masculine forms last given :

Mistress of Liberal Arts.	Mistress of Polite Literature.
Mistress of English Literature.	Mistress of Music.

Besides, there are these venerable distinctions :

Doctor of Medicine.	Doctor of Divinity.
Doctor of Laws.	Doctor of Sacred Theology
Doctor of Civil Law.	

It is not strange that, in these circumstances, fraudulent diplomas are sometimes issued, as in the famous cases exposed in Philadelphia and Chicago; and that notices like the following are possible in one of the oldest States in the Union. A recent circular of the "University School for Young Ladies in the city of ——" says:

"The Board of Governors and Visitors are invested by its charter with full power to confer such honors and degrees, attested by medals and diplomas, as are usually conferred in this State by colleges, normal schools, and universities; also to appoint an *advisory Board of Lady Visitors, to be vested with the same privileges and powers.*"

In view of what has been said, the reader may now be prepared to consider what Dr. Barnard, of Columbia College, has called "the rehabilitation of degrees." The questions are constantly arising, Are academic titles of use either to the recipient or to the public? Can their value be increased? Are they worth saving? Let honorary degrees be considered first. Those coveted marks of approbation are bestowed without examination, by grace, and are not claimed by right. These distinctions are closely allied to such as are won by election to the membership of certain academies and associations, like the Royal Society of London, or the Institute of France. They belong to those subtle influences, sometimes called incentives, that are among the most potent means in existence for drawing out intellectual exertions.

Ten years ago, a distinguished astronomer, in an article well worth reperusal, discussed in this REVIEW the reasons why Americans have contributed so little to the progress of exact science. He dwelt especially upon mathematics, and showed that in this department of knowledge our countrymen have been much less productive than Europeans; and he suggested two reasons for their lack of fertility: the absence of journals in which good mathematical work could be promptly and appropriately published, and the uncertainty of any favorable recognition when a good piece of work is performed. In other words, the incentives are not strong enough to draw out the best exertions of the most competent intellects. Of course, as he acknowledged, there are always internal rewards,—the pleasure of finding out, the consciousness of doing one's duty, the delights of intellectual activity, and so on,—but these subjective impulses are not favorable to productivity. In order to induce a scholar to elaborate and write out in an orderly manner what

he has thought, he must be assured that what he writes will be printed, and in most cases he needs the additional assurance that what he prints will be read, and again, that what is read will receive due recognition from those that are competent to judge of its worth. Hence it is that modern society has evolved and still perpetuates so many modes of showing an appreciation of good intellectual work. Favorable mention in the works of the learned, careful reviews, election into the fellowship of academies and other dignified bodies, commemorative celebrations and jubilees, monuments, portraits, statues, prizes, medals, and last, but by no means least, admission to honorary degrees, with a right to bear honorary titles, are among the distinctions offered in all civilized countries to those that have aided in the advancement of knowledge, whether their part has been the acquisition of great learning, the discovery of new truths, the re-statement of old truths in better form, or the instruction of youth in the methods of intellectual life. In some countries, especially in those where the traditions of a court are strong, social rank is bestowed on scholars,—as Humboldt was made a royal chamberlain, and Tennyson was made a baron,—and sometimes pensions and purses are offered to those whose lives have been consecrated to literary and scientific work. By all these devices, society is saying that recognition shall be the reward of productivity; honor shall wait on learning.

In respect to degrees to be won by examination, it may be said that their action as incentives is much stronger upon young minds than that of honorary degrees upon those that are older. It is not uncommon to hold a youth to the completion of a long and perhaps wearisome course of study by the assurance that at its close he shall receive the title of Bachelor of Arts. He knows that if he wishes to enter a good professional school, or to engage in teaching, or to publish a book, it will be a help to place after his name the initials A. B. He knows that through life the question will often be asked, Are you a college graduate? It is deemed a great hardship if one that has been allowed to remain in a college till near the end of his senior year is at the last moment deprived of the titular honor so long anticipated. If any further proof is needed, the bestowal of degrees by all the colleges of the country, and the employment of the term “graduated” in institutions that do not confer degrees, may be taken as significant indications.

In order to give true value to these distinctions, the authority to confer degrees should be limited. Theoretically, it is absurd that every incorporated college should exercise such a prerogative. Everywhere, except in the United States, the degree-giving functions are restricted by customs and by statutes so rigid that to violate them would be a most serious offense. But it is too late to appeal to legislation; the reform desired can only be secured by the combination of a few strong institutions. Is it hopeless to expect such concurrent action? Dr. McCosh, fresh from British traditions, made a suggestion in his inaugural address that the colleges of one State should agree to act together as a university; but we have never heard of any echo to this proposal from New Brunswick or Hoboken. Dr. Barnard, with the prestige of Columbia to sustain him, urgently advised, several years ago, that the University of the State of New York should be recognized as the one degree-giving body in that State; but the centennial anniversary has passed without any such agreement. President White, of Cornell University, has expressed his willingness to accept such a scheme; but it will be a long while, we apprehend, before the numerous colleges in New York are ready to yield the privileges they have been wont to exercise. Dr. Woolsey, in his recent article, has reviewed with great learning the historic usages that confined the degree-giving power to authorized universities. If opinions like these were generally accepted, remedies could be found. Certainly, in those Western States where strong foundations have been laid by the legislatures,—for example, in Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and California,—State examinations, to be conducted by the State universities and by such colleges as would consent to affiliate with them, might be instituted, and certain privileges might be accorded to the degrees won under these conditions. Even elsewhere, all the colleges within the borders of a State might yield their independence in degree-giving, and might consent on equitable terms to fellowship with other institutions in the exercise of this university function. To the writer it seems possible that a few strong institutions in different States—for example, Columbia, Cornell, Princeton, the University of Pennsylvania, and Johns Hopkins—might unite in examining candidates and bestowing degrees upon a uniform basis of merit, and with uniform tests of proficiency. The student would still be known as a graduate of Princeton,

Cornell, etc., while his degree would be conferred with the approval of the board of examiners in the university union. Honors won in such lists would be worth having. The experiment of intercollegiate examinations, which failed for lack of funds, was sustained long enough to show what readiness there is among students to compete for intercollegiate honors. Certainly, if rivalry in athletic sports is worth encouraging, a rivalry in intellectual exertions is much more desirable.

An effort should also be made to restore the true meaning of degrees. It is generally regarded as unfortunate that so many modifications of the baccalaureate title have been employed by American colleges. According to wide-spread and time-honored usages the degree of Bachelor of Arts should indicate that the first grade after matriculation has been attained in a society of scholars; it should mark the termination of a period of fundamental studies. Usage has driven out of this country the degree of Bachelor of Medicine, and the mere suggestion of its restoration not long ago awakened the decided opposition of the medical faculty; on the contrary, usage has favored the degree of Bachelor of Laws and of Bachelor of Divinity, so that their disappearance is improbable, and perhaps undesirable; but most of the other modifications of the bachelor's degree—Bachelors of Science, Philosophy, Literature, Agriculture, Architecture, Engineering, and the rest—might well be given up. It would be well if everywhere the degree of Bachelor of Arts should signify that the recipient has been thoroughly trained in the fundamental studies of a liberal education; that he has received such discipline in languages, mathematics, science, and philosophy, as entitles him to be called well educated. His diploma would then be a testimonial to the world that, in the opinion of the degree-giving body, the recipient of this honor had passed the period of adolescent training, and had reached the beginning of academic freedom. For the public one such title, bestowed on principles distinctly avowed by leading institutions, upon those who comply with the conditions, would be better far than the multiplicity of designations now in vogue.

What should be done for those proficient in technical subjects who have not received a training in the liberal arts? Our answer is ready. Give them certificates and titles that indicate what they have become proficient in—anything but a baccalaureate degree. Let their first distinction be the winning of a

diploma as proficient in engineering, chemistry, etc.; but let their final professional stand be that of architect, civil engineer, mining engineer, chemist, electrician, agriculturist, veterinary surgeon, or the like—titles that correspond with the vocations of modern society, and are much better than such queer titles as those now given. A youth that has been pronounced an architect, a veterinary surgeon, or an engineer, after prolonged study and satisfactory examinations by a reputable institution, would have a title worth having, which would introduce him to the world as expert in the theory of the art he purposes to practice. The public would have some guarantee as to the candidate's attainments, while colleges and universities would be held up to a high standard of fidelity, lest their indorsements, no longer hidden in mediæval Latinity, but uttered in nineteenth-century English, should go to protest.

Our conclusions are simply these: that as academic degrees are already established, boards of trustees and faculties should endeavor to restore their significance by reducing the number of titles; by seeing that they are only bestowed on worthy recipients; by encouraging everybody that wears a title to declare, whenever he points to it, the source from which it comes; and by welcoming all measures that tend toward the bestowal of degrees by college unions and not by a single faculty.

D. C. GILMAN.

SPECULATION IN POLITICS.

AS THE magnetic currents are said to play about the earth, enveloping it in an intricate net-work of living forces, so thought plays about every object of human interest. Thinking minds try to trace out causes and to forecast results. Institutions are scrutinized to ascertain their conformity to principle, or the equity of their operation, and new ones are devised to supplement or to replace the old. As knowledge and experience, the data for final judgment, are variously colored by the thinker's passions and relations to the objects of thought, diverse tendencies arise, resulting in the most important consequences, when thought is translated into action. Some, unswayed by self-interest, yet smitten with love for the naked symmetry of abstract truth, and ignorant, perhaps, of the conditions of a healthy national life, clamor for radical reforms. Others are led by responsibility for the conduct of affairs, or by personal interest, to deprecate change as unjust or dangerous. These opposing tendencies characterize all associate life; the radical reformer constituting the centrifugal and the conservative the centripetal forces, by whose just balance is produced that condition of peaceful activity with progress which Shakspeare felicitously styles "the married calm of states," but the undue preponderance of the one or the other of which results in rash innovation or in retrogression. It is an interesting question, whether the principles and affections constituting at any epoch the animating spirit of these tendencies have any absolute, or only a relative, validity. The historical fact, that in all vigorous national life an onward sweep is apparent, as in some vast orbit, in which the rearmost columns to-day occupy ground yesterday held by those in the advance, their relative positions remaining unchanged, suggests a doubt whether those principles and affections change with them or are permanent. It is our pur-

pose to inquire into the reasonableness of this doubt, an inquiry that involves, in substance, the determination of the proper scope and function of speculation in the life of a people, and especially in its political life.

By speculation is meant the viewing of an object of thought in its causes, in the light of universal or controlling principles. This definition leaves to each mind as well the formulation as the application of these principles. If the object of thought be an existing institution, or a proposed movement in politics or religion, thinkers envelop it, throw upon it the light of science, peer into its origin, its justifying causes, its physical consequences, its tendency to elevate or to lower the standard of national morality, intelligence, or freedom, and report facts and reasons tending to show its folly or its wisdom, upon which society may act. In discharging this function, speculative thinkers do for society what is done for an army on the march by scouts swarming about its front and flanks; those attending the Roman legion were called *speculatores*. While they cover its movements, they spy out the enemy and the preferable lines of advance or retreat, and thus furnish to the commander the facts out of which he may form, in the light of general maxims and his own experience, the plan of his campaign. If the analogy suggested is real, does it extend so far as to justify the inference, that the reports of the *speculatores* of to-day—the theater of the conflict, the number, character, necessities, and purposes of friends and enemies alike changing from hour to hour—can form the basis only of the campaign of to-day?

Considered as a practical force or method, it is the function of speculation, on the one hand, to inaugurate or to resist contemplated changes in the social state, or, on the other, to justify or to discredit changes already accomplished; and it may perform one or more of these offices at the same time. History will, it is believed, confirm this analysis. In respect to that of the ancient peoples who rose and fell before the Christian era, we shall refer to it only to point out a remarkable law apparent in the order in which different forms of government succeeded or grew out of one another. It was as if the various political institutions, with the ideas and maxims cohering to each, sprang out of the soil in a fixed order, from seeds planted by nature; first the patriarchal, then the kingly, then the aristocratic, then the popular or democratic, and then, perhaps, excepting only its

initial step, a repetition of the same order ; as though, in analogy to vegetable growths, each particular form had exhausted the soil of ingredients needed to sustain its life, and left it fit only for some other form lying ready in the laboratory of nature. In other words, ancient history justifies the belief that every form of government is menaced by peculiar dangers and enemies, and that if overcome by them it is likely to lapse into some particular alternative form. Thus, a people wearied of the insignificance and hazards attending the patriarchal constitution, easily passes over into the monarchical; from that, into the aristocratic; and from that into the democratic, etc. The point of chief interest for us is that at each transition speculation furnishes the armories of all parties to strengthen or to overcome the inertia of institutions, and that the weapons employed by each are commonly, under similar conditions, the same.

In modern states the operation of a similar law is observable. Even in the early days of Christianity, when politics and religion were so blended as to obscure the operation of merely political causes, traces of it are distinctly discernible. The antagonism whose issue was at that time to determine the future of existing institutions, was that between imperial Rome, with her inexorable traditions and her waning powers, or between her successors in the temporal order, and Papal Rome, then beginning to throw out the threads of her wide dominion. Which of the two should prevail was only half decided when Constantine founded a Christian empire on the ruins of the Pagan; for he did little more than substitute one imperialism, thinly varnished with the forms of Christianity, for another, which, although unchristian, had been, so far as the elements of good government were concerned, scarcely inferior to it. There was no longer persecution of Christianity by the state; but against this must be set off the fact that the church was then first enabled to take its turn at persecution. But, in the main, in her contest with the state, the church was fighting not only for her own existence and that of Christianity, but for the best interests of humanity; she bore aloft, unconsciously, perhaps, the standard of enfranchisement for the new Europe that was to arise out of the *débris* of Rome, shattered by the Gothic invasions. How was it possible for her whose kingdom was not of this world to break the iron fetters of imperialism, inherited from Rome by the feudal sovereigns? It could be done only

through the consciences of men; and she did it thus by proclaiming the divine right of the see of Rome to rule as well in political as in spiritual things. That she did so was fortunate for herself and, we think, for civilization, which otherwise could hardly have weathered the storms of the Middle Ages.

Thus was established the divine right of the Pope of Rome to give laws to Europe. But was it a right absolute for all time? As claimed for the Pope, it was but a new divine right set up against an old one; for, according to Roman belief and custom, if not by law, the Cæsars were rulers by divine appointment, and came finally to be worshiped as gods. This worship had passed away. Would a time come when the divine right of the church would be discredited? Her pretensions were put forth gradually, and it was not until the time of the great Popes—Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII.—that they were distinctly promulgated, and, in the confusion and distress then prevailing, widely allowed. By their political alliances, and the Crusades instituted by their astute policy, the Papacy received a vast accession to its temporal power, and the leading princes were enabled to begin that process of absorbing the dominions of their weaker feudatories by which were laid the foundations of the great kingdoms of modern times. The work thus wrought by the church, added to her general services to civilization, is inestimable, whatever may be thought of the dogma of divine right. That dogma had served its purpose; the reign of lawlessness and of national disintegration was verging to an end; and it seemed to the men of that day not unjust that the church, through which this great good had been effected, should sit as sovereign mistress of the bodies as well as the souls of men, to both of which she had brought salvation. So prevalent was this conviction, that one familiar with the history of the Middle Ages need not be reminded of Europe's danger for centuries, of becoming subject, in things temporal as well as spiritual, to a single head. Most Catholic sovereigns, even in England to the time of Henry VIII., reigned rather than governed, the real sway being in the hands of their clerical ministers. Gradually Europe became restive under this yoke, and after the Reformation arose a disposition to shake it off, though in France the dogma was strenuously insisted upon by Sixtus V. and the Guises, at the time of the League under Henry III. Inquiry into the nature of government at length led to the suspicion,

that while the function of governing might be divine, it was not necessarily vested in the head of the church; a function to be discharged in the political order in administering the state, though in its origin divine, might and ought, for the general good, to be intrusted to the king, who in the political order represented its divine author. This conception was in reality founded upon the necessity of transferring to the secular arm a jurisdiction that had proved, when invested in the spiritual head of Christendom, extremely odious and oppressive. To the Tudor sovereigns little speculation was necessary to demonstrate the rightfulness of anything "they were inclined to," or the wrongfulness of whatever "they had no mind to." But, for the English people in general, political necessity must be shown to coincide with moral right before they could act with the requisite zeal and decision. Such demonstration was furnished by the writings of Sir Robert Filmer and of Thomas Hobbes, published during the contest between Charles I. and his Parliament. They demonstrated not only that no divine right to govern inhered in the church, but that the king, and not the Parliament or the nation, as many thought, was by divine right possessed of that function. Filmer maintained that in the beginning God gave supreme authority to Adam, from whom it was transmitted to Noah, and from him to all kings and governors, and that their authority is therefore absolute, and above all human control. Filmer was a man of slender abilities, who would now be forgotten, but for the use made of his name and principles by the English clergy and their Tory allies in the political struggles of the next two reigns. Far superior to Filmer was Thomas Hobbes, one of the greatest thinkers that England has produced. The purpose of Hobbes in his principal work, "*The Leviathan*," was, like that of Filmer, to break down the supremacy of the church, and to establish absolute power in the hands of the English sovereigns. It need not surprise us, therefore, that he roused the bitterest enmity of the English clergy, and that his reputation has suffered from it. Warburton says that the "press of his time sweat with controversy with the philosopher of Malmesbury, every young churchman militant trying his arms in thundering upon Hobbes's steel cap." He taught that absolute authority might be acquired in two ways: one by force, and the other by voluntary transfer, to one or more men, of the right that every man had by nature to govern

himself. The man or body receiving this transfer he styled "The great Leviathan" or "Mortal God," and its power was absolute and irrevocable, no matter of what wrong or injury it might be guilty. In this doctrine was foreshadowed the theory, afterward so celebrated, of the social contract, since Hobbes taught that absolute government might be based upon the agreement of all.

Thus far speculative thinkers had claimed the divine right for a monarch — first the spiritual, and then the temporal. But experience in most of the leading states finally led to the conviction that, although the dogma of the divine right of kings was a useful *succedaneum* to that of the divine right of the clergy, which had become odious, it was even more fruitful of evils, because, with powers far superior to those of pope and curia, kings had, in general, equal ambition and greater vices. Be that as it may, absolute supremacy in both church and king became ultimately intolerable. Then speculation advanced another step; it proceeded to examine the basis upon which absolute kingly power had been made to rest. The result was the propounding of a doctrine destined to displace it, that of the social contract. Whatever we may think of the divine right to govern, a people has certainly, it was argued, a right to be justly and wisely governed, and to compel its rulers so to discharge their function as to subserve this great purpose of civilized life. To this end, in instituting governments, each man contracted with his fellows to forego some of his natural rights, or of what would be his rights if he were living in a state of nature, in return for protection from injury and for a similar surrender by all. As every man was a party to this contract, it was the right of all — divine, if any right is divine — to see to it that the contract was carried out; to compel performance, and to punish violations of it; and when, in the judgment of a majority, kings or other functionaries, however revered for imputed divineness, by misconduct had made impossible the attainment of the ends of government without their removal, it was their right to punish them, even with death. This theory, the result of the speculations of Sidney and Locke, has had extraordinary currency and influence for more than two hundred years. Propounded originally, as we have said, with a view to break the force of the dogma of the divine right of kings, as taught by Filmer in 1648, it was again invoked, after the Revolution of 1688, to justify that

Revolution, in the interest of the Whig party, and against the Jacobites and Tories who sought the restoration of the Stuarts. By the reasonings of those writers, the nation was brought to believe that it was not, as pretended by the enemies of the Revolution, a sin to keep the Stuarts out of their pretended rights. They had plotted with the Papists to destroy the liberties and religion of England. They had been driven into exile by a general revolt of their subjects, and their banishment was a righteous punishment, unless the divine right of kings was a right to commit the most outrageous acts of treason against not only man but God. Thus they justified, after the event, a revolt accomplished, with painful misgivings, by men who had felt in their consciences that rebellion was a sin, but who had been constrained by necessity to commit it.

A hundred years later, the same doctrine was used as a disintegrating force to prepare and to consummate two great revolutions, those of America and France; for, remarkable as it may seem, such vitality had been exhibited by the dogma of the divine right, combated by Locke and Sidney, that to educate Frenchmen and Americans up to the point of rebelling against their sovereigns was the greatest moral difficulty encountered by those revolutions. In France, this was accomplished mainly by the writings of Voltaire and Rousseau, the former directed primarily against *L'infame*, as he denominated Gallican Christianity; the latter against the social order and monarchy of France, rooted in the offensive dogma against which he wrote his celebrated treatise, "*Le Contrat Social*." America received the same doctrine by a double inheritance, from England, the source of all her institutions, and from France, through Rousseau, the source of much of her political theory, as well as of the rhetoric with which she set forth her rights. And yet, so little had the doctrine of the social contract penetrated the hearts of our fathers, at the beginning of our Revolution, that in the Americana of that period are found not a few sermons combating the slavish dogma of the divine right of George III. to rule America, or those of non-resistance and passive obedience, its most offensive corollaries. But when they became convinced that "resistance to tyrants" was not a sin, but "obedience to God," tender consciences yielded to the instinct of freemen to maintain their rights by force of arms, even against their sovereign. Then began "the dreadful night of kings," of

which the poet Barlow sang as casting its baleful shadow over the world at our Revolution ; and it has gone on deepening, until most thinkers, perhaps, believe that, if there be a divine right of governing, it is inherent, not in a monarch, but in the living organism called the people ; a right to be worked out by them in various forms — aristocratic, democratic, or even monarchical — according to existing conditions. But is this conviction a finality for our race, or does it express only a temporary phase of its political faith, which, as time rolls on, and its unforeseen consequences are developed, may in its turn be renounced as a half-truth or an error ?

The particular form of this conviction embodied in the doctrine of the social contract has long since been rejected by thinking minds. Not only is it denied as a fact that men ever did or could contract with one another, as supposed by Locke and Rousseau, but it is maintained that while many of the incidents of the best governments are not inconsistent with the contract theory, others are so, and especially with many of the logical deductions from it. Indeed, since men readily accept inferences that are logically drawn from premises believed to be established, logic is one of the principal sources of danger in political speculation. But conceding to the people, as we know it, the right to govern itself, we ask again, Is the right absolute, and is mankind shut up to that doctrine, or may it modify or renounce it, if occasion should arise ? It is conceived that the only absolute right in the case is that of mankind to be well governed. If the early patriarchal form was found insufficient, it had a right to take refuge from it in the monarchical, in the aristocratic, in the democratic, or again in the patriarchal, as its highest wisdom should dictate ; and that right it has to-day, and will always have. When its highest wisdom is found, as it often is, in a single mind, it should nevertheless prevail, but only on the condition that it secure acknowledgment as such, and that it prevail through the power of the people itself ; for wisdom that cannot secure such recognition and such ascendancy is not, for the time, the highest. We repeat, then, whatever the existing form may be, if it result in injustice or oppression, there is a right in the people to destroy or to reform it in any mode deemed best. Upon this right as a basis will arise, through all time, a succession of political forms as varied as the knowledge, the needs, and the affections of men. Un-

changing institutions could be based only upon perfect knowledge, for by it alone would men's needs be perfectly comprehended, and their affections be self-directed to that only which is the best for all.

We therefore conclude, that the high maxims and principles deduced by speculation from the nature of man, from experience of previous forms of government, and from human needs, are relative and provisional; and that they who build upon them, or upon the deductions that logicians reel off from them, as of absolute validity, build upon the sand. The function of speculation in politics, like that of the prophetic assumption in science, being to furnish a working hypothesis for the guidance of the state, by correlating the fruits of knowledge and experience, the resulting institutions to be and remain flexible to changing conditions, it follows that a speculative dogma in the political sphere, which stiffens into an iron rule, especially if armed with a divine sanction, is an unmixed calamity to mankind. It may seem heresy to maintain that the well-loved forms of constitutional states like ours, or like England's, may be rightfully overthrown; and it would be heresy to counsel their overthrow now, when with some evil there is in their operation a vast preponderance of good; but as there are times when heresy is the true religion, so there are times when treason to one's government may be the only true patriotism. Governments are made for man, not man for governments.

But the question arises, If the products of speculation are relative and provisional, and if greater knowledge and experience may displace them all in turn, is speculation not, therefore, useless or insincere? By no means. Speculation is the effort of imperfect humanity to develop its institutions to conform with its principles, its moral instincts, and its needs, as seen with increased clearness from day to day in the growing light of knowledge. Hence, that may be honestly denounced to-day for which one honestly shed his blood yesterday, and for which, if the conditions change, he may as honestly die to-morrow. All that can be demanded for either sincerity or usefulness is, that the adoption or rejection of truth shall be founded on what appear at the time to be sound reasons.

It would be easy to enforce further, by many examples from political life, the truth of these principles. We shall cite but two. Mr. Herbert Spencer has lately written a scathing ex-

posure of "the sins of legislators," and of the widely prevalent theory, or, as he calls it, superstition, that special preparation is not needed to enable legislators to perform successfully their most important function. Did space permit, it could be demonstrated, that what he affirms to be true of the law-makers of England is equally so of those of America; more than this, that no sin is committed and no superstition cherished by the former, that is not imitated and improved upon by the latter. On this point we shall only say further, that to the superstitions exhibited respecting legislation in England we add others peculiar to our system of free elections, but which, like them, are destined to disappear in the light of greater experience and knowledge. Among these is the superstition that universal suffrage necessarily results in the choice of either able or honest legislators; and the superstition that good laws, whether executed or not, constitute good government. The other example is found in the history of a well-known political theory, formerly very widely held, but by its subsidence now exemplifying the transitoriness of the products of speculation, the theory of State sovereignty. Formerly, that the States were sovereign bodies was by many speculative thinkers considered to be as indisputable as a truth of divine revelation. The past few years, however, have wrought a great change of sentiment, not only in regard to the fact of the sovereignty of the States, but as to what is competent evidence of the fact, and particularly as to the pertinence and evidentiary value of opinion in the discussion of that question. Until of late, they who believed in the sovereignty of the States argued the question upon historical documents and the opinions of the founders and administrators of the American governments. But it is now the better doctrine, that documentary evidence and the judgments of eminent statesmen and magistrates have no power whatever to determine the fact; no more, indeed, than had the dogmas of the school-men to establish the attributes of the divine nature, or than the decrees of the Roman Curia had to disprove the truths of astronomy propounded by Copernicus and Galileo. Sovereignty is a complex fact, involving the simultaneous exercise, by a part or all of an independent people, occupying a determinate territory, of the power and the will to control and govern that territory, irrespective of legal or moral right to do so. As bearing on the *locus* of such a power in fact, therefore, the only competent evidence is the presence or

absence of those elements of control. Indeed, in a national debate upon the question, the logic of facts that must decide it admits of but one incontrovertible syllogism, and that is the exhibition, by one side or the other, of an overwhelming preponderance of civic power and energy, culminating in superior military prowess in the field. A debate, in which this syllogism was used, was lately held in America, and the result was the effectual refutation of the doctrine of State sovereignty. He who agitates the question anew, with a view to reverse that decision, must appeal, not to documents or judicial *dicta*, but to the next war between *soi-disant* sovereign States and the nation.

Such is now the accepted theory of sovereignty in our government,—that it is a power existing in the nation, and not in the States,—because that theory alone seems to accord with the facts. Should these change, future speculators will formulate a new theory to correspond with them, and that now held will be filed away among exploded fallacies.

JOHN A. JAMESON.

RAILWAY LAND-GRANTS.

ALTHOUGH the last session of Congress was largely occupied with the consideration of land-grants to railways, and bills relating to nearly all such grants ever made were introduced, yet no bill was passed or final action taken. This resulted in a great degree from the intrinsic difficulty and importance of the subject, which became more apparent as examination of it progressed. The number of grants was great; some were to States, and some to companies. In many cases no work whatever had been done; in others the roads were partly made, and in others completed. Sections of roads had been accepted by the President after the time fixed for the completion of the road. New legislation had also been passed after the lapse of the period in which the whole work was to be done, and transfers of the lands had been made by one company to another. The charters and grants were not all alike, but differed in many important particulars. Bonds had been issued, and mortgages covering the land granted had been executed. Much of the land had been sold to actual settlers, and the money received in payment therefor. In some cases the Government had undertaken to do certain things, but had postponed action. Towns had been built, rights had attached, money been invested, business engaged in, all on the faith of the enjoyment of the land-grant. It was apparent that if Congress undertook to deal finally with the subject, and to declare and enforce forfeitures without the aid and intervention of the courts, a separate bill would be necessary in each case, as it was clearly impossible to make one law cover them all; and that an infinite number and variety of questions would arise, intricate and difficult—questions of law and of fact; questions between the United States and some of the States, between the Government and corporations and individuals; questions of title to franchises, and to

real estate, of the validity of the acts of a coördinate branch of the Government and their effects, between the Government and holders of the bonds of companies; questions of forfeiture and of waiver, questions of when a forfeiture should be enforced, and to what extent, whether the Government had not estopped itself, whether the right of forfeiture had not been equitably lost by acquiescence and delay on the part of Congress, whether one company could legally transfer its rights to another, and whether the lands granted vested *in presenti*, or only on the completion of the road.

No legislation ever before Congress presented such a variety of questions, or required more careful examination; nor was any question more unsuitable for Congressional action, or more in need of judicial consideration. The failure of Congress to take any decisive step is easily accounted for. That body saw the difficulties, and its incapacity to deal with them alone. How was a committee of either house to ascertain facts? It had neither time nor facilities for the ascertainment of the truth, for such investigations would practically engross a committee and prevent its members from attending to other duties.

If, therefore, this grave and important subject, which is now filling so much of the public mind that both political parties made it a feature in their platforms, is to be dealt with fairly and fully and justly, Congress should not attempt to do it itself, but should provide for its submission to judicial tribunals. Senator Morgan, of Alabama, by his bill (S. 1445), has sought to do this, and supported the general proposition in a most conclusive speech. He points out plainly the insurmountable objections to any final and obligatory solution of the question except through the decisions of a court. He assumes that in proper cases Congress should take the initiatory steps to bring the case before the courts, which should be invested with the power to decide all controversies growing out of the grant, whether between the Government and a State or between the Government and a company, and also the rights of persons holding lands or other rights under the company. When, therefore, Congress thought that a company had forfeited its land-grant, all that was necessary was to pass a declaratory bill or joint resolution, and then the courts should take jurisdiction and decide: first, whether, under the charter, the lands were forfeitable, or whether, as is claimed in some cases, they were absolutely dedicated to

the construction of the road ; second, if forfeitable, whether a forfeiture had in fact occurred ; third, if in strict law a forfeiture had occurred, whether it had not been waived, or whether the Government was not equitably estopped from asserting it.

In regard to the last point, while it is claimed that the Government cannot be estopped, or be guilty of laches, and while as a general proposition this is true, yet the Government should be slow to deal harshly and strictly with its own citizens, and can voluntarily release these sovereign rights, or at least put itself in a situation in which it would be improper to exercise them. When the United States contracts with its own citizens, it does not and should not stand in the attitude of a sovereign, but as a contracting party, and should construe the contract precisely as if it were between two citizens. To do anything else, is to throw the sword into the scales. The Supreme Court, in the Central and Union Pacific Railroad cases, decided this to be the law. That court says :

"It has been often decided by this court that a charter granted by a State creates a contract between the State and the incorporator, which the State cannot violate." (13 Wallace, 264.) "A grant is a contract executed. Congress cannot, by direct legislation, vacate mortgages already made under powers originally granted. When a law is in its nature a contract, where absolute rights have vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot divest those rights. A party to a contract cannot pronounce its own deed invalid, although that party be a sovereign state." (6 Cranch, 87.)

But if Congress shall insist on trying these questions, and erect itself into a court, it ought at least to be a court of equity. Nothing else would be just, nothing else would be tolerated by the people. It is true that Congress would be trying a case in which it was one of the parties, would be passing upon the validity, construction, and binding force of its own acts, would be called upon to say whether it had not been guilty of some default, whether it had waived its rights ; all of which ought to constitute an overwhelming objection to any action on the part of Congress beyond taking the necessary measures to have the rights of all parties fairly adjudicated. Congress being one contracting party, there can be no reason why, if it claim rights for the Government, it should not assert them and have them passed upon. But there are conclusive reasons why Congress itself should not decide its own case and pass upon its own claims and acts, and deprive the other contracting party of the rights exist-

ing as to all other persons and in all other cases, of having a fair and full investigation before the tribunals that are created for the purpose and can alone decide properly. And if Congress should sit as a court of equity, as of course it would do, let it be recollected that the sole ground upon which a forfeiture is claimed is, that the State or company did not complete the road within the time prescribed, and that nothing shall be heard by way of excuse, nor can any laches or default be imputed to the United States. If this ground were taken before a court of equity, what treatment would it receive? In the beginning, the court would say to the United States, "You are a plaintiff here; you are a contracting party, and must be treated only as such. You shall not be allowed to eke out your just and equitable rights, or excuse your own shortcomings, by the use and weight of your sovereignty." And having said this much, it would proceed to apply the well-known principles of courts of equity, laid down so clearly in "*Pomeroy on Contracts*":

"In all ordinary cases of contract for the sale of land, if there is nothing special in its object or in its subject-matter, although a certain period of time or particular day is stipulated for the completion of the agreement or execution of any of its terms, equity treats this provision as formal rather than essential, and permits a party who has suffered the period to elapse within which he should have done the acts on his part according to the literal terms of his agreement, to perform such requisite acts after the prescribed date, and to compels a performance by the other party, notwithstanding his own delay." . . . "Finally, the condition of forfeiture may be waived, and is waived, by the conduct of the party entitled to enforce it, which is only consistent with the continued efficacy and subsisting obligation of the contract."

These are the just principles that a court of equity would apply, and Congress, sitting as a court of equity, should be bound by them. It must always be borne in mind that there was a vast difference in the motives and purposes of Congress in granting lands to different railway companies. Where the grant was to a State, it was in the main only one way of giving that particular State some portion of the public lands to be used for her own interior development. To many companies the grant was a mere business transaction between the Government and the company, and had no other or higher end than the opening and settlement of the country and the convenience of business. But in a few cases public considerations of greatest gravity constituted the mainspring of action. The grant

was not made merely to facilitate intercourse, but also for the security and protection of the Government itself. The Union and Central Pacific roads were pushed forward with great vigor, at immense expense and through the greatest natural difficulties, to bind our Pacific coast States to the Union, at a time when the strength of the Constitution and its centripetal powers were strongly tested. So, too, with the Northern Pacific, the history of and legislation in regard to which form perhaps the best illustration of the difficulties attending congressional judicature. That road has been regarded, in all the legislation relating to it, as standing on high, peculiar, and exclusive grounds, from its great public importance.

The State of Maine granted the first charter for the building of a Northern railway to the Pacific coast. Such was then the state of feeling in the country, that its projectors believed the people would come forward and contribute the money necessary to make and equip the road. So strong was this feeling, and so profound was the opinion that the funds would be obtained by a sort of popular uprising, that the charter absolutely prohibited the execution of any mortgage by the company to raise funds. But it was soon ascertained that a State charter was not broad and great enough for a work to traverse other States and Territories and substantially span the continent. So Congress was asked to grant the sanction of the United States to the work. In July, 1864, Congress granted the company a charter, retaining the main features of the original, and giving land, but no money.

The war was then at its height, and the Northern mind was inflamed against England, which it was thought exhibited sympathy for the South. But in less than a year from the date of the charter the South was vanquished, and with the surrender the apprehensions as to what England might do were much moderated. The money that was expected to come in to carry on the work did not make its appearance, and it became apparent that the road would never be made from that source. Nearly six years having passed, and the people having made no voluntary contribution, another application to Congress was necessary, and a resolution was passed "authorizing the company to issue its bonds to aid in the construction and equipment of its road, and to secure the same by mortgage on its property and rights of property of all kinds and descriptions,—real, per-

sonal, and mixed,—including its franchise as a corporation,” and also to locate and construct the road.

The fact had become transparent that the land-grant was worth nothing without the right to mortgage it, and that a large portion of the necessary money had to be obtained upon the credit of the property of the company, which then consisted almost wholly of the land-grant. Therefore, Congress allowed the lands to be mortgaged in advance, not a portion of them only, but every acre and fraction of acre, all the way from Lake Superior to the Pacific Ocean. No reservation or exception was made, or limitation or restriction imposed; and the action of Congress was not merely a permission to execute the mortgage, but an invitation to the people to lend their money to the company, on the credit of the only thing of value the company then had, the lands granted.

Puget Sound is a splendid body of water on our extreme north-western border. It is the best point on the Pacific coast from which to reach the Asiatic trade, and is easy of access through the British Possessions. A Pacific road to San Francisco, or any point south of Puget Sound, would be safe from foreign competition; but not so with one to Puget Sound, and the apprehension that England would make such a road, which would intercept much of our trade, and be dangerous in case of war, was one of the main reasons for passing this charter and for giving this company rights that existed in no other. The bill being before the House, Mr. Sweat said:

“This matter has been considered by the British Government, and by British capitalists, and they will, it is believed, build a road through the British Possessions to Puget Sound, if this road is abandoned.”

The apprehension of a road on British soil to the same harbor, which would be a great rival, not only for the Asiatic trade, but for that of our country to the south, and would at the same time be the means of transporting men and munitions of war in case of hostilities between Great Britain and the United States, was a specter that loomed up largely in that day. The war was then pending. What Great Britain was going to do was uncertain, and it was considered wise to provide against her on all sides and in every way.

Congress thought that the lands granted were then of no value, and would not be of any for many years, unless made so

by the construction of a railway; that the Government was to get a great through line completed, which should aid in settling the Indian question, bring other lands into market, invite immigration, secure the trade of Asiatic nations, afford a means for the transportation of troops and supplies, and be a line of defense in case of war; and all for no consideration on the part of the Government, or a consideration not then deemed of any value.

Acting under the authority given by Congress, the company did mortgage the entire land-grant and issue its bonds, which have gone into general circulation. This being the situation, is it competent for Congress, or if competent, is it right, to diminish the securities of the bondholders in the slightest degree, or to take away any portion of the land? Precisely the same reasons exist now as during the war, for encouraging and aiding the construction of a railway along the border. What was predicted and apprehended during the debates, as to the purposes of England, has come to pass; and while our northern border route to the Pacific is threatened at home, and in the very body that created it, Great Britain and the Dominion of Canada are pushing their road to Puget Sound and aiding it with subsidies and Government credit. The Canadian Pacific Railway was begun about the same time that the Northern Pacific was; but not much progress was made till 1881, when a company agreed to build a railway from Lake Nipissing, near the north-east shore of Lake Huron, to Port Moody, on Bussard Inlet, in British Columbia, opposite the south end of Vancouver's Island, and to complete it by May 1, 1891, and maintain and operate it forever. When this arrangement was consummated about seven hundred miles of the road had already been made, and the Dominion of Canada gave the company that seven hundred miles of road and 25,000,000 acres of land and \$25,000,000; making in all an out-and-out donation of seventy or eighty millions of dollars. And recently the Government has made further advances by loans to the company, on good terms, and the work is progressing vigorously. But as it is not to be finished for seven years yet, there is still time for us, if not embarrassed by unfriendly legislation, to reach Puget Sound several years in advance, and plant ourselves securely there, opening business communications, and acquiring trade, which can afterward be maintained. The importance of this to the people of the United States is incalculable, and the policy of delaying it cannot be otherwise than short-sighted.

While our Atlantic coast is indented all the way from Canada to Mexico with harbors, there are but three good ones on the entire Pacific coast—San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound, and it is in the waters of the latter that the United States and England are to meet and contend for the trade of Asiatic countries. Never did road connect two such bodies of water as Lake Superior and Puget Sound. Lake Superior is a vast inland harbor, surrounded by a rich country with cities and towns, and in it centers the trade of an immense region and of millions of capital. Puget Sound is another immense harbor. From the Straits of Fuca, which constitute its outlet to the ocean, it has an air-line length of eighty miles, and a coast-line of eight hundred and six miles. Within, all the waters are navigable, and the smaller inlets afford numerous safe, deep, and capacious harbors. Is the construction of a road between two such bodies of water to be impeded by any but the most overpowering motives of public policy? Puget Sound is partly within British territory, and can be as easily reached on that side as on this. The trade of Asia has always enriched the nation that enjoyed it, and, instead of hindering or embarrassing lines of communication and channels of trade with that continent, our Government should encourage and facilitate them in every legitimate way. The Supreme Court well describes the public importance of certain great roads; for in the Union Pacific case it uses this language:

"This enterprise was viewed as a national undertaking for national purposes, and the public mind was directed to the end in view, rather than the particular means of securing it. The project of building the road was not conceived for private ends, and the prevalent opinion was, that it could not be worked out by private capital alone. It was a national work, originating in national necessities and requiring national assistance."

But in cases where a road has not been completed within the time prescribed in the grant, and it is claimed that a forfeiture of the lands has thereby been incurred, nevertheless the forfeiture may be waived and absolutely nullified. The charters all provide that when a section of twenty-five miles is made, the President shall appoint commissioners to examine and report upon it. If the report is favorable, the President is authorized formally to accept it. When this has been done,—not once only, but many times,—Congress cannot go behind it. If the

President acts as an independent and coördinate branch of the Government, then of course his acts are conclusive, and cannot be reversed or rescinded by another department. And if he be only the agent of Congress, performing a ministerial act for that body, and did repeatedly perform it, with the knowledge of Congress and without objection or protest, then Congress is bound by the acts of its agent. It is clear what the intention of Congress was in granting lands to aid in conducting a road to Puget Sound. That body was not treating with a company for the mere profit of the latter or the promotion of business, but was beginning a great and indispensable public work, and providing for its completion in any event. Therefore the clause, found in other grants, that the lands should revert to the United States if the provisions of the charter were not complied with, was omitted in this, and in its place was substituted one that dedicated the lands irrevocably to the completion of the road.

But if Congress had a clear legal right to declare a forfeiture of a land-grant, or any part thereof, still, in equity, the power should not be exercised, when the sole ground on which the right is asserted is, that the road was not completed in time. The panic of 1873 in a single day withered up stocks, shrunk values, destroyed credit, made rich men bankrupt, stopped many branches of business, closed iron and manufacturing establishments, arrested railway building, and threw the poor out of employment, and its disastrous effects were felt in every part of the United States and among all classes of people. The Government of the United States itself was unable to fulfill its obligations. The Secretary of the Treasury, in 1880, reported that the panic had made it impossible for the Government to meet the requirements of the sinking fund, which had fallen into arrears more than fifty million dollars during the six years ending in 1879. The panic rendered it impossible for the Government to maintain the sanctity of the sinking fund, not for one year only, but for six consecutive years, and the very same during which the railways, from the same causes, were compelled to suspend work. The Government had sovereign power, immense resources, good credit, and almost unlimited power of taxation, and with all could not perform its contracts, but let the sinking fund diminish each year, until, in 1879, the diminution was over thirty-six million dollars. With this fact before it, does Congress seriously propose to hold the company contracting with

it to a strict account? to forfeit their property because they did not do what the Government itself did not and could not do?

Upon the whole, it would seem wise for Congress to confine itself, on this grave question, to such legislation as will authorize the courts to hear and adjudicate all controversies growing out of the land-grants. So far as grants have been made to States, and there is no compliance whatever on the part of the State with the conditions of the grant, there ought to be no difficulty. The whole matter could be settled easily and promptly by a retrocession by the State to the United States, which no doubt all the States would readily do upon a proper case being made. But in no event ought those great lines that have become useful to the Government, and will be essential in times of trouble, to be disturbed. If the companies now controlling them are not doing their duty, let Congress act under the power reserved in the charter, and do any and all things that may be needful to insure a speedy completion of the road.

JOHN W. JOHNSTON.

1

2

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXLI.

APRIL, 1885.

A STUDY OF PRISON MANAGEMENT.

OUR failure in the handling of criminals with reference to their reformation, and the proportionate security of society and decrease of taxation, is due largely to the fact that we have considered the problem as physical, and not psychological. The effort has been to improve prisons and the physical condition and environment of prisoners. (This effort has been directed by sentiment, rather than upon principles of economy and a study of human nature. It has been assumed that if convicts were treated with more kindness, if they were lodged in prisons well warmed and well ventilated, light and airy, in cells more roomy and comfortable, if they had better food and more privileges (graduated on good deportment), they would be more likely to reform and to lead honest lives after their discharge.

This movement was dictated by philanthropic motives, and I am far from saying that it is all wrong. But it has not produced the results that were expected; and it seems to me that the revolt in the public mind against what is called the "coddling" system is justified by facts and results. The modern model prison is a costly and architecturally imposing structure;

it is safer to lodge in and freer from odors than most hotels; its cells are well warmed, lighted with gas, and comfortable; it has a better dietary than most of its inmates are accustomed to; it has bath-rooms, a library, often large and well selected; an admirably arranged hospital; a cheerful chapel, garnished with frescoes and improving texts; there are Sunday services and Sunday-schools; there is a chaplain who visits the prisoners to distribute books and tracts, and converse on religious topics; there are lectures and readings and occasional musical concerts by the best talent; sometimes holidays are given; there are extra dinners on Thanksgiving day, Christmas day, and the Fourth of July, when the delicacies of the season stimulate the holiday and patriotic sentiments; and in most State-prisons a man may earn a considerable abatement of his sentence by good behavior.

The sanitary condition of most of these model prisons is good; they are very good refuges in which to recuperate the system impaired by excesses and crime. The discipline is excellent. It is, in fact, improved by the good treatment and privileges granted. In some prisons this is carried to a perfection that is boasted of, and that wins the admiration of visitors; the prisoners move like a machine, they never speak, they never look up. This appears to be admirable. In some prisons, however, there are relaxations from the severe rules. If the men dine at a common mess, they are permitted to talk while at table; the privilege being withdrawn if they abuse it and become noisy and quarrelsome. The uniform close-crop of the hair is not always insisted on, and the better prisons are discarding the striped or motley prison dress, as tending simply to degrade the men and serving no good purpose whatever.

There is no doubt that the convicts like the new prisons better than the old. They have their preferences in them as other people have in hotels. (Some prisons have a bad reputation with the criminal fraternity, and I fancy they rather shun the States where these exist.) I remember reading some time ago a newspaper communication from an old convict, a man who had experience in many prisons in different parts of the Union, who compared the diet in each, and spoke very feelingly and bitterly of that in one of them (at Wethersfield, Conn.) for its lack of variety. He wrote with a natural indignation, and I have no doubt had the sympathy of a good many philanthro-

pists and sentimentalists. And it did seem an outrage (from one point of view of the management of prisons) that he should not have green corn twice a week in the season, and fresh tomatoes, which are given in a prison he named. A professional criminal, whose sole occupation is crime, has a right to demand of modern civilization that it should keep pace with itself in the matter of prisons, and provide him agreeable quarters during the periods of his temporary seclusion from general society. Nor is the question of economy wholly overlooked. Many of our prisons pay their way; that is, the prisoners earn enough at hard labor (which is no harder as to hours or amount than free labor), under the contract or other system, to pay the running expenses of the establishment—allowing nothing for interest on the cost, or for repairs and improvements. This is reasonable. The criminal has already cost the State enough; he ought to support himself while in confinement. The taxpayers certainly have a right to demand this. And under this sort of prison system that we are now considering, the first requisite should be that it be self-supporting.

The reform in prison construction and management was very much needed, and I am not anxious now to express an opinion whether or not it has gone too far. (But it must be noted that along with this movement has grown up a sickly sentimentality about criminals which has gone altogether too far, and which, under the guise of "humanity" and philanthropy, confounds all moral distinctions.) The mawkish sympathy of good and soft-headed women with the most degraded and persistent criminals of the male sex is one of the signs of an unhealthy public sentiment. A self-respecting murderer is obliged to write upon his cards "no flowers." I think it will not be denied that our civilization, which has considerably raised the average of human life, tends to foster and increase the number of weaklings, incompetents, and criminally inclined. (Unsystematic charity increases pauperism, and unphilosophical leniency towards the criminal class increases that class.)

It seems to me that we have either gone too far, or we have not gone far enough. If our treatment of the incompetent and vicious is to keep pace with our general civilization, we must resort to more radical measures. The plan of systematized charity, which cultivates independence instead of dependence, and the increased attention given to the very young children

who by their situation and inheritance are criminally inclined, are steps in the right direction. Probably it will be more and more evident that it is the best economy for the State to spend money liberally on those who are liable to become dependents and criminals. If the State were to show as much energy in this direction as it does in police supervision and the capture and conviction of criminals, it is certain that a marked improvement would be felt in society within a generation. But we are now considering the treatment of criminals, and I can best illustrate what I wish to bring into relief by an example.

(My proposition is, that there is very little difference between our worst State-prisons and our best in the effect produced upon convicts as to reformation or a reduction of the criminal class.)
The State-prison at Wethersfield, Conn., is one of the old type. It is an old and ram-shackle establishment, patched up from time to time, and altogether a gloomy and depressing place. It is, however, well managed; it is made to pay about its running expenses; and many of the modern alleviations of prison life are applied there—a library, occasional entertainments, a diminution of time of sentence for good conduct, and so on, whatever such a place is capable of in the way of comfort consistent with the system. But the inmates are the most discouraging feature of the exhibition. They are in appearance depressed, degraded, down-looking, physically sluggish, mentally and morally tending to more and more degradation. There is no hope or suggestion of improvement in them. The discipline is good, and the men earn time by good conduct, but there are no evidences that the alleviations (which take from the former terrors of prison life) are working the least moral change. It is a most depressing and dispiriting sight.

Would any change for the better be wrought if the environment were more cheerful? The State-prison at Cranston, R. I., is a new, handsome, granite building, with the modern improvements. Perfectly lighted and ventilated, with roomy cells, a common mess-room, an admirable hospital, a more than usually varied dietary, with a library, and all the privileges that humanity can suggest as consistent with discipline and security, it is as little gloomy and depressing as a State-prison well can be. Having occasion recently to look into this matter officially, I confess that I expected to find at Cranston a very different state of affairs as to the convicts from that existing at Wethersfield.

The improved physical conditions ought to show some moral and physical uplift in the men. I was totally disappointed. Here were the same hang-dog, depressed, hopeless, heavy lot of convicts. The two prisons might change inmates, and no visitor would know the difference. You might expect just as little reformation in one as in the other. We are not considering now any question of sentiment or humanity; and the conclusion was forced upon me that, so far as the real interests of society are concerned, nothing is gained by converting prisons into comfortable hotels.

(Since we have abolished punishments, and are not ready to take any radical steps for reformation, it would be better to make prison life so hard that detention would be a punishment in itself.) The men should earn their living at hard labor, and be made to feel the weight of their transgressions.) If professional and confirmed criminals, men who declare by undergoing second conviction for a felony that they have made preying upon society their business, who belong, in short, to a pretty well defined criminal class, cannot be removed altogether from troubling this world, they ought to be locked up permanently and made to earn their living. They are of no sort of use in the world, and are an expense and a danger to society.) The rose-water treatment has no effect on this class, as a rule. Holidays, occasional fine dinners, concerts, lectures, flowers—we are going ridiculously far in this direction, unless we add a radical something to this sort of treatment that will touch the life of the man, and tend to change his nature and inclination. (Our great prisons now are little better than seminaries and nurseries of crime. We are contributing to the breeding of a criminal class, which propagates itself under favoring conditions, aided by a misdirected philanthropy.) Unless we adopt a plan radically different from the present one, it would be better to abandon all this coddling of the determined criminal class, leave it to its fate, and direct the energies of the State to cutting off the supply, by looking after the children who from infancy are on the predetermined road to join it.

Can anything better be done with men convicted of State-prison offenses? It is with the hope of throwing some light on this question that I wish to give a brief and informal account of what is going on in the Reformatory at Elmira, New York, under the superintendency of Mr. Z. R. Brockway. Here is an

experiment in the personal treatment of convicts, unique, so far as I know, in the world; and I suppose it is an open question whether anybody except Mr. Brockway could carry it on. It is well to say, by way of preliminary, that the theory of indeterminate sentences, held by Mr. Brockway and other prison reformers, has been by many regarded as impracticable of operation, for want of a tribunal to say when a man is sufficiently reformed for his sentence to terminate. For the rôle of hypocrisy is one of the easiest for a rogue to play.

The Elmira Reformatory, which cost more than it should (being built in New York), is a somewhat pretentious building, situated on a commanding eminence. It need not be particularly described, further than to say that in point of arrangement, light, air, roominess, ventilation, etc., it conforms to modern notions. It is as little gloomy and depressing as a place of penal confinement can be. What distinguishes it, however, is that it is provided with school-rooms sufficient for the accommodation of all its inmates. And it is, as we shall see, a great educational establishment, the entrance to which is through the door of crime. The key-note of it is compulsory education. The qualifications for admission to it are that the man convicted of a State-prison offense shall be between the ages of sixteen and thirty, and that he has not been in State-prison before. In his discretion any judge in the State may send a convict of this description to Elmira. He is sentenced to the Reformatory subject to the rules of that institution, not for a definite term; but he cannot be detained there longer than the maximum for which he might have been sentenced under the law. For instance, if for burglary he might have been sentenced to State-prison for ten years, he may be held at Elmira for ten years; but he may, in the discretion of the board of managers, who are appointed by the Governor, be discharged in one year. The institution is practically managed by the superintendent. The discharges are made only by the board, who consider the man's record in the prison, and the probabilities, from all the evidence concerning him, that he will behave if set at liberty. He must have a perfect record before the board consider his case; and, besides this, the board must have confidence in his will and ability to live up to it.

Let us follow a man in this institutional life. Upon his reception he is subjected to a bath, clad in the plain suit that is

worn by the intermediate grade, and locked up in a cell for a day or two, to give him time for reflection. He is then taken before the superintendent, who makes a thorough examination of him, a complete diagnosis of his physical, mental, and moral condition. His antecedents are ascertained, the habits and occupation of his parents (and grandparents, if possible), whether they were temperate or intemperate, lived cleanly and honestly, or otherwise; what the man's home life was, if he had any, and at how early years he was turned loose upon the world; what have been his habits and associations up to the commission of the crime for which he was sentenced. An examination is then made of his physical condition, his inheritances, and not simply the actual state of his health, but his physical texture, whether fine or coarse-grained. His intellectual capacity is next ascertained, and then his acquirements. Is he bright or dull, can he read and write, and how far has his education gone? Inquiry is then made into his moral condition; has he any sensibility, any shame, any susceptibility to praise or blame? What sort of moral fiber has he? After a keen investigation of an hour or so, Mr. Brockway thoroughly knows his man; long practice and a very deep knowledge of human nature enable him to diagnose the case pretty accurately. The subject finds himself in the presence of a man who probably wins his confidence, and whom, he very soon discovers, it is of no use to try to deceive. The result of this searching examination is entered at length on the page of a big ledger; the superintendent commonly outlines at the bottom the proposed treatment; and the new-comer is instructed in the rules of the institution and what is expected of him, and what he must do in order to "get out."

He goes at first into the second, or intermediate, grade, and it depends upon himself whether he goes up to the first or down to the third. He is made to understand the minute rules of behavior that he must attend to; he is assigned to the class in school fitted to his capacity and acquirements, and he is put into the work-shop that is best adapted to his health and training. He is informed of the maximum time for which he can be detained, and that he can, by perfect conduct in these lines of effort, win his release in one year. To effect this he must gain a certain number of credit marks; and these credit marks are constantly liable to be canceled by negligence or ill-behavior. He is tested at every step by the mark system. In the shop he is marked

according to his diligence, his sharp attention to his work, his voluntariness at his labor. If he is listless, slights his work, and does not give his mind and energy to it, he not only misses credit marks, but will get discredit marks. There is no escape for him; he must work with a will. In behavior he must be perfect in obedience of the many and minute rules laid down, of which he is furnished a printed copy. In school he is required to study according to his capacity, and the marking is much the same as in a well-regulated high-school. But while he must be perfect in work and behavior, he will pass in school if he gains 75 in the scale of 100. As soon as he enters upon this course of discipline and study, an account is opened with him in another big ledger.

The process of his release is this: If he is reported perfect in three things,—labor, school, and conduct,—for each of which three marks are required each month, making nine in all, for six months, he is advanced to the first grade. If he remains perfect in the first grade for six months more, gaining nine good marks each month, he may then, at the discretion of the managers, be sent out on his parole. But he is not released on parole until a place is found for him, in which he can get employment and earn his living. If his friends cannot find a place for him, or he will not be received back into his former employment, if he had any, the institution places him by means of correspondence. On parole he must report his conduct and condition every month to the superintendent, and this report must be indorsed by some one of known character. If the paroled continues to behave himself for six months, he receives his final discharge; if he backslides, he is rearrested, brought back, and must begin over again.

The grades are three, and they mark considerable difference in privileges. The first-grade men wear a light blue uniform with a military cap. They occupy better cells than the others. They dine together in the large mess-room, at small tables, accommodating eight to twelve, and are permitted to talk freely, and to spend the noon-hour in social intercourse. Up till recently a summary of the news of the day, culled from the newspapers, was read to them once a week at table, but there is a substitute for that now. They have somewhat better food than the other grades. When they march from cells to work-shops, to dining-room, etc., they march in columns of four, and they are officered

by captains and sergeants, chosen by the superintendent from their own number. Monitors in the corridors, clerks, and officers for the next grade are chosen from them. Besides their privileges, a measure of confidence is reposed in them, but they are also under strict discipline, and are liable to be degraded for neglect of duty or failure to report delinquencies in their capacity as monitors and sub-officers. The second, or intermediate, grade wear citizens' dress, with Scotch caps. They march in columns of two, officered by members of the first grade. They take their meals in their cells, and have generally less privileges than the first grade. (The third, or convict, grade wear suits of red clothes, eat in their cells, march in the degraded prison lock-step, are officered by officers of the institution, and in various ways are made to feel the dishonor of their position and greater rigors of prison life.) It should be noted that the three grades mingle in the work-shops and in the schools, for they take places in them on other standards than that of conduct.

It will be seen from this slight sketch that it is not an easy matter to get out of the Elmira Reformatory before the expiration of the maximum sentence. Three things are required,—perfect conduct, perfect diligence, and willingness in labor,—with as good progress in school as the capacity of the man admits. A man may do well in two, but be sent into the third grade for delinquency in the third. He may work well and study well, but if he does not behave, down he goes. He may work well and behave, but if he will not study, he is sent down. Here is a three-ply strand that must be woven daily, and the task is not easy. There can be no shamming, no successful hypocrisy; the tests are too searching. Almost every new-comer tries some game; he affects religion, or this and that hypocrisy, but he is dealing with a new set of circumstances, and with men a good deal sharper than he is; and after trying his wits in vain, he generally gives it up, and “comes down to business.” Most of them run the gamut up and down the grades before they strike a pace of performance that will carry them to the parole. An examination of the conduct-ledger shows a curious inequality of behavior; the lines of performance are like the isothermal lines across our continent. When a man drops into the third grade from the first or second, it is not easy to regain his standing. But from the beginning every man, by going into the intermediate grade, is given a fair chance to rise or fall.

The most striking thing about the institution is the cultivation of individual responsibility; a man's progress depends upon himself.

The education is strictly compulsory. Such a motive was never before given men to study, for release depends upon diligence and understanding of the matter in hand. There are seven classes: the two higher classes, A and B, and a supplementary class, first and second intermediate classes, and first and second primary classes. The teaching is largely oral and by lectures, and in the higher classes printed outlines of the lectures, with questions, are distributed to the pupils. The students take notes. The examinations are monthly, and in the higher classes by written examination papers, in which a knowledge of the subject must be shown, by illustrations or otherwise, and a mere parroting or memorizing of words and phrases will not pass.

Eight hours a day labor is required; this is the State limit. There is time for study after labor hours and in the evening. In each cell is a gas-light, and books are furnished when needed. The schools are in the evening. They are taught, for the most part, by able men outside the institution, who have some compensation; but some classes are conducted by inmates. The education runs from the rudiments—reading, writing, and arithmetic—up through grammar, higher mathematics, and geography, to history, specially American and English history, politics, English literature, such knowledge of law and the government of society as is necessary to make one an intelligent citizen, and political economy. None of these things are superficially taught; they are drilled in and in. The course in English literature, for example, is as thorough as in any school, and men are studying their Shakespeare and Chaucer and other masters with keen diligence and relish. But the end of education kept in view, in history, elementary law and morals, political economy, etc., is the fitting of the student to play his part well as a citizen, and to be an orderly member of society. It is also intended to broaden his view of life and his interest in it as an orderly process, and to discipline his perverted faculties. The first attempt is to awaken the convict's mind, to arouse an interest in himself and his welfare. This is often very difficult. These are not normal minds or dispositions. By inheritance or bad practices their natures are warped. Most of them have neither the knowledge nor the will to do right. It is a mistake to suppose that crimi-

nals are naturally bright. The moral failure has affected the intellect in most cases. If they are bright, it is usually in a narrow line, the development of a ferret-like cunning and smartness. (They lack intellectual breadth as they do moral stability.) They are uncertain in all their operations; cannot long hold steadily one course; are continually falling and going to pieces. They are, in short, in an abnormal condition, and any real growth or reformation must be radical, built up from the foundations. The skill of the superintendent is shown in awakening the interest, in arousing hope and ambition, and creating a moral steadiness of will.

(The great incentive, of course, at first is the man's desire to regain his liberty.) But there are reserve forces. If a man is incorrigible and a hopeless case, the superintendent may transfer him to a State-prison. He may degrade him in rank, cut off his privileges, put him in solitary confinement, or punish him physically by a little judicious "strapping" or "spanking." Punishment is never inflicted except by the superintendent himself, never in any passion, and it almost always gives the man the little start he needed in good conduct.) It is so managed that the man owns this himself, is not brutalized or humiliated by it, and rarely (never, so far as I have heard) cherishes any resentment on account of it. (It seems to be the little reserve of physical force behind the moral that is needed in all good government.) I should say that it is a good deal more effectual than the traditional flogging by which English school-boys had the Latin and Greek grammars driven into them.)

This great industrial and educational establishment contains now a little over six hundred prisoners. On Sunday they all assemble in the chapel in the afternoon and evening for religious exercises; singing—a very good choir of a hundred voices, and some good soloists; generally a sermon in the afternoon, and either a sermon or lecture in the evening by volunteer clergymen, the best that can be induced to come. Sometimes there is a lecture or extemporary talk or reading, in place of the sermon. For special occasions the choir practices some set piece; for Christmas one of the prisoners had composed a very pretty carol, which they were practicing. Sunday morning the casuistry or practical morality class meets in the chapel. This numbers about two hundred, and is selected from all grades according to intellectual brightness and attainments. It is for the discussion

of questions relating to morals and the conduct of life. The men all take notes, for they must pass a written examination on what they hear. The conductor reads or lectures, and free but orderly discussion takes place. The first Sunday the writer was present, they were concluding the reading of Socrates. Each man had a printed syllabus of the morning's reading, with questions appended. The next Sunday would be a review preparatory to examination. Each man took notes as the reading went on. Questions were asked and opinions given, the interlocutor raising his hand and rising when recognized by the lecturer. Such absorbed attention I have seldom seen in a class-room. They are obliged to be alert. These men are not merely going through a process of training to please their relatives or to gratify their own tastes; they are putting all their energies into the business in hand to win marks to get out of prison. And this is true in all the classes. (Never was compulsory education so completely applied.) But it must be confessed, in this case, that the class had got thoroughly interested in the subject. The expression of their faces was that of aroused intelligence. Nothing seemed lost on the majority of them; the finest points made by Socrates, his searching moral distinctions, his humor, you could see were taken instantly, by the expression of their faces. The discussions and the essays in this class show a most remarkable grasp, subtlety, penetration, and power of drawing fine moral distinctions; and the vigor and fitness of the language in which they are couched are not the least notable part of the display. The previous Sunday there had been a lively discussion of the question, "Is Honesty the best Policy?" The study of the morality of Socrates led the class naturally, and by their request, to a study of the morality of Jesus and the New Testament, though not at all as a religious inquiry; and thus a result was reached in moral investigation that a clergyman, beginning at the other end, probably never could have brought this mixed and abnormal class to attempt willingly. For these men are not only criminals, warped and prejudiced against any religious teaching, but they are of all sects by inheritance, perhaps half the number Catholics, and fifty of them Hebrews. Among men that have abandoned all practice of religion it would be perfectly easy to stir up a bitter theological feeling. The lecture on the second Sunday I was present was introductory on the development of religions, preparatory to such a study of the New Testament morality as

had been given to that of Socrates. Before I quit this Sunday audience, I ought to say that, when the six hundred are assembled, it is one of the most alert and quickly responsive I have ever seen.

The education of the institution is intended to be industrial as well as scholastic. A few of those best fitted for it are taught telegraphy, and others stenography. Lessons in drawing and design are given; and I saw some very creditable designs for tiles and mantel-pieces, done by the pupils. Teaching specific industries is to be carried out more generally in future, the object being to fit the discharged to earn a living honestly, as carpenters, workers in metals, etc. The class in carpentry was very successful.

This Reformatory is a busy place; it has the aspect, as I said, of a great industrial and educational establishment. What first impresses one accustomed to visit prisons is the aroused physical life. The old convict heaviness and hopeless inertness of flesh are gone—gone with the depressing hang-dog look. The men work, move about, run up and down stairs, with alertness and vigor, and apparent enjoyment of motion. We see here the well-known criminal type of head, but the expression of face is altogether changed; stupidity and hopelessness have given place to intelligence and ambition. The change is astonishing. New life has been awakened all through the mass; and the mental and physical activity, first aroused by the desire to get out, has now in a large number of the prisoners passed into a desire to know something and to be somebody.

I was at first surprised to learn that men do not like to be sent to this institution; many of them, perhaps most of them, would prefer to go to a regular State-prison. Their whole nature revolts against the idea of discipline, of study, of reform. They like crime and an irregular life, and they hate any influences to turn them away from it. They hate the notion of behaving, as some boys out of prison hate moral restraint and religious instruction. They resent the pressure as long as they can; and some of them, of course, never do surrender, and go out unregenerate. It is admitted that a certain percentage of criminals here are incorrigible. It is believed, however, that this percentage could be greatly reduced by universal indeterminate sentences, giving a longer time to work on obdurate natures.

The Reformatory has been in operation eight years. The *morale* in it has been gradually changing for the better. At first the heroes (as in other prisons) were the biggest, sharpest, most successful rogues. The standard has changed. These men are no longer looked up to. There is a considerable *esprit de corps* of good conduct and progress, and goodness and intellect are respected. There is a strong moral influence among the inmates themselves in favor of good order and good conduct. I believe that the superintendent is almost universally regarded with affection. When I went the rounds with him, all the faces lighted up at his approach; he knew every one; he spoke to this and that one some word of encouragement, or appreciation, or warning, all in the utmost good nature and kindness; and they preferred any request they had to make frankly, but most respectfully. They are encouraged in this frankness of communication. Every day, after work hours, the superintendent receives privately any one that wants to see him, to complain of treatment, to ask advice, to state his difficulties with his study or his work, or to get sympathy; and he summons the delinquents that need warning or correction. This openness of communication, with the tact that makes use of it, is one secret of Mr. Brockway's power and success. He plays upon these six hundred natures individually, as a pianist manipulates his keys. They have absolute confidence in his justice. He never remembers an offense if it is repented of and abandoned. There are no yesterdays in the institution; only to-days and to-morrows. In every case the man is judged and classed, not by what he has done, but by what he does and will do. There is no element of revenge in the treatment.

I cannot here give all the details of this treatment; but, as an illustration of the minuteness of it, I may say that there are three sorts of adverse reports: a neglect report, on pink paper; a dereliction report, on yellow paper; and an offense report, on brown paper. These are offsets to the conduct report, in which the credits are earned. The neglect report notices the least things, in orderly conduct,—arms not folded, bed not properly made, coat not buttoned, necktie not properly tied, shoes not polished, not being at door of cell for count, and so on, for some thirty particulars,—like the discipline at West Point. The man may have in a month five “neglects” and be excused; six cancel a credit mark. Of the dereliction reports, only two are

allowed per month; three cancel a credit. On the brown blanks offenses of a more serious nature are reported; one report may cancel a credit, or degrade in rank, or call for other punishment. Each day the men receive copies of the reports filed against them. The pink notices are signals of "danger." Thus, daily, the men know which way they are going.

A noticeable thing in the treatment here, which distinguishes it from most institutional life that I have seen, is the cultivation of the habit of self-reliance. The responsibility is upon each man to "work out his own salvation," as we say. The vice of ordinary institutional life is the destruction of self-help and self-care. And even here the man's wants are provided for, whatever he does. He is under no anxiety about food and clothes, as free men are. It is proposed to perfect the system here by making a man dependent for what he gets upon what he earns. That is, he will receive such food in the institution as he can pay for by his earnings. I merely state the principle, without going into details. The object is to teach the man how to spend his money as well as how to earn it, so that he shall learn thrift and how to care for himself.

I was much struck with the excellent, it is not too much to say courteous, behavior of the men of the first grade, seated in small groups at dinner. The tables had white table-cloths. One of the number carved; they helped one another politely; they talked quietly and freely. Good manners and courtesy prevailed. It was roast-beef day; and I remarked that the fare was good. "Yes," said Mr. Brockway, "I am inclined to improve in the dietary—plenty that is good, and variety. I find that I get better results in study, work, and behavior, if I feed better." We certainly expect better results in stock-raising and training if we feed well. I give the diet one day in the first grade. Breakfast: corned-beef hash, white bread, coffee and sugar. Dinner: soup, roast beef and gravy, string beans, white bread, coffee and sugar. Supper: dried apples, white bread and butter, syrup, tea and sugar.

I noticed many interesting things in the Reformatory, but I have space only to set down one or two curious psychological observations. There seems to prevail a kind of intellectual honesty, especially in the practical morality class. This is due partly to the fact that these men have no past to bind them—have no fear of expressing their opinions, as men and women in soci-

ety are apt to have, and partly to the fact that they are encouraged to a frank expression. They are in no danger of losing caste by any opinion, and they seem to enjoy saying absolutely what they think on all moral questions that arise. I am quite sure that for various reasons, some creditable and some otherwise, the tendency here is to intellectual honesty. I asked the superintendent what relation this had to moral honesty; whether men cultivating this attitude as to abstract questions would be less likely to lie; and he promised to institute some inquiries and tests on this point.

Another question was this: What is the relation of intellectual ability as shown by the position in the school classes, to standing as shown by the grades? In other words, what is the relation of mental activity and progress to conduct? This is one of the most important inquiries in regard to a reformatory, for the charge is constantly made that education only sharpens criminals, and does not help conduct. The reply is in the following table, which is to me most interesting and encouraging:

ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL POPULATION, BY GRADES.

CLASS.	NUMBER OF MEN IN CLASS.			PERCENTAGE.		
	1st Grade.	2d Grade.	3d Grade.	1st Grade.	2d Grade.	3d Grade.
A.	51	31	4	59.3	36	4.7
B.	37	36	11	44	42.9	13.1
Supplementary Class.....	30	18	6	55.6	33.3	11.1
I ¹	40	36	14	44.4	40	15.6
I ²	30	58	22	27.3	52.7	20
P ¹	12	58	17	13.8	66.7	19.5
P ²	5	33	15	9.4	62.3	28.3
Excused	14	5	1	70	25	5

I was led to make this inquiry because I saw in the morality class men of all grades. In this table it will be noticed that in the highest class, A, the percentage of the first-grade men is 59.3, of the second grade, 36, of the third grade, only 4.7. As we pass down in the school classes, the proportions keep changing, until we reach the lowest primary, in which there is only a per-

centage of 9.4 in the first grade, but 62.3 in the second grade, and 28.3 in the third grade. The first grade numbers now about two hundred, and of course contains all the men on the high road to be paroled. The middle grade is most numerous, for all are placed there on entering, and men are constantly passing through it, up or down. The third grade is the smallest.

The large clerical labor is done by the inmates. They set the type and run the hand-press that is kept busy printing the daily reports, the syllabuses for school, etc. The institution publishes also a weekly newspaper, distributed Sunday morning, called "The Summary." It is a small neat sheet of two leaves. A prisoner makes for it a complete condensed summary of the news of the week, excluding all scandal and reports of crime. It contains, besides, local prison news, often letters or extracts from letters of released and paroled men ("graduates"), perhaps a little fun, and brief editorials by the superintendent, who is the editor. It is about the only thoroughly clean family newspaper I know; certainly, there are few journals published outside that are fit to circulate inside this prison. It needs a good world to stand some of our newspapers; a prison can not.

In this simple presentation of what I saw at Elmira lies the answer to the question, whether we can probably better our present treatment of criminals. It remains to add the statistical results of eight years of experiment. I should say, inferentially, that no matter what a man's motive may be in submitting to the hard threefold discipline of this institution, with whatever hypocrisy he might behave well, study hard, and work industriously, some years of such discipline must affect his character and affect it radically; in many cases working a regeneration of his whole moral nature and purpose in life. (I do not see how he can be in the habit of well-doing in these three ways for a long time and not be radically changed. In fact, the reports show that eighty per cent. of the men going out from here are reformed.) That is to say, they do not again fall under the law; it is not supposed that they become saints, but they are fairly law-abiding, do not commit felonies; as somebody wittily said, the object of the institution is to teach men to steal legally.) The men are closely watched for six months after they go out, and a general run is kept of many afterward. Some, of course, are discharged because they have served the maximum time, not because they are fit to go. In many cases, where a man would probably prefer an

honest life, he is so morally debilitated by inheritance and indulgence, that it takes a long time to build up in him enough moral stamina to carry him along safely in life; and the time of detention is often too short. This result—eighty per cent. put in a better way—is astonishing, when we remember that of those ordinarily discharged from State-prisons, sixty per cent. have to be caught and imprisoned again. Certainly that is not a paying thing for the State.

As to economy, I notice by the reports that the Elmira Reformatory does not pay. Its inmates earn by labor from \$60,000 to \$75,000 a year, but the State has to appropriate annually about \$30,000 to carry it on. It is money well spent; for it would cost the State in cash a good deal more than \$30,000 a year to catch, try, and send to prison those who would repeat felonies on being discharged, if these men followed the State-prison rule. And this does not take into account the deprecations they would commit, the injury to individuals, their bad moral influence, nor the cost of police to catch them.

With such results, the Elmira Reformatory is worthy of the most thoughtful attention of tax-payers, as well as of sociologists.

CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.

THE LAW'S DELAY.

BEFORE and since Hamlet's soliloquy was written, the law's delay has been a by-word and reproach, a source of anxiety and unhappiness, the cause of mental distress and financial disaster, the object of poetic contempt, an actual impediment to the advance of civilization, and an obstruction to the development of the science of law. Rules of law and statutes should accord with common sense, agree with logical reasoning, avoid absurd consequents, and result, when put in practice, in rapid but not hasty or ill-considered settlement of forensic disputes.

The principal source of the law's delay is the law's defects, originating immediately in the venality, neglect, or incapacity of legislators, which springs from their election by the ignorance, corruption, or partisanship of a class of suffragists who too often hold the balance of power in elections. How to reach the tap-root of the evil is the deep and vital question to this country. As the suffrage is the original, ultimate, irresistible power on which the general and State governments rest and their perpetuity depends, nothing else can be so important as the purity and intelligence of the ballot; yet the ballot is in the hands of some who are wholly ignorant of its object and its power; of others who sell it under a thin veil in open market to the highest bidder; and of a much larger number who use it to gratify passionate and unreasoning partisanship, the meaning of whose banner-cry is, "For the offices we are patriots."

There are remedies for this public malady, but to adopt and administer them requires patience, courage, and wisdom. The voter has the jewel of modern, and therefore American, civil liberty in his hands, and he too often casts it in the dust. He is invested with a unit of the only arbitrary power in the government, but regards it with thoughtless indifference, or exercises it with reckless passion. The only certain and substantial relief

from this condition lies in the education of the people, and the development of the free and enlightening spirit of commerce, which is the best of educators, by improving and connecting, when possible, our great natural water-ways, and opening to us the markets and patronage of the world. The dense illiteracy in many parts of the United States, shown by the last census, is an argument in behalf of public education that no statesman who loves humanity can with sound reason oppose. The man who is too indolent or too perverse to avail himself of the opportunities to learn to read and write that are offered in this country, is undeserving of the right to exercise the important function of a voter. Yet public men, either deficient in statesmanship, or dominated by demagogism, will not openly and bravely advocate an educational qualification, for fear of being charged with possessing tendencies to property qualification, although it would indicate no such thing, but clearly the reverse. For if the people become educated, property aristocracy, whose successes have been universally the result of superior intelligence, could never rule them, and they would not consent to other qualifications of suffrage than those based upon equality and composed of elements common to all. If a law were enacted by each State and by Congress that three years from its passage no person who could not read should vote, and four years after its adoption he should not be qualified to vote if he could not write, there would, within that probationary time, be more real advance in common education than this country has seen in half a century. The American sovereign would discontinue mispending his precious hours at least long enough to learn to read and write. The demagogues would rant a little, and some lazy fellows would yawn against the tyrants who, while breaking the shackles of their ignorance, deprive them of the personal freedom of illiteracy; but the bright dawn of intelligence, under such laws, would soon show the folly and weakness of the opposition. With the people educated in letters, and in the laws of trade and commerce, self-interest, observation, and intelligence would demand better statesmanship and more useful and practical legislation. As a consequence, the people would select wiser law-makers, and the primal causes of the law's delay would gradually disappear.

Passing from the blessings we have not to the curses we endure, it is to be noted that the legislators of the present

day are guilty of two great sins, among many less, in law-making. First, they pass laws in a hurry, by cabal and cavil, with a little meritorious debate, in order to rush home to their constituents, (in search of the politician's balm in Gilead, the approval of the people, whose business they have transacted in the briefest time, on the least information, and with the smallest alleged expense; and in most instances it will cost double the labor, time, and expense to undo the mischief. Second, through selfishness, the generalization of the law is overlooked or disregarded, and special or local legislation is often made the exclusive subject of their attention. Much of this condition of things results from the interference and misdemeanors of the lobby, which in the name of the right of petition obstructs the enactment of equal and uniform laws, and retards the great measures of legislative reform.

Lobbying should be made the object of incessant war and corrective enactment, until it is driven from legislative halls. Its exit would proclaim the inflow of fresh thought, calm deliberation, and renewed legislative vigor, and the end of rife reported corruption that shames the country, alarms the people, and shakes public confidence. (Strike the gyves of the lobby from the limbs of the legislatures,) purify their precincts, and another cause of the law's delay would become inconspicuous and finally cease to annoy the country. This view needs no further specification, and from the defective qualifications of voters to select law-makers, and the noxious influence of the lobby, we may descend to a brood of minor evils whose influence is in the same direction.

It is conceded by the well-informed that we have progressed painfully and but little in the true development of civil government; yet, as to theory, America is in advance of the world. The trouble is not in our form of government, which is by far the strongest and best adapted to the ends of civil order and civil liberty; and the deficiency in administration, aside from bad law-givers, consists mainly in the lack of business order in public affairs. The existence of passion, favoritism, nepotism, and subjection to the behests of party, instead of love of country, thoughtfulness, and systematic business principles in the administration of government, with too much esotericism in its conduct, gives posts of honor to servants that impede, and retains officials that resist reform and accuracy in the civil

service of the country. They forget they are chosen to be about their country's business, in which every citizen has an interest. Thus the want of business capacity and fidelity to the people's trust furnishes many causes for the law's delay, and some for its death. Red tape, or useless technical forms, in judiciary and executive, which have long since done their appointed work and should be remembered only as marks on the way of the law's progress, ought to be dispensed with, and the simple methods of truth and justice adopted.

These general notions, which are more than merely "sugared suppositions," relate particularly to the legislative and executive branches of government, and it is hoped they will dispel in part the popular idea that the law's delay is entirely attributable to the courts. While it is not true that the cause of delay in the administration of justice is to be found, either at all times or more potent, in the courts, yet tardiness in judges and faults in judicial administration do exist. An indolent judge, or one with such shallow impressions of the responsibility of his station as cause him to pass lightly through the performance of his duties, is too often found. The relief furnished by the States lies in the election, at the next regular poll, of somebody else in his place; that by the general government in removal, if his derelictions rise to the dignity of misbehavior, high crime, or misdemeanor. The judiciary is generally composed of the best material the bar affords, but in many instances this is not the case. The cause of the misfortune is in the looseness of the elective system. To the election of judges by the people there is, to my mind, no valid objection; for if vote-selling can be punished and repressed, and suffrage elevated, respected, and understood, the elective system, where the voice of the largest constituency can be invoked, will secure as good judges as any other that can be devised in a republic. Experience teaches that when the whole body of people in a State participate in the election of judges or other officers, better material is presented for their choice than where the election is confined to smaller geographical limits or fewer voters. The extent of country and diversity of interests, character, and attainments of voters repress the pretentious and undeserving, and the result is, that larger constituencies are generally blessed with a higher intellectual and moral grade of officials. All appellate and circuit judges should be elected by the voters of the State at large; and to insure freedom from

improper influences, arising from the elective system, circuit judges ought to be assigned by the court of highest jurisdiction to districts in which they do not reside. These regulations, it is believed, would sufficiently remove the judges from the bane of political exactions, yet retain the feature of popular elections through which the people control their government. Thus incompetency, so fruitful of delays when it roots itself in the bench, would be diminished, if not extirpated.

Next to the importance of pure and enlightened judges are honest and intelligent jurors. The determination of the facts in criminal and civil trials can never be confided to a better tribunal than the jury, for whose perpetuation the soundest arguments have again and again been repeated. But, like many of the rules and institutions of the common law, the mode of selecting jurors and finding verdicts can, in the light of civilization, be improved. In the first place, no person should be qualified to serve on juries unless moral, sober, intelligent, able to read and write, and possessed of some knowledge of arithmetic. Yet the writer has seen ensconced among "the apostolic twelve," in ambushed ignorance, men who did not know a letter of the alphabet. Juries perform duties that require intelligence and moral courage. The difficult question is, how to select jurors. There are serious objections to the selection by commissioners or sheriffs, for they usually pick from their own church or political party. The best practicable method of securing unbiased and intelligent jurors, is to require the judge, at each term, with the aid of four sworn commissioners taken equally from the political parties, to select the grand and petit jurors himself for the succeeding session, taking an equal number as may be from the different subdivisions of the county, and from the various political parties, without regard to religious tenets. The list should be sealed and delivered to the clerk of the court, and the names of the jurors kept a sworn secret by judge, commissioners, and clerk, until only time is left for breaking the seal and summoning them for the term they are to serve. Any attempt to corrupt or prejudice jurors should be so punished as to render the offender odious; and a corrupt verdict should disqualify the juror engaged in it from serving on juries, voting, or holding office. Let the dangerous method of summoning bystanders to fill vacancies in the panel be abandoned,—the returned list being made large enough to supply the demand,—because it

encourages the professional juror, and furnishes an unmastered opportunity for packing juries. If such precautionary measures as these were adopted, fewer hung juries, excessive verdicts, and verdicts contrary to law and evidence would be found. Badly informed, partisan, wrong-headed, and careless jurors have, in my experience, consumed more time by their blunders and stubbornness than any other part of the machinery of justice. The requirement of a unanimous verdict is prolific of delay. Often one ignorant, froward, perverse, or corrupt juror will hang a jury without reason, unmindful of the contempt and ridicule that his position deserves. This should not occur in the trial of civil actions; for new trials, accumulating costs, constant destruction or deterioration of the property in controversy, consumption of time, and exasperation of litigants, outweigh vastly the importance of a unanimous verdict, which operates, in most cases, as a preclusion of the better judgments of ten-twelfths of the jury, for the whims, speculation, or something worse of one or two negatives. On the first trial, two jurors ought not to be allowed to hang the jury, and after that a majority verdict should be accepted. This rule would not put justice to hazard, for the court stands, like the reserve of an army, to protect it from disaster; ready to arrest the judgment or set aside the verdict when in conflict with law, evidence, or substantial justice. Its adoption would save one-fourth of the time of *nisi prius* courts, which is now consumed by delays produced by hung juries. To reach the reforms suggested, it is not necessary, nor would they tend, to abolish election of judges by the people or selection of juries from the people. Both are essential to their rights, and must be preserved by the States as the offspring of liberty secured to us by the genius of democratic government.

Here the growing evil of interference, by the mob spirit, with the administration of justice, may be mentioned. The presence of its hideous form, shadowing courts and juries with awe, sends a shudder to the heart of every patriot, and demands the profound consideration of all men who respect law or love peace. It is an undeniable fact that mobs form and notify the courts, in a manner never proven, of their existence; and irregular or illegal convictions often follow, which have to be annulled on review, or the law is thrown into confusion. They sometimes appear on the very floor of the court-room,

under pretense of mere on-lookers, but ready at each development of evidence tending to justify their passion to applaud, and if the spirit of mobocracy has been lashed into fury by communistic speeches and publications, to burst forth with deafening yells ungoverned or uncontrollable by the courts and officers. Such criminal obstruction of public justice and desecration of the uses of courts pass by with feeble or no effort to punish the perpetrators, and there is no law sufficient to bring them to the bar to answer for this gravest of crimes. And the same mob that thus prevent a fair and legal trial distribute themselves back into the community to denounce courts, threaten jurors, and breed discontent over the law's delay when the result of their wild and ignorant work is undone by calm, intelligent, and impartial courts. No one can estimate the amount of judicial work that mobs and the mob spirit compel the courts to do over and over again. Here is a detestable evil for political philosophers to examine and expose, for the law-abiding citizen to encounter, and the bravery of the country to destroy, before it enshrouds us in the darkness of communism.

Among many other causes of the law's delay is the great bulk and conflict of laws. The vast number of volumes of reports, in which law and *dicta* are found in an almost indistinguishable mass, render it a physical impossibility for the judges to examine all of them on every question, and also decide the cases assigned to them or brought in their courts, without dispensing with the maximized right of every citizen under the constitution to a speedy and public trial. Hence the codification of American law is a growing and urgent necessity that cannot be withstood much longer.

The law's delay begins and ends with the people. Its intermediate forces and remedies of control have been named in part, but of course not elaborated. They are looped in every nook and cranny of the political edifice in which we live, and within whose walls governments within a government are at work solving the question whether man is capable of governing himself. The labor of origination, making possible a sound and just government, was done when its ichnography was drawn and its foundations laid. Our duty and service point us to adjustment, correction, method, and perfection in the details of a faultless plan of government, whose founders "builded better than they knew."

THOMAS F. HARGIS.

FREE THOUGHT IN AMERICA.

THERE is a notion even in refined circles in America that the influence of a man like Colonel Robert Ingersoll may be an influence for good. I altogether fail to see it. While doing full justice to the honesty, the courage, and the good humor of this remarkable orator, I am convinced that he is precisely the sort of teacher—I had almost written devil's advocate—to whom Americans should just now shut their ears. Free thought should be distinguished from the offenses against common intelligence committed by a Philistine of the Philistines. Ingersoll enters the temples of religion with his hat on one side, a cigar in his mouth, and a jest upon his lips. No matter who the god may be,—Vishnu, Buddha, Apollo, or Jesus,—he is ready to tackle him in his own peculiar vocabulary. His philosophy may be summed up in the words of Burns:

“To keep a cozy fireside clean
For weans and wife—
That's the true pathos and sublime
O' human life!”

This philosophy is all very well in its way, just as well as eating and drinking, dancing, marrying and giving in marriage, and infant-dandling; but if it were all-sufficient, George the Third would have been a great king, and Voltaire would have been a great poet. To take Colonel Ingersoll seriously, of course, would be like asking for reverence from Mark Twain. He represents the natural reaction of American Bohemianism against the Puritanism of Boston and the overstrained transcendentalism of Brook Farm. But he is just the sort of person of whom America does not stand in need. The predominant vices of America, especially as represented by its great cities, are its irreverence, its recklessness, its impatience—in one

word, its materialism. A nation in which the artistic sense is almost dead, which is practically without a literature, which is impatient of all sanctions and indifferent to all religions, which is corrupt from the highest pinnacle of its public life down to the lowest depth of its primalism, which is at once thin-skin'd under criticism and aggressive to criticise, which worships material forces in every shape and form, which despises conventional conditions, yet is slavish to ignoble fashions, which, too hasty to think for itself, takes recklessly at second-hand any old- or new-clothes philosophy that may be imported from Europe, yet, while wearing the raiment openly, mocks and ridicules the civilization that wove the fabric—such a nation, I think, might be spared the spectacle of an elderly gentleman in modern costume trampling on the lotus, the rose, and the lily in the gardens of the gods. The exhibition can do no good; it may do no little harm. If the science of mythology did not exist, if the old gods or the new had any bloody altars left, if the tongue of free thought had not been loosened once and forever, it might be another matter; but the danger now is, not that men may believe too much, but that they may believe too little; that in due time skepticism, which has demolished all religions and fatally discredited the divine religion of poetry itself, may turn the temple of mystery into a bear-garden or a beer-garden, exchange the language of literature for the argot of the cheap press, and Americanize even the sentiment of humanity. "I beg to remind honorable gentlemen," said Benjamin Disraeli, on a memorable occasion, "that we owe much to the Jews." I beg to remind the Colonel Ingersolls and Mark Twains of this continent that we owe much to the gods, without whom, when all is said and done,

"The world would smell like what it is—a tomb!"

But for them, Europe would have been Americanized long ago; but for them, Europe would have arrived centuries since at the blessed era of presidential elections, colossal public swindles, races for money-bags, the torturing rack of the interviewer, and the inquisition of the newspaper; but for them, but for the divine tyrants and instructors of mankind, malignant or benignant, terrible or beautiful, the pessimism of Schopenhauer and Leopardi might have been antedated a thousand years. For my

own part, I should prefer even to accept hell with John Calvin, rather than to eat cakes, drink ale, and munch hot ginger with Colonel Ingersoll. He is the boy in the gallery, cracking nuts and making precocious comments during the performance of the tragedy of life; blind to the splendor of the scenery, deaf to the beauty of the dialogue, indifferent to the pathetic or tragic solicitations of the players; seeing in Christ or Buddha or Jehovah only a leading man spouting platitudes, and indifferently dressed for the part he is playing. A great mythus is to him a great "lie," nothing more; a great poetical theology is only an invention of the arch-enemy. Hugely does he enjoy the joke of the garden of Eden or the tree of Igdrassil; clearly does he perceive, having hung round the stage-door of the world, that the goddesses are only ballet-girls, exhibiting their nudity for so much a night. For him Æschylus has no terror, Sophocles no charm, the author of the Book of Job no pathos; everything is leather-and-prunella, except the performance of Harlequin.

That such a person should have a large following, among a generation so much of his way of thinking, is no matter for surprise; a few centuries ago it might have been a cause for joy; but in the nineteenth century it is truly sad, as showing how little science has done, after all, to elevate the intellectual condition of the masses. The same uninstructed influence that is thus brought to bear upon religion would speedily be fatal, and already, as I have suggested, threatens to be fatal to all poetry, all true literature, all great art, and, in the long run, all speculative science. Colonel Ingersoll is very fond of proclaiming his admiration for the great scientific teachers of the age; but in reality he is as far away in spirit from the thought of Darwin as from the vision of Shakespeare, as obtuse to the scientific problems as to the pathetic poetic fallacy. Religion is the grave, elder daughter of Poetry, and to understand religious questions a man must have the heart of a poet. Science, too, is the daughter of Poetry; indeed, her youngest born; while calmer and colder than her mother, she has the same far-away, wrapt look into the heaven of heavens; and her teaching is for poetic hearts also, not for those who confound her with her sordid and hardworking handmaid, Invention. Science ranges the universe, reaches the farthest suns, reaches the farthest cloud confines, and cries honestly and loudly, "Thus far—no farther—here I pause"; and then even she begins to dream. Invention

squats on the ground, sets her little water-wheel, lights her little lamp, pieces her mechanical puzzles, does homely work, delightful and useful to everybody. But Invention-worship is fetish-worship, and Colonel Ingersoll is a fetish-worshiper—that is to say, an individual exactly at the savage stage where neither religion nor science begins. To go to him for religious guidance, is like asking a native of the kingdom of Dahomey to favor us with his ideas on Free-will, the Incarnation, the philosophy of Plato, the art of Raphael, the poetry of Æschylus, the music of Beethoven, and the positive philosophy of Comte or Spencer.

The Christian stage, whatever objection we may take to it, is higher than the fetish-stage, and the lowest form of anthropomorphism is infinitely superior to totem-worship. The mass of mankind do not need to be told that it is well to fill their bellies, to love their children, to live amicably with one another, to accept no guidance but their own very questionable “common-sense”; all that is taught to them of right and of necessity by the conditions of that period of evolution which they have already attained. What they require to learn is, that life necessitates divine sanctions as well as cheery conditions; that the gods are not dead, but living, imperishable ideals fashioned by the sublimest and supremest conceptions of mankind; that the truth of any religion lies not in its dogma, but in its moral beauty or poetical imperishability, because just so far as it is beautiful is it fundamentally and actually true; that our sharpest hours of suffering contain our clearest moments of insight; and that human love and sympathy are born, not of common junketing, but of common despair and sorrow. The gospel of hot ginger, as preached by Colonel Ingersoll, would soon make of New York another Sodom. Fortunately, such a man as Octavius Frothingham is hard by to vindicate the poetry of religion against the champions of cakes and ale, and to prove that free thought, even in America, does not necessarily imply free permission to outrage your neighbor’s most sacred convictions.

Mr. Frothingham is well known to most readers of this REVIEW as one of the most brilliant and enlightened apostles of free thought or radical religion in America. Until quite lately, I believe, he preached every Sunday in New York; with the field of his present labors I am unacquainted; but my knowledge of him is altogether based on his writings and on

Mr. Stedman's little monograph — one of those admirably lucid bits of crystallization for which the writer is distinguished. Of course, a man educated like myself in the school of English Jacobinism finds in Mr. Frothingham a not very novel type of thinker, uttering sentiments with which the world of free thought has long been familiar; but the author of "Transcendentalism in New England" has a distinct individuality, often perfervid, occasionally convincing, and never tiresome. His style is admirable, even where his matter is questionable, as it now and then is; and, on the whole, America is to be congratulated on the privilege of listening to such a man. But does America listen to him? It would very much astonish me to hear that it did. His faith is far too filmy, his foothold much too unsteady, to carry conviction to the hearts of a hasty generation. His tolerance to all religions, all opinions, all orthodoxies and heresies, is beautiful and welcome, but his infinite patience lacks, to my mind, the shaping power of conviction. He has set his soul free of every bond and shackle, but he leaves it to beat the empty air. With all this, it must be clearly understood that his written works have the highest of all literary merits, that of directly stimulating thought in the reader; they are full of grave, wise, tender, even profound things, expressed in perfect language; they are reverent to the very extremes of their gentle audacity; and there can be no doubt whatever that they have had a deeply beneficent influence whenever and wherever they have been studied. But the fatal spirit of a self-destructive latitudinarianism, which has paralyzed the will of every transcendentalist from Hegel downward, possesses Mr. Frothingham also. His message to men carries no conviction, for it has neither the hate of hate nor the love of love; it lacks the fertilizing energy and superb bigotry of a logical belief.

Mr. Frothingham, for example, utterly repudiates anthropomorphism. The universe, in his conception, is as it was to Springer, as it has been to every true transcendentalist, a system of universal law, entirely divorced from personality. From one point of view, this conception is rational and impregnable; from another, it is inexpedient, not to say trivial. No sane man doubts the profundity of the current ideas on which Mr. Frothingham sails so cheerfully; of the "stream of tendency" and the "power beyond ourselves which works for righteousness"; but many men doubt, as I do, the scientific necessity, or

the mental possibility, of divorcing the idea of God from the idea of personality. The poetical image of the magnified non-natural man at least hits the mark better than the preposterous images of "streams" and "tendencies" and impersonal working "powers" beyond humanity. Very instructive it is to observe, in this connection, how the apostle of blind law, taken off his guard, appropriates the anthropomorphic metaphors :

"The Radical has no definition ; he does not venture on a written definition. He will not define or confine the infinite. He has no interpretation which he can accept or impose upon anybody else ; but the substance of the idea he holds in a manner so transcendental, grand, vast, and beautiful that the others dwarf themselves into utter insignificance. The Hebrew Jehovah seems to him a fanciful and fantastical idea ; the Christian's triune deity is limited ; and the theist's conception of the personal God is bounded. The Radical believes in the universal law, omnipotent, omnipresent, sweeping through the world, administering the least things, controlling the greatest, holding close relations between you and me, holding in the hollow of its hand all the affairs of all the nations of the globe. This idea of law — material, intellectual, spiritual — comprehends everything, all the domain of reason, all the domain of hope, so vast that no faith can scale its heights, so tender that one can lie like a child on its bosom, so mighty and majestic that nobody need be afraid that it cannot overcome every obstacle in the way of the highest and noblest advance." ("The Mission of the Radical Preacher," by O. B. Frothingham.)

Which, after all, is the most illogical and fantastic, the idea of a Hebrew Jehovah, or of a Christian triune deity, or the picture of a universal law that "administers" and "controls," holds affairs in "the hollow of its hand," and is so "tender that one can lie like a child on its bosom" ? Every one admits that God, in the absolute, is unknowable and inconceivable ; but the consensus of human experience has established that the only image that can represent his relation to conditioned creatures is the human or anthropomorphic one, though it has made modern scientists so angry. After all, is not the rejection of the popular image made in the most "crass" spirit of transcendentalism ? Where is the wisdom of a criticism that would endow blind law with "hands" and a "bosom," and in the same breath object to the terminology of the Lord's Prayer ?

Elsewhere in the same book from which I have quoted, Mr. Frothingham's language becomes less contradictory, but even more extraordinary — so extraordinary, indeed, that, if it came from any other pen, one might presume that the writer had no

spiritual claim to speak *in cathedra* on religious topics at all. In proclaiming his revolt from the Christian religion, and his rejection of the Christian idea, he admits, regretfully, that the Christian faith still prevails, that it keeps alive the potent activities that sustain the life of Christendom. Nevertheless, he adds, "it is a superstition; it is not grounded on history, on knowledge, on science, on fact, but it is a fancy, an imagination, a tradition"; and now, in the natural course of things, it is dissolving away before the breath of science. People, he naïvely affirms, reject it in the great centers of activity—in Paris, in Berlin, in London, in New York! Among other reasons for the long permanence of this false faith, and its still surviving power, he gives the following: 1. The exceeding antiquity of the system; 2. The hindrances so long thrown in the way of Biblical criticism; 3. *Mirabile dictu*, the persistence with which the faith is taught. The last reason is a superb *non sequitur*; it is simply affirming that the zeal with which an army fights its battles is in direct ratio to the weakness of its cause. But, not content with so wonderful an affirmation, Mr. Frothingham goes on to arraign Christianity because it is the "religion of sorrow." He quotes both Jesus and Paul in illustration of his statement. Then he adds, not without eloquence:

"Through the chinks we can see the light. The condition of man becomes more comfortable, more easy; the hope of man is more visible; the endeavor of man is more often crowned with success; the attempt to solve the darkest life-problems is not so desperate as it was. The reformer meets with fewer rebuffs; the philanthropist does not despair as he did. The light is dawning. The great teachers of knowledge multiply, bear their burdens more and more steadily; the traditions of truth and knowledge are becoming established in the intellectual world. It is so; and those of us who have caught a vision of the better times coming through reason, through knowledge, through manly and womanly endeavor, have caught a sight of a Christendom passing away, of a religion of sorrow declining, of a gospel preached for the poor no longer useful to a world that is mastering its own problems of poverty and lifting itself out of disabling misery into wealth without angelic assistance. This is our consolation; and while we admit, clearly and frankly, the real power of the popular faith, we also see the pillars on which a new faith rests, which shall be a faith not of sorrow, but of joy." ("The Rising and the Setting Faith, and other Discourses," by O. B. Frothingham.)

Is it necessary to demolish this cumbrous snow-heap of misconception, to point out the fallacy that confuses the Christian

sentiment with the utilitarian philosophy of loaves and fishes? If all that Jesus meant was that the poor should become the rich in another world, and the suffering become the joyful; if the kernel of his teaching was merely, as narrow logicians have suggested, the notion that bad luck here would of necessity insure a bonus elsewhere, Christianity would stand but a poor chance at the hands of either the higher or the lower criticism. What Jesus did teach, or what we have learned at least by the divine ideal that he afforded, was, and is, that worldly knowledge, worldly prosperity, worldly success and happiness, are poor things compared with the heaven of sin vanquished, the other world of supreme love and insight. If the triumph of the political economist were quite secure; if the earth were equally divided among men according to some such scheme as that of Henry George; if there were no work-houses in it, and no prisons, the poor would still inherit the kingdom of heaven; for the true poor of the Christian idea are those who despise ignoble prizes, who are indifferent to vain knowledge, who have found in the certainty of human failure the sublimity of sympathetic love and insight. It must be borne in mind, too, that Jesus could sit down with the rich man as well as the poor, when the rich man was poor "in spirit." To refute Mr. Frothingham here would be to refute the whole argument of utilitarianism, which has already been done, or attempted, and is of course far beyond the scope of this paper; nor am I in any way holding a brief for the Christian religion, or speaking from the point of view of the orthodox believer. But let us have fair play on both sides, nor attempt to answer the proposition that one may be multiplied into three by an assertion that two and two are four. Elsewhere Mr. Frothingham clearly expresses his conviction that perfect happiness is simply impossible under mundane conditions, and that mere knowledge and power may be, and generally are, in the nature of vanity. As long as these things are true, there is room in our dialectics for the Christian argument that the compensations of a higher and nobler life are precisely what is needed for the settlement of the complex human problem. It is so melancholy to find a thinker like Mr. Frothingham, among Americans, of all people in the world, arguing that there is to be a millennium of inexhaustible dry goods and of physical prosperity, compared with which the coming of the Messiah would be but an ineffective performance.

Mr. Frothingham writes very eloquently on evolution; accepts all its splendid suggestions, both in the material and in the moral world; shows clearly that cause follows effect in the social as well as the physical sphere, and that out of evil must come evil, and out of good must issue good. He accepts, if I understand him rightly, the Comtist notion of the perfectibility of humanity, and infinitely prefers the *Grand Être*, or divine administration of the genius of man, to either Jehovah or Jesus, Buddha or Balder. He does not, however, imitate Colonel Ingersoll in treating any of these gods with disrespect, but he nevertheless measures them with his free-thought foot-rule, and finds them, at the best, only a cubit high. What, after all, is this *Grand Être* of which we hear so much? Not the Son of Man transubstantiated, but the Spirit of Man glorified; not the Paraclete, the Redeemer, or the Divine Ideal, but the vague, impersonal, stupendous, and overpowering outcome of all human intelligence, effort, suffering, limitless struggle, and despair. His other names are Science, Knowledge, Intellectual Victory, Moral Supremacy; his other name will be Happiness, or *Summum Bonum*, by and by. Well, when our *Grand Être* looks forward, what will be his prospect? A reign of indefinite but not endless length, cut short inevitably, sooner or later, by the cataclysm of our solar system. In the far future, then, inevitable Death. When he looks backward, what must be his retrospect? Far away as the first beginnings of life he traces the progression from pain to pain, marks the graves of the generations, from the tomb of the pterodactyl in the chalk to the sepulchre of Franklin among the Arctic snows. Far backward, then, Death too; æons of agony, vistas of the types that have perished to fashion the *Grand Être* for his short ecstatic reign. Science may smile at the thought of compensation; but surely the *Grand Être*, with his supreme potentialities of pity, must say to himself, "Alas and alas! though my children now rejoice like motes in the sunbeam, what of those who have been destroyed, tortured, and obliterated in the long darkness that preceded this splendid dawn of day?" And so, after all, the *Grand Être*, with all his good intentions, finds his poor feet slipping and sinking in the arid sands of pessimism, and the only gospel left for his worshipers to preach will be the old weary gospel of the materialist, "Eat, drink, and be happy, for to-morrow we die!"

But to do Mr. Frothingham justice, he is not a pessimist. In one of the very finest of his essays, the sermon on "Immortality," a piece of writing that can be read and re-read for its marvelous clearness of exposition and its consummate beauty of expression, he echoes, though somewhat half-heartedly, the great hope of the human race for an individual existence after death. But in scrutinizing his argument closely, we perceive that, while he welcomes with enthusiasm the conception of the *Grand Être*, and states that chimerical being's case with splendid eloquence, he is lost in amazement that humanity ever contained that other idea of a personal immortality; can see no rational excuse for it; fears, indeed, that it is altogether too shadowy to be at all tangible. All he can venture to say in plea for it is that its very audacity favors it, its very wildness is its guarantee. Here, again, we get frank confession, but bad logic. How a faith can be vindicated by its own sheer improbability, how a belief may be true because it goes in the teeth of all experience, I leave for the transcendentalists of free thought to decide. I believe the evolutionists have clearly explained how the notion of life after death "developed" easily out of the first superstitions of the human race, and how its permanence in all communities and most individuals proceeds from the permanence of other instincts seemingly imperishable. But where I join issue with Mr. Frothingham is at the one point where issue is possible — that the idea of immortality is irrational and opposed to common experience; for if it were so, there can be no doubt that it would have been "obliterated" long ago in the process of evolution. It is not because it is preposterous, but because it is probable, that it has kept its strenuous hold on the hearts of mankind. Jesus, in his supreme practical wisdom, in his relentless logic, perceived this fully, perceived that this very idea was the natural, indeed the only, escape from between the horrors of our mundane dilemma. And forthwith (for I hold that this man, whatever his credentials, was scientific or nothing) he proceeded to verification. Opening the human heart, he found that it demanded ampler life on account of the infinite possibilities of love without it. Examining the social organism, he saw that its structure was welded together by the blood of human martyrdom, that every hope and every aspiration within it were based upon the certainty that consciousness, and all its consequent affections, must be permanent, and therefore immaterial. The law of growth was

absolute, the indestructibility of force was sure, and the permanence of force was the certainty of the soul. As for his creed being one of sorrow, that is not strictly true; it is the world that is sorrowful, not the creed that redeems it, which, after all, has never until now had a fair trial. Christianity in its essence, apart from its miraculous pretensions, is, like the mind of its founder, strictly simple and scientific. It may not be feasible, we may be altogether unable to believe it, its history is a long chapter of horrors and enormities, and for some inscrutable reason its priests and paid professors have almost invariably been the enemies of human progress; but, compared with any other creed that has been offered in God's name to men, it has the solitary merit of logical truth and common-sense. If we admit its fundamental proposition, that spiritual personality is permanent, and is at the same time directly conditioned by unselfish love and brotherhood, all the mystery and pain, all the struggle of the ages, becomes clear. Moral salvation, being independent of dogma or of worldly happiness, was as possible for the first half-savage human product as it is possible now for the highest and the meanest of mankind. Knowledge is nothing, power is nothing, material success is nothing; the insight of love is everything, and looks right up into the heaven of heavens, crying, "Oh, grave, where is thy victory? Oh, death, where is thy sting?"

In saying so much, perhaps, concerning one or two points of Mr. Frothingham's teaching, I may seem to be carping at what I came to praise. Let me repeat, then, that the said teaching is in the main as wise as it is beneficent, as beautiful as it is just. For every flower that grows in the gardens of the gods, Mr. Frothingham has reverent admiration; he is Pharisaic to no creed, but tolerant toward all. With his faith in the teaching of science I can find no fault, except that it blinds him now and then to the subtler issues of life and experience; it is, indeed, a kind of faith that must grow in the hearts of all men, and ultimately, I believe, lead to the triumph of the Christian ideal. The star of a holy purpose shines at all times, more or less brightly, through the clouds of the writer's transcendentalism. For with all his scientific leanings he is of the race that produced Emerson and Theodore Parker; he possesses by temperament their vagueness and haziness of logic, leading sometimes to that universal tolerance which makes religion blow neither

hot nor cold, but lukewarm. Mr. Frothingham has done noble work in negating the pretensions of still rampant dogmatisms and special Providences, in asserting the supreme right of private judgment, in bearing testimony from the pulpit that the teachings of science, instead of narrowing, enlarge the heavenly horizons, and in following the divine thread of meaning to be found in all creeds and all theologies. His teaching has the one cardinal defect, that it lacks the consecrating touch of pathos that accompanies the highest kind of spiritual solicitation, which we feel as certainly in the Buddhist books as in the Jewish Testament, in the tragedies of Sophocles as well as in the moralities of John Bunyan, and in the prophesies of Walt Whitman (despite all the Emersonian leaven) as well as in the child-like songs of Whittier. For this is the fatal tendency of transcendentalism—to soften the lines of conviction, and to strain the anguish out of sentiment. There is no pathos in Emerson; never once does his gentle hand, grasping its soothsayer's wand, touch the fountain of tears; yet even such a man as Spurgeon can stir that fountain, if only with the mere breath of a phrase. And no creed without pathos will ever justify the great human hope, or conquer the great human heart. So I part from Mr. Frothingham with no lack of respect and admiration, but with some little sadness, feeling that the tale he has to tell is one already twice told, and misses the charm of those fairy stories of God which will continue to add to human happiness, so long as the heart of man is as a child's and some glimpses of a heavenly dream remain.

ROBERT BUCHANAN.

CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSIAN POETRY.

PERSIAN poetry had its birth in a country conspicuous for natural advantages; a country distinguished for the mildness of its climate, the clearness of its streams, and the perpetual verdure of its plains; a country of lofty mountains, inland seas, and rolling rivers; the land of the gazelle, the camel, and the caravan; a land abounding in fruits and flowers, full of pleasant gardens, and enlivened with the songs of innumerable birds; a land where millions of butterflies of the richest colors were wafted through the summer air. In this land of the olive, the date, the pomegranate, and the fig, where the palms of the South met the pines of the North, was reared a race of men combining in a rare degree ingenuity, vivacity, intellectual force, subtlety, and refinement of manners. The Persians early acquired repute as a people of taste, invention, and artistic skill. The finest silks, the richest velvets, the costliest brocades, the softest and rarest carpets, and the most splendid tissues were of Persian origin. The art newly discovered in America and Europe, how to combine great variety of colors with perfect harmony, and to delight the eye with soft and pleasing gradations, producing a rich composite effect from the simplest elements, was original with the Persians centuries ago. The very figures of floor-cloth on which the Shah Mahmoud walked in the tenth century, the shawl patterns that adorned the heroines of Jami and of Hafiz, are imitated in the looms of England and the United States to-day. In architecture and the fine arts, as in decorative art, the Persians of the middle ages achieved a notable success. Their chief cities showed splendid palaces, filled with gems of art and sparkling with jewels, and stately mosques with white or azure domes.

Nor was it an effeminate race, steeped in pleasure and enervated by luxury, that enjoyed all these advantages. Their

bodies were strong and supple, while strikingly handsome in form and countenance. The Persians were adepts in archery and horsemanship, and were distinguished by courtesy and high-breeding. Even the common people were keen admirers of poetry, and were continually calling upon their favorite bards to recite their verses.

Persia, the Iran of the ancients, though its boundaries have varied in different centuries, has occupied substantially that portion of Central Asia extending from the twenty-fifth to the forty-fifth parallel of latitude, and its climate, like that of the United States, includes every zone, from the semi-tropical almost to the frigid. Persia's writers possessed the history and literature of the Scriptures, and some of their finest poems and allegories have allusions or adaptations from them.

In the period from the tenth to the fourteenth century all her great poets flourished, and this may be styled the golden age of her literature. It is one of the most remarkable facts of history, that at the time when the literature of what is called enlightened Europe was at its lowest ebb, when for centuries not a book was produced there worth the reading, the genius and learning of Asiatic nations shone out in their greatest luster. Not only in Persia, but in Arabia and India was produced a succession of works of the imagination, of philosophy and science, which were the sole permanent contributions to the world's literature in that age. Genius and imagination in Europe had gone to sleep, and it was literally the sleep of ages. The splendid literature of the classic period in Greece and Rome had no successors, but only the feeblest of imitators. The dark ages hung like a pall over Italy and Greece, over France and Germany, over Spain and England. The renaissance of letters and art that was to follow gave no premonitory sign. Just at this time came a great intellectual development in the East. The poetry and art of the Persians, and the imaginative literature of Arabia, produced their greatest works. It was an age of intellectual decrepitude and intolerance; an age when the inestimable remains of Greek poetry were publicly burned at Constantinople, by order of a Greek emperor; an age when the inhabitants of all Europe besides had scarcely heard of the Greek poets at all; when England was buried in semi-barbarism; when America was an unbroken wilderness. Into this unpromising age came the poetry of the Persians,—fresh, original, melodious, full of

fire, and animated by the most lively coloring. It had for its vehicle a language singularly flexible, musical, and sonorous, which has been called the softest and richest in the world. While the Arabic tongue, to which the Persian is allied, is more striking, impetuous, and strong, the Persian excels in tenderness and sweetness. A single stanza of rhymed couplets may suffice as a specimen :

“ Gulistáni tohu gulzári giuvani,
Guli sirábi abi zendegani,
Nuval endelibi ashretanghize
Huval star bizé ráhetamize.”

If there is any one dialect better fitted than another to a sweet and melodious poetical expression, it is that of the Persians. And it is almost equally adapted to the expression of sublime ideas. Add to this gift of language the influence of climate and of picturesque scenery, in a country where the open air continually invites abroad, adorned with almost perpetual verdure, and hemmed in by lofty blue mountains, and you have conditions favorable in a high degree to the poetic temperament. To these influences of nature as seen by day succeeded the splendors of the night, when the contemplative man (for the Persian almost lived on the house-top) turned from his inward thoughts, fixing his eyes on the stars, and enjoyed the glory of the heavens. In a genial and temperate clime, with abundant leisure, free from those enervating heats which conspire on the more torrid plains of India and Arabia to wilt the energies of man, the poets of Persia were inspired to sing as naturally as the roses to bloom. We find in their compositions two leading, though somewhat contrasted, characteristics: a sensuous beauty, reflecting intimately the charms of nature around them, and thus objective in a high degree; and a contemplative, speculative, sometimes mystical tone, peculiar to the subjective school of poetry. In these two species of composition the poetry of the Persians affords numerous specimens of the highest order. Nowhere else have the charms of natural objects, of fruits and flowers, of trees and birds, of mountains and running waters, been more finely celebrated. The reproach so often brought against the literature of classic times, that the great poets of Greece and Rome never celebrate the praises of natural scenery, does not lie at the door of the Persian bards. The rose and the bulb, the lily

and the jasmine, the cypress and the palm, the valley and the mountain, continually appear in their verse. Then, too, in their amatory gazels, the fair one is described with passionate adoration and exuberant imagery, combined with a delicacy of sentiment that never degenerates into coarseness. Whether celebrating the praise of wine, of woman, or of nature, there is an ethereal touch which seems borrowed from the atmosphere of that halcyon clime wherein the poet worked. The best Persian compositions, alike in prose and in verse, are marked by fine poetic imagery, combined with a profusion of metaphor. All things are viewed through an imaginative medium. Sir William Jones says that the oriental poets surpass in beauty of diction, and in power of imagery, all the authors of Europe, save only the Greek lyric poets, and Horace among the Latins. Metaphor is almost the natural dialect of the Persian. Thus, a generous man is called "the rose of liberality"; fame is "the sweet savor of renown"; and to write verses is "to string pearls." Among their fine similes is the comparison of a violet sparkling with dew to the blue eyes of a beautiful girl in tears; and of a warrior advancing at the head of his troops, to an eagle cleaving the air and piercing the clouds with his impetuous wings. Allegory, or a string of metaphors, is very common; as, for example, "When the tempest of fear had torn the veil of their understanding, and the deluge of despair had submerged the vessel of their hopes, in order that they might emerge from the gulf of danger and reach the haven of safety, they turned the rudder of flight and spread the sails of swift retreat." If this metaphorical tendency sometimes degenerates (as in the poets of the Elizabethan and later ages in England) into unnatural images and poor conceits, this blemish is comparatively rare among the poets of the highest rank.

The Persian gazel is a kind of verse in which the first two lines rhyme, and then this rhyme repeats itself only in the second line of each succeeding couplet. Here is an example:

"Thee have thousands sought in vain
Over land and barren main,

"Chidher's well,—of which men say,
That thou makest young again.

"Fountain of eternal youth,
Washing free from every stain,

"To thy waves the aged moons
Aye betake them when they wane ;

"And the suns their golden light,
While they bathe in thee, retain.

"From that fountain drops are flung,
Mingling with the vernal rain,

"And the old earth clothes itself
In its young attire again.

"And the timid wild gazelles
Seek it through the desert plain."

The most celebrated among the sustained poetic compositions of Persia is unquestionably the "Shah-Namah," or "Book of Kings," composed by Firdusi (A. D. 941-1020) during the thirty years of his life running from the fiftieth to the eightieth. This great historical epic relates the history of Persia from the earliest times to the invasion of the Arabs under the Caliph Omar, A. D. 641. It is as long as the *Iliad*, and is unrivaled in Persian literature for the power and eloquence of its verse. It has for one of its principal heroes Rustem, the lion-hearted, an oriental Achilles, whom Firdusi celebrates as a prodigy of force, valor, and wisdom. He subdues dragons and other monsters, has a charmed horse named Baktra, or Lightning, and is described as a mighty warrior, wielding preternatural powers. The creation of peris and of the dives of the Persians marks the undoubted originals of our fairies and genii. These fictions were probably transplanted into Europe by the Moors, an Asiatic race, and from them adopted into the romances of Spain. Firdusi's creative faculty is wonderful; his great work abounds throughout in bold and animated descriptions, and in certain portions rises to the highest sublimity. But a single specimen, in each kind, of his descriptive power, can here be given :

"Look forth, companions, cast afar your eyes,
Where yonder many-colored plain extends :
Ah ! in my breast what sweet sensations rise !
Behold how each soft charm of nature blends.

"The tender silken grass invites the tread ;
With musky odor breathes the fanning air ;
Pure waters glide along their perfumed bed,
As though the rose gave them her essence rare.

"The lily stalk bends with her fragrant flower,
The luster of the rose glads every bower.

"The pheasant walks with graceful pace along;
Soft doves and mournful nightingales are nigh,
Charming the silence with a mingled song,
And murmurs from the cypress boughs reply.

"There in gay groups, beneath the trees, beside
Those streams that through the vales in music glide,
Lovely as fairies, beautiful as day,
Are maids who wander on in sportive play.

"She decks the plain with beauty as she goes,
Before her shrink, ashamed, the jasmine and the rose!

"And there are Turkish maids that near them rove
With forms like cypress boughs, that zephyrs move,
Locks dark as musk — and see! each veil discloses
Eyes filled with sleep, and cheeks all full of roses."

The entertainment prepared for Rustem is thus described, as rendered by James Atkinson:

"The ready herald, by the king's command,
Convened the chiefs and warriors of the land;
And soon the banquet social glee restored,
And China wine-cups glittered on the board;
And cheerful song, and music's magic power,
And sparkling wine beguiled the festive hour.
The dulcet draughts o'er Rustem's senses stole,
And melting strains absorbed his softened soul.
But when approached the period of repose,
All, prompt and mindful, from the banquet rose;
A couch was spread well worthy such a guest,
Perfumed with rose and musk; and whilst at rest,
In deep sound sleep, the wearied champion lay,
Forgot were all the sorrows of the way.

"One watch had passed, and still sweet slumber shed
Its magic power around the hero's head,
When forth Talmineh came — a damsel held
An amber taper, which the gloom dispelled —
And near his pillow stood; in beauty bright,
The monarch's daughter struck his wondering sight.

"Clear as the moon, in glowing charms arrayed,
Her winning eyes the light of heaven displayed.
Her cypress form entranced the gazer's view,
Her waving curls the heart resistless drew.

Her eyebrows, like the archer's bended bow;
 Her ringlets, snares; her cheek, the rose's glow,
 Mixed with the lily; from her ear-tips hung
 Rings rich and glittering, star-like; and her tongue
 And lips, all sugared sweetness; pearls the while
 Sparkled within a mouth formed to beguile.
 Her presence dimmed the stars, and breathing round
 Fragrance and joy, she scarcely touched the ground,
 So light her step, so graceful every part
 Perfect, and suited to her spotless heart."

Khokani, who died at Tabriz, in 1186, is considered the most learned of the lyric poets of Persia. Here are some stanzas from one of his gazels:

"Oh, waving cypress! cheek of rose!
 Oh, jasmine-breathing bosom! say,
 Tell me each charm that round her glows,
 Who are ye that my heart betray?
 Tyrant unkind! to whom I bow,
 Oh, life-destroyer, who art thou?"

"I saw thy form of waving grace,
 I heard thy soft and gentle sighs,
 I gazed on that enchanting face,
 And looked in thy Narcissus eyes.
 Oh, by the hopes thy smiles allow,
 Bright soul-inspirer! who art thou?"

"Where'er she walks, amidst the shades,
 Where perfumed hyacinths unclose,
 Danger her every glance pervades,
 Her bow is bent on friends and foes.
 Thy rich cheek shames the rose, thy brow
 Is like the young moon—who art thou?"

The poet Nizami, who lived from A. D. 1100 to about 1180, had fine descriptive powers, and ranks high in the romantic school of poets. Of his works, known as "The Five Treasures," the "Loves of Khosru and Shireen" is the finest. The following from Atkinson's translation is a brief specimen:

"On lofty Beysitoun the lingering sun
 Looks down on ceaseless labors long begun;
 The mountain trembles to the echoing sound
 Of falling rocks that from her sides rebound.
 Each day, all respite, all repose denied,
 Without a pause the thundering strokes are plied.

The mist of night around the summits coils,
 But still Ferhad, the lover-artist, toils.
 And still, the flashes of his axe between,
 He sighs to every wind, 'Alas, Shireen!'

"The piles give way, the rocky peaks divide,
 The stream comes gushing on, a foaming tide,
 A mighty work for ages to remain,
 The token of his passion and his pain.

"Around the pair, lo! chiseled courtiers wait,
 And slaves and pages grouped in solemn state;
 From columns imaged wreaths their garlands throw,
 And fretted roofs with stars appear to glow;
 Fresh leaves and blossoms seem around to spring,
 And feathered throngs their loves seem murmuring.
 The hands of peris might have wrought those stems
 Where dew-drops hang their fragile diadems,
 And strings of pearl and sharp-cut diamonds shine
 New from the wave, or recent from the mine."

Hafiz (1300-1391 ?) is prince of the poets of good cheer. His nimble fancy adorns the wine-cup with all the flowers of song. Nor is he merely a gay trifler; his gazels have a high reach of thought, and are full of every-day wisdom. As sententious as Horace, as hilarious as Anacreon, as tender as Theocritus, his poems are as full of felicities as of melodies. His favorite form is that of the gazel, and his collected poems form what is known as the "Divan" of Hafiz—a word equivalent to anthology. Many of them are devoted to love and pleasure, but others are full of lofty moralizings. The following is Herman Bicknell's translation of one of them:

"My soul is as a sacred bird, the highest heaven its nest;
 Fretting within the body's bars, it finds on earth no rest.

"When speeding from this dusty heap, this bird of mine shall soar,
 'Twill find upon yon lofty gate the nest it had before.

"The Sidrah* shall receive my bird when it has winged its way;
 Far on the empyrean's top my falcon's foot shall stay.

"Over the ample fields of earth is fortune's shadow cast,
 Where, upon wings and pennons borne, this bird of mine has passed.

* The Sidrah is the tree of Paradise.

"No spot in the two worlds it owns—above the sphere its goal;
Its body from the quarry is, from No-place is its soul.

"'Tis only in the glorious world my bird its splendor shows;
The rosy bower of Paradise its daily food bestows."

Here is Mr. Emerson's version (from the German) of the same *gazel* of Hafiz:

"My phoenix long ago secured
His nest in the sky-vault's cope;
In the body's cage immured
He was weary of life's hope.

"Round and round this heap of ashes
Now flies the bird amain,
But in that odorous niche of heaven
Nestles the bird again.

"Once flies he upward, he will perch
On Tuba's golden bough;
His home is on that fruited arch
Which cools the blest below.

"If over this world of ours
His wings my phoenix spread,
How gracious falls on land and sea
The soul-refreshing shade!

"Either world inhabits he,
Sees oft below him planets roll;
His body is all of air compact,
Of Allah's love his soul."

Here is another of Bicknell's translations from Hafiz:

"Zealot, censure not the toper, guileless though thou keep thy soul;
Certain 'tis that sins of others none shall write upon thy scroll.

"Be my deeds or good or evil, look thou to thyself alone;
All men, when their work is ended, reap the harvest they have sown.

"Never of eternal mercy preach that I must yet despair;
Canst thou pierce the veil, and tell me who is ugly, who is fair?

"Every one the friend solicits, be he sober, quaff he wine;
Every place has love its tenant, be it of the mosque, or shrine.

"From the still retreat of virtue not the first am I to roam,
For my father also quitted his eternal Eden home.

"See this head devout submission; bricks at many a vintner's door;
If my foe these words misconstrue—'Bricks and head'!—say nothing
more.

"Fair though Paradise's garden, deign to my advice to yield;
Here enjoy the shading willow, and the border of the field.

"Lean not on thy store of merits; know'st thou 'gainst thy name for aye
What the Plastic Pen indited on the Unbeginning Day?

"Hafiz, if thou grasp thy beaker when the hour of death is nigh,
From the street where stands the tavern straight they'll bear thee to
the sky."

The vivacity of Hafiz is marvelous, and goes far to redeem
the monotony of his principal themes. He is as full of life-blood
as his beloved grape of wine. He sings:

"Take an example from the roses,
Who live direct on sun and dew;
They never question after Moses,
And why, in heaven's name, should you?"

The odes of Hafiz have been for centuries the delight not
only of cultivated Persians, but of the common people. They
are repeated everywhere, in schools and universities, in palaces
and hovels, in shops and markets. Bicknell thus renders one
of them:

"Saki, come! my bowl rekindle with the light of lustrous wine;
Minstrel, chant thy lay! for Fortune smiles upon my heart's design.

"In the goblet's depths reflected, I beheld my Loved one's cheek,
Thou who yet ignor'st the rapture of the wine-cup which I seek.

"Upright fair ones, coy and charming, only for so long shall shine,
Till appears our splendid cypress, moving as the dancing pine.

"He whose soul by love is quickened, never can to death be hurled;
Written is my life immortal in the records of the world." |

To the gentle Hafiz may well be applied Emerson's axiom,
that the true poet and the true philosopher are one. I borrow
two more translations from Bicknell:

"A thousand times be blest wine's ruddy ray,
Which drove the pallor from my cheek away.



"I reverence the hand that plucked the grape;
Ne'er molder may the foot that pressed its shape.

"Traced on my brow is 'Love'; Fate wrote it there,
To blot what Fate inscribed should no one dare.

"Slight me not, zealot, go thou hence ashamed,
For nought is slight that has by God been framed.

"So live thou here, that when thy life has fled
No one may say of thee, 'This man is dead.'"

"The morning of my future dawns; where have they placed the sun-like
bowl?
What time more opportune than this? Haste! with the wine-cup cheer
my soul.

"The house is peaceful, Saki kind; the minstrel many a jest doth fling;
'Tis rapture, and the goblet's hour; it is the season of glad spring.

"To raise our spirits when sad we are, to crown mirth's beauty as is due,
Good is the molten ruby's tide with the gold goblet's lustrous hue.

"Charmer and songster wave their hands, drunk rev'lers strike their feet
anon;
From wine-adorers' eyes hath sleep by Saki's fascination gone.

"Safe is this spot, a close retreat, for bosom-friends a pleasure-ground;
Victory's hundred gates are oped to him who hath such converse found.

"Nature, the tire-maid, ever brisk, seeing how wine sweet joy bestows,
Hides deftly in the rose's leaves the fragrant essence of the rose.

"Since zealously that Moon has sought to buy the pearls by Hafiz strung,
In Zuhrah's ear at every hour the rebeck's melody has rung."

Persian poetry abounds in expressions of the greatness of the
Infinite, like the following:

"What, thou askest, is the heaven, and the round earth, and the sea,
And their dwellers, men and angels, if with God compared they be?

"Heaven and earth, and men and angels, all that anywhere is named,
Matched with Him, lose name and being, and to nothing shrink ashamed.

"Its unnumbered billows rolling, great to thee the ocean seems;
Great the sun, from golden fountains pouring out a flood of beams;

"Yet the faithful, God-enlightened, know another wonder-land,
Where the ocean is a dew-drop, and the sun a grain of sand.

"In the forest's dark recesses hast thou marked the glow-worm's light,
In a green dell unbeholden, twinkling through the storm and night!

"Once a pilgrim said: 'O gentle star that shinest nightly, say,
Wherefore thou appearest never in the bright and glorious day!'

"Hear what then the gentle glow-worm answered from its mouth of fire:
'In the gloomy forest shine I, but before the sun expire.'

Sadi stands at the head of the poet-teachers of Persia. A Dervish, a hermit, and a pilgrim, he set forth the vanity of the world, and the true vocation of man, in a series of noble apologues, poems, and epigrams, which have made him almost a world's classic. His "*Gulistan*," or "*Rose-Garden*," is in mingled verse and prose; his "*Bustan*," or "*Fruit-Garden*," is composed of tales and of moral and political reflections. He died in 1291, at the age of 102. Here are a few maxims from the "*Gulistan*," as translated by Eastwick:

"When, in transacting business, thou art in doubt, make choice of that side from which the least injury will result.

"Reply not roughly to smooth language, nor
Contend with him who knocks at peace's door."

"Twist not thy mustaches boastful,
Nor with pride thy weak foe scan;
Every bone contains some marrow,
Every garment cloaks a man."

"Affairs succeed by patience, and he that is hasty falleth headlong."

"He who, before he slept or took repose,
Did roses and the jasmine round him fling;
Revolving time has shed his beauty's rose,
While from his ashes now the thorns upspring."

Jami, one of the most masterly of Persian writers, belongs to the fifteenth century. He may be placed at the head of the romantic school of Persian poets, combining exquisite diction and affluent imagination with a high moral aim. These verses are from his chief work, "*Yusuf and Zulaikha*," translated by R. H. T. Griffith:

"Soon as the place where he dwelt she knew,
With an eager heart to the spot she flew;
Like a soul with no mixture of clay, she beheld
His beauty, which thought never paralleled.

Ne'er had she seen such a marvel, ne'er
 Dreamed of a form so divinely fair.
 As she looked on his splendor, she swooned and lay
 In a rapturous trance with her senses astray.
 She woke to consciousness slowly, and passed
 Out of the swoon that had held her fast.
 Her lips she opened; she fain would speak,
 From that store-house of riches, rare pearls to seek.
 'O youth,' she cried, 'from all evil free,
 Who made thy beauty so fair to see?
 By whom was the sun's own splendor lent,
 And the moon, for thy forehead's ornament?
 Say in what garden that cypress grew,
 And what artist-hand the fair picture drew?
 Whose compasses marked thy brow's delicate line?
 Who curled in bright clusters those locks of thine?
 Who set the young flower in the garden? Who
 Fed the tender plant with the splendor of dew?
 Where could a master be found to teach
 Thy cypress its motion, thy ruby its speech?
 Thy locks' fair letters whose pen could trace?
 Who read the book of thy moon-bright face?
 Who bade thee from nothingness wake and arise?
 And opened to light those Narcissus-like eyes;
 And that onyx lock in that pearl-casket laid,
 Whence the soul of the hearer is strengthened and stayed?
 Who hollowed the well in thy soft round chin,
 And poured the sweet water of life therein?
 Who set the dark mole on thy cheek, and spread
 The raven's wing o'er the roses' bed?'

He heard her speech; and from wisdom's spring
 Flowed forth the reply to her questioning:
 'I am the work of that Maker,' said he,
 'From whose ocean one drop is enough for me;
 Heaven is but a dot which his pen has made,
 And the earth but a bird in his garden displayed.
 The sun is a spark of his wisdom's light,
 And a bubble the world, of the sea of his might.
 From atoms he made us, as mirrors to shine
 With the borrowed light of his face divine.
 Screened by dark curtains from mortal eye,
 On his pure perfection no stain may lie;
 Whatever fair to thy sight appears
 Is the light of his face when thy vision clears —
 Dost thou see the reflection? Then fly to him
 To whom faint is that shadow, and cold and dim.
 Dost thou shun the light's Author? No, God forbid!
 Or dark were thy lot when that reflex is hid.
 It will last but a moment, this borrowed ray,

As the bloom of the rose and her scent decay.
 Dost thou seek the eternal, the firm, the true?
 Then fix on him ever thy steadfast view.
 'Tis this that pierces our hearts with pain,
 That fair things are with us, ah! not to remain!

"The maiden listened as Yusuf replied.
 She folded love's carpet and laid it aside.
 'I heard thy praises,' 'twas thus she spoke,
 'And the flame of love in my heart awoke.
 Hither I journeyed thy face to see,
 And my head was my foot in the search for thee.
 I came, I found thee; I swooned away.
 And my life at thy feet I was fain to lay.
 But wisdom's pearls thou hast deigned to string,
 And pointed the way to the pure light's spring.
 Thou hast cut the fine hair with the word of truth,
 And repelled the love of mine eager youth.
 Thou hast lifted the veil of my hope, and shown
 The way to the sun which I never had known.
 This truth at last to my heart is plain,
 That my love for thee like a dream was vain;
 Mine eyes have been touched by the truth's pure ray,
 And the dream of folly has passed away.'"

Ferid-eddin-Attar, who lived in the thirteenth century, and was a Sufi philosopher, wrote the "Pend Namah," or "Book of Counsels," a fine moral poem, from which these verses are taken :

"Impartial in his goodness still,
 Equal to all is good or ill.

"One lies on Persian silk reclined,
 One naked in a frozen wind;
 One scarce can count his heaps of ore,
 One faints with hunger at the door.

"The dives before his vengeance fly,
 By hosts of stars expelled the sky.
 And kings who hold the world in thrall,
 At his great word, to ruin fall."

Jelalu'ddin Er Rûmî, who died in 1260, stands at the head of the religious or mystic school of Persian poets. His principal work, the "Mesnevi," a long poem full of apologues and allegory, while disfigured by numerous digressions and trivialities, has much thought and frequent splendor of expression. His mystical odes are fairly represented in this specimen :

"Seeks thy spirit to be gifted
With a deathless life?
Let it seek to be uplifted
O'er earth's storm and strife.

"Spurn its joys—its ties dis sever;
Hopes and fears divest;
Thus aspire to live forever—
Be for ever blest!

"Faith and doubt leave far behind thee;
Cease to love or hate;
Let not Time's illusions blind thee;
Thou shalt Time outdate.

"Merge thine individual being
In the Eternal's love;
All this sensual nature fleeing
For pure bliss above."

Among Persian poets who have also made a name as men of science, the palm must be awarded to Omar Kháyyám, of Nash-apûr. He was born about the middle of the eleventh century, and his life extended to the year 1123. He devoted himself to mathematics, wrote a treatise on algebra, and was one of the eight learned men appointed by the Sultan Malik Shah to reform the calendar. His astronomical knowledge, always in high repute among the Persians, brought him the title of "King of the Wise"; and, in fact, he was unrivaled in science in his own generation. But the versatility of his genius led him to poetic composition, and he embodied in several hundred *Rubaiyat*, or quatrains, his philosophic creed. Treating the problems of humanity with complete sincerity, and led by the fruit of his knowledge and reflection to regard to-day as the only certainty, he sang of things as they are. Here are some passages from Fitzgerald's translation :

"Ah, my beloved, fill the cup that clears
To-day of past regret and future fears.
To-morrow! why, to-morrow I may be
Myself with yesterday's seven thousand years.

"Come, fill the cup! and in the fire of spring
Your winter garments of repentance fling!
The bird of Time has but a little way
To flutter, and the bird is on the wing.

"Whether at Nashapûr or Babylon,
Whether the cup with sweet or bitter run,
The wine of life keeps oozing drop by drop,
The leaves of life keep falling one by one.

"For some we loved, the loveliest and the best,
That from his vintage rolling Time has pressed,
Have drunk their cup a round or two before,
And one by one crept silently to rest.

"And all the saints and sages, who discussed
Of the two worlds so learnedly, are thrust
Like foolish prophets forth; their words to scorn
Are scattered, and their mouths are stopped with dust.

"Myself when young did eagerly frequent
Doctor and saint, and heard great argument
About it and about; but evermore
Came out by the same door wherein I went.

"With them the seed of wisdom did I sow,
And with my own hand wrought to make it grow,
And this was all the harvest that I reaped—
'I came like water, and like wind I go.'

"And if the wine you drink, the lips you press,
End in what all begins and ends in, Yes;
Think then you are to-day what yesterday
You were; to-morrow you shall not be less.

"So when the angel of the darker drink
At last shall find you by the river-brink,
And, offering his cup, invite your soul
Forth to your lips to quaff, you shall not shrink.

"For if the soul can fling the dust aside,
And naked on the air of heaven ride,
Wer't not a shame—wer't not a shame for him
In this clay carcass crippled to abide?

"Alas! that spring should vanish with the rose!
That youth's sweet-scented manuscript should close!
The nightingale that in the branches sang,
Ah, whence, and whither flown again, who knows?

"Strange, is it not? that of the myriads who
Before us passed the door of darkness through,
Not one returns to tell us of the road,
Which to discover we must travel too.

"The revelations of devout and learned
 Who rose before us, and as prophets burned,
 Are all but stories which, awoke from sleep
 They told their fellows, and to sleep returned.

"I sent my soul through the Invisible,
 Some letter of that after-life to spell;
 And by and by my soul returned to me,
 And answered, 'I myself am Heaven and Hell!'"

From these serene and lofty speculations, Omar Kháyyám descends to sing of wine and love, but with a wealth of imagery and a beauty of expression from which later Persian poets, and even Hafiz, have borrowed much.

"Morn's first rays are glimmering,
 From the skies the stars are creeping;
 Rouse, for shame, the goblet bring,
 All too long thou liest sleeping;
 Open those Narcissus eyes,
 Wake, be happy, and be wise!

"Nothing in this world of ours
 Flows as we would have it flow;
 What avail, then, careful hours,
 Thought and trouble, tears and woe?"

If the honest realism of the Rubáiyát and their rugged utterances of fatalism are often profoundly saddening, let us be mindful that they are but the reflection of the uncertainties that beset the life of man. And if any to whom a clear and dogmatic view of the universe, its wonder and its mystery, has been vouchsafed, should find fault with this early poet of agnosticism, let it not be forgotten that the subtlest and the wisest intellects the world has known have been those who have most modestly disclaimed all knowledge of the Infinite. This poet-astronomer of Khorasan once said to a friend, "Let my tomb be in a spot where the north wind shall scatter roses over it," and his wish was fulfilled.

The Persian tendency to idealism is never more marked than in religious poetry. Says Jelalu'ddin, the great mystic poet of the Sufis, and author of the *Mesnevi*:

"O, heart! weak follower of the weak,
 That thou shouldst traverse land and sea,
 In this far place that God to seek,
 Who long ago had come to thee!"

A pensive and sweet melancholy pervades much of their verse. Treading upon the graves of kings and the ruins of splendid cities, they sing the vanity of life in strains at once tender and sublime. Says Firdusi :

“What is glory to man? An illusion, a cheat.
What did it for Jemschid, the world at his feet?”

And Sir William Jones thus translates an exquisite quatrain from the Persian :

“On parent knees, a naked, new-born child,
Weeping thou sat'st while all around thee smiled.
So live that, sinking in thy last long sleep,
Calm thou mayst smile, while all around thee weep.”

If we, who are dependent upon translations in English, French, and German for our means of judging, find the sweetness and the compass of these Persian poems so admirable, how incomparably finer must they be in the original? Indeed, there is no poetic literature anywhere more picturesque than the Persian. Strikingly national, bearing no trace of European models (for the literature of the West had not penetrated into Persia when it was written), it is as racy of the soil that produced it as the blood of the grape so often sung by Hafiz. The great writers of English and American literature (save only a few marked originals) have been and are still dependent upon classic Greece and Rome for their inspiration and their models. Without desiring to overvalue the poetry of the Persians, it must be conceded that for descriptive power, for ideality, for lofty imagination, and for magnificence of diction, it is worthy of a high place in the world's literature.

AINSWORTH R. SPOFFORD.

THE AGRICULTURAL CRISIS IN ENGLAND.

IN an article on "Agricultural Politics in England," in this REVIEW last March, the serious character of the agricultural depression that had long been prevalent in England, and for a shorter period in Scotland, was described. Since then the depression has culminated in a crisis of great severity. The immediate cause of it is the great drop in the price of wheat, followed, as usual, by diminished prices for other grain. These prices were low enough before harvest to render grain-production unremunerative under existing conditions of farming, except on the most fertile soils, and the further fall has been the last straw which breaks the camel's back. For the year 1883 the average price of wheat was 41s. 7d. per quarter of eight bushels; that of barley was 31s. 10d., and that of oats was 21s. 5d. In 1884 the weekly average price of wheat only once reached 39s., and for the whole year it was 35s. 8d. After September it was not higher than 32s. 4d., and for one week it was as low as 30s. 5d. These prices are, in great measure, taken from sales by merchants, after the cost of carriage and profits have been added. Large quantities of excellent wheat have been sold by farmers at 28s. per quarter. The average price of barley for the whole of 1883 was 31s. 10d.; for 1884 it was 30s. 8d. This is not a great drop, and barley is now worth about as much as wheat. Oats averaged 21s. 5d. for 1883, and 20s. 3d. for 1884; but after September the weekly average did not reach 20s.

The product of last harvest was not by any means so great as to render such prices as have lately prevailed remunerative. As usual, it was greatly overestimated by writers in the newspapers. The wheat crop turned out to be a fair, though not a great one; but almost every other crop that the ordinary farmer grows in England was below average. Barley and oats have both been lower in price than they are now; but wheat never,

since the value of money was anywhere near its present standard. The lowest weekly average price of wheat during the hundred years preceding 1884 was 35s. 6d., the price for the week ending October 11, 1851; and the yearly average has not been below 40s. more than twice in the century; in 1835, when it was 39s. 4d., and in 1851, when it was 38s. 6d. The yearly average price of barley during the ninety-four years ending with 1883 was below 32s. thirty-one times; that of oats in the same period was below 20s. only fourteen times. In the past, the low prices of a single year were commonly followed by high or moderate prices for several years; whereas during the past six years prices have been continuously low. The extremely low price of wool has been another serious blow to the farmers of arable land, by whom sheep are chiefly kept. Even meat, and especially mutton, has been lower in price during the latter half of the past year than it has been for a long period. The bare statement of this general fall in the values of agricultural produce suffices to show that the British farmer is in a very awkward position; but when it is further pointed out that expenditure has increased as income has decreased, the alarming character of his dilemma is obvious. Rents, labor, rates and taxes, and the general cost of living, have all greatly risen during the past thirty years. It is only since the summer that wages have begun to fall. All through the long period of depression, on the principle that "he that is low needs fear no fall," the earnings of farm workmen remained steady up to the time when the great drop in the price of wheat compelled employers to reduce crops and discharge a large proportion of their men. Increased taxation is an evil under which all owners of property labor; but some new burdens have been put upon land, chiefly in relation to education, sanitary provisions, and highways. The cost of living has risen because the standard of living among farmers, as among all other classes of the community, has been advanced.

Dairy farming has paid well, on the whole, during the greater part of the period of agricultural depression, and stock-breeding has paid moderately well also. The prevalence of disease among cattle and sheep has been the chief drawback to the prosperity of pastoral farmers. Rents have risen in the grass districts, and other expenses also; but the increased cost of labor falls with comparative lightness here. It may be asked why, if dairy farming and breeding are profitable, the occupiers of arable land

do not grow grass and other feeding crops. Since 1870 the area of permanent pasture has increased by 8,581,911 acres, and clovers and rotation grasses by 72,276 acres; while the area under grain and pulse crops has decreased by 1,641,789 acres, that under potatoes by 265,461 acres, that under roots, and other green crops, except clovers and grasses, by 107,814 acres, and that under flax by 127,426 acres. During the same period there has been an increase of 1,663,607 acres in the cultivated area of the kingdom, all of which, together with the balance of decreases over increases of other crops, has been absorbed in pasture. A large proportion of our best grain-growing land is not well fitted for pasture. Then the cost of laying down grass is considerable, and tenants have no protection for capital thus expended, while landlords, as a rule, being chiefly life-owners, are not sufficiently interested in the improvement of their estates to undertake it at much expense. The existing difficulty of letting large areas of arable land, however, is more rapidly than heretofore causing owners to lay down pasture or to encourage their tenants to do so.

For an estimate of the cost of growing wheat and the receipts at the current price, let us take the case of land good enough to grow 32 bushels an acre, which is considerably above the average produce for England, now generally reckoned at 28 bushels. To simplify the calculation, the value of the straw (which few farmers are allowed to sell, however) may be set against the cost of making the manure. The account would then stand about as follows:

	£	s.	d.
Rents, tithes, rates, and taxes.....	2	2	0
Carting and spreading manure.....		10	0
Plowing, rolling, drilling, and harrowing.....		15	0
Seed, including preparation.....		8	0
Keeping rooks off.....		2	0
Hoeing and weeding.....		10	0
Harvesting and thatching.....	1	0	0
Threshing, dressing, and carting, etc.....		10	0
Wear and tear of implements.....		3	0
Interest on capital and miscellaneous expenses.....	1	0	0
	7	0	0
Receipts for 4 qrs. of wheat at 30s.....	6	0	0
Loss per acre ..	£1	0	0

Where, as usually, the straw of one crop is used to make manure for the next, instead of being sold, there would be a further loss of at least £1 an acre, as it is very seldom that the fattening of cattle pays for the cost of the roots and hay they consume, and the cost of cake or other purchased feeding stuff and attendance is almost invariably all loss. The loss in our representative instance of wheat-growing, then, may be put at £2 an acre. If wheat were selling at 40s. a quarter instead of at 30s., the expenses would be only just met.

The cost of labor will not bear reduction, except so far as that may be accomplished by the improvement of agricultural machinery, as laborers' wages are too low already in the greater part of the country. The only item in which a substantial reduction can be made is rent, which is already greatly reduced in new hirings, but very little where there has been no change of tenancy.

The great rise in rents dates from the period of the Crimean war, which began in 1854. For some time previous to 1853 the prices of grain had been low. In 1849 the average prices of the cereals were as follows: Wheat, 44s. 3d. a quarter; barley, 27s. 9d.; oats, 17s. 6d. For the next three years the prices were these: Wheat, 40s. 3d., 38s. 6d., and 40s. 9d.; barley, 23s. 6d., 24s. 9d., and 28s. 6d.; oats, 16s. 5d., 18s. 7d., and 19s. 1d. Previous to 1849, prices had been much higher, as a rule; and in England, where most of the wheat is grown, rents had fallen. But in 1853 wheat rose to 52s. 3d., in 1854 to 72s. 5d., and in 1855 to 74s. 8d., other grain being proportionately high during the period, which covered the time of the Crimean war. Farmers made fortunes, and there was a great rush of townspeople to the land, so that rents rose rapidly. For the next twelve years prices were satisfactory, and rents continued to rise, reaching the highest point in England in 1877; after which, in that portion of the kingdom, rents as well as prices began to fall, though in Wales and Scotland there was no reduction in rents for another two years. The following tables show the amounts and the increase and decrease of the assessments during the thirty years ending with 1882-3:

GROSS ANNUAL VALUE OF FARMS, MARKET GARDENS, AND NURSERIES IN GREAT BRITAIN.

	1852-3.	1862-3.	1872-3.	1876-7.	1879-80.	1882-3.
	£	£	£	£	£	£
England	38,658,782	41,988,685	46,075,893	48,426,933	48,352,389	} 48,268,992
Wales	2,498,431	2,659,016	2,871,996	3,183,139	3,273,171	
Scotland	5,414,676	6,715,341	7,363,235	7,690,213	7,776,919	
Great Britain...	46,571,889	51,363,042	56,311,114	59,300,285	59,402,479	55,841,857

INCREASE AND DECREASE IN GROSS ANNUAL VALUE OF FARMS, MARKET GARDENS, AND NURSERIES OF GREAT BRITAIN.

	Increase, 1852-3 to 1879-80.	Percentage of increase.	Decrease, 1879-80 to 1882-3.	Percentage of decrease.
England and Wales	10,468,347	26·4	3,356,568	6·5
Scotland	2,362,243	43·0	204,034	2·6
Great Britain	12,830,590	27·5	3,560,602	6·0

When every reasonable allowance has been made, the fact remains that land in Great Britain is not worth so much to farm now as it was in 1852. A large proportion of the increase in rents has been due to tenants' improvements, confiscated according to law by landlords. Since the spring of 1883 (the latest date to which the income-tax returns take us), there has been a further reduction; but the whole reduction since 1879-80 must be very small, compared with the enormous increase up to that date. Temporary remissions of rent do not show in these figures. Many landlords have remitted ten or twenty, and a few fifty per cent. of the rent due from their tenants during the past two or three years.

It is obvious that the first remedy must be a substantial reduction in the rents of farms arable or chiefly arable. The figures given above show that the reduction has been far from general. The alternative is really only that between reducing rents at once and saving the tenants from ruin, and ruining the tenants first and reducing rents a few years hence.

It may be urged that the present low price of wheat is not likely to be permanent, and there is good reason for that opinion. Amer-

ican agricultural and financial journals have recently published a great mass of evidence showing that in no part of the United States can wheat be grown at current prices without loss, and that mixed husbandry should take the place of the almost exclusive wheat-growing that is usual in some States and districts. Even in India, where, it is supposed, wheat can be grown more cheaply than anywhere else in the world, the best authorities say that the crop will not pay well enough to induce the ryots to increase its cultivation unless the produce sells at 42s. a quarter in London. It is reported that the area under winter wheat in the United States is smaller than that of last year by 25 per cent., while in Great Britain the reduction is about ten per cent., and in most other European countries there is also a diminished acreage. It is almost certain, then, that prices next summer will be higher than they are now, and it is probable that they will not again sink to the present extremely low level for many years to come. But it is also highly probable that at about 40s. a quarter in London, or a little more, there will continue to be an abundant supply of wheat, whatever the home production may be; and it has already been shown that British farmers, as a rule, cannot grow wheat with profit at 40s. under existing conditions.

There is now a cry — a new one for England or Scotland — for judicial rents, after the Irish fashion. This demand has recently been formally made by the Scottish Farmers' Alliance, an association having six thousand members. The nearest approach to it previously put forward in England or Scotland by any responsible body of men was the proposal of the English Farmers' Alliance to allow an appeal to a court of law to decide whether the rent demanded by a landlord would in reality take from the tenant the value of his improvements, or any portion of that value. This was a very reasonable and fair proposal, though it was scouted by the landlord party at the time when it was made. The English Alliance drafted a Landlord-and-Tenant Bill before the Agricultural Holdings Act of 1883 was introduced, and if it had been passed instead of the abortive Government measure, the rent question and other problems would have been in a fair way toward satisfactory settlement.

The leaders of the Scottish Alliance demand the extension to Scotland of the Irish Land Act, with its Land Courts, fixity of tenure, fair rents, and free sale. Under the Irish Act rents are fixed to some extent in proportion to the ability of ten-

ants to pay them, and the market value of rent is interfered with, apart from the protection of tenants' improvements. The Scottish reformers defend this interference on the ground that land is a monopoly, and should not, therefore, be treated as a commodity open to free competition. They contend that it is to the public interest to insist on land being let on such terms as will enable skilled tenants to get a fair living upon it, and this, they urge, can only be insured by the fixing of rents by an impartial authority. The answer is that if rents are put down below market value, the only result is to hand over to existing tenants the difference between judicial rents and competition rents, hitherto the property of landlords. In future the full market rents would in reality be paid as heretofore; only the difference between them and judicial rents would be sold by outgoing tenants, under the form of good-will. It would not be easy to prove that tenants are entitled to this transference of property from their landlords to them, or to show how it would be advantageous to the public. If a tenant is to be entitled to sell his share in the value of a farm to the highest bidder, it would be manifestly unjust to prohibit the landlord from selling his share in the same way.

Another proposal made by the Scottish Alliance is reasonable. Under the Scottish system of long leases, usually nineteen years, combined with the now repealed Law of Hypothec (the Scottish counterpart of the English Law of Distress), and in the absence of security for tenants' improvements, rents were artificially enhanced. The exceptional security given to landlords by means of their prior claim over all other creditors of their tenants, enables them to accept the offers of the highest bidders for their farms, often reckless speculators, with very little capital. Thus competition, and accordingly rent, was artificially increased. Then, as tenants had no legal claim to compensation for their improvements, they were compelled either to pay exorbitant rents or to leave their improvements for the landlords. The rents due from the leaseholders were fixed under conditions as to prices and expenses more favorable to farmers than those now prevailing, and it is impossible to pay such rents without loss. The Scottish Alliance, therefore, asks for an Act of Parliament to enable leaseholders to obtain a revaluation of rent, or to escape from their contracts by giving two years' notice, and to entitle them to compensation for their improvements by means of free sale when they quit their holdings.

Next to rent-reduction, and to a great extent as opposed to it, the most prominent remedy for the agricultural crisis now before the country is a duty on foreign grain, and especially on wheat. Unfortunately, this demand is rapidly spreading among the farmers of England, though it finds small favor in Scotland. It is a great waste of time and energy, which might be devoted to useful purposes, to carry on a hopeless agitation for a return to protection, especially in relation to farm produce. It is not at all likely that the people of this country will ever consent to reverse the policy of free trade which has brought them such unexampled prosperity, and they certainly will never so far reverse it as to allow of taxes on the principal articles of their food. To a great extent, the agitation is being fostered by scheming politicians for party purposes; but now that the great masses of bread-consumers have been enfranchised, there is not the slightest prospect of success for the trickery. The whole benefit of protection to agricultural produce would speedily be absorbed by landlords in the form of rent, as it was in the old times, when agricultural crises were far more frequent and severe than they have been since the Corn Laws were repealed.

With respect to remedies that may be termed practical, as distinguished from legislative remedies, there is hope in the increase of dairy-farming, stock-breeding, meat-production, fruit-growing, and poultry-keeping; but, as already intimated, all new departures involving free enterprise and the expenditure of capital are checked by the want of security for capital and by the absurd restrictions that landlords impose upon cropping and sale of produce. The Agricultural Holdings Act, passed ostensibly to give security to tenants' improvements, so far as it has been tested, has proved a failure. In every case tried under it the tenant has made claims for various improvements, the landlord has made counter-claims for deterioration and dilapidation, the arbitrator has about split the difference between the contending parties, and each has had to pay his own costs. The net result has been a transfer of money from the pockets of landlords and tenants to the pockets of valuers and lawyers. This is precisely what happened in the case of the Irish Land Act of 1870, which proved so complete a failure that further legislation was soon seen to be necessary.

Thus it is that any discussion of what are called practical remedies for agricultural depression inevitably leads up to those legislative remedies that are essential and fundamental prelimi-

naries to any extensive changes in our system of farming. Pharaoh was not more unreasonable when he commanded the Children of Israel to make bricks without straw than are those who tell tenant-farmers to make silos, plant orchards, make market-gardens and glass-houses, or lay down permanent pasture where it is needed, without security for capital invested in improvements and freedom to use it to the best advantage. We have in Great Britain the best farmers in the world, and it is only because they have been kept in leading-strings that they are not the most enterprising farmers in the world, and the most ready to adapt themselves to new circumstances. Give them security and freedom, and they will keep the agriculture of this country in its proper position, at the head of the agriculture of the world. Without these advantages, the agriculture of Great Britain must inevitably sink to insignificance.

It is a discredit to the intelligence of landlords to compel a tenant to have straw worth only 12s. 6d. a ton as manure stamped down, when it is worth 50s. to 60s. in the market; or to feed clover hay, when it is worth £7 a ton; or mangel-wurtzels, when they sell at 30s. a ton; yet a large majority of the tenants of Great Britain are tied down by such ridiculous regulations. In agriculture, as in any other pursuit, it is essential to prosperity that the man in business should have complete control over that business, and it is usually best that he should have only himself to rely on. Our landlord-and-tenant system is a partnership in which one partner is constantly waiting for the other to do something which is to the interest of neither. As a rule, all that the landlord spends he gives away to the heir to his estate, at the expense of his other children or relatives; and a great deal of what the tenant spends he presents to his landlord. The habit of waiting for the landlord to do what is needed to make a farm pay, relying upon him as a kind of special Providence, has done much to ruin the enterprise and independence of the British farmer. The only tolerable condition of the landlord-and-tenant system is one in which the landlord is a sleeping partner, finding capital for the land and perhaps for the buildings, and taking rent, but without any power to control the conduct of the business. This has been pretty well effected in Ireland, and has done good there; but it would be much more effective in Great Britain.

It may be that the land-tenure problem in this country will ultimately be solved by the adoption of a system of occupying-

ownership, as in Prussia and other parts of the German Empire, or by the nationalization of the land. But the main thing to do is to make it to the interest of one man, and that man the occupier of the farm, to do his best by the land, by giving him complete security and perfect freedom, under reasonable liabilities. Then capital in abundance will flow to farming; capital and energy will be concentrated, instead of being dissipated as they now are; and enterprise will branch out in a manner hitherto unknown to agriculture, which is still in its infancy, in spite of its great age. It is absurd to suppose that land will go out of cultivation in a country well fitted to grow the various crops of the farm, the orchard, and the market-garden, and peculiarly suited to stock breeding and fattening, as well as to the production of milk, butter, and cheese, and possessing the best markets in the world for these kinds of produce, if the cultivators of the soil have only a fair chance of holding their own against foreign competition.

Other changes are needed besides those already alluded to, but these can only be briefly mentioned. The Law of Distress must be abolished, as its rent-raising incidence has not been touched by the tinkering it has undergone. Railway charges for conveyance of agricultural produce must be made equitable. Extraordinary tithes on hop and fruit land must be abolished, and ordinary tithes must be paid directly by landlords until they have been nationalized and the proceeds have been applied partly, let us hope, to the expenses of education and other local burdens. Then we must have cattle disease stamped out and kept from being introduced from foreign sources. Lastly, rates should be divided between landlord and tenant, so that new and increased burdens will no longer be borne entirely by the latter until the next adjustment of rent.

In conclusion, it appears desirable to point out to the people of the United States the warning they may well derive from the great disaster that has overtaken British agriculture. It is reported that the landlord-and-tenant system is extending in America, and that it is encouraged by some of the journals connected with agriculture. The best advice that can be given to the American people upon this point is that they should avoid that system as they would shrink from a pestilence. It is gratifying to observe the efforts now being made by some American politicians to prevent the acquisition of great estates

by aliens. Too many British landlords, and other capitalists intending to become landlords, have already acquired vast tracts of land in the United States; and, glad as the people of this country would be to get rid of their landlords, they are not so cruel as to desire to inflict them upon the people of America. There is a crisis just now among the farmers of the United States; but it will soon pass away, because they have security and freedom to use their capital and direct their enterprise as their judgment dictates. The farmers of the Eastern States at first felt the competition of their Western rivals far more severely than our farmers have felt it; but they speedily recovered from its effects by altering their system of husbandry to meet the circumstances of the times. If they had been fettered tenants instead of free farmers, they would have been ruined.

WILLIAM E. BEAR.

HOW TO REFORM ENGLISH SPELLING.

AMONG the questions current in the sphere of English studies is that of English orthography. By reason of its close connection with orthoepy, and from the extremely composite structure of our language, the question is one of no little difficulty, and should elicit the most patient attention of English students. While free to confess that we are among the advocates of this reform, it will be our aim to give due weight to all valid objections, and thus avoid those extreme deliverances by reason of which the cause of English spelling has been made to suffer.

"In every written language," says Müller, "a reform of spelling is sooner or later inevitable." To this may be added the vigorous language of Whitney: "Of all spellings in the world, the English is the most absurd." It would follow from these high authorities that a reform of English orthography is especially inevitable and desirable. If inquiry be made as to the more particular reason of this need, the answer is apparent and vital to the discussion before us. It is found in the principle that in all languages the relation of sounds to signs should be close and uniformly correspondent. As far as possible, they should answer to each other at every successive point of structure. When such a principle as this is applied in English, it is seen that the proportion of sounds to signs is so unequal, and their adjustment so irregular, that the relation is fortuitous rather than philosophic. There is no fixed law on which a permanent orthographic system can be founded.

The general linguistic principle, already stated, may be thus specified: Every sound must be represented by a distinct sign. No sound must be represented by more than one sign. Applying these criteria to the existing English alphabet as related to English spelling, it is seen that in each of them there is striking irregularity and a consequent call for revision. Our alphabet is

made up of forty-three sounds, while having but twenty-six signs. Strictly speaking, it has but twenty-three signs. Indeed, the absolutely fixed letters of our alphabet—letters true alike to eye and ear—have been reduced by some philologists to eight. Here, at the outset, is great disproportion. The same sign is obliged to do double duty, and often more than that, in its representation of different sounds, *e. g.* :

head,	rough,	height,
seat,	plough,	sleigh.
	through,	

Still further, the cases are numberless where the second criterion is violated, and many different signs are used to represent the same sound. There is no point within the area of English spelling where the confusion is worse confounded than here. In such words as *flute*, *deuce*, *news*, *tour*, *sluice*, there are seen to be for the same sound no fewer than five distinct signs where the theory requires but one, and where with each change of sign the complexity is increased. In the present system there is no assignable limit to such variations, and each man becomes, in a sense, his own law and guide.

Enough has been said to show that, whatever the reform of our spelling may be, there is an urgent need of some kind of revision. Our English orthography could not be much more unsettled and misleading than it is. Almost any change would be a change for the better; and, if we judge aright, the present era is propitious for the serious consideration of the best methods of reform. Granted that the reform is desirable; the special question is, Is it feasible? At this point hosts of investigators arise, each with his special theory and procedure. It is here that the discussion must turn, and enlightenment is needed.

It is not our purpose to give in detail the various phonic, pictorial, and phonetic systems that have been proposed as a solution of the problem in question, or to show in what particulars such men as Pitman and Leigh differ with one another. The special need, from the first, has been greater uniformity of method. There has been less danger from the absence of interest on the part of scholars and the people than from the wild variety of views among those who have been one as to the urgent need and final purpose of reform. Some one definite and feasible scheme must be offered to the judgment of the people. Up to a recent period no such unanimity of plan existed.

Opinion has varied, for example, between the minimum number of signs, at thirty-six, and the maximum number, at forty-four. Such a difference is too wide to commend itself to critical or even to common minds. As Professor Lounsbury expresses it: "When authority enough of the whole body of educated men can be collected to consent to the introduction of a reformed orthography, its triumph will have been achieved." These diversities of view have been fast disappearing, and common ground may now be said to have been reached.

At a recent meeting of the English Spelling Reform Association, in London, this unifying of plans was the chief topic of discussion. Sharp distinctions were made for the first time between essential and non-essential conditions. Among the twenty-seven schemes proposed, a severe eliminating process selected seven as test examples of feasible plans. In order still further to show the necessity of unity, the essential conditions of the seven methods were reduced to two. At this point unity appears in alphabetical systems, and light breaks over the entire province of reform. The one method of reform proposed may be termed the Phonetic or Ideal, as distinct from the present Historical or Anti-Phonetic System. It is that method recently adopted in joint action by the Philological Society of England and the American Philological Association. It expresses the latest and best result of the reform movement in England and America, and is the only method to which this paper refers. Much of the random discussion of the day on spelling reform seems to be conducted in utter ignorance of this method proposed to us by the two most distinguished philological bodies of the English world. This method is based on the exact correspondence of sounds and signs. The Phonetic alphabet adopted by the Spelling Reform Association, in Baltimore, in 1877, presents it in feasible form. Its principles are:

1. There are eighteen Roman letters that commonly represent in English nearly the same elementary sounds that they represented in Latin: *a* (father), *b*, *c* (*k*, *g*), *d*, *e* (*met*), *f*, *g* (*go*), *h*, *i* (*pick*), *l*, *m*, *n*, *o* (*go*), *p*, *r*, *s* (*so*), *t*, *u* (*full*).

2. The consonant sounds represented in Latin by *i* and *u* are now represented by *y* and *w*, and the sounds corresponding to *f* and *s* are now represented by *v* and *z*.

3. There are three short vowels unknown to the early Romans, which are without proper representatives in English, those in *fat*, *not*, *but*.

4. There are five elementary consonants represented by digraphs—*th* (*thin*), *th=ðh* (*then*), *sh* (*she*), *sh* (*asure*), *ng* (*sing*), also, *ch* (*church*), *g* (*j*).

It seems best to follow the Latin in the use of a single sign for a short vowel and its long sound, distinguishing them, when necessary, by a diacritical mark. The three vowels in *fat*, *not*, *but*, need new letters, and for these it is recommended to try some modification of these vowels. For the consonants represented by digraphs (*th*, etc.), new letters are desirable but not essential. With this alphabet, as Professor March says, "the English language can be spelled according to its new sounds." Professor Scott, of New York, writes:

"After an examination of several hundred proposed alphabets,—good, bad, indifferent, and dreadful,—I am prepared to declare this alphabet in all respects the simplest, most accurate, and least revolutionary of all systems founded on the Roman alphabet."

It is essential to understand that this proposed method is meant to be gradual in its application. There are many, indeed, who will never advocate a change of the present system of spelling, simply because it is called historical and has the sanction of age. But even to those who are less conservative and are open to conviction, this method is commended only for gradual application. While in the schools the alphabet itself should be adopted and used, the wiser procedure among the people is that of a reserved progress ever looking toward final and full application. The alphabet itself has been prepared on this principle of wise concession, as Whitney in his report (1876) clearly intimates. The gradual manner in which this method is to be applied by the people may well be illustrated in noting the different stages that have been marked out, leading us from the simplest beginnings to the complete use of the phonetic alphabet. Thus:

1. Use simplified forms in standard dictionaries — *program*, *favor*, etc.
2. Use the two words — *tho*, *thru*.
3. Use the ten words — *tho*, *thru*, *gard*, *catalog*, *ar*, *giv*, *liv*, *hav*, *definit*, *wisht*.
4. Use the five rules:
 - a. Omit *a* from the digraf *ea* when pronounced as *e* short — *hed*, *helth*, etc.
 - b. Omit silent final *e* after a short vowel — *hav*, *giv*, etc.
 - c. Write *f* for *ph* in such words as *fantom*, *alfabet*, etc.
 - d. When a word ends with a double letter omit the last — *clif*, etc.
 - e. Change *ed* final to *t* where it has the *t* sound — *laast*, *fixt*, etc.
5. Use the joint rules for amended spellings.

These rules are twenty-four in number, and may be said to prepare the way for the adoption of the perfected system as based on the phonetic alphabet. They are termed by those who framed them "the basis of a scheme of partial reform." Certainly they have greatly erred who have supposed that the proposed reform of English spelling runs abruptly and violently athwart all that has traditionally existed. The following are substantially the joint rules :

1. Drop silent *e* when phonetically useless — *bronz*, *engin*, etc.
2. Drop *a* from *ea* having the sound of *e* — *fether*, etc.
3. For *beauty*, use the old *beuty*.
4. Drop *o* from *eo* having the sound of *e* — *lepard*, etc.
5. Drop *i* in *parliament*.
6. For *o* having the sound of *u* in *but*, write *u* — *abuv*, *sum*, etc.
7. Drop *o* from *ou* having the sound of *u* — *nurish*, etc.
8. Drop silent *u* after *g* before *a*, and in native English words — *gard*, *gest*.
9. Drop final *ue* in *catalog*, etc.
10. Spell *rhyme*, *rime*.
11. Double consonants may be simplified — *od*, *eb*, etc.
12. Drop silent *b* in *bom*, *det*, *lim*, etc.
13. Change *c* back to *s* in *sinder*, *pens*, etc.
14. Drop the *h* of *ch* in *coler*, *scool*, etc.
15. Change *d* and *ed* final to *t* when so pronounced — *crost*, etc. Not so when the *e* affects the preceding sound — *chafed*, etc.
16. Drop *g* in *fein*, etc.
17. Drop *h* in *gost*, etc.
18. Drop *l* in *could* — *coud*.
19. Drop *p* in *receipt* — *receit*.
20. Drop *s* in *aisle* — *aile*, etc.
21. Drop *c* in *scent* — *sent*.
22. Drop *t* in *catch*, etc.
23. Drop *w* in *whole* — *hole*.
24. Write *f* for *ph* — *filosofy*, etc.

In these five collections of rules for gradual spelling reform, it will be noted that only such changes are advised as are within reach of every one at all desirous to simplify his orthography. No new letters are needed for the reader, and no new types for the printer. It is all feasible, and if adopted up to this limit would vastly improve our spelling.

Omitting many of the minor considerations, attention will be directed to two or three of the more important positions held by those who have discussed the question on either side. The economical argument has reference to the saving of time, labor,

and expense, as affecting the author, printer, publisher, teacher, learner, and reader. In the memorial presented to Congress by the American Philological Association (1878) in behalf of this reform, the advantage of economy is the first one urged. To the same effect Müller, in the "Fortnightly Review," says: "Behind these reformers there is a motive power which has been hardly taken into account. I mean the misery endured by millions of children at school, who might learn in one year what they now require four or five years to learn." Professor March has taken special pains to enlighten the public on this practical view of the question. The law of the present era is that of economy. It applies in language and literature as well as in trade. Other things being equal, that is the best method which is the most direct and practical. The reform of English spelling stands on this basis. It insists upon retaining only that part of the word which is essential to it as it strikes the ear. It presses this principle with special emphasis at present in that the bounds of knowledge are so widening, and the demands upon the learner so increasing, that not a needless hour should be given to the mastery of the elements of speech. No substantial reply has as yet been made to this argument, nothing to disprove the fact that this immense loss of means and energy is mainly due to the existing system of orthography. Archbishop Trench, who stands almost alone in England as a distinguished advocate of the present spelling, contents himself with the assertion that this saving is exaggerated; that the gains are more apparent than real, and are offset by corresponding losses, such as that of discrimination of words meaning differently and yet pronounced alike—rain, reign, rein. Of these assertions, the last only has any validity as an argument, and it has been fully answered by Müller and others. If in the rapidity of oral speech these words of similar sound are accurately distinguished in meaning, such accuracy would be even greater as to the written word on the page before the eye and interpreted by the context. If, despite this, any difficulty of distinction should arise, it is easily removed by a resort to synonymous terms. This argument from economy still holds, nor is it to be interpreted as a merely mercenary one for selfish ends. The reduction of cost is but trifling compared with the husbandry of time and effort that it secures. Economy in this direction means enlarged personal power; it means the more rapid and health-

ful growth of English civilization, and through that agency the more speedy moral conquest of the world.

In the present so-called system there is, as we have seen, no class of principles so fixed and so uniformly applicable that they can be accepted as safe and so applied. Hence the enormous waste indicated. Hence the startling statistics on this subject in English-speaking countries. Dr. Morell says that of 1972 failures in the Civil-service examinations in England, 1866 were in spelling. It has been certified that twenty-five per cent. of the teachers in State schools are deficient in this particular. Mr. Jones, of Liverpool, in his report on national education, confirms these statements. If we descend from the educated to the illiterate, the facts are all the more suggestive.

It is just here that the special difficulty of English to foreigners is apparent. The more intelligent among them tell us, and justly, that there is no logic or philosophy in our language as at present spelled, no reliable code of laws by which the learner may be guided. No sooner is the pupil called to apply one principle than he is obliged to ignore it in the application of another, and so on through an endless series of contradictions. Müller sees but one advantage in all this, as he sarcastically remarks: "A child accustomed to believe that *though* is *tho* and that *through* is *throo*, would afterward believe anything." He traces English orthodoxy to this source, the instant acceptance of the mysterious. President White, of Cornell, is therefore right in calling our system of spelling "the most illogical the world has ever seen." There is no sense or reason in it to win the confidence of thinking men. Each one is his own guide. It is an open question, whether incorrect spelling should be regarded as discreditable. In the average class of an American college, there is but a very small proportion of accurate spellers. Here is one of the strongest arguments for the reform as proposed, and one not as yet answered. The system offered is consistent and applicable, based on well-established phonetic principles, and, with few exceptions, it is the one system that unifies the alphabet by the coördination of signs and sounds. By this it is not meant that the phonetic alphabet secures an absolute agreement of the written and the spoken. This would be impossible; the human voice is greater in variety than any written alphabet can be. But these differences can be reduced to a minimum. The present system ignores any such attempt. The proposed method

attempts it, and substantially succeeds. When Trench declares that phonetic spelling is impossible because it requires "a reconstruction of the alphabet," he has in mind a complete and faultless reconstruction. No one contends for this. Though no system of spelling can fully adjust sound to sign, the phonetic system is the most consistent in that it approximately secures it. The reform is rational as well as economic. Among opposing arguments there are two deserving of notice.

First. The proposed system impairs the historical and etymological characters of the language. This is a favorite argument with Trench. The reader will find it fully met by Müller in the "Fortnightly Review." The substance of the refutation is this: That it is simply begging the question to call the present system of spelling historical and etymological, to the exclusion of other systems. Every scholar of First and Middle English knows that the present system is comparatively modern or unhistorical; that, if we were to spell with strict historical accuracy, we would spell in the line of the system proposed, as we find it in the writings of Orm, Chaucer, and Spenser. The fact is, phonetic spelling in some form is nothing new in English. The etymological argument is closely connected with this, and is equally misleading. It proceeds on the assumption—proved by Hadley and others to be false—that our present spelling is out and out etymological. Here again a simple reference to early English is sufficient. In 1880 the Philological Society of England appointed a committee to present a list of words "in which etymology or history is obscured or falsified by the present spelling." Dr. Murray, of London, finds thousands of such. In our words, lord, woman, orchard, and righteousness, what guide is there as to etymology, to the first English forms—hlāford, wifman, ort-geard, and riht-wisnes? The argument proves too much. Even conceding the principle, it may be said on behalf of the proposed system that all necessary etymological knowledge could be gained by the scholar through study and reference, while to the common classes it would be a matter neither of necessity nor of interest. In a word, the argument turns upon itself. The phonetic method is the more historical of the two, and obliges the learner to return at once to the oldest forms of the language, in the days of Alfred and Layamen, to discern the real sources and historical sequence of present English speech.

Second. The more formidable objection is based on the uncertainty of English pronunciation. Trench, in his last edition of "English, Past and Present," renews the attack from this quarter. It runs as follows: When we are told to spell as we pronounce, it is asked, How do we pronounce? "It is an assumption," he says, "that all men pronounce all words alike, or agree as to the sound." This is correct. As a fact, men do not pronounce alike. Pronunciation itself is changing, and there is no stable basis. As to this objection, it is well not to be too dogmatic. The present system of spelling involves this same difficulty — in lesser measure, indeed, but still involves it. It includes it in so far as to make this argument comparatively invalid as adduced against the reform. Under any system of spelling in a spoken language, the element of change will be potent, and nowhere more so than in the departments of orthoepy and orthography. As Müller strongly insists, the very reason of the present variety of pronunciation, and consequent variety of spelling, is found in the looseness of the existing system, where the same sounds can be represented in so many different ways. He argues, justly, that if from childhood we were trained to the use of a consistent phonetic alphabet, these present variations would not exist, because they could not. *Wiclif* would not be spelled twenty-eight ways, but one way. The fact that with the same phonetic alphabet the different advocates of reform will write and spell the same word differently, is an anomaly due to the traditional looseness in which they have been trained; to the necessary imperfections of any ideal system, and often to the total depravity of those who will do as they please. As Müller asks, "What Scotchman would admit that his pronunciation was faulty?" It is pertinent here to add, alike by way of refutation and positive argument, that the general application of the phonetic method would do more than any other one thing to coördinate pronunciation and orthography.

The present status of the reform is substantially encouraging. As to the active agencies at work, the reader may be referred to the "Circular (No. 7, 1880) of the Bureau of Education at Washington," officially sanctioning the movement; to the successive reports issued by the English and American associations; to the increasing number of State, national, and international conventions in its behalf; to definite local legisla-

tion in England and in America—as in Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania; to the favorable attitude of the press in many parts of the country; to the spirit of inquiry as to its feasibility; and to its actual introduction into some of the elementary schools. As to the literature it has evoked, this itself would constitute a library. Eminent scholars have written treatises and prepared manuals, while valuable articles may be found in nearly all of the leading periodicals of this nation and England.

Most of the highest English and American names in philology have expressed themselves in favor of spelling-reform as defined in the present paper. This fact in itself raises the question at once to the level of a great philological problem. Nothing could be more false than to call it the scheme of a few interested specialists for speculative ends. In fact, the sanctions are so high and numerous that, if adduced in any other scheme of reform, they would be accepted as final, and warrant a fair trial. Here are such names as Skeat, Sayce, Müller, Sweet, Morris, March, Child, Whitney, Angus, and Earle. To such a catalogue might be added the names of scores of others, such as Harkness, Lounsbury, Garnett, Price, Scott, Corson, Harrison, White, Seelye, and Carter. Such a cause need not go begging, but justifies a greater boldness than has yet been exhibited in its defense and propagation. These exponents believe the reform to be desirable. They deem it feasible, and have submitted a definite method, first in its full form, as based on a phonetic alphabet, and then in a modified form, as based on a collection of amended spellings. At this point their function rests. The intelligent public, in unison with the great body of educators, are asked to accept and apply it in a way sufficiently honest, and for a time sufficiently long, to test its asserted feasibility. The scheme is based on popular approval and general usage as the condition of its success. This desire to coöperate is growing, and is the most hopeful thing in the present outlook.

The main province of the reform must be in the primary schools. It is not expected that the new method is to be wholly substituted for the old by the great body of our adult population. All that is asked of such is, that they give the proposal candid discussion; that, as far as possible, they apply the modified system, and do nothing to impede those who are aiming to

insure its full application in our common educational system. It is only in the schools that the full method can be tested by those who have not first to unlearn an old system, but who come to it without bias or bigotry. Hence, the wisdom of such manuals for schools as those of Dr. Vickroy and Professor March. The child must be met as he begins to learn the English alphabet in order to read and spell. On this method it would require but a few generations to displace the old by the new. So as to journalism, much may be done. The Adams & Lyon Publishing Company, of Chicago, have done good service here. The Missouri Press Association at Sedalia (May, 1880) set an example to all editorial bodies when they resolved that they "heartily sympathized with the earnest efforts to simplify English spelling," and would "aid and encourage one another to begin and make such gradual changes as are recommended." The "Home Journal" of New York has seconded this action, while our best journals have admitted more or less of change by way of trial. A corporate press association, as suggested by the "Utica Herald," would be an invaluable auxiliary. It is interesting to note, in reference to our two standard dictionaries, that Noah Webster was one of the pioneer reformers, and that in the successive editions of Worcester and Webster alike, amended spellings are more and more numerous. It is also gratifying that Dr. Murray, of London, the editor-in-chief of the great Historical English Dictionary, now preparing, is one of the vice-presidents of the Reform Association. Recent American critics have called attention to the need of a journal of popular philology. The prospectus of such a journal lies before us, and the list of its projectors corresponds very suggestively with the list of spelling reformers, while among its statements we read: "It is proposed to adopt as the standard of orthography that recommended by the Philological Associations of England and America."

The reform of our spelling is a necessity. The method proposed is a vast improvement upon the present one, and is practicable. The weight of scholarly authority is on its side. Its outlook is promising. As a gradual and general reform it finds its present need to be actual introduction in schools, partial use by journalists, and the intelligent study of the people. Some essential reform of English spelling is sure to come, and possibly within the experience of those now living. The greatest Englishman of the present century, Mr. Gladstone, tells us that if he

were younger he would lead the movement, while England's Post Laureate is on its official boards. It is an eminently economical and rational movement, projected partly by the very necessities of language, and partly by popular needs. No reform of modern times can present so goodly a list of advocates, and while by no means unattended with objections and difficulties, it is so substantially valid and judicious as to be safely commended to the schools for immediate adoption, and to all English-speaking people for intelligent discussion and approval.

T. W. HUNT.

THE ARMY OF THE DISCONTENTED.

In January, 1884, the following paragraph appeared in one of the daily papers :

"It is estimated that at the present time one million and a half of men are out of employment in the United States ; it is safe to predict that, if opportunities were offered to these men to drop into useful occupations, a large majority would not avail themselves of them."

Since then, the number of the unemployed must have increased, for nearly every day we read such items as this :

"The worsted mill connected with the Bigelow Carpet Mills, which employs about three hundred hands, shut down this morning for three weeks. This, with the five per cent. cut down at the Lancaster Gingham Mills, where two thousand five hundred hands are employed, which also went into effect this morning, makes Clinton's business outlook decidedly poor."

In the two years ending December 1, 1884, those employed in and around the coal-mines worked but little over half-time, and for the length of time that they were not at work they must be counted in with the unemployed. If the figures above quoted were correct in January, it is safe to assume that at present the number will not fall short of 2,000,000. The census of 1880 shows that the number of persons engaged in gainful occupations was 17,392,099. Of this number 3,837,112 were engaged in manufacturing, mechanical, and mining pursuits, while 5,183,099 gained a livelihood as laborers (agricultural and otherwise). Thus in 1880 we had in the United States, between laborers, mechanics, miners, and those engaged in manufacturing establishments, 9,020,211 persons.

From a personal experience, I am led to believe that the greater portion of those who are now out of employment comes from occupations that go to make up the 9,020,211. It is safe to

assume that the 2,000,000 unemployed persons are discontented with their lot; and not only are they discontented, but those who labor at the same occupations that they previously followed have every reason to be dissatisfied also. With so many men and women seeking employment, the tendency of wages must be downward. It does not follow, because men are out of employment, that such articles as their fellow-workmen produce should decrease in value, or that the profit on the manufactured article, accruing to the owners of the establishments in which they work, should be any less; on the contrary, the expectation is that diminished production will increase the price of the manufactured article, or at least prevent its depreciation when thrown on the market. Notwithstanding the reduction in the expenses of the mining company, we pay the same price for coal that we paid a year ago. It matters not that the carpet mills "suspend three hundred hands," the price of carpeting remains unchanged. The gingham mills and the cotton and woolen mills may reduce the wages of employes five and ten per cent., yet the price of gingham and calico continues as before. Whether the manufactured article commands the same price in the market or not, the employer, knowing that he can secure an abundance of help, reduces the wages of his employes. Those who are out of employment are no longer producers, and they certainly are not consumers to any increased extent. The wages of those employed having been reduced, their powers of consumption are limited. The merchant whose shelves are stocked with goods becomes discontented when he views the rows of men and women that stand in front of his store, peering with hungry-looking eyes through his windows at the goods so temptingly held to view, willing and anxious to buy these goods, but deprived of the means, through enforced idleness or inadequate compensation for services rendered. Ask the business man what the cause of the depression is, and he, parrot-like, will say, "It is all regulated by the law of supply and demand." A moment's reflection would show him that the law of supply and demand, like all other laws, is open to different constructions. On his shelves is a supply of goods; outside of his window is a demand for these goods—a demand that is at all times equal to the supply. Why is it that the demand does not reach forth and secure the supply? The answer comes, "Because the medium of exchange is lacking; because labor is too

cheap and plenty, and money too dear and scarce." That a deep-rooted feeling of discontent pervades the masses, none can deny; that there is a just cause for it, must be admitted. The old cry, "These agitators are stirring up a feeling of dissatisfaction among workingmen, and they should be suppressed," will not avail now. Every thinking person knows that the agitator did not throw two millions of men out of employment. The man that reads such paragraphs as this will not lay the blame of it at the door of the agitator.

"Mrs. Sarah Jane Geary, an Englishwoman, residing in this city, committed suicide a few days since. Her husband is a miner, and, owing to the frequent suspensions of business in the mines during the past winter, his meager earnings were insufficient to support the family. The fact preyed on Mrs. Geary's mind, and she resolved to end her life, that her children might receive her share of the food, otherwise they would go hungry."

The Cincinnati riots, that occurred less than one year ago, were not brought about through the agitation of the labor leader. If the demand for "the removal of unjust technicalities, delays, and discriminations in the administration of justice" had been listened to when first made by the Knights of Labor, Cincinnati would have been spared sorrow and disgrace, and her "prominent citizens" would not have had to lead a mob in order to open the eyes of the country to the manner in which her courts were throttled and virtue and truth were trampled upon in her temples of justice. That the army of the discontented is gathering fresh recruits day by day is true, and if this army should become so large that, driven to desperation, it should one day arise in its wrath and grapple with its real or fancied enemy, the responsibility for that act must fall upon the heads of those who could have averted the blow, but who turned a deaf ear to the supplication of suffering humanity, and gave the screw of oppression an extra turn because they had the power. Workingmen's organizations are doing all they can to avert the blow; but if that day dawns upon us, it will be chargeable directly to men who taunt others with unequal earnings and distort the truth as was done in an interview recently had with Mr. William H. Vanderbilt:

"One of the troubles in this country just now is the relation of wages to the cost of production. A skilled workman in almost every branch of business gets every day money enough to buy a barrel of flour. I don't refer to

ordinary laborers, but to men skilled at their trades. The man who makes the article receives as much wages in many instances as the article is worth when it is finished. This is not exactly fair, in my opinion, and must be adjusted. Until wages bear a truer relation to production, there can be no real prosperity in the country."

I have seen no denial of the above, and take it for granted that it is a correct report. Mr. Vanderbilt starts out well enough, but he is in error when he says that "a skilled workman in almost every branch of business gets money enough every day to buy a barrel of flour." I know of no business in the United States in which a skilled mechanic, working regularly at his trade day by day, gets money enough for his day's labor to buy a barrel of flour. That they earn the price of a barrel of flour, I do not deny; but that they get it, is not true. It may be that Mr. Vanderbilt refers to superintendents, foremen, or contractors, for they are the only ones that receive such wages. The average wage paid to the skilled mechanic will not exceed \$2.50 a day. I know of but few branches of business in which men can command that price. The wages of skilled mechanics are on the decline, while the price of flour remains unchanged, from \$5.75 to \$8.50 a barrel. If Mr. Vanderbilt will demonstrate how one can purchase a six-dollar barrel of flour for two dollars and a half, he will have solved a very difficult problem for the workingman. It is not the labor of the skilled mechanic alone that must be taken into account in computing the cost of the manufactured article; the average price paid to labor in the establishment should be the standard, if a standard of wages is required. An examination of the last census report shows that the number of manufacturing establishments in the United States was 253,852, and the amount of capital invested was \$2,790,272,606; the average number of hands employed was 2,732,595; the value of the raw material was \$3,396,823,549; while the product of the manufactured articles was \$5,369,579,191. Deduct the sum paid for the raw material from the product of the manufactured article, and we have \$1,972,745,642. This sum represents the difference between the price paid for the article when in a raw state and that received for it when manufactured. It is evident that something more than interest on money invested was required to give this additional value to the material. That something was the labor of the hands referred to. The total amount paid in wages to the employes of

these establishments was \$947,953,795. Deducting this amount from the \$1,972,745,642, we have left \$1,024,791,847. This sum goes to the manufacturer. It is estimated by some that the amount paid for raw material includes taxes, insurance, salaries, and repairs; but, in the absence of reliable statistics, I am not prepared to prove that such is the case. By adding the sum paid for raw material to the amount of capital invested, we have \$6,187,096,155, the total investment of the manufacturer. From this sum we have, pitted against every one of the 2,732,595 employés, a fraction over \$2264. While the average yearly earnings of each employé were \$720, he received in wages but a fraction over \$346, or a trifle over one dollar a day for every working day in the year. Subtract the wages of the employé from his earnings, and we have left \$374. The employé receives an average of \$346 a year for his labor, while his employer receives \$374 on an investment of \$2264. Instead of basing the cost of the manufactured article on the wages given to the highest-priced skilled mechanic, it should be based on the average wage paid to the men in these establishments. It thus appears that a barrel of flour costs several days' labor.

It may be said that many of the employés of the manufacturing establishments are minors, and consequently cannot perform as great an amount of labor as a corresponding number of adults. That argument might have had some weight years ago, but now it is fruitless. The age and strength of the workman are no longer regarded as factors in the field of production; it is the skill of the operator in managing a labor-saving machine that is held to be the most essential. It is true that a child can operate a machine as successfully as a man, and that muscle is no longer a requisite in accomplishing results. It is also true that less time is required to perform a given amount of labor than heretofore. This being the case, the plea for shorter hours is not unreasonable. Benjamin Franklin said, one hundred years ago, that "if the workers of the world would labor but four hours each day, they could produce enough in that length of time to supply the wants of mankind." While it is true that the means of supplying the wants of man have increased as if by magic, yet man has acquired no new wants; he is merely enabled to gratify his needs more fully. If it were true in Franklin's time that four hours of toil each day would prove sufficient to minister to the necessities of the world's inhabitants,

the argument certainly has lost none of its force since then. At that time it took the sailing-vessel three months to cross the ocean; the stage-coach made its thirty or forty miles a day; the electric wire was not dreamt of; and the letter that traveled but little faster than the stage-coach was the quickest medium of communication.

It required six days' labor at the hands of the machinist, with hammer, chisel, and file, to perfect a certain piece of machinery at the beginning of this century. The machinist of the present day can finish a better job in six hours, with the aid of a labor-saving machine. In a yarn mill in Philadelphia the proprietor says that improved machinery has caused a displacement of fifty per cent. of the former employés within five years, and that one person, with the aid of improved machinery, can perform the work that it took upward of one hundred carders and spinners to do with the tools and implements in use at the beginning of this century. In Massachusetts it has been estimated that 318,768 men, women, and children do, with improved machinery, the work that it would require 1,912,468 men to perform if improved machinery were not in use. To insure safety on a passenger train, it is no longer necessary to have a brakeman at each end of the car; the automatic air-brake does the work, while one brakeman can shout "All right here!" for the whole train. The employé that has had a limb cut off in a collision, must beg for bread or turn the crank of a hand-organ and gather his pennies under the legend, "Please assist a poor soldier who lost his leg at Gettysburg." He is no longer stationed, flag in hand, at the switch; the automatic lever directs the course of the train and renders the one-legged switchman unnecessary. It is said that the iron-molder recently invented is capable of performing as much labor as three skilled workmen; while the following dispatch to a Philadelphia paper, from Mahanoy City, shows what is being done in the mines:

"For the past three years the reduction in wages has been systematic and steady. When one of the officials of one of the great companies was interviewed on the matter, he replied that the advance in labor-saving machinery had lightened the labor of the men. A miner at one of the Reading collieries says that some months ago he expended a large sum for a patent drill, which enabled him to do five times the usual amount of work. He was employed in driving a gangway, the price paid being \$10 a yard; but at the end of the week, when the officials saw the amount of work he had done, the rate was reduced to \$4.50 a yard."

Take the iron-molder as an illustration. Three flesh-and-blood men, who require shelter, clothing, recreation, and social intercourse, who must eat or starve, who must pay taxes to support the State, and whose bodies can be taken to defend the State in case of invasion or rebellion; one iron man, who does not feel, sleep, eat, or drink, who never tires and never rests. Three flesh-and-blood men, who have children depending upon them for bread; one iron man, who has no family to support; and the three men whom he has displaced must continue to support families or enlist in that ever-increasing army of tramps. Heat, steam, electricity, labor-saving machines pay no taxes, municipal or national; the men thrown out of employment through the introduction of these agents are deprived of the means of contributing to the support of the State, and an extra burden is shifted to the shoulders of those that continue to work. The existence of such a state of affairs gives evidence that the introduction of machinery, from which the many should derive an advantage, is being used for the benefit of a few, who already feel the blow given to trade through the displacement of so many consumers.

A great many remedies are recommended for the ills that I speak of; let me deal with what seems to be the most unimportant—the reduction of the hours of labor to eight a day. Men, women, and children are working from ten to eighteen hours a day, and two million men have nothing to do. If four men, following a given occupation, at which they work ten hours a day, would rest from their labors two hours each day, the two hours taken from the labor of each, if added together, would give the tramp that stands looking on an opportunity of stepping into a position at eight hours a day. It is said that a vast majority of those who are idle would not work if they had work to do. That statement is untrue; but let us admit that five hundred thousand of the two million idle men would not work, we still have a million and a half who are anxious and willing to work. If but six million of the seventeen million producers will abstain from working ten, fifteen, and eighteen hours a day, and work but eight, the one million and a half of idle men that are willing to work can again take their places in the ranks of the world's producers. Need it be said that a million and a half of new hats will be needed; that a corresponding number of pairs of shoes, suits of clothing, and a hundred other things, will



be required ; that the wants of these men and their families will be supplied ; that shelves will be emptied of their goods, and that the money expended will again go into circulation. It would entail hardship on some branches of business to require men employed in them to work eight hours a day. Miners and those working by contract could not very well adopt the eight-hour plan without lengthening their hours of labor. Before giving the matter a second thought, many of these men look upon the eight-hour agitation as of no consequence to them. If a mechanic is thrown out of employment and cannot find anything to do at his trade, he turns toward the first place where an opportunity for work is presented. If he is reënforced by two million idle men, the number that apply at the mouth of the mine, or seek to secure contracts at lower figures, become quite large, and the miner and contract-man grumble because so many men are crowding in upon them in quest of work. Every new applicant for work in the mine makes it possible for the boss to let his contract to a lower bidder ; therefore it is clearly to the interest of the miner to assist in reducing the hours of labor in shop, mill, and factory, to the end that the idle millions may be gathered in from the streets to self-sustaining positions.

The eight-hour system, to be of value to the masses, must be put in operation all over the country, for the manufacturers of one State cannot successfully compete with those of other States if they run their establishments but eight hours while others operate theirs ten or twelve hours a day. The movement should be national, and should have the hearty coöperation of all men.

A Scottish clergyman, Dr. Donald Macleod, in a sermon on "The Sin of Cheapness," says that "the craving for cheapness and hunting after bargains is not only economically false, but a cause of great suffering to thousands of men, women, and children." If men worked shorter hours, they would learn that when a man begins to look for cheap bargains he strikes a blow at trade everywhere. The employer looks for a better bargain in labor, and reduces his force or hires cheaper men. His employé must practice enforced economy, which is no saving ; he drives sharper bargains for articles manufactured by others ; he cannot purchase so good an article, or in such quantities, as before ; and the effect is felt where these articles are made, taking the shape of a reduction either in the working force or in the wages. When the President of the United States issued his

Thanksgiving proclamation in 1884, there were millions of men and women in want of bread, notwithstanding "the abundant harvests and continued prosperity which God hath vouchsafed to this nation," and the cry, not of thanksgiving, went up from millions of farmers of "Too much wheat!" Doubting as to the exact meaning of the Creator in growing so much wheat, they invoked the aid of such institutions as the Chicago Board of Trade, in the hope of thwarting the will of God by cornering wheat. These men invoked blessings on their Thanksgiving dinners, and thanked God for the turkey, while they hoarded the wheat away from those who asked for bread.

Give men shorter hours in which to labor, and you give them more time to study and learn why bread is so scarce while wheat is so plenty. You give them more time in which to learn that millions of acres of American soil are controlled by alien landlords that have no interest in America but to draw a revenue from it. You give them time to learn that America belongs to Americans, native and naturalized, and that the landlord who drives his tenant from the Old World must not be permitted to exact tribute from him when he settles in our country.

T. V. POWDERLY.

COMMENTS.

MR. EDITOR: The Rev. Dr. Shedd's article on Endless Punishment, in the February number of the REVIEW, is so skillful a bit of dialectics, so accurate and clever in much of its reasoning, and at the same time so full of unconscious self-portraiture, that I can quite understand your determination to risk the publication of such a paper in pages noteworthy otherwise for their catholicity. The reverend gentleman handles his brief well, and if he fails to convince me that everlasting damnation is a cheerful creed, quite reconcilable with human ideas of the goodness of God, it is not from any want of talent as, literally, a devil's advocate. At the same time, I think he has a very bad case — unless, as I suspect, he is a sly humorist, and really means, in his dry way, to express sympathy for the other side. I am reminded of a famous dictum of Frederick the Great, uttered when this very question was fluttering the ecclesiastical dove-cotes. "Let those who believe in eternal damnation," he said, "be eternally damned, as they hope and believe; but, in the mean time, let them leave other more charitable people alone." I quite agree with Dr. Shedd, that God is Eternal Justice; but on what possible ground does our finite reason presume to fathom the ways in which that Eternal Justice is to work? How is the Conditioned to postulate the conduct of the Unconditioned, to show where finite sin ends and infinite retribution begins? It seems to many of us that the great saving strength of Christianity is its power to explain away the very Nemesis that Dr. Shedd vaunts so boldly, to extend indefinitely the area of human efforts toward regeneration, and to show that, however harshly man's judgment may deal with social and moral offenses, the judgment of God is something so very different that it points out avenues of escape to even the worst of sinners. Certain sins, according to Dr. Shedd, must be infinite in their consequences, and one of these is the sin of taking away human life — videlicet, murder. But surely there is here a very manifest contradiction. The sin of murder, from the Christian point of view, is in reality a finite sin; it does not destroy the life eternal, but only shortens the finite life; for, though Abel is slain, the soul of Abel lives imperishable. How, then, exact an eternal penalty from Cain for what was, after all, only a finite offense? Yes, cries Dr. Shedd, but Eternal Justice has to be satisfied! Eternal Justice? Is Dr. Shedd to determine where that begins and ends, or how it works? Why, it is as much as saying that God cannot save Cain, because finite human intelligence weighs and appraises the quality of his justice, or mercy! The reverend doctor argues very cleverly that punishment is retributive, not reforma-

tory; a point that has previously been taken by Sir James Stephen, in his writings on criminal jurisprudence. Here again, however, the difficulty arises, that judicial punishment, though retributive and absolute in form, is essentially founded on human conceptions of ethics. A judge is, for expedience' sake, the representative of Law Absolute; in reality, however, he is merely the administrator of local ideas of right and wrong. His work begins and ends with the exactment of a certain penalty; he never presumes to follow the criminal *ad infinitum* with the consequences of deeds for which he has legally atoned. Unless Dr. Shedd can show us, what no eye has yet seen and no mind yet conceived, the entire code of a Divine Jurisprudence, and thus convince us that he, a creature, can understand the Law Absolute, he has, in his zeal to damn some of his unfortunate brethren, left himself on the horns of a dilemma. The famous *bon mot*, that God having in the beginning created man in his image, man has ever since been returning the compliment, is sadly illustrated in the case of Dr. Shedd. The God of his imagining is, to my thinking, something monstrous beyond measure, and to talk of eternal mercy in such a connection is, I feel, little short of blasphemy. The wrath of the Lord may be likened to a sword, but never to an instrument of endless torture. But I am quite certain that Dr. Shedd does not realize the full extent of his argument, that he is the victim of his own solitary blunder in logic. He has tried to define the indefinable, to postulate what is inconceivable; and, in so doing, he has invested the Divine Father with the attributes of a human Rhadamanthus. The conception of an All-Powerful and All-Beneficent Being, who bases his Eternal Law on the moral destruction and consequent damnation of any living creature, is out of all harmony with the Christian idea of a Redeemer—one who came not to lead the righteous, but sinners, to repentance. All Dr. Shedd's cleverness will not free him from the folly of having taken a brief for the devil, and thrown discredit on the tenderest and deepest intuitions of human nature.

WALTER S. PALMER.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Murat Halstead, in the rôle of resurrectionist of sectionalism, is a harmless being, and but for his grim aspect of earnestness would be almost diverting. But a wild-eyed and grimy grave-digger cannot be quite comic. As a "presumptionist," so to speak, Mr. Halstead is really amusing. In the REVIEW for March, he remarks: "It is a safe presumption that the Independent Republican diversion of the campaign closed in November will not be repeated." This is, in fact, a very unsafe presumption for the revivalists of sectionalism. It may be that the Republican party will never again dare to nominate for the highest office in this Republic a man who throughout a long political career has used his influence and the power intrusted to him for the service of the public to make sordid gain for himself; who, though fiery in debate and bold in denial of fact and allegation of falsehood, has been quick enough

"To crook the pregnant hinges of the knee
Where thrift may follow fawning";

a man who could be supported by half the press of his party only by a general somersault of able editors. But should it repeat that daring experi-

ment, there would unquestionably be another diversion, fully as independent and perhaps less diverting for the elastic editors than the last. One other thing would be pretty sure to produce an independent diversion; and that is, the success of those crazy counselors of the Republican party who wish to get it to hold a grand camp-meeting in 1888 for the revival of sectionalism. There is a kind of men whom Mr. Murat Halstead cannot understand, to whom conscience is more than party, and honesty higher than success. They have a normal vision, and cannot be frightened from their equanimity by the "bugs and goblins" conjured up in a brain inflamed with party spirit. It may seem strange to Mr. Murat Halstead that they can "keep the natural ruby" of their cheeks when his are "blanched with fear," but they do not "behold such sights" as shake his disposition. It is the sheet-anchor of our national safety that there are men enough in the country with fidelity to conscience to hold the balance between parties and turn the scale against that which threatens at any moment to sacrifice the public weal for some selfish or corrupt end.

A. K. FISKE.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Frederic Harrison's comment in the January Review on Froude's revelation of Carlyle is a capital essay. Mr. Harrison's command of language is the despair of literary beginners. From the "well of English undefiled," in which he dips his pen, brilliant words and polished sentences gush up as profusely as the grains of sand in Heber's sunny fountains. One is dazzled by the display, if indeed he be not in danger of being blinded by it. The point of the criticism is this: That Carlyle, by exaggerating the facts, and Froude, by skillfully manipulating the records, have contrived between them to give an utterly false and inartistic view of the great man's life and character. Carlyle was not less happily situated (so Mr. Harrison holds) than a majority of the greatest writers in earlier and later times have been. In bodily state and surroundings, he was fortunate by comparison with many men of genius who have growled and grunted less. But, by an unlucky trick of speech, and the too artful aid of a literary disciple, he succeeded in persuading first himself and then his fellow-mortals that he was, without exception, the unhappiest creature ever born into a miserable world. As the whole trouble lay in his habit of exaggeration, Mr. Harrison naturally exclaims, "Let us not exaggerate." So, having said that Carlyle "lived and worked in poverty, in most honorable poverty," he adds (to avoid the appearance of exaggeration) that he was "surfeited with all that wealth could offer him." Again, having begun his article with an allusion to Carlyle as "the greatest master of English prose within our generation," he hastens to qualify this estimate by the statement that "the finest Carlylese is never equal to fine English." Thus, by exaggerating both ways, he seeks to avoid the error into which Carlyle and his biographer have fallen. Undoubtedly Carlyle did exaggerate, and it is not to be supposed that Mr. Froude attempted to soften the lights and shadows in the autobiographical picture that his master drew. But there can be no doubt—there is none in my mind, at least—that the portrait of Carlyle painted by himself in the volumes Mr. Froude has edited is as true to life as the portraits therein drawn of his contemporaries are false. It is not an attractive likeness; but there are noble features in it, that stand out in high relief from the murky background.

Mr. Harrison questions that Carlyle had the right "to fling into the street the inner sanctities of his heart," or that it could have been the duty of a friend to abet him in such an undertaking. By such revelations, if not of married misery, yet certainly of something very different from wedded happiness, "a moral wound is inflicted upon the conscience of men." They are not edifying, it is true. But what really wounds the conscience and debases the moral tone of English readers to-day, is not such books as Mr. Froude's Carlyle, which serve a serious if unpleasant purpose; it is the social tittle-tattle, the cheap cynicism, the affectation, vulgarity, and insidious immorality of the so-called society journals. Let Mr. Harrison direct his brilliant rhetoric against this evil, and he will find it impossible to err in the direction of exaggeration.

JOSEPH B. GILDER.

MR. EDITOR: In Mr. Halstead's admirable article in the March number of the REVIEW there is, it seems to me, one important error. He calculates on the return to the Republican ranks, before 1888, of those who acted with the Democrats in the recent Presidential election. But this is not the teaching of experience. Did the Federalists that went over to the Democracy during Madison's Administration ever go back? Did a single one of the Free Soilers that left the Democratic party in 1848, and later, return to it? The Know-nothings were mainly from the Whig or Republican party; but when their organization went to pieces, they mostly (so far as we can trace them) became Democrats. And the war Democrats, who acted with the Republicans during the Rebellion, nearly all continued the alliance after the war was ended. Furthermore, in those historic instances nobody doubted that the seceders gave their true reason. These facts indicate a rule for which there are several explanations. One is to be found in the workings of popular imagination—or the lack of it. Standing long aloof from an organization or a set of men whom he looks upon as opponents, one attributes to them more evil qualities than they possess; and when some truce or other incident has thrown him among them, he awakes to the consciousness that these are men like unto himself, not so very bad after all, and in the delight of the new brotherhood he is liable to forget even the most important differences of faith and principle. Another is, that no man likes to have the reputation of a shuttlecock, and the very fact of having changed sides once becomes a powerful reason for not changing again. Among those Republicans who voted against their party last autumn, there are unquestionably some strong men who will prove superior to such tendencies, and will promptly return to it; but the large majority of them are practically Democrats henceforth. There are two sources from which the Republican party may now look for recruits. The first, of course, is the body of young men that will come of age before the next election. The other is more important. During the twenty-four years of Republican administration, all those honest, unassuming, but not altogether practical men, who look for perfection and can never see anything but defects, who imagine that a change might somehow or other bring in the political millennium, have been acting against the dominant party. They will now have, for the first time in the lives of many of them, an opportunity to see how infinitely worse a Democratic Administration can be, and will go over in a body to the Republicans. I do not say they

will be numerous enough to carry victory ; but that they will have abundant reason for going over, is no flippant assumption. All expectations of reform under the incoming Administration are childish. No reformation ever results from any movement, however honest at the outset, if in its eagerness for the means of success it parallels all the objectionable features of that which it promises to reform. Of course, every good citizen hopes that our new President will rise superior to the power that created him such ; and he may do so, if he is braver than the intrepid Pierce, more diplomatic than the veteran diplomatist Buchanan, more of a Christian gentleman than Polk ; all of whom were the choice of the South,—solid then as now,—and were by consequence its most obedient servants.

ROSSITER JOHNSON.

MR. EDITOR: In the symposium on "How Shall the President be Elected?" all the writers agree that the fathers of the Republic missed their aim in trying to provide that the people should vote for Electors, and that these latter should use their own judgment in voting for President. They ignore the question whether the aim itself was wise, or assume it to have been unwise ; and hence they suggest no means by which, if wise, it may now be attained. I hold the aim itself to have been wise, and that, instead of abolishing the Electoral College, it is better to make the slight change necessary to give it its proper working action, viz., to provide that instead of the Presidential Electors meeting at their State capitals, they shall meet in one body, voting still by ballot, at the national capital. This would transfer the responsibility to the Electors personally, and doubtless would subject them to the possibility of bribery. But bribery of a constitutional Elector can be made a crime, while bribery in our existing national conventions cannot be made a crime. Thus, to bring the operation of the Constitution into harmony with its intent, would supersede our State and national conventions so far as they are designed to bear on the choice of President, because all men would know that a National Electoral College meeting in one body would make its own nominations, as the College of Cardinals does in electing a Pope, and as our State legislatures do in electing a United States Senator. The degree in which our State legislatures are boggled and botched as legislatures, and hindered in their proper work, by making them an electoral body, even for choosing a United States Senator, should cure all men of the desire that they choose the Electors or the President, or even that Congress should choose the President. To make a legislature an electoral body, spoils it as a legislature, and does not arrive at a good electoral body. What some of your writers call the "distrust of the people" felt by the fathers was an actual foresight of two facts that all men will acknowledge to be true, viz. : that in a great country no man can be intelligently, personally known except to a few hundred or a few thousand persons. Millions may know his features accurately through portraits, or falsely through cartoons ; but they cannot know his qualities. Nor are more than a few thousand persons likely to have a very intelligent judgment as to the fitness of a man for President. For no man who is not himself fit for an office will judge very intelligently whether another is fit for it. The fact that he is not himself fit for it precludes his judging well of another's fitness. Mr. Purcell says that campaign biographies and the newspapers inform every voter fully as to the

candidate's qualities. Does he call the flingings of the campaign smut-mill a source of information? Mr. Purcell also calls the work of the nominating conventions, from primaries up to nationals, the choice of "the people." Pray when did these self-seeking political brokers and their tools, who alone take part in primaries, become "the people?" Was a man ever known to attend a primary or a convention who did not want an office? And did as many as one-tenth of the people ever take part in these unconstitutional primaries, which assume to make the choice for the whole? As well call the selection of the Divine Ox by the Egyptian priests a choice by the people. The campaign biographies and newspaper adulation are no more instructive to a voter than the floral garlands with which the priests bedeck the ox are useful to enable the boatman on the Nile to judge whether the Sun-God has really descended into the beef. All men that have first known a man's reputation, and then known him personally, know of how little value the opinions of men are concerning a man they do not personally know. Of the ten million votes cast for Blaine or Cleveland, all but those who knew both men personally, and knew the office of President well, were ignorant votes, *pro hac vice*, though cast by men that speak twenty languages. The fathers desired intelligent voting, without letting loose the floods of defamation or of adulation. On their plan, no one need vote for a man he did not know, or for an office concerning whose duties he could form no correct judgment. Voters would know the Elector in their own Congressional district; and the Electors, three or four hundred in number, would all know, without glamor or mask, the men for whom they voted. A National Electoral College would, if it met in one body, decide upon the election and qualifications of its members, and thus fill up every hiatus in the existing system that Mr. Dawes points out.

VAN BUREN DENSELOW.

MR. EDITOR: I congratulate you on your symposium on that barren fig-tree in our national vineyard, the Electoral College. But how many words are wasted by your able writers before they can tell you what they think! If the Electoral College is needless, then it is a nuisance, and therefore it ought to be abated. Our history demonstrates that political corruption exists in exactly inverse proportion to the extent of the constituency; that it is easier to bribe or overawe or overreach any one class than all classes; that the only effective policy to secure pure government is to make all the great offices elective by a secret vote of all the people; and that the old notion of the Federalists that we should seek to "clarify the popular will by successive filtrations," was false in theory and has been pernicious in practice. Plans to secure a true record of the popular vote deserve the study of every enlightened patriot. Whether complex or simple, all political machinery has two aims only: to get twelve honest men into the jury-box, and to get an honest count of the votes in the ballot-box. Chicago has just devised a plan that would seem to render election frauds impossible in communities that can defend their rights. It was the result of a conference between the Iroquois Club (a Democratic organization) and the Union League Club (a Republican organization) on the last day of last year. It provides for the selection or election of responsible and trustworthy judges and clerks, of both parties, or of all parties, when there are more than two contestants.

These officers shall be compelled by law to serve at the polling-places. No election precinct shall have more than three hundred voters, so that every voter may be known and his right to vote be investigated. No citizen shall be allowed to vote unless he shall have registered, and a legal investigation must precede registration. This inquest shall be made by the clerks officially, accompanied by authorized representatives of the political parties. To insure faithful service by intelligent men, all elective officers are to be regarded as officers of the county courts, and subject thereby to legal punishment for contempt of court in case of dereliction of duty. The scheme of law provides, furthermore, that returns in triplicate and tallies in duplicate shall be made, officially, to all the officers of election, and that the polls shall be promptly closed at four o'clock in the afternoon, so as to insure the publication of the result at an early hour. Other practical provisions are made to secure purity and fidelity. The plan has been elaborated into a bill covering fifty-five solid pages, and a joint committee has been appointed to revise and perfect it, and to urge its enactment by the Legislature. This is genuine political reform, and it should be reproduced and championed in other States. For, with an honest count, and not otherwise, every wise reform can be speedily accomplished.

JAMES REDPATH.

MR. EDITOR: I wish, as an illiterate man of letters, to express the sense of satisfaction that I owe to Prof. Max Müller for his admirable paper on "Buddhist Charity," in the March number of the REVIEW. In common with many unscholarly writers, I have long been familiar with the publications of this accomplished Orientalist, whom we all know through the lyrics of his poet-father, one of the latest of the master-singers, and I desire to thank him for the flotsam and jetsam that he has cast up along our bleak New England shores, treasure-trove from the peaks of the Himalayas, the Sacred River, and the many-islanded Ho-ang-ho. The work that he has been instrumental in accomplishing, through his translations from the Sanskrit and other old-world languages, is not to be measured by the younger generation of Puritans. I am old enough to remember the day when it was proclaimed of a noted infidel, Abner Kneeland, that his tongue ought to be torn out by the roots. This was in Boston, early in the third decade of this Christian century. The charity of Boston was not the charity of Buddhism in the days of King Asoka, of Judaism in the days of Jesus of Nazareth, of Christianity in the days of St. Martin of Tours, or in the days of that holy woman, St. Elizabeth of Hungary, whose life and suffering was the noblest inspiration of the Rector of Eversley in his young manhood. It was not, and is not, the boundless charity of the World's Poet, who discovered the soul of goodness in things evil, and observingly distilled it out. It is not even the charity of Burns and Byron, reprobates both; still less is it the charity of Hawthorne and Mrs. Stowe. I am in a hot-bed of revivalism at this present writing, and the shadows of Moody and Sankey darken the pages on which I scrawl these words. It was only last night that three children—for they were little more—entered this chamber, and said that an orphan girl, not seventeen, was walking up and down the windy, frosty road, out of her mind, with a Bible in her hand, crazed with religion. I have not heard what became of her, but I suppose she spent the night in that *maison de santé*, the

poor-house. Better than alms like this, the moldy scraps in "The Three Baskets." Better still the charity of St. Paul, if it was St. Paul who wrote, "Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal."

R. H. STODDARD.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Halstead, in the March number of the REVIEW, delivered a rattling fusillade all along the political lines. It contained, however, more noise and smoke than lead; for, whatever else we may say, one cannot consider the article heavy. His thesis, "The Revival of Sectionalism," aimed to prove the identity of Republican defeat with the rehabilitation of a narrow, local, and selfish policy; that Democratic victory means national disaster, etc. We all know the familiar wail of the vanquished politician, "My party is beaten, and the country will go to the dogs." We cannot congratulate the author on the novelty of his war-cry. Disrobed of its brilliant paradoxes and stripped to the skin, the plea becomes substantially this: The late slave-holding States sought unsuccessfully to shatter the Union; they were treated with unparalleled generosity because no one was hanged, drawn, and quartered; their full constitutional rights were restored after a period of probation, with additional representation, answering to the increased vote gained by the suffrage of the colored race; ergo, the Democratic party, which represents the most intelligent and competent classes of the South, was guilty of a monstrous crime, because, in carrying these States, it carried such increased representation as to put the power of the Government in its hands, when it secured the Presidential victory. This is the most curious *non sequitur* in the history of logic. The activity of party life is the very root of healthy government. A party that does not fight to win shows that feebleness of conviction which deserves defeat. Yet, as hard as the Democratic party fought for success, it achieved victory not so much by its own strength as by the weakness of its opponent. After twenty-four years of triumph, a great party had gradually succumbed to a dry rot. Many of its enthusiastic adherents had, from time to time, left its ranks, and at last a sufficient body had gone over to the enemy to carry the weight of victory with them. These seceders represented the best element of Republicanism, *i. e.*, that least tainted with jobbery and political corruption. Yet Mr. Halstead, who, like Danton, believes thoroughly in audacity, cries aloud in trumpet tones that the clock of time has been set back, and pours forth a series of woful jeremiads. Let the dashing Cincinnati editor cheer up. He may still have another chance for a somersault, and four years hence may be applying the lash, as he did once before, to the very men whom he now applauds to the echo.

G. T. FERRIS.

MR. EDITOR: The article on Titles, contributed to the REVIEW by President Gilman, is very suggestive. In fact, I am inclined to think it is too suggestive, since it suggests the question, Why not abolish all titles? President Gilman wants a reformation in the bestowal of academic titles, so that they shall mean something and be given only to those who deserve them. If we are to be thus exacting with the scholars, why not be equally

strict with the politicians? If a man has once held a seat in Congress, he forever wears the prefix "Hon." But to give this any real value, there should be discrimination. We should know whether he was elected unanimously, or by the skin of his teeth; whether he was reelected, or was told at the end of one term that his constituents had had enough of him; whether indeed he was elected at all, or was a contestant voted into a seat because his party in the House needed him. If we could have an impartial committee to give every Congressman a diploma certifying as to these facts, his "Hon." might be good for something. I think the fallacy in Dr. Gilman's discussion of academic titles lies in the assumption that it is possible to label men like merchandise. Being president of a university, he should know, as every graduate knows, that a dozen or twenty boys may be put through the same course of study, recite equally well, and receive the same marks, so that any faculty would be compelled to give them all the same diploma; yet their capacities for assimilating what they have learned, for growing by what they feed on, will be widely various. If a young man is to become a teacher, a certificate that he has passed honorably through certain courses of study has its value; but in any other calling, even under the best circumstances, it signifies exceedingly little. Only so much of his learning avails him as shows itself in the man, without unrolling the parchment. The person that writes A. B. or A. M. after his own name, is generally under the necessity of thus telling us what we should not otherwise have suspected.

LOUIS LEEMAN.

MR. EDITOR: I have read with interest Prof. Davis's able paper on the "Moral Aspects of Vivisection"; but the whole subject that he discusses is, I think, far broader than any question of ordinary morality. It concerns, indeed, the whole theory of the moral government of the universe, and whether on the theological or the utilitarian side, it can be settled by an appeal to the evidence of Nature. If, as I believe, it can be shown that the scheme of Nature is one totally indifferent to mere pain,—in other words, that torture for beneficent ends is resorted to at any and every stage of natural development,—it is surely clear that the advocates of vivisection need no apology. All life, indeed, is based upon the law of suffering. The dream of Science is to reduce that suffering to a minimum, and no one whose knowledge is adequate can doubt that men of science have achieved more good in this direction during the past two decades than sentimentalists have been able to do in a thousand years.

J. L. SMITH.

MR. EDITOR: I have read with no little interest the article on Endless Punishment, contributed by the Rev. Dr. Shedd to the February number of the REVIEW, and think it will do much good, by showing that there are some few philosophic spirits who still uphold, in these backsliding days, the central dogmas of the church, rooted in inspiration and founded in reason. Particularly interesting to me is his vindication of the Eternal Justice, which metes out punishment in that mathematical measure, apart from all considerations of human sentiment. Modern science, with all its perversions and

blasphemies, has done this great service to mankind : it has shown the Eternal Justice under the other form and name of righteous Law, exacting inexorably from every man and thing the penalty of wrong-doing, even to the utmost generation. No truth can be more evident to every thinking man than the truth of retribution, permanent in the physical and the moral world, and practically eternal, since no atonement, short of the highest, can divert it from its object ; and there are sins — murder, for example, or the shedding of blood — which even he cannot pardon, and the punishment of which, therefore, must be everlasting. True to the last syllable is the statement that “suffering that is penal can never come to an end, because guilt is the reason for its infliction, and guilt once incurred never ceases to be.” If the converse of this were true, — *i. e.*, that guilt is merely infirmity, and that punishment is merely educational, — the whole government of the moral universe would be indictable, wrong would in the long run be every whit as profitable as right (which, indeed, many transcendentalists would like to make us believe), and there would be no such thing as justice in the world. Fortunately, the Christian religion, while teaching the forgiveness of certain offenses, establishes the hopelessness and misery of sin that is absolute, of corruption that is irremediable. God is good because he is just, not because he is forgiving ; forgiveness being only tenable when forgiveness is just. To say that God pardons sin, and absolves it of its penalty, is to say that God fails to distinguish between good and evil — a hideous supposition. The divine law is fixed and adamant ; an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, saith the Lord. Living in a remote part of the country, and seeing little of the world, I have to gather much of my worldly knowledge from newspapers ; but what I read only corroborates my own small experience, that the world is full of sins that only Eternal Justice could adequately punish, sins not of ignorance and inexperience, but against the voice of conscience and the written and unwritten law. Such a sin, I conceive, is that conspiracy against social order which willfully destroys innocent lives by means of devilish modern inventions, such as dynamite. Surely no plea of justification could absolve the dynamiter from the eternal consequences of his own infernal deeds. But it is not for weak man to determine what sins are hopeless and utterly remote from the sweet rays of the divine mercy ; yet Dr. Shedd has shown that the whole scheme of Providence is inseparable from a philosophy that may be summed up in the words of Robert Browning :

“ Infinite Mercy, but, I wis,
As Infinite a Justice too ! ”

MARK ANDERSON.

1

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXLII.

MAY, 1885.

HAS CHRISTIANITY BENEFITED WOMAN?

THE assertion that woman owes all the advantages of her present position to the Christian church, has been repeated so often, that it is accepted as an established truth by those who would be unwilling to admit that all the injustice and degradation she has suffered might be logically traced to the same source. A consideration of woman's position before Christianity, under Christianity, and at the present time, shows that she is not indebted to any form of religion for one step of progress, or one new liberty; on the contrary, it has been through the perversion of her religious sentiments that she has been so long held in a condition of slavery. All religions thus far have taught the headship and superiority of man, the inferiority and subordination of woman. Whatever new dignity, honor, and self-respect the changing theologies may have brought to man, they have all alike brought to woman but another form of humiliation. History shows that the condition of woman has changed with different forms of civilization, and that she has enjoyed in some periods greater honor and dignity and more personal and property rights than have been accorded her in the Christian era. History shows, too, that the moral degradation of

woman is due more to theological superstitions than to all other influences together. It is not to any form of religion that we are to look for woman's advancement, but to material civilization, to commerce, science, art, invention, to the discovery of the art of printing, and the general dissemination of knowledge. Buckle, in his "*History of Civilization*," calls attention to the fact that when woman became valuable in a commercial sense, in proportion as she secured material elevation and wealth through her property rights, she began to be treated with a deference and respect that the Christian church never accorded. In ancient Egypt, at the most brilliant period of its history, woman sat upon the throne and directed the civilization of the country. In the marriage relation she was supreme in all things—a rule that, according to Wilkinson, was productive of lasting fidelity. As priestess she performed the most holy offices of religion, and to her is traced the foundation of Egyptian literature, the sacred songs of Isis, said by Plato to be ten thousand years old. Colleges for women were founded there twelve hundred years before Christ, and the medical profession was in the hands of women. It is a sad commentary on the Christianity of England and America, to find professors in medical colleges of the nineteenth century less liberal than those in the earliest civilizations. In 1876 four professors in the College of Surgeons in London resigned because three women were licensed for the practice of midwifery, and the whole Royal College of Physicians thanked them for it. In 1869 the professors in the University of Edinburgh refused to teach four highly respectable women that had matriculated, and the students, echoing the contempt of their teachers, mobbed them. Nor did the conduct of American students, when women were admitted to the clinics of the Pennsylvania and New York hospitals, reflect greater credit on American manhood.

All Pagandom recognized a female priesthood, believing that national safety depended on them. Sybils wrote the books of Fate, and oracles where women presided were consulted by many nations. The pages of Roman history are gilded with the honor shown to women, and the civil laws for wives and mothers were more liberal in some respects than those in Christian countries have ever been. The rights of property that were willingly secured to women by ancient Roman law, were wrung out of the English Government by the persistent efforts of women themselves, only three years ago. Among the Germanic

nations woman was treated with marked respect. Tacitus gives us many striking pictures of the equal privileges of the men and women, of their mutual love and confidence, and their lofty virtue; the dignity of the German bride and the marriage ceremony, and the significance of the wedding presents. Their marriage bond was strict and severe, alike for men and women. Almost alone among barbaric nations, they preserved monogamic relations. "In all things," says Tacitus, "they consulted their women," who, with strong muscular bodies, possessed clear, vigorous minds; and though, as in all warlike tribes, they performed the agricultural labor, yet they preserved their health and beauty to a great age, because they were respected and honored by their men, who were chaste and temperate in all things; and they enjoyed the inspiration of liberty and love in their daily toil.

The German scholar Curtius says, "The native selfishness of man has been the great power against which moralists, philosophers, and teachers have had to contend." What sooner dissipates this than a deep affection for a noble woman? No love is so all-absorbing, so enduring, or gives such satisfaction to this mortal life; no power can so exalt and quicken civilization. It was this that elevated the Germanic tribes, and infused the poetic sentiment into their earliest literature. It is only in countries where Germanic ideas have taken root, that we see marks of any elevation of woman superior to that of Pagan antiquity; and as the condition of the German woman in her deepest paganism was so striking as to challenge the attention of Tacitus and his contemporaries, it is highly unreasonable to claim it as an achievement of Christianity. In fact, the Christian doctrine of marriage, as propounded by Paul, does not dignify woman as does that which German soundness of heart established at an early day. F. W. Newman, brother of the cardinal, one of the leading authorities on ecclesiastical subjects, says:

"With Paul, the sole reason for marriage is, that a man may gratify instinct without sin. He teaches that, but for this object, it would be better not to marry. He wishes that all in this respect were as free as himself, and calls it a special gift from God. He does not encourage a man to desire a mutual soul-union intimately to share his griefs and joys, one in whom the confiding heart can repose, whose smile shall reward and soften toil, whose voice shall beguile sorrow. He does not seem aware that the fascinations of woman refine and chasten society; that virtuous attachment has in it an element of respect which abashes and purifies, and which shields the soul

even when marriage is deferred ; nor yet, that the union of two persons who have no previous affection can seldom yield the highest fruit of matrimony, but often leads to the severest temptations. How should he know all this ? Courtship before marriage did not exist in the society open to him, hence he treats the propriety of giving away a maiden as one in which her conscience, her likes and dislikes, are not concerned. (1 Cor. vii. 37, 38.) As a result of the Apostolic doctrines, in the second, third, and following centuries, very gross views concerning the relations of the sexes prevailed ; and they have been everywhere transmitted where men's morality is exclusively formed from the New Testament, viz., in the Armenian, Syrian, and Greek churches, and in the Romish church, in exact proportion as Germanic and poetical influences have been repressed ; that is, in proportion as the hereditary Christian doctrine has been kept pure from modern innovations. The marriage service of the Church of England, which incorporates the Pauline doctrine, is felt by English brides and bridegrooms to contain what is so offensive and degrading, that many clergymen mercifully make lawful omissions. The old Roman matron was morally as high as in modern Italy ; nor is there any ground for supposing that modern women have advantage over the ancient in Spain and Portugal, where Germanic have been counteracted by Moorish influences. The relative position of the sexes in Homeric Greece exhibits nothing materially different from the present day. In Armenia and Syria perhaps Christianity has done the service of extinguishing polygamy ; this is creditable, though nowise remarkable, as Judaism, also, in time unlearned polygamy, and made an unbidden improvement on Moses."

Rev. William Ellery Channing, in his essay on Milton's character and writings, says :

"There is no prohibition of polygamy in the New Testament. It is an indisputable fact that, although Christianity was first preached in Asia, which had been from the earliest ages the seat of polygamy, the apostles never denounced it as a crime, and never required their converts to put away all wives but one."

Hence, we cannot credit Christianity with woman's elevation from the degradation of polygamy, especially as it exists under our own government to-day, in the Territory of Utah and elsewhere, and concubinage is recognized by statute law in some of the Southern States. The historian Hallam says in his "History of Literature" :

"Love, with the ancient poets, is often tender, sometimes virtuous, but never accompanied by a sense of deference or inferiority. This elevation of the female sex through the voluntary submission of the stronger is a remarkable fact in the philosophical history of Europe. It originated partially in the Teutonic manners. Some have said 'the reverence and adoration of the female sex which has descended to our own times, is the offspring of the Christian dispensation.' But until it can be shown that Christianity estab-

lishes any such principle, we must look a little farther down for its origin. . . . Without rejecting the Teutonic influence, we might ascribe more direct efficacy to the favor shown towards women in succession to lands, through inheritance or dower, by the later Roman law."

Gallantry, in the sense of a general homage to the fair, a respectful deference to woman, independent of personal attachment, first became a perceptible element of European manners in the south of France at the end of the tenth century. This spirit is not found in the ancient poetry of the Franks or Anglo-Saxons, but it is fully developed in the sentiments and usages of northern France. Gallantry toward women was practiced by the Goths before they were acquainted with Christianity. Catholicism has greatly diminished the political and priestly powers of women.* It would seem, then, that the authorities are against the proposition that the moral elevation of woman-kind is due to Christianity, and tell us that it is due to altogether different causes, among which we find early Germanic influences and the modern literature of Germany, containing pure and noble views of love; ancient customs, giving woman property rights, and favors shown to woman by later Roman law; French influence; gallantry; the springing up of home life in the dark ages. The brave words and deeds of reformers in every generation, proclaiming the principles of justice and equality for all humanity, must be recognized as one of the essential factors in the civilization in which woman has had a share. With regard to intellectual growth and elevation, we have the same causes alike for man and woman. What either acquired was in opposition to the church, which sedulously tried to keep all learning within itself. Man, seeking after knowledge, was opposed by the church; woman, by both church and man. Educated men in our own day, who have outgrown many of the popular theological superstitions, do not share with the women of their households the freedom they themselves enjoy. Hence, it is not unusual to find the wives of clergymen far more bigoted than their husbands. Among the Greeks there was a class of women that possessed absolute freedom, surrounded by the wisest men of their day. They devoted themselves to study and thought, which enabled them to add to their other charms an intense intellectual fascination, and to make themselves the center of a literary society of matchless splendor. Aspasia was as famous

* See Comte, "Philosophie Positive," Vol. V., pp. 221-223.

for her genius as for her beauty. She is said to have composed many of Pericles's most famous orations, and inspired his loftiest flights of eloquence. Socrates, too, owned his deep obligations to Diotema. In the society of this remarkable type of Grecian womanhood the most brilliant artists, poets, historians, and philosophers found their highest inspiration. True, the position of these women was questionable; but as they were the only class to whom learning and liberty were permitted, they illustrate the civilization of the period.

The question is pertinent, Does the same class in Christian civilization enjoy as high culture and equal governmental protection? Since English and American statesmen, by recent legislation, have proved that they consider this phase of social life a necessity, why do not the Church and the State throw some shield of protection over the class of whom Lecky, in his "History of Morals," speaks so tenderly? What has Christianity done for this type of womanhood? Have eighteen centuries of its influence mitigated the miseries of this phase of life one iota? No, nor ever will, until the mother of the race is recognized as equal in every position in life, honored and dignified at every altar; not until another revision of the Protestant Bible shall strike from its pages all invidious distinctions based on sex. The masculine and feminine elements of humanity, in exact equilibrium, are as necessary to the order and harmony of the world of morals as are the centripetal and centrifugal forces exactly balanced in the world of matter. As long as the religion of a nation teaches the subordination of woman, of the moral and spiritual elements of humanity to physical force, a pure civilization is impossible. Just as slavery in the South, with its lessons of obedience, degraded every black man in the Northern States, so does an accepted system of prostitution, with its lessons of subjection and self-sacrifice, degrade the ideal womanhood everywhere.

In harmony with the pagan worship of an ideal womanhood of sybils, oracles, and priestesses, women held prominent positions in the church for several centuries after Christ. We have proof of this in the restrictions that at a later period were placed upon them by canon laws. The Council of Laodicea, three hundred and sixty-five years after Christ, forbade the ordination of women to the ministry, and prohibited them from entering the altar. The Council of Orleans, five hundred and eleven

years after Christ, consisting of twenty-six bishops and priests, promulgated a canon that, on account of their frailty, women must be excluded from the deaconship. Nearly three hundred years later we find the Council of Paris complaining that women serve at the altar, and even give to the people the body and blood of Jesus Christ. Through these canons we have the negative proof that for centuries women preached, baptized, administered the sacrament, and filled various offices of the church; and that ecclesiastics, through prohibitory canons, annulled these rights.

In the fifth century the church fully developed the doctrine of original sin, making woman its weak and guilty author. To St. Augustine, whose early life was licentious and degraded, we are indebted for this idea, which was infused into the canon law, and was the basis of all the persecutions woman endured for centuries, in the drift of Christian opinion from the extremes of polygamy to celibacy, from the virtues of chivalry to the cruelties of witchcraft, when the church taught its devotees to shun woman as a temptation and defilement. It was this persecution, this crushing out of the feminine element in humanity, more than all other influences combined, that plunged the world into the dark ages, shadowing the slowly rolling centuries till now with woman's agonies and death, paralyzing literature, science, commerce, education, changing the features of art, the sentiments of poetry, the ethics of philosophy, from the tender, the loving, the beautiful, the grand, to the stern, the dark, the terrible. Even the paintings representing Jesus were gradually changed from the gentle, watchful shepherd to the stern, unrelenting judge. Harrowing representations of the temptation, the crucifixion, the judgment-day, the Inferno, were intensified and elaborated by Dante and Milton. Painter and poet vied with each other in their gloomy portrayals, while crafty bishops coined these crude terrors into canons, and timid, dishonest judges allowed them to throw their dark shadows over the civil law.

The influence of the church on woman's civil position was equally calamitous. A curious old black-letter volume, published in London in 1632, entitled "*The Lawes and Resolutions of Woman's Rights*," says, "The reason why women have no controul in Parliament, why they make no laws, consent to none, abrogate none, is their Original Sin." This idea is the chief block in the way of woman's advancement at this hour. It was fully set

forth by the canon law, with wearisome repetition, and when, in the fifteenth century, the sacred Scriptures were collected and first printed, the spirit of these canons and all that logically grew out of them were engrafted on its pages, making woman an afterthought in the creation, the author of sin, in collusion with the devil, sex a crime, marriage a condition of slavery for woman and defilement for man, and maternity a curse to be attended with sorrow and suffering that neither time nor knowledge could ever mitigate, a just punishment for having effected the downfall of man. And all these monstrous ideas, emanating from the bewildered brains of men in the dark ages, under an exclusively masculine religion, were declared to be the word of God, penned by writers specially inspired by his Spirit.

Just at the period when the civil code began to recognize the equality and independence of the wife in the marriage relation, the church, to which woman had reason to look for protection, either blindly or perversely gave the whole force of its power against woman's equality in the family, and in fact against her influence altogether. In chapter V. of Maine's "Ancient Law" we have a clear statement of the influence of canon law on the liberty of person and property that Roman women then enjoyed. Speaking of their freedom, he says:

"Christianity tended from the very first to narrow this remarkable liberty." "No society which preserves any tincture of Christian institution is likely to restore to married women the personal liberty conferred on them by middle Roman law." "The expositors of the canon law have deeply injured civilization." "There are many vestiges of a struggle between the secular and ecclesiastical principles, but the canon law nearly everywhere prevailed. In some of the French provinces married women of a rank below nobility, obtained all the powers of dealing with property which Roman jurisprudence had allowed, and this local law has been largely followed by the code Napoleon. The systems, however, which are least indulgent to married women are invariably those which have followed the canon law exclusively, or those which from the lateness of their contact with European civilization have never had their archaisms weeded out."

By the dishonoring of womanhood on the ground of original sin, by the dishonoring of all relations with her as carnal and unclean, the whole sex touched a depth of moral degradation that it had never known before. Rescued in a measure from the miseries of polygamy, woman was plunged into the more degrading and unnatural condition of celibacy. Out of this grew the terrible

persecutions of witchcraft,* which raged for centuries, women being its chief victims. They were hunted down by the clergy, tortured, burned, drowned, dragged into the courts, tried, and condemned, for crimes that never existed but in the minds of religious devotees. The clergy sustained witchcraft as Bible doctrine, far into the eighteenth century, until the spirit of rationalism laughed the whole thing to scorn and gave mankind a more cheerful view of life. The reformation brought no new hope to woman. The great head of the movement, while declaring the right of individual conscience and judgment above church authority, as if to warn woman that she had no share in this liberty, was wont to say, "No gown worse becomes a woman than that she should be wise." Here is the key-note to the Protestant pulpit for three centuries, and it grates harshly on our ears to-day. The Catholic Church, in its holy sisterhoods, so honored and revered, and in its worship of the Virgin Mary, Mother of Jesus, has preserved some recognition of the feminine element in its religion; but from Protestantism it is wholly eliminated. Religions like the Jewish and Christian, which make God exclusively male and man supreme, consign woman logically to the subordinate position assigned her in Mohammedism. History has perpetuated this tradition, and her subjection has existed as an invariable element in Christian civilization. It could not be otherwise, with the Godhead represented as a trinity of males. The old masters in the galleries of art have left us their ideals of the Trinity in three bearded male heads. No heavenly Mother is recognized in the Protestant world.

The present position of woman in the spirit of our creeds and codes is far behind the civilization of the age, and unworthy the representative women of this day. And now, as ever, the strongest adverse influence to her elevation comes from the church, judging from its Biblical expositions, the attitude of the clergy, and the insignificant status that woman holds in the various sectarian organizations. For nearly forty years there has been an organized movement in England and America to liberalize the laws in relation to woman, to secure a more profitable place in the world of work, to open the colleges for higher education, and the schools of medicine, law, and theology, and to give woman an equal voice in the government and re-

* See Lecky's "History of Rationalism."

ligion of the country. These demands, one by one, are slowly being conceded by the secular branch of the government, while the sectarian influence has been uniformly in the opposite direction. Appeals before legislative assemblies, constitutional conventions, and the highest courts have been respectfully heard and decided, while propositions for the consideration even of some honors to women in the church have uniformly been received with sneers and denunciations by leading denominations, who quote Scripture freely to maintain their position. Judges and statesmen have made able arguments in their respective places for woman's civil and political rights; but where shall we look for sectarian leaders that, in their general assemblies, synods, or other ecclesiastical conventions, have advocated a higher position for woman in the church? The attitude of the clergy is the same as in bygone centuries, modified somewhat, on this as on all other questions, by advancing civilization. The Methodists have a lay ministry, but they do not ordain women. Liberal clergymen in other sects have been arraigned and tried by their general assemblies for allowing women to preach in their pulpits. In imitation of the high churches in England, we have some in this country in which boys from twelve to fifteen supply the place of women in the choir, that the sacred altars may not be defiled by the inferior sex—an early Christian idea. The discourses of clergymen, when they enlarge on the condition of woman, read more like canons in the fifth century than sermons in the nineteenth, addressed to those who are their peers in religious thought and scientific attainment. The Rev. Morgan Dix's Lenten lectures last spring, and Bishop Littlejohn's last triennial sermon, are fair specimens. The latter recommends that all the liberal legislation of the past forty years for woman should be reversed, while the former is the chief obstacle in the way of woman's admission to Columbia College. And these fairly represent the sentiments of the vast majority, who never refer to the movement for woman's enfranchisement but with ridicule and contempt—sentiments that they insidiously infuse into all classes of women under their influence. None of the leading theological seminaries will admit women who are preparing for the ministry, and none of the leading denominations will ordain them when prepared. The Universalists, Unitarians, and Quakers are the only sects that ordain women. And yet women are the chief supporters of the church to-day. They

make the surplices and gowns, get up the fairs and donation-parties, and are the untiring beggars for its benefit. They supply its enthusiasm, and are continually making large bequests to its treasury; and their reward is still the echo of the old canon law of woman's subjection, from pulpit to pulpit throughout Christendom. Though England and America are the two nations in which the Christian religion is dominant, and can boast the highest type of womanhood, and the greatest number in every department of art, science, and literature, yet even here women have been compelled to clear their own way for every step in progress. Not one wrong has been righted until women themselves made organized resistance against it. In the face of every form of opposition they are throwing off the disabilities of the old common law, which Lord Brougham said long ago "was in relation to woman the opprobrium of the age and Christianity." And not until they make an organized resistance against the withering influence of the canon law, will they rid themselves of the moral disabilities growing out of the theologies of our times. When I was standing near the last resting-place of the Rev. Charles Kingsley not long ago, his warning words for woman, in a letter to John Stuart Mill, seemed like a voice from the clouds, saying with new inspiration and power, "This will never be a good world for woman until the last remnant of the canon law is civilized off the face of the earth."

ELIZABETH CADY STANTON.

NO MAN can write worthily of woman who does not approach his subject with a kind of religious reverence; and a true man will ever treat woman, both in life and in literature, not with justice merely, but with generous sympathy. Into her arms we are born, on her breast our helpless cries are hushed, and her hands close our eyes when the light is gone. Watching her lips, our own become vocal; in her eyes we read the mystery of faith, hope, and love; led by her hand, we learn to look up and to walk in the way of obedience to law. We owe to her, as mother, as sister, as wife, as friend, the tenderest emotions of life, the purest aspirations of the soul, the noblest elements of character, and the completest sympathy in all our joy and sorrow. She weaves

flowers of heaven into the vesture of earthly life. In poetry, painting, sculpture, and religion, she gives us ideals of the fair and beautiful. Innocence is a woman, chastity is a woman, charity is a woman. And yet, true as all this is, and is felt to be throughout Christendom, such views and sentiments, when considered in the light of history, seem to be little less than absurd. The poets have sung divinely of woman, but man has treated her inhumanly. At the origin of society she is everywhere a drudge, a slave, a chattel. Among the Babylonians, we know from Herodotus, it was the custom to offer women for sale to the highest bidder, and every woman was required, at least for a time, to put a price on her virtue. With the Lydians this was a universal practice. The Syrians, to the immolation of children to idols, joined the compulsory sacrifice of woman's honor. Strabo affirms that even the most distinguished families among the Armenians presented their daughters to the goddess of debauch in the temple of Anaïtis; and the same writer tells us that a law of the Medes required every man to have not less than seven wives. That polygamy and infanticide were common among the Persians, is a fact to which Herodotus testifies, who also says that the Scythians were promiscuous in their relations with women, were conjugal despots, and immolated widows on the graves of their husbands. And Strabo asserts that the ancient Hindoos bought their wives, treated them as slaves, and burned them when their husbands died. Among the Mongols, community of women was consecrated both by law and custom. In Egypt, Diodorus tells us, unlimited polygamy was lawful to all except the priests; and the support of the family, by the rudest labors, and often by the sale of virtue, devolved upon woman, while the men stayed at home to nurse and knit. In Greece woman held a less degraded position. She was not the slave of her husband, but, with the exception of a certain class of public women, she was reared in ignorance and confined to the nursing of children and domestic drudgery. When her husband entertained his friends, she was not permitted to sit at table. The Grecian view of marriage is physico-political. Even in the heroic epoch of Homer, there is no trace of the sentiment of love as it is known to us. Of the many suitors of Penelope, not one seeks to render himself worthy of her love. The famous passage in which Homer describes the parting of Hector from Andromache, depicts the great hero's concern for his son, rather than

for his wife; and Andromache is embraced by Pyrrhus, the son of the slayer of her husband. Menelaus takes Helen back in complete indifference, after she had lived ten years with Paris. Telemachus rudely tells his mother to go back to her spinning-wheel, and that to speak among men belongs only to man. The husband bought his wife, and the woman taken captive was reduced to slavery and sold as a chattel. Woman's work in the Homeric period was to draw water, to wash, to grind corn, to make the fire, and to perform all the most menial and even indecent labors for men. Hesiod, who probably belongs to this period, calls women "an accursed brood, and the chief scourge of the human race." And Æschylus, at a later date, declares that woman is the direst scourge both of the state and the home. The daily prayer of Socrates was a thanksgiving to the gods that he had been born neither a slave nor a woman; and Aristotle teaches that woman is by nature the inferior of man. Plato, in his "Republic," takes a purely political view of woman, and would have the propagation of the human race made subject to the principles that guide stock-raisers in the breeding of animals. In the historical age of Greece, a slight improvement in the legal position of woman was accompanied by her social degradation. Virtuous women were kept in ignorance and seclusion, and the place of honor was given to courtesans. The companionship of Socrates and Theodota, and Plato's presence in the house of Aspasia, without even the remotest suspicion that such a state of affairs was reprehensible, make it unnecessary to use other arguments to show the ineffable degradation to which woman had been brought in the most brilliant epoch of Grecian civilization.

In the earliest days the Romans bought or captured their wives; and women were not permitted to own or inherit property. Romulus gave the husband absolute authority over the wife, even to the right of life and death. Egnacius Menecius was scarcely blamed for killing his wife, though she had been guilty of nothing more grievous than merely tasting wine. "Slacken the rein," said Cato, speaking of woman, "and you will afterward strive in vain to check the mad career of that unreasoning animal." The Romans habitually contrasted the majesty of man (*majestas virorum*) with the imbecility, frivolity, and weakness of woman (*sexus imbecillis, levis, impar laboribus*). As they drowned weak and deformed children, so they treated woman as an inferior and a slave. In Rome, as in Greece, as

the laws were made more just to woman, her moral and social degradation was intensified. There is nothing sadder in human history than the condition of women during the decline of the Roman state. A depravity of which it is impossible to speak without becoming indelicate, grew like a leprosy into the lives of women of every class, until, as Plutarch says, they seemed to have been born only for luxury and sensuality. Asiatic slaves of surpassing beauty were introduced into every patrician house, and Roman matrons, throwing aside even the appearance of decency, delivered themselves up to the most revolting vice. Seneca says, "They vied with men in licentiousness." There was a universal aversion to marriage, and a weariness of life itself. The Roman Empire had become a slough of blood and filth.

If we turn to the barbarous populations from which the modern Christian nations have been developed, we find no marked change for the better in the condition of woman. Certain authors, in their zeal to deny all beneficent influence to the Christian religion, have sought to make it appear that the present position of women in the civilized world is, in a great measure, to be ascribed to the reverence in which it is supposed woman was held by the Teutonic tribes that on the downfall of the Roman Empire gained control of a large part of Europe. They form this opinion upon information derived from Tacitus, who, in his account of the manners and customs of the Germans, says :

"They think there is in women something holy and prophetic; they do not despise their counsels, and they listen to their predictions. In the time of the divine Vespasian we have seen the greater part of them regard Velleda as a goddess."

But Tacitus here alludes manifestly to a superstitious belief in woman as a sorceress and prophetess, and any conclusions that we may attempt to draw from his words as to woman's social position among these barbarous tribes, must be valueless. Similar beliefs and analogous customs, as Guizot has remarked, have existed among many savage and barbarous peoples. Tacitus, indeed, expressly says in another passage, that the authority of Velleda was due to a superstition among the Germans that led them to look upon many women as prophetesses; and the witchcraft of the Middle Ages, and even that of New England, at a later day, for which Christianity has been held accountable,

was the survival of an ancient pagan superstition, which it required centuries to erase from the popular imagination. It must be borne in mind, too, that Tacitus had never crossed the Rhine, and that his knowledge of the social customs of the barbarians was derived from others, whose accounts may or may not have been trustworthy. Again, Tacitus wrote in the mephitic air of Roman corruption, and the indignation with which the moral degradation of his countrymen filled him must have led him to paint in brighter colors the life of barbarians who could not have been as depraved as the civilized men whom he knew. We know, at all events, that the lot of woman among the Teutonic tribes was what it has always been among barbarous peoples. The slayer of a woman capable of bearing children was made to pay a fine of about six dollars; if she was too young or too old to become a mother, the fine was put at two dollars. It is the old Greek view, in which woman is valuable because without her it is not possible to have man. The husband bought his wife, and if she became unfaithful he drove her with rods through the village in a state of nudity. The sentiment of modesty and holy shame, which is so essential a part of Christian reverence for woman, could hardly have existed among these populations, since we know, from Tacitus, that custom permitted the men and women to bathe promiscuously. Polygamy was conceded in principle, since kings and nobles were permitted to have several wives. "A slave," says Strabo, "woman was compelled to toil for her husband during his life, and at his death she was immolated on his grave, that she might continue to serve him in another world." Among the other barbarous peoples of Europe, woman's lot was still more deplorable. Cæsar's account of the tribes that inhabited England gives us an insight into a state of depravity to which history can hardly furnish a parallel.

It is not difficult to account for this world-wide inhumanity of man to woman. Throughout all pre-Christian history the law of superior strength was the rule of conduct. The strongest governed, and governed in virtue of their strength, and not in virtue of any moral sanction or divine authority—

"The good old plan
That he should take who has the power,
And he should keep who can."

This is at all times true of savage and barbarous hordes; and it is, in a general way, true of the pagan states of Greece and

Rome. The notion that man has duties to his fellow-man, even though he be wholly in his power, did not enter into the view of human life. Captives, therefore, might be put to death, or reduced to a state of slavery worse than death. The slave was a chattel; the master was free to treat him as he treated his ass or his dog. Among pagans, the later stoics were the first to teach that masters are bound by ties of moral obligation to their slaves, and how far these views may have been the result of Christian influences, it is not easy to determine. When strength is made the measure of right, woman is inevitably driven to the wall. Nature, in making her a mother, makes her weak—takes a part of her blood, her mind, and her heart to give it to another. Child-bearing and child-rearing place her at a disadvantage. Were she even physically stronger and mentally more capable than man, the infirmities and the duties inseparable from her sex would make it impossible for her to cope with him in the life-struggle. Hence, wherever the law of strength has been accepted as the rule of life, man has treated woman as Petruchio proposed to treat Katherina:

“I will be master of what is mine own.
She is my goods, my chattels; she is my house,
My household stuff, my field, my barn,
My horse, my ox, my ass, my anything.”

The savage went wife-hunting, as he went wolf or bear hunting, and brought the captive home to be his slave. The barbarian, too, captured his woman in war, or bought her. The civilized pagan was a polygamist, or at least looked upon himself as wholly free from all obligations of marital fidelity.

If this be, in general outlines, the history of woman except in Christendom, it is pertinent to ask whether the Christian religion bears any causal relation to her actual position in the civilized world. When Christ came, woman, like the slave, was everywhere without honor, without freedom, without hope. Men, bearing the curse of their own depravity, sank into the depths of moral infamy to which they had reduced the poor and the weak. Surrounded by human herds to whom vice in its most degrading forms had become a second nature, they breathed an atmosphere of corruption, in which the moral sense perished. Life grew to be a kind of remittent fever alternating between lust and blood. Here and there a stray voice protested, but

only in tones of despair. The masses of mankind—the slave and the woman—had been reduced to a state so pitiable that possibly nothing short of the coming of God himself, in sorrow and in weakness, could have inspired the courage even to dream of better things. Hope had fled; the world was prostrate; in the mephitic air of unnatural sensual indulgence the soul was stifled; woman had lost even the attractiveness of sex, and a thousand slaves could hardly feed the stomach of Dives. To such a world Jesus Christ came, and took Lazarus in his arms, and called upon all who believed in God to follow him in the service of outraged humanity. Before any moral progress could be hoped for, new ideas had to be grafted in the human mind, ideas as to what man is in himself, as to what is due to him in virtue of his very nature; new doctrines concerning the duties of all men to all men, and especially of the strong to the weak, of the rich to the poor, of man to woman. Christ sees the soul. The soul determines the value of human life, and the soul of the child, of the slave, of woman, is as sacred as the soul of Cæsar. “There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither bond nor free; there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus.” That which is supreme in Christ is love. He pours the boundless love of God into the channels in which human life flows. In his presence upglows the purest, the strongest, the most unquenchable love that exists or has existed on earth; and he turns this stream of divine charity into the desert of human wretchedness and woe, to refresh and gladden the hearts of the poor and the forlorn, of the slave and the beggar, and of woman, the great outcast of humanity. He sends those who love him to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty, to clothe the naked, to ransom the captive, to visit the sick. Wherever a human being suffers wrong or want, there is Christ to be loved and to be served. Homer is not so much the father of all our poetry, nor Socrates so much the master of all our intellectual discipline, as is Christ the fountain-head of the humanitarian love that makes men helpful to the weak and the wronged. In lifting the soul into the full light of God’s presence, he not only gave a new measure of the value of life, but a new meaning to authority. The supremacy of force is supplanted by the supremacy of truth and justice, of love and mercy. Slaves and beggars will now appeal from emperors and senates to God, in the name of the soul, redeemed by Christ.

Henceforth, to be man is to be God-like; to be an emperor, is to be human. In the light of this truth, woman becomes the equal of man. Hence polygamy is abolished, and marriage is of one with one, and for life. Wedded love becomes sacramental love, and the tenderness with which Christ loves his church, the symbol of the love of husband for wife. "He that loveth his wife," says St. Paul, "loveth himself. For no man ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, as also Christ doth his church." Thus the family becomes a lesser church, the home a sanctuary, and woman is God's providence, sitting by each man's hearth-fire. Eve withdraws, and the Virgin Mother is made the ideal woman. No Amazon here, no Spartan mother, no stern mother of the Gracchi, no goddess of sensual love, no fair slave of man's animal appetites; but woman, pure, gentle, tender, loving, patient, strong; the world's benefactress, because, through her, divine manhood lives on earth, and peace, love, mercy, and righteousness prevail. With this new ideal of womanhood, the exaltation of the beauty and moral worth of perfect chastity is intimately associated. The selfishness of man, which is chiefly shown in the indulgence of his sensual passions, is woman's most terrible enemy. Love is pure and gentle; lust is coarse and brutal. Love is born of the soul, and not of the senses; and when this celestial flower first blooms under the eyes of a pure youth and a fair maiden, they are lifted to infinite heights, and the sad side of love is the disenchantment that comes when they are awakened from their dream. Nothing tends more to exalt the passion of pure love than reverence for virginity, real belief in the sacredness of womanly virtue. They only are worthy of the love of woman who, like King Arthur's knights, bind themselves —

"To lead sweet lives in purest chastity,
To love one maiden only, cleave to her,
And worship her by years of noble deeds."

This exaltation of perfect chastity is the most emphatic assertion of the truth that woman does not exist simply for man; that the sphere of her activity is not bounded by the duties of wife and mother. She may love Jesus Christ, and, with no man for her husband, become a ministering angel of light and love to the wide world. Purity, meekness, patience, faith, and love—which are the virtues that our blessed Lord most empha-

sizes—are, above all, womanly virtues. He does not exalt in intellect, courage, and strength, but gentleness, and lovingness, and helpfulness. The Christian hero even, like all heroines, shows his supreme strength in suffering rather than in doing. To the most wretched phase even of woman's existence the Saviour has brought the healing of his heavenly grace. In all literature, sacred and profane, there is nothing so touching, so tender and consoling, as the Gospel episode of Magdalene; and he who looks with more complacency upon Aspasia with Plato at her feet than upon Magdalene at the feet of Jesus, is self-condemned. If we take a view of Christian history in the light of the ideals that Christ has given us, there is, of course, disappointment. The ideal never becomes real in this earthly existence, and since even the best reach not these heights, the multitude, of course, remain far below. Ideals are like the mountain-peaks that gleam amid the azure heavens; we look up to them with delight, but the ascent wearies, and when on the summit we find the air too fine for our coarse breathing, and in the solitude we miss the crowd and grow lonely. Nevertheless, on these snow-capped heights are born the spring showers and the summer rains, which nourish the growing corn and the ripening grain. But if Christian society has not realized its ideals concerning woman, it has never been without their elevating and refining influence. To the action of the church in the middle ages we are indebted for the monogamic family, which lies at the basis of our civilization and is the stronghold of all that is best in our social life. Had not popes and bishops withstood kings and barons when they sought to continue the polygamous practices that among the German barbarians were lawful, monogamy would have perished among the ruling classes of Europe; and with the development of popular power, had such development then been possible, woman would have fallen to the place that she to-day occupies in Mohammedan countries. Indeed, the preservation of all western Europe from the blight of Mohammedanism is due to the action of the church, which united and was alone able to unite the warring factions of western semi-barbarians, and to hurl them, century after century, against the strongholds of the hordes whose dream of heaven was a place of sensual delights.

The objection has often been urged, that in making man the head of the family the church is unjust to woman. But the family is an organic unity, and cannot exist without subordina-

tion and authority. Either the husband or the wife must be the depository of domestic authority, and unless it can be shown that woman is better fitted than man to exercise this power, no injustice has been done. Physically man is stronger than woman; he is better able to confront the world and to do the work by which the members of the family are maintained in health and comfort. Historically, society grows out of a warlike and barbarous state of life, and since women are less fitted for war than men, the defense of property and rights is naturally intrusted to those whose hands hold the sword. But it is not necessary to examine into the genesis and evolution of society to find reasons for giving the headship of the family to man; we need but look into the heart of woman to see there an impulse as strong as life to look up to and follow the man she loves. Between man and woman there ought to be no question of superiority or inferiority; they are unlike, and in nothing do they differ more than in their relative power to escape from their impressions. A woman understands only what she feels, whereas a man may grow to be able to look at things as they are in themselves, remaining the while indifferent to their relations to himself. Hence women are superior to men in those virtues in which the essential element is right feeling. They believe more, hope more, and love more than men. They are more compassionate, more capable of remaining faithful to those who are unworthy of their love, because they consider only the love they feel, and give comparatively little heed to its object. Men, on the other hand, are superior in the virtues that spring less from sentiment and depend rather on the nature of things, their eternal fitness, as justice, fortitude, equanimity, wisdom, prudence. This difference in character determines their position in domestic and social relations; (nor would there be gain for either man or woman if they could be made less unlike.) The charm, as well as the helpfulness, of their relations lies in their differences, and not in their likenesses. They are complementary; each needs the qualities of the other, and their wants are the bond of union. The opposition of men and women to so-called woman's rights comes, doubtless, in many instances from a belief that to throw woman into public life is to make her less womanly. Nor gods nor men love a mannish woman or a womanish man. The unfairness with which woman is treated in the legislation of the mediæval epoch may be traced to the bar-

barous ideas of woman that partially survived in Europe centuries after our ancestors had been converted to Christianity; nor has this injustice even yet disappeared from the statute-books of the civilized nations. The causes that have led to the improvement of woman's condition among the Christian nations are, in general, the same that have developed our civilization. Whatever influences have been active in the abolition of slavery, in securing popular rights, free government, protection of children and the poor, in bringing knowledge within the reach of all, and thereby spreading abroad juster and more humane principles of conduct, have also wrought for the welfare of woman; and it is not necessary to point out how intimately all this progress is associated with the social action of the Christian religion. The spirit of chivalry is the outgrowth of the Christian ideal of womanhood. To maintain that Christianity crushed out "the feminine element, and, more than all other influences combined, plunged the world into the dark ages," is to indulge in a kind of declamation that, for the past half century at least, has become impossible to enlightened minds. To say the doctrine of original sin throws the guilt exclusively or chiefly on woman, is merely to affirm one's ignorance of Christian teaching. St. Ambrose, one of the four great doctors of the Western Church, declares that woman's fault in the original fall was less than that of man, as her bearing was beyond question more generous. And then the Catholic Church at least teaches that Mary has more than made good any wrong that Eve may have done. To assert that in the Christian religion "the godhead is a trinity of males" is to be at once ignorant and coarse. God is neither male nor female, as in Christ there is neither male nor female. To proclaim that the Christian religion teaches that "woman is an afterthought in creation, sex a crime, marriage a condition of slavery for woman and defilement for man, and maternity a curse," is to mistake rant for reason, declamation for argument. In fact, the advocates of woman's rights too often take this false and therefore offensive tone. They speak like people who have grievances, and to have a grievance is to be a bore. They scold, and when women scold, whether in public or in private, men may not be able to answer them, but they grow sullen and cease to be helpful. / To be persuasive, woman must be amiable; and to be strong, she must speak from a loving heart, and not from a sour mind. / Whoever is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of

Christianity must sympathize with all movements having as their object the giving to woman the full possession of her rights. No law that is unjust to her should exist in Christendom. She should not be shut out from any career that offers to her the means of an honest livelihood. For the same work she should receive the same wages as a man, and should hold her property in virtue of the same right that secures to him the possession of his own. For wrong-doing of whatever kind she should not be made to suffer a severer punishment than is inflicted upon man. (The world will continue to be unjust to her until public opinion makes the impure man as odious as it makes the impure woman.)

The best interests of mankind, of the church and the state, will be served by widening and strengthening woman's influence. The ancient civilization perished because woman was degraded, and ours will be perpetuated by a pure, believing, self-reverent, and enlightened womanhood. Woman here in the United States is more religious, more moral, and more intelligent than man; more intelligent in the sense of greater openness to ideas, greater flexibility of mind, and a wider acquaintance with literature; and whatever is really good for her must be good for our religion and civilization. She "stays all the fair young planet in her hands."

J. L. SPALDING.

INDUSTRIAL COÖPERATION.

ALTHOUGH the words corporation and coöperation do not spring from the same root, the things are closely related, for the object of corporations is in general coöperation. Most of our modern enterprises would be impossible without them. The State is a body politic and corporate, the city is another, the county and the township others still. These are public corporations; the private ones are sometimes for religious rites or for charity, more commonly for profit. Every church spire is the sign of a corporate body. The chimes that ring out from the towers, the music that swells from the organ and rolls through the arches, are the voices of corporate service. The asylums that crown so many of our hills, proffering relief to the suffering, are endowed with the corporate faculty. The agencies that most affect modern society are the fruits of corporate action. The leviathans, no longer of oak, but of iron, that swim the seas, the railways that span the land, the telegraphs that flash intelligence from city to city across the next valley or beyond the seas, the machinery that plows and reaps the fields, and the mills that grind the harvests, are for the most part the outcome of corporate forces. As often as men need great wealth for great undertakings, they gather it together in a corporate name, and manage it with corporate faculties. The sands of Egypt have been pierced by a great canal, and the ridges of the Cordilleras are to be pierced by another, all by the agencies of corporations whose shareholders are scattered over the world. They who declaim against corporations as such know not what they do.

The spirit of association is one of the principal forces of our time. Within two generations it has brought the East into closer communion with the West, introduced China and Japan within the international circle, and is now opening up the African continent, through its great central river. The "Association Internationale du Congo," latest of international corporations, has

brought the representatives of the great nations of Europe and America together in the German capital, to decide the fate of half a continent. This is the national or international development of the spirit of association. In private affairs the same spirit is, if possible, still more manifest. Men are more and more united in sympathy and enterprise, and feel more and more in need of all the aids possible to united action.

It is easy to see whence came the first outcry against corporations; it came from the abuse of corporate power. It was the fear of abuse that so long limited the granting of the privilege to few persons and few occasions. There was a time when special charters only were given and they grudgingly, as much as to say, You ask for a favor, you seek advantage over your fellows, and while we yield to your importunity you must never forget how much you are beholden to our bounty. By and by the demands of business and the dread of corruption in the granting of favors led to the enactment of general statutes, under which all who choose may become incorporate. So it has come to pass, that there are now in a State thousands upon thousands of corporations. But there is murmuring against them. Why? Because in our thirst for the wealth that these institutions help to increase we have neglected to fence them about with all the restraints that prudence should have foreseen to be necessary. We have, in fact, created a new class of beings, incorporeal, and mortal or immortal, according to the will or caprice of their creator, as chance or reason may have it, great in riches and in power, and formidable by the number of their dependents. No wonder that individuals often find themselves powerless before these aggregations of wealth and people; no wonder that the managers or governors of these institutions should sometimes forget their better nature in the consciousness of their power; no wonder that conflicts should arise frequently between the corporations and individuals, and sometimes between the corporations and the State. That there is danger in the situation, none can deny. The problem is, how to avoid the danger while holding on to the benefit.

Many of the abuses of corporate powers have crept into our system from careless and hap-hazard legislation. Let us for example take a look into the statute-book of New York for the past ten years; a decade, be it remembered, when general statutes had come to be the rule and special charters the excep-

tion. At the last session seventy-four statutes were passed relating to corporations, some general, some special, new laws or amendments of old ones. If this be considered the average, the number of statutes relating to corporations passed in the last ten years reaches to 740. The cost of a session of the Legislature during these ten years, taking one year with another, has been about \$450,000, and as the number of statutes averages 550 a year, the cost of one statute, if we were to measure the benefits of a legislature by the statutes it enacts, would be a little more than \$800, and the cost of the laws relating to corporations passed last year would be about \$60,000, and of those in ten years the enormous sum of \$600,000.

For so great an outlay there should be something great in return. But what have we? Contradiction, confusion, uncertainty. The principal corporations formed for profit are banks, insurance companies, trust companies, railway, telegraph, and manufacturing companies. There is not the slightest reason why all these corporations should not hereafter be formed by the like number of persons and under one general law. As it is, they are formed under different laws, diverse in principle and diverse in details. A bank may be formed by one person or by many; an ordinary insurance company, be it marine, life, or fire, by any number not less than thirteen; but a town insurance company must have at least twenty-five; a railway corporation, for a railway in this State, must have not less than twenty-five to bring it into being, while one formed here for another country need have but ten. A telegraph company may be established by any number of persons; a manufacturing company must have at least three.

Corporations are complained of as monopolies. So far as the franchise of being a corporation is a privilege, it may be a monopoly or not, according as the privilege is exclusive or open to all. In New York it is open to all, for certain kinds of business, though burdened in particular cases with unwise technicalities and unnecessary risks. In respect of other privileges, the possessor may or may not have a monopoly, according to their nature and extent. A railway company has a monopoly if it has an exclusive right to run between definite places, otherwise it has not a monopoly.

The real cause of complaint is that the enormous aggregations of capital invested in corporations fall into few hands,

and, without adequate restraint, control great interests and great numbers of persons. We forget, however, that the same amount of capital in a single hand might be used more effectively and more oppressively than in the hands of several managers of a corporation. For this reason the restraint of corporate capital is easier than the restraint of individual capital. The regulation and control of corporate action is really one of the easiest of the functions of modern government. The great guilds of former ages were more powerful and unmanageable than any corporations we are concerned with.

For our times and our wants wise and comprehensive legislation is needed. What it should be, this is not the place to discuss. The subject is too large for a single paper. But one thing is certain: the State should keep and exercise control over every corporate franchise. A franchise is a privilege that the possessor enjoys beyond the rest of the citizens. For that reason it should never be irrevocable. Equality of rights is the foundation of republican government, and whenever, for any reason, some out of the body of citizens are invested with peculiar privileges, these should be revocable at all times, saving such guaranties as the inviolability of property requires. In other words, it should be a cardinal maxim that there can be no private property in privilege. It is enough here to say that I think it possible to protect the rights of the state, and at the same time the rights of the citizen who has received the grant of a franchise and under it has invested his property. There must be some feasible plan of reconciling the rights of the state with the rights of corporate proprietors, which, while it guaranties the former, will protect the latter as well. Meanwhile let us turn to another view of the corporate function.

May we not prudently and wisely carry the principle of association a little further, and make it help bridge over the chasm, yawning wider and wider every day, between capital and labor? The hostility to corporations has grown, as already mentioned, out of hostility to associated capital. Why not, then, enlarge these agencies so as to make them associations, not of capital only, nor of labor only, but of capital and labor united? Can this be done? If we are not able to solve the problem altogether, we may perhaps help solve it in part; at least let us try. We are all agreed that there is need of closer relations between the different members of the social body. We are wont to boast, and the boast is

for the most part a just one, that in our country every man's career is open before him, so that he is free to choose whichever he will. But while this is true, it is also true that the means of pursuing a particular career are not given to all alike. To bring these means within reach, so far as possible, is a problem that it would be well for us all to study. Though it be true that most of our successful men, the great preachers, lawyers, physicians, the principal manufacturers and merchants, the navigators of the lakes and rivers, the cultivators of the soil, began with nothing and worked their way up by sober and laborious thrift; and that what these men have done, others in like circumstances may do; yet not all are endowed with the same vigor of body or mind, the same power of endurance, or the same strength of will. Opportunities are not equal; health may fail; an agent or a partner may prove faithless; and so it may happen, as it does often happen without one's own fault, that his foot slips, and he stumbles to the ground. A financial crisis may throw workmen out of employment. Of all the mishaps in the world, no inconsiderable number are due to accident or misfortune, or the evil contrivances of others. So it comes to pass that men willing to labor get nothing to do, and want comes to their homes. One of the saddest sights in the world is a strong and sober man, anxious for work, yet finding none. He goes out in the morning to earn what he can, he finds nothing, and returns to his wife and children by a cold hearth and an empty table. This man may not be in the least to blame. He may be industrious and careful. When business is prosperous he has enough to do, and he provides for the needs of himself and family; but when business ceases to be prosperous, as it sometimes will in any condition of an industrious community, and most of all where laws of the land are pitted against the laws of nature, then he suffers.

The ideal commonwealth is that in which there is not only no inequality of rights, in which not only are all protected in life, liberty, and property, but in which all have food, raiment, and shelter, and equal opportunities of pursuing their own welfare. Our aim, the aim of American republicanism, is this ideal. Hence arises one of the chief problems for the patriotic and the benevolent to study: what can be done to lessen the evil of poor wages, or no wages, and starving families? The problem assumes that the persons we are thinking of are deserving. The incurably vicious are of another class, and to be dealt with in a

different manner. What we are hoping for — dreaming of, possibly — is that all they who are able and willing to work may find work, and with it the means of improving their condition. The criminal should have another treatment, the tramp another, and the drunkard yet another. These all in their turn. For the present we are concerned only with those who are willing and ready to contribute their own labor to their own support and welfare. May it not be true that one means of affording them the opportunity of helping themselves is coöperation, and that coöperation is best obtained by private corporations?

A division of property among all the people is the dream of madmen. To take from one against his will that which he owns and give it to another, would be a violation of that instinct of justice which God has implanted in the heart of every human being; a violation, in short, of the supreme law of the Most High. But to persuade one who has much to coöperate with one who has little, for the ultimate benefit of both, is a different matter. In other words, to induce the capitalist to take the laborer into that kind of partnership to which corporations are best adapted, may tend to the support and enrichment of both, and to the solution of that problem which now, more perhaps than any other, confronts the world.

What is coöperation? Acting together for a common end. Several families unite for the purchase of their supplies by a common agent at wholesale prices, and thus save a part at least of the profit of retail trade. This is the most common kind of coöperation. Coöperative shops are in the same category. There is likewise a coöperation to some extent of labor in the custom prevailing in some districts, of farmers assisting each other at harvests by uniting their hands and teams. There is no reason why two or more of them should not agree to work their farms together at certain seasons, and thus secure a concentration of labor and the use of more and better machinery than their separate means would warrant. This is, indeed, the only way in which they can compete with great estates, supplied with the best machinery and abundance of hands. See what the Shakers do. Strange as their religious tenets appear to us, they contrive by a union of forces to lessen their labors to such a degree that the women have finished their daily household tasks by ten o'clock in the morning. The men work more hours, but they are not overworked. They have shelter,

and enough to eat, drink, and wear, for moderate and combined labor. Whaling voyages from time immemorial have been fitted out and prosecuted upon the coöperative theory, but without the aid of incorporation, as the persons employed are few and are cut off from the rest of the world during their voyages. There are establishments in France on a coöperative basis. Coöperative shops are frequent in London for different branches of the public service, the diplomatic, colonial, army and navy, and the church.

There are, however, two difficulties in the way of all coöperative schemes that are not endowed with the corporate faculty — the uncertainty of duration, and the personal liability of members. When half a dozen persons unite in a business, each becomes liable for all the rest, and the death of one may impede if it does not put a stop to the enterprise. Few persons are willing to place their interests without reserve in the hands of others, or make themselves liable for their engagements. A corporation offers the means of obviating these difficulties. What is a corporation? An artificial being; a creature of the law, endowed with certain functions of a natural person, and such a term of life as the law in particular cases may prescribe. The corporate property alone, unless otherwise specially provided, is held for its debts, and it lives out its appointed time though its members one after another pass away. Stability, simplicity, and the exemption of the members from personal risks are its attributes. Is not this then the best machinery for the working of a coöperative scheme?

How can capital and labor be enlisted? Is there any reason why corporations created for profit that heretofore have been aggregations of capital only should not be made also aggregations of capital and labor, or, to speak more accurately, representatives of capital and labor? Let us suppose a manufacturing corporation to be formed with the view of giving to all the persons employed an interest in the profits of the establishment. Divide the nominal capital into shares of small amount, some of them payable in labor to be contributed; give to the workman credit for a part of his wages, and pay him the rest for his daily living. Is this a wild scheme? Let us see.

The plan supposes a cash capital sufficient to plant and stock the establishment, and a credit capital, payable in labor, sufficient to work it. The difference between such a plan and the

present is, that the latter requires a capital payable in cash or its equivalent in other property, whereas the plan suggested requires also a credit capital payable in labor. As the business goes on now, the laborer has no interest in the capital; he works for wages fixed between him and his employer, upon a bargain in which there is no equality between the parties, in which one is to a greater or less degree in the power of the other, or at least stands in such a relation of dependence as is incompatible with that sense of self-respect, that pride of manhood, which should be the patrimony of every American citizen. Why may not the two be made to stand in the relation of equal dependence and mutual respect? Would not both be better off for the new relation? The capitalist shareholder would know that every blow of the workman was given in the interest of both, and the workman would know that every good bargain of the capitalist tended to the increase of his daily bread and the advancement of his family. Let us picture in imagination such an establishment. Let us make a sketch that, if it amounts to nothing in itself, may at least suggest something better. Suppose a manufacturing corporation to be formed with a capital of half a million dollars, divided into shares of five dollars each, three-fifths of them payable in cash and the other two-fifths in prospective labor; the former to be invested in land, buildings, machinery, materials for manufacture, and supplies for the consumption of the working shareholders; one hundred workmen to be received as members of the corporation, the skilled workmen to be allowed wages, say (as often now) three dollars a day, the others a dollar and a half, and each one to be inscribed in the books for four hundred shares. If the earnings were six per cent. on the capital, each skilled workman would be credited in twelve months with about \$900 for wages and \$120 for profit. Deducting \$500 for his supplies,—that is to say, food, clothing, and lodging,—there would be left a net balance to his credit at the end of the year of \$520, which would pay for 104 shares of the stock. He would then have had his living and have become in the year the owner of 104 shares of marketable stock. Next year he would acquire 104 more shares, and in less than four years he would have paid for all the 400. The fixing of the rate of wages, the purchase of supplies, the admission or dismissal of working members, and the discipline of the establishment should be vested

in the hands of all the members, whether actual or expectant shareholders; but the financial department, the purchases and sales, should be in the hands of the actual shareholders. The great object is to bring capital and labor into closer communion, to make them lean on each other, strengthening the capitalist, and enabling the workman who has no capital to acquire an interest in an industrial establishment by becoming a co-worker and participant upon the pledge of his labor. To this end, the requirement of a cash or property capital must be in part dispensed with, and instead of it an engagement to labor accepted. The workman must have the means of living while he is earning the price of his shares. He must thus be enabled to live as cheaply as possible, by having all his supplies furnished at the lowest price. He must have fair wages, cheap living, the prospect of bettering his condition from a participation in the profits of the capital and labor combined. But all concerned should have the power of superintending the conduct of the workmen, dismissing the idle or incompetent, and choosing between different applicants. An account would be kept with every member, charging him with his supplies and crediting him with his wages and proportion of profits. Among the provisions for the workmen a reading-room and library might well be included.

How many persons would such a scheme benefit? According to the census of 1880 the population of the United States was then a little over fifty millions, being about twenty-five and a half million males and twenty-four and a half million females. Of the males nearly ten millions were under fifteen years of age, leaving fifteen and a half millions above it. Subtracting from these the criminals in confinement, the hopelessly infirm, and the paupers supported at public expense, there remain a little more than fifteen millions. Of these over seven millions are put down as occupied in agriculture, and over three millions in manufactures. A host, "an exceeding great army," engaged in the workshops and factories of the country, would thus be specially benefited by the scheme proposed.

If we were asked what inducements capitalists would have to enter into such arrangements, we should answer that, apart from the fraternal motives that are supposed to influence all the members of the human family, there are such economic reasons as these, that the scheme, if successful, would bind employer and

employed closer together, lead the latter to strive more and more for the increase of the common product, advance his self-respect, do away with strikes, give security to capital, and heal the breach between capital and labor. These ends are surely worth striving for, and the suggestions here made, though there may be little new in them, and they may appear visionary to many persons, may lead others to study more closely the great social problem of our time.

DAVID DUDLEY FIELD.

SUCCESS IN FICTION.

THERE is the same "fatal facility" about the profession of literature that belongs to octosyllabic verse. It is not only that pen and ink and paper are within the reach of the poorest, and leisure in unwished-for abundance, but the trick of setting down what are called by courtesy "one's ideas" in writing comes very easily to a good many people. It is almost as common as the gift of small-talk, that "one weak, washy, everlasting flow of words," which, except among Fenimore Cooper's red Indians, with their charming and expressive "Ugh," is found among all peoples, nations, and languages, and is confidently believed by its possessors to be conversation. Every editor receives annually hundreds of manuscripts that leave nothing to be desired in the way of expression, and, if there was anything to be expressed, would be acceptable enough. Indeed, this deficiency (though a drawback, from the publishing point of view) itself extorts a kind of admiration; one turns over page after page of beautiful English, and wonders what it is all about; it leaves a certain vague but stately impression upon the mind, like a regiment of soldiers marking time. To what end, one asks one's self, are these well-chosen adjectives, these excellent substantives, these respectable pronouns, all marshaled together and governed by their proper verbs? I remember to have studied in my childhood a little book called "Mary's Grammar" (the only intelligible work upon the subject, by the bye, that I ever did meet with), in which all the parts of speech were personified. Mr. Adjective, Mr. Verb, and Miss Past Participle (an old maid, I suppose) really lived and moved and had their being in it, and were substantial entities. But this is unfortunately not the case with the compositions I have in my mind, where the parts of speech are intended to be auxiliary, but help me to nothing. An example that will occur to every well-regulated mind — to every one, that

is, who goes to hear them—is found in sermons. How often has one had to listen to some “snowy-banded, delicate-handed, dilettante” young gentleman in the pulpit, whose discourse for five and twenty minutes is absolutely diaphanous and elusive, except for the occasional introduction of the text, to which the attention, half drowned in the sea of words, fixes itself and clings till it is washed off again. When, in the somewhat cynical words of the Rubric, he “lets us depart,” it is absolutely impossible to say what it has all been about. It must be remembered, however, that the preacher has a hard task. It is given only to a very few to make spiritual things tangible—a very difficult and dangerous feat, reminding one of the (reported) achievements of those Indian thaumaturgists who, before performing their prodigies, balance themselves up in mid-air to begin with. The priest, too, is weighted by his sense of reverence, which forbids him to speak familiarly even of matters that he does understand. The professor of ethics, who has certainly no such scruples, does not succeed much better in making himself intelligible.

The disciples of literature of whom I speak have no such excuse, yet are equally inefficacious. They besiege the Temple of Fame in thousands, and exclaim with indignation that envy and jealousy, in the concrete form of “Cliques,” have closed its gates against them. “With this excellent gift of literary expression of ours,” they inquire, “how is it otherwise possible that we do not succeed?” The answer is plain but impolite: Because, my good sirs, you have nothing particular to say. It is a very common circumstance, and one of which there is no ground to complain. The vast majority of the human race, amongst which are the best, the bravest, and perhaps even the wisest of us, are in the same condition. The greatest statesmen, the greatest lawyers, the greatest soldiers, have often labored, and still labor, under the same deficiency, which, however, is no disadvantage. They have no particular message to deliver to the human race; but neither they nor it are any the worse for it. The word “message,” by the bye, is open to misconstruction; it is the favorite term of highfalutin writers, when describing some pet poet, generally dead. Rossetti, I observe, for instance, is frequently spoken of in this way pretty much as if he were Moses. The founder of this school, though he was much more genial and had none of their affectations, was the old Scotch

critic, George Gilfillan. He would speak of rather "one-horse" literary productions as though they were coaches and four. "It is no more possible to imagine a world without an Evangeline," he would say, "than without"—I forget what, but perhaps a sun. In his view, every creditable stanza was a "message," and the author had a divine commission to compose it.

In my opinion, this special license is not necessary for the publication of a literary work (though it is probable that all men who succeed in letters have a consciousness of their peculiar fitness for that calling); but what is absolutely indispensable to success is a clear conception of what one has to say.¹ Their deficiency in this respect is the cause of failure of that great army of martyrs (to the "bad taste" of the public and the "neglect" of editors), the amateurs. When one's own ideas upon a subject are hazy, how is it possible to dilate upon it without its becoming more and more hazy! It is like submitting a bad photograph to the process of enlargement, by which the defects become exaggerated, and what likeness it did possess disappears. Yet nothing is more familiar to me, in that unfortunate position of literary adviser to the human race, in which one act of indiscretion* has placed me, than the inquiry from people whose talents, tastes, and even sex I know nothing of, "Would you be kind enough to give me a subject to write about? I find that my only difficulty." Very likely; but it is, unfortunately, as regards imaginative literature at least, an insuperable one. With respect to journalism, in which is to be found, of course, very admirable literary work, this, it must be admitted, is not the case. The suggester of the subject and the man who writes upon it are often different persons. Years ago I had the compliment paid me of being asked by the editor of a great political organ to become a leading-article writer. I expressed my acknowledgments, but ventured to hint that I had not the necessary knowledge, and, in short, nothing particular to say upon the matters in question. "My good sir," said the great man, encouragingly, "we will stuff you like a chicken." The story-teller who is to make any mark in the world cannot be stuffed. He may, indeed, get his first conception of his story from a chance conversation, or from a newspaper paragraph, or even possibly from a dream; but the main trunk of the tale and

* The writing of the paper, "The Literary Calling," in the "Nineteenth Century."

the chief ramifications of it must be his own. Moreover, having once got it, he must let it grow. The germ of a plot in the true novelist's mind is as a grain of mustard-seed; its vegetation in that fertile soil, if it be let alone, is tropical; but if he proceeds with it prematurely, it produces mere mustard and cress.

It is the impulse of all young writers who find themselves struck with an idea, instead of presenting the other cheek for more, to sit down and begin operations. Yet they can hardly commit a graver error; the longer they chew the cud of their plot, the better. They may dwell upon it, pen in hand, if it must be so; but that should be only to draw the outline and chronicle suggestions; they should think upon it, "in the steamship, in the railway," or in "following the plow upon the mountain-side," if that happens to be their occupation; at high noon, and in the lonely watches of the night—in a word, everywhere and at all times (except, I need hardly say, at church). Their story will in time grow upon them, till they begin to lead two lives, one of the work-a-day kind, and the other amongst the scenes and characters that they have thus evolved, not from their "inner consciousness," but from that union of imagination and observation, the offspring of which never fails to receive a welcome from the world and is sometimes recognized as Genius. They must also have some faculty of insight into character. I doubt whether a man who makes mistakes in choosing his friends can ever become a novelist. This gift of intuition, however, has its drawbacks; like all others, it is increased by cultivation, and in the end is apt to render its possessor not only fastidious (which deprives him of the pleasures of general society), but incapable of looking upon those he loves, and to whose weaknesses he would fain be blind, with uncritical eyes. One whose knowledge of mankind is now universally acknowledged, and who had had it sharpened in this way by professional study, once playfully offered his services to a city friend in a large way of business as a moral detective. "If you will give me ten minutes' conversation with any client," he said, "I will tell you if he is a scoundrel or not, and separate for you your sheep from your goats." "Thank you very much," replied the other frankly, "but your office would be a sinecure; we have only to do with goats."

Fertility of imagination, then, observation, and intuition may be said to be the natural gifts that are essential to the success

of the novelist. Without them, it is just possible, through some particular incident making an extraordinary impression on his mind, that a man may write a single narrative (not a novel) that will bring him some reputation; but that lucky stroke will not be repeated, and if story-telling is to be his profession, he must possess other attributes, of a more ordinary kind indeed, but hardly less essential to success. He must not spare pains, nor shrink from trouble. There is a foolish notion abroad that unless the spirit moves a writer in some almost supernatural manner, his work will never rise to excellence, and that the very necessity of study and forethought almost presupposes an absence of genius. It is quite true that some of the most admirable poems of our language have been written at a sitting, and under a strong impulse of the mind (or, if you will, of the soul) that falls little short of inspiration; but it is an error to suppose that whole novels break forth from an author's imagination in three volumes. Any one who has read with care the lives of our great novelists must be aware indeed that quite the contrary is the case. The idea, it is true, may be born after that fashion, but the working it out involves toil and study, the reading of unattractive books, travel, and a hundred inconveniences abhorrent to the indolent mind. Unhappily, the literary mind is naturally indolent. In many of what are called "the inferior works" of our great writers, failure is distinctly to be traced, not to any falling off in the writer's powers, but to that disinclination to take pains which comes with advancing years, especially when accompanied with popularity. Sure of his audience, the author is too often tempted to let this stand as it is, and that run as it will, rather than trouble himself, as of old, to make sure of his ground, to avoid discrepancies, or carefully to collect his threads together at the close of his weaving. The same thing occurs in ordinary life: the merchant, once so keen in his business affairs, becomes automatic; the parson, formerly so conscientious and painstaking about his sermons, discharges that duty in a more perfunctory manner. This slipshod system, dangerous to the best-established reputation, is fatal to the young novelist. By him, at all events, success is never found that way; it comes by an opposite road.

There is a matter besides reputation, though included in it, that is generally of some consequence to the man of letters, but to which I feel some delicacy in alluding. The novelist is not

only understood by the public to possess inspiration, but also in a manner to live upon it, or at all events on something like it — air. The notion of getting money by literature is considered vulgar, and “voted low.” Still, even the gorgeous butterfly feeds on something, and it is, therefore, hardly to be wondered at that the same necessity is imposed upon the denizens of Grub street. Among the items of success in fiction, it may therefore not be wholly degrading to allude to that of finance. As indolence detracts from excellence in literature, it is also apt to diminish the profits to be derived from it much more than in other callings. In no other will a man who is bent on success in it make it secondary, as men of letters so often do, to that of pleasure. The rising barrister, ambitious to rise higher as well as to fill his purse, will require something much more tempting than a fine morning to make him give up going to chambers, and pass the day in the country; nor does he permit the convivialities of the evening to keep him up till the small hours, and therefore to disorganize him for the work of the ensuing day. It is recorded, indeed, of the greatest wit that has ever set our tables in a roar, that he was wont to send round on “soda-water mornings” to a fellow scribe for “ink,” an euphemistic term implying a request that he would be so good as to do his work for him; but, though the gentleman in question enjoyed a high reputation in letters, he could scarcely be said to have been a conspicuous example of material success. Even indisposition, which is often only another name for disinclination for work, should not be lightly permitted to interfere with literary labor. If once a man of letters permits the consideration of his not feeling quite in the humor to excuse his taking holiday, he will find that sort of inspiration occur to him pretty often; of course there are many examples of writers that have done well for themselves in spite of this weakness, but they would have done much better if they had not given in to it; nor have men of the highest rank in literature, such as Scott and Dickens, despised those virtues of diligence and industry which are absurdly supposed to be inconsistent with great natural gifts. The vulgar phrase “it is dogged as does it” is almost as applicable to success in fiction as in law or physics. It is not too much to say that there have been more failures among men of high promise in letters through neglect of this common virtue of application than in any other calling. The

axiom adopted by the children in "Lilliput Levee," "Never do to-day what can be put off till to-morrow," has unhappily been always a favorite one with the soldiers of Captain Pen, and has sadly interfered with their promotion. As a matter of fact, there is no trade, however mechanical, that requires punctuality more than the profession of literature as it exists to-day. It is possible, indeed, as happened (late in life, however) in the case of our most popular novelist, that the imagination will not stir without the stimulus of "the thunder of the presses" demanding their tale of copy; but even leaving out the unpleasant contingency, that the writer may be seized with sudden illness* and not be able to come to time, it will hardly be contended that this is a wholesome or natural state of things.

It may surely be taken for granted that no man's work is the better for being hurried, or for the necessity of its being ready within a certain short space of time; and I need hardly say that the value of a man's literary labor is much enhanced by the knowledge, soon acquired among publishers, that his punctuality may be absolutely relied on. In these days, when novels appear in serial coincidently in three or four English-speaking countries, to be well beforehand with his work is to the writer of fiction a very important consideration, since it enables him to make arrangements for its distribution. The days are coming, though they will not come in my time, when the popular novelist will reap these advantages much more fully, but even then the soil he cultivates will not be of that sort of which it has been said that when you tickle it with a hoe it laughs with a harvest.

While the more he reads the better, the writer of fiction must be careful not to become too bookish, and above all he must avoid such studies as cause the mind to run in grooves. Readers resent too much quotation in a story, and especially the evidences of "cram." An extreme example of this latter error is to be found in the "Last Days of Pompeii," which, however attractive to the young, repels the mature mind by the cheap

* An eminent Scottish publisher, the proprietor of a well-known magazine, used always to refuse to begin any novel in serial unless the whole of the manuscript was placed in his hands, upon the ground that "a man might die." The example of Dickens, Thackeray Mrs. Gaskell, and Trollope, who all left unfinished serials behind them, would (had he lived to see it) have amply corroborated his views.

learning with which it bristles, and the impertinent accuracy of its foot-notes. For other men of letters the library is the place whence they gather their ideas and "hive their sweet thoughts for putting into books," but the source of the novelist's productions is or should be the page of human nature, and he must learn to read it as he runs. He should, of course, mix much with his fellow-creatures; but if this is confined to what is called "going into society," it will profit him but little. The upper ten thousand is a very small world, and by no means a picturesque one; its "views" are as conventional as itself; even when it is not dull—and there is nothing duller than your ordinary dinner-party—it is shallow; nor, in truth, is there much to be got out of it beyond first impressions. The true novelist should go further afield. Of the evil consequences of not doing so, we have only too many examples. Even in the case of such a master as Thackeray, when society and its hangers-on are taken out of his works, how scanty is their population. The same observation may be made on Trollope. With Scott and Dickens and George Eliot it is not so. The cause of this exclusiveness is not far to seek; it is indolence. The popular novelist is asked everywhere, and it is less trouble to accept invitations than to decline them. Moreover, there is something pleasant, no doubt, in being thus fêted, while to go out of one's way in search of "character" is decidedly unpleasant. It is easier to sit at home and tax the memory than to go abroad and refresh it by observation. If the British novelist would be successful, by the bye, he must not go abroad for his materials. He may visit the United States and lay his scenes there, or the American novelist may visit England and lay his scenes here, but neither of them will achieve success (worthy to be called such) if he places his life-drama on the continent and makes his *dramatis personæ* foreigners. English readers "cannot abide" foreigners. They know nothing about them, and are very far from taking *omne ignotum pro magnifico*. Of course this is not true of persons of fashion and position, who often know more about France and Italy, at least, than about their own country. But it is comparatively easy to be a fashionable novelist; I am speaking of how to become a popular one.

It is rather curious that great popularity has been very seldom achieved by any writer, with both sexes. There are men's novelists, and there are women's novelists. Not one

woman in ten thousand ever reads Fielding, I suppose; it may be said that his coarseness repels them, which, indeed, is likely enough; but even when Fielding was not considered coarse he was never popular with ladies; they preferred Richardson. Men read novels now much more than they used to. Politicians and judges are so good as to tell us that they "often take up a novel," as Sarah Butler used to relax her gigantic intellect over a book; but women still form the majority of the readers of fiction. They require the delineation of the softer passion in detail. (I am not speaking of the "vicious circle," who have vicious writers of their own sex to pander to them, but of women in general, our pure wives and sisters and daughters.) They like description, and relish minute analysis of motive. They shrink from strong situation (Lefanu appalls them); they seldom appreciate satire, they do not care for high spirits, or for humor, which is to them no disinfectant of coarseness; and on almost all these matters men have opposite tastes. I can only recall two novelists who can be said, in any extended sense, to have made conquests of both sexes. No writer, of course, can choose for himself in this matter; he must needs address his own proper audience; but there is no question, under the present conditions of literature, at least, upon which road popularity lies.

Success will never crown his efforts, let his genius be what it may, unless he possesses the simpler virtues to which I have alluded. Nay, even with them there is one sort of success, the greatest of all, which he will not make, though it is possible that his grandson may do so. The man who has arrived nearer to it than any other is Charles Dickens, but even he fell far short of it. I speak of the success that shall befall the first great novelist who is welcomed, not by tens of thousands or by hundreds of thousands,—for that happens even now,—but by millions of readers. At present,—and so it will be, perhaps, for generations to come,—to the great bulk of even the reading community,—i. e., of those who read at all,—our greatest writers in all descriptions of literature are practically unknown. The first with whom it will become acquainted are undoubtedly the writers of fiction, but how long it will be before that introduction takes place it is impossible to guess. There is no master of the ceremonies to effect it. The hands that reach down from above and touch our eyes with tears, are held out in

vain to the multitude; to the mighty voices of the Past its ears are deaf; for it genius itself has no magic—nay more, it is repugnant to it. More than one attempt has been made of late by enterprising publishers to tap this tremendous reservoir; assisted by the ablest hands, they have sunk their artesian well (some magazine of a high class) through this obstinate stratum of ignorance and stupidity, with very indifferent success. This multitude still prefers “the banjo and the bones” to the most celestial music. The secret of success as regards circulation among the million is a very different matter from that with which this paper has been dealing. It has nothing to do with genius, or talent, or study, or observation, but requires a certain knack of expressing commonplace ideas in such a manner that the commonplace reader exclaims to himself, with rapture, “Why, that is the very thing I have often thought myself, but did not know how to set it down in words!” It is a mistake to suppose that tales of blood and thunder have now any great popularity; readers, even of the humblest class, are already beginning to despise the monstrosities of literature, but they still prefer to be taught, as it were, by pupil teachers—minds only a very little keener than their own—rather than by masters of the craft of story-telling. The immense popularity of Mr. Tupper’s poems, as I have elsewhere maintained, was undoubtedly owing to this cause, though, of course, even he never reached the lowest stratum. Until the sun of “Proverbial Philosophy” arose, a great class of people, who had never ventured on anything but prose, were delighted to find that they could understand what purported to be poetry. When true poetry shall be appreciated by the masses (I don’t mean those miraculously intelligent Scottish peasants whom William and Mary Howitt were always meeting with on their travels, but the real millions), the conditions under which literature is written will be changed. A more obvious example of my meaning may be gathered from what now passes among the crowd for humor. Even at penny readings, the audiences of which are comparatively select, it is not the best humorist, but the third-rate ones, that are most applauded. What passes for “exquisite fooling” at the Music Hall is so ineffably dull as to produce in an intelligent mind a feeling approaching to loathing. In such places, even the drolleries of Hood would be as unintelligible as the wit of Præd or Locker. Dickens alone, by reason,

perhaps, of his dealing with the classes in question in his fictions, as much as by his transcendent genius, has any acceptance in these Cimmerian regions; and even he only here and there. I was once conversing upon this subject with the proprietor of a certain periodical, more notorious for its popularity than for its literary merit, and ventured to ask what, in his opinion, was the secret of its extraordinary success. He replied, quite frankly, that it consisted in "never flying over the heads" of his subscribers, and in having for his editor, not, of course, a fool, but a sort of foolometer, who thoroughly understood the limits of their intelligence. It should be added, to this gentleman's credit, that he had more than once tried an infusion of genuine merit in his literary bill of fare, with the most discouraging and disastrous results.

It is hardly necessary to say that no good writer — unlike that Lord Chief Justice who drank beer to put himself on a par with the puisne judges — has ever succeeded in writing down to the level of his readers; nor is it a course to be recommended, even if it were possible to follow it. The influence of good fiction is at present in its infancy, or rather, they whose suffrages will one day spell "success" for those who shall supply it, are but babes, and have as yet no appetite for strong meat.

JAMES PAYN.

WHAT IS ACADEMIC FREEDOM?

THE proposal recently urged by President Eliot that "in a university the student should choose his studies and govern himself," coupled with recent legislation at Harvard founded upon this principle, forces upon our American colleges a crisis greater than any they have hitherto been called upon to meet; greater not only for the reason that it affects the arrangement of their courses of study and their methods of government, but also because, if the real intention of the movement for which this skillfully worded proposal serves as a watchword and catchword is to prevail generally, our colleges must be reconstructed, their attitude as to conduct and studies radically changed, the objects for which they were founded set aside, the course of preparation for entrance greatly modified, and a system of training hitherto prevalent in education abandoned. The roots of this question extend to the very theory of education, to our fundamental beliefs both as to knowledge and morals, to the questions of intelligence and enlightenment in society. The proposal itself consists of two distinct parts—one that there is a stage in education when the student should be free to choose his studies and govern himself, the other that the university is the place where this freedom should be granted. These two statements no educated man will be apt to deny. The proposal (if this be all there is in it) is a harmless truism, a matter of general admission. But it has a purpose. It is no mere reassertion of a sound educational maxim; for the movement it represents expressly proposes to apply this to the American college, which is not in any sense a university, and has no early prospect of becoming one. Believing the proposal, though plausible in words, to be in the first place thoroughly unsound in theory, in the second place contrary to the best educational experience, and in the third place practically inapplicable to all

or any of our existing colleges, I desire to examine it briefly by these three tests:

I. The proposal is unsound in theory. This takes us back, step by step, to the fundamental question from which all the others spring—Why do men need to be educated at all? The answer to this is very simple, almost too simple to repeat. It is part of the accepted alphabet of civilization. Men need to be educated because they are born into this world ignorant—ignorant of themselves and ignorant of the world in which they are to live. To live rationally and order their conduct wisely, they need to know; and being ignorant, they have to learn; and being ignorant and having to learn, they must be educated. But what do they need to know? Just that of which they are born ignorant, namely, themselves and their surroundings. If either of these two is left unexplored, the man is so far uninformed, ignorant, uneducated. A true education will therefore acquaint us with ourselves and with our surroundings. How is this to be done? In two ways. First, by training the mind to its highest efficiency, making it able both to know and to use all its powers to their full capacity. These as they unfold should therefore be exercised regularly, continuously, symmetrically. Thus, by frequent practice, the observing faculties are made acute and memory retentive, imagination is chastened, reason expanded, the will invigorated, the moral sense made clear, and the emotional nature kept unperverted and wholesome. In this way, and by the play of one power on the other, are built up such qualities as the logically clear judgment, the habit of industry, general command of our abilities, delicate taste, genuine tact, and, in short, all those ripened results in character which prove our capacity to act as free, well-balanced, rational men, able to decide for ourselves the thousand important questions of knowledge and conduct. Second, by communication of the most valuable knowledge. The training of the mind is not the sole object and process in education. The acquisition of useful, usable knowledge is also an end; for we have to live and make our way in the world. Hence this second part; it is a chief end for which we train our minds. But the training should come first, for it gives us the power to acquire. The supposed acquisitions, the observations and reasonings and the actions too, of a man of untrained mind are ignorant, crude, and intellectually worthless. When once the pupil has received this training, and

thereby has attained sufficient maturity to know his powers accurately and use them wisely, he is ready for freedom, and not sooner. With this stage in his educational development properly comes the place where his freedom should be exercised, and that, by common consent, is the university. Is it for an instant to be supposed that our American boys, even from the best preparatory schools, are thus intellectually and morally mature when they enter college? Is it not a fact perfectly obvious to every one that knows anything about our colleges, that the reverse is true? Inexperience, immaturity, incomplete preparation, want of acquaintance with his own powers, half-shaped desires and purposes, with a conscious willingness on the part of the diligent to be trained and taught,—these are the very marks by which the entering freshman is regularly detected. Anything opposite to this is exceptional. Ask the alumni of any college what they were when they left school to become freshmen; ask preparatory instructors, college professors, who are concerned with teaching; parents, who know with what solicitude they trusted their sons to the college; in fact, all who are in any way experts, and they give but one answer: The American college-student at entrance is decidedly immature.

It will be urged against this view that the way to mature him is to expect manly actions and intelligence, and thus elevate him by what we distinctly assume that he will do. Give the immature young student freedom at the very start, and this will bring out his sense of responsibility, and in this way will compel him to rise to self-possession, discriminating judgment, and intellectual ripeness. It is hard to say whether the chief characteristic of this view is its plausibility or its absurdity. Absurd it certainly is, for it attempts to bring out mental maturity, not by a training process but by a forcing process. It overlooks the prime law of mental development, which is that of continuous gradual growth, and not strained and sudden change. Shall we then seek to have students do what they have as yet no mature deliberative capacity for doing, by simply expecting it, or by further training? Clearly the latter. Can we omit or force any stages of mental growth, and leap from one plane to the other? Is not the mind to follow its own gradual and steady processes of development? The further objection, that in making a university we are entitled to count not only on what already exists, but on what may reasonably be expected of preparatory schools

in response to the greater stimulus offered by increased requirements and expectations, has the same radical defect. In fact, the new departure at Harvard offers no such stimulus. The news that a boy may soon be able to enter there, and at graduation receive the degree of Bachelor of Arts, the symbol of academic culture, without ever having opened a Greek book, or, if he prefer, a Latin book, will not stimulate schools to require higher training. The additional fact that, save in freshman year, he may now go through and receive his degree without being required to take a single course in Latin, Greek, mathematics, physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, psychology, logic, ethics, political science, German, or even English, is still less encouraging.* But suppose the movement to be a real attempt to secure higher preparation by having the university require this of the schools. Few if any of them are able to respond to severer requirements, such as the German, or even the French and English, schools consider necessary. Our best schools rarely furnish more than four years of Latin and three of Greek, taught at most five times a week. Compare with this the English six years' Latin and five Greek, or the French seven years' Latin and five years' Greek, both French and English schools giving these languages more exercises a week than we do. Are we ready to do this? Shall we ask it, and then simply expect it? For ten years Harvard has asked better English from our schools, and, as President Eliot confesses, with but indifferent success; and this is the verdict of colleges generally. But let us go a step higher in our comparison. Take the German gymnasias, with their nine years' Latin averaging nine exercises a week, and six years' Greek at the rate of six exercises a week. Besides this, there are eight years of French and nine years of training in the mother-tongue. Is it not folly to talk of obtaining anything comparable to this by merely requiring and expecting it of our existing schools? Schools do not stand on colleges, but colleges on schools. The higher limit of preparatory teaching will fix the lower limit for colleges or universities. As this moves up or down, they move with it. To use the words of Prof. Hofmann, of Berlin: "The form and contents of university instruction will always be dependent on the amount of preparation that the student brings with him to

* See President McCosh's address on "The New Departure," p. 13. (New York, 1885.)

the university."* Education grows from below upward, from the elementary to the advanced, and each lower stage needs substantial completion before the next higher can be essayed with reasonable hope of success. What the student "brings with him" from the lower, gives him confidence in attempting the higher.

II. The proposal is opposed to the best educated experience of the world. Systems of education have been built. Generations of well-tested experience are at hand for our inspection. This is no new question. The universities of the Old World have had to meet it. Three great systems have been constructed,—the English, the French, and the German,—and each of them on a well-defined basis. The English universities stand on the endowed public schools with their six years' course, whose central core is classical and mathematical preparation, with thorough training in the moral qualities of diligence and obedience to law. The French university plan is a system of special faculties, and the University of Paris a commission of expert educators, who prescribe the preparatory course for the lycées. These have a seven years' course, classical and mathematical at heart, and upon this stands the higher education of France. The German, or, more correctly, the Prussian university system is confessedly the best of all that have hitherto appeared. It stands on the gymnasium. President Eliot wishes us to take humble lessons from Germany as to what universities ought to be; and to that court the case may well be submitted as to that of the best qualified judges in the world. What is the Prussian system? What are its guarantees of university stability and efficiency? They are three.

First. At the base of the whole fabric lies compulsory education, given in the Volksschule.

Second. Next above this stands the gymnasium. This has a nine years' continuous course of study. Its instruction centers in the classical languages, Latin being taught nine years, with an average of nine weekly exercises, and Greek six years, with six lessons a week. These two form nearly half of all the school work. To this we must add nine years of the mother-tongue, taught fully three times a week, and eight of French twice a week. This completes the language-instruction, which in all amounts to about eighteen lessons a week. Twenty lessons is

Inaugural address as Rector of the University, Oct. 15, 1880.

the approximate weekly work of our American schools. But this is only two-thirds of the German schedule. Add two exercises more for religious instruction, five for mathematics and elementary science, three for history and geography, two for writing and drawing, and we have the gymnasial schedule of thirty lessons a week,* an amount not paralleled elsewhere. Besides this, there are gymnastics and music. At the end of the course, if the pupil desires to enter the university regularly and seek a degree at graduation, he must first pass the severe *Abiturienten-examen*, or final examination of the school. The object of this is distinctly prescribed, namely, "to ascertain whether the student has attained to that degree of scholarly culture which is the goal of the gymnasium."† To this end all cramming is severely discouraged, all roundabout ways, short cuts, or extraordinary efforts before examination, are excluded so far as possible, and reliance is placed on the quietly sustained work of the long school course. The examination is conducted by a carefully organized commission, and has two parts, the written and the oral, of which the written lasts a week. At the end of the examination the successful student's reward is the *Zeugnis der Reife*, the "certificate of ripeness" or maturity, which alone can insure him a place in the university as a regularly matriculated student, a candidate for the degree at the end of his university career. This certificate is most carefully drawn. It always contains three things—a statement as to the student's moral behavior, attentiveness, and diligence, a statement as to how his recitation and examination attainments have comported with the standard of the school, and a declaration that he has sustained the final examination. Armed with this proof of "ripeness," he is ready, in the judgment of the Prussian university, for university freedom, but not sooner.

The gymnasium does even more than this. Not content with training and testing its pupils, it also proves its teachers. Ordinarily the Prussian gymnasial teacher must first have passed through the gymnasium as a pupil, and after that the university, where, if he wishes to stand well, he attends the *Seminar* or regular meeting for training and investigation in his department, and takes a degree at the end of his course upon a stringent

* *Centralblatt für die gesammte Unterrichts Verwaltung in Breussen*, April, 1882.

† *Id.*, May, 1882, p. 377.

VOL. CXL.—NO. 342.

examination, and at all events passes the terrible *Staats-examen*, on which depends his right to be employed as a teacher. If he runs all these gauntlets, he passes a trial-year or *Probe-jahr* at teaching. Then, if successful, he is entitled to call himself a teacher. These are the men that make the gymnasium what it is, "the corner-stone of German culture."*

Third. As the gymnasium rests upon the *Volkschule*, so the university in turn rests upon the gymnasium and crowns the whole system. Here the student is free. As Helmholtz, in his address† as Rector at Berlin, explains it, the students are "young men responsible to themselves, striving after science of their own free will, to whom it is left to arrange their own plan of studies as they think best." Here is freedom in studies and conduct, and at the university. But this freedom does not mean that any student, even if he be a gymnasial graduate, will obtain his degree at the end of his course, no matter what subjects he studies. If he desires a degree, he must first obtain permission to be examined, and then present himself thoroughly prepared in some one chief subject, called his *Hauptfach*, in which he must show, not mere accomplishments, but that he has done original investigation. Besides this, he must offer one or two kindred subsidiary subjects, called *Nebenfächer*. Should he venture to present absurdly unrelated subjects, such as chemistry and Sanskrit, the university would refuse to examine him. Should he seek for such subjects as French plays and novels, courses giving facility in Spanish or Italian, or the beginnings of fine art, he would search in vain to find them in a Prussian university.‡ And whether he seeks a degree or not, if he wishes to fill any of the offices of church or state, he must still pass the *Staats-examen*, whose power is well-nigh absolute, and whose rigor is unrelenting. This upholds the whole level of university work, in addition to the guarantees furnished from below by the gymnasium. Such is the Prussian university, and such its pledges of stability. First the *Volkschule*, then the gymnasium, after that the university. Need we wonder that the Germans are profoundly attached to it and regard it as the very crown of their civilization?

* Opinion of the University of Berlin. (Boston, 1883.)

† "On Academic Freedom in German Universities," delivered October 15, 1877.

‡ For complete lists of all the courses offered in the German universities, consult the *Deutscher Universitäts-Kalender*, published in Berlin.

It is almost superfluous to say that President Eliot's proposed university has not one of these three great safeguards. All the features considered essential by the Germans are lacking. Still more, the practical interpretation of the proposal—seen in the intention to make Greek or Latin optional for entrance, whereas the Germans consider these two the essentials, or rather the one indivisible essential, of preparatory training—is calculated to lower our already insufficient standards. Of the same character is the attempt first to dissipate and consequently degrade the meaning of the degree of Bachelor of Arts, the historic symbol of college culture, by using it to label graduation in hundreds of combinations of different studies, from the severest to the easiest, and then to call it a university degree; whereas the Germans have no Bachelor of Arts degree, but intend by their degrees, such as Ph. D., to label ability for original investigation only, and not miscellaneous attainments. This is not improvement and advancement of our already imperfect education, but the disintegration of even what good we now have. The lesson of Germany and of England and of France for us is, not to build universities high in the clouds and try to drag up the foundations toward them, but to find the foundation first and then build in full faith that the structure will stand.

It is a singular fact that the French Revolution, that great leveler of good and bad alike, destroyed the old classical training of France. The experiment of destruction was seen to be a mistake, and if the last and present generation of French educators have devoted themselves to anything with success, it has been to the reestablishment of the lyceés. It is also to be remembered that in the early years of this century Prussia tried the plan of admitting to university privileges students whose maturity was not guaranteed by the gymnasia. The distress that followed the Napoleonic wars forced universities to let down their bars, and they did so with disastrous effects, notably at the University of Bonn. This produced a strong reaction, and out of this very crisis emerged the present system in full play a few years later, under the leadership of Von Humboldt, Minister of Education, who cut out the pernicious practice by the roots and lodged the great power of the *Abiturienten-examen* in the gymnasia,* thus holding gymnasial training un-

* See Matthew Arnold's "Higher Schools and Universities of Germany," ed. of 1874, chapter on the *Abiturienten-examen*.

broken to its completion. From that time dates the manhood of the Prussian university. The spirit of President Eliot's movement was tested and condemned in Prussia long before it was born here.

More widely known than either of these is the experiment recently allowed by the Prussian universities under protest, that of admitting students without gymnasial preparation as candidates for degrees. It is well to remember that the *Realschule* pupils, thus allowed to enter, whose preparation the universities consider fatally deficient, simply differ from gymnasial graduates in having no Greek, less Latin (though they have nine years of it), and more modern languages, mathematics, and science. The opinion of the University of Berlin on this question is so well known as to need no special comment; it is unmistakable and unanimous. A few words from Hofmann and Helmholtz, professors there, both of the first scientific eminence, and both recently honored with the dignity of Rector of that university, will be of weight here. This is from Hofmann, on the character and secret of gymnasial success :

"After a long and vain search, we must always come back finally to the result of centuries of experience, that the surest instrument that can be used in training the mind of youth is given us in the study of the languages, the literature, and the works of art of classical antiquity."

And this is from Helmholtz, on academic freedom :

"Any institution based upon freedom must also be able to calculate upon the judgment and reasonableness of those to whom freedom is granted. . . . The majority of students must come to us with a sufficiently logically trained judgment, with a sufficient habit of mental exertion, with a tact sufficiently developed on the best models, to be able to discriminate truth from the babbling appearance of truth. . . . Thus prepared, they have hitherto been sent to us by the gymnasiums. It would be very dangerous for the universities if large numbers of students frequented them who were less developed in these respects. The general self-respect of the students must not be allowed to sink. If that were the case, the dangers of academic freedom would choke its blessings. It must not, therefore, be looked upon as pedantry, or arrogance, if the universities are scrupulous in the admission of students of a different style of education."*

III. The proposal is practically inapplicable to our existing colleges, any or all of them. The essential feature of the American college is a four years' course of study leading to the degree

* "On Academic Freedom in German Universities," Inaugural Address as Rector at Berlin, Oct. 15, 1877.

of Bachelor of Arts. A college may have many other courses besides this,—scientific, literary, or special,—but this one is its historic center, and has been its strength. Acquaintance with our current college catalogues and college history cannot fail to prove the truth of this fact. On what does the college stand? On preparatory schools that rarely, if ever, give more than four years to their special preparation, four years for Latin, and the last three of these four to Greek also. Until within a few years, the college course of study has been prescribed throughout. But as our schools have improved, the leading colleges have been able to allow limited freedom of choice for part of the studies of the last two college years, and have kept the first two entirely or substantially prescribed, with their classical and mathematical training and incidental teaching in modern languages and science,—the very elements of gymnasial instruction. If we take four years of preparatory training with the first two years of prescribed training in college, we find six years of fairly disciplinary education, running to the end of sophomore year. From this time such colleges as Yale and Princeton introduce the elective system, but preserve with it a substratum of prescribed studies. This is the attitude of our colleges generally. Harvard, however, has now no required courses except three in freshman year,—one in English, one in modern languages, and one in elementary science,—and these bid fair to vanish soon, and thus leave a complete system of election, subject only to restrictions of college convenience in teaching and the unwillingness that individual instructors may exhibit to open their particular courses to unprepared students. This system goes still further. All uniformity of studies being removed, the students choose as they wish among the hundreds of possible combinations; and whatever be the character of their courses chosen, severe or easy, rationally connected or wildly miscellaneous, they are all entitled upon examination to receive the degree of Bachelor of Arts. This, instead of meaning one definite thing, may now indicate hundreds of different kinds of courses. Besides thus affecting the degree with which the college stamps its approval on its graduates at the end, it also affects the entrance itself. For if the student may drop all his disciplinary school studies upon entering freshman year, the preparatory four years of Latin and three of Greek (or, as is more commonly the case, three of Latin and two of Greek), if

stopped here, are fragmentary and incomplete, worth little to those who pursue them no further. Hence Greek, having received the least time, was attacked first and made optional. Now Latin also is made optional. The student, as he prefers, is to offer one, but need not bring both, in order to enter and gain the degree at the end. The irresistible logic of the situation will not permit this to stop here. When Greek goes, why does it go? Because it has had but slight attention at the school, and as it need not be pursued in college and is not a prerequisite for the degree, and hence at best only a fragment, it goes. But the system allows Latin to be omitted, on condition that the student offers Greek. Latin, it is true, usually receives a year more than Greek in the schools; but as the student need not continue Latin, it is also a fragment. If the student may drop both Latin and Greek as he enters college, why compel him to offer both, or one, or either, in order to enter? Either alone is a fragment of no great value, both together are incomplete unless pursued further. There is no good reason, and so the next thing to go after Greek or Latin will be Greek and Latin; and who shall insure the movement stopping even here?

What, then, is the situation? Simply this: the proposal that comes disguised as an alluring plea for universities, and consequent university freedom, first destroys the meaning of our only existing degree given for academic culture, by making it mean everything, and so nothing. It abolishes not only the prescribed substratum of studies commonly found in the last two years of college, but also the prescribed training of the first two years. Thereupon, instead of making every effort to secure what is thus lost from the college (or attempted university) by strengthening the schools so that they may make good the deficiency, it not only makes no such attempt, but, by making Latin or Greek optional for the boy who is to enter, it puts a premium on the avoidance of these studies which the best experience of the world assures us are the very essentials of high preparation, and so degrades our already imperfect school training. In short it means not the construction of a real university, but the destruction of what little good we now have in our preparatory education. It means the creation of a so-called university to which students shall be attracted by the plea of freedom, but a place where no strong guarantee of training preliminary to entrance is required, and no assurance of scholarship expected for its degree; a place

where young students may flock from our schools without a common basis of culture, and may study what they please, as they please, if they please; a place where thousands may come to sit under the shadow of a university and get what they desire, with none to molest or make them afraid — only to discover, too late, that no university has ever cast its shadow upon them. Is this the promotion of higher culture? Is this liberal education? Is this what educated experience counsels? Is there any assurance that such a fabric will contain one element of intellectual unity, strength, or permanence?

It is the part of wisdom to take another plan. Strengthen and improve the good we now have, crude and defective though it be. Build from the base upward, and not from the clouds downward. Make better schools, train better teachers, study a few things well and continuously, and lift the whole level of our preparatory education. Then will the university, so deeply needed at this time in our American life, not only be a possibility but a certainty.

Freedom in studies, freedom in conduct. I have spoken mainly of the first, but these two are one. It is one education of one mind acting and interacting in two lines. The attainments in culture are moral attainments, and conversely. The very means employed to produce intellectual education and the desired products of this education are moral. Discipline in studies is out of the question, unless the moral elements of diligence, attentiveness, candor, ready obedience to law, determination to achieve honorable success, patience, perseverance, courage, assured control over appetites and passions, and unselfish devotion to pending duty are the ruling powers. These are both preconditions and products of genuine education. He who has them not is in the worst sense uneducated. What might such a man as Byron have been if, as Goethe (no prejudiced witness here) asserts, "he had but known how to endure moral restraint also? That he could not, was his ruin." What may, what do men become when thus destitute? Does not the proposal for freedom in conduct touch this question deeply? It is urged that the college is not to teach religion or attempt the supervision of morals. Let the student look to these himself, aided by the natural helps of home remembrances, his studies, and his ambition. If this be so, and the home-training in religion and virtue, priceless so far as it goes, is to cease when the inex-

perienced American school-boy becomes a freshman, and finds that religion which he has been taught to revere receiving no public recognition or general respect from the college, and instruction in religion specifically ruled out from the course of study, that the college in no way encourages him to attend any religious exercise, that in matters of morals he cannot confidently expect the personal help and succor of his instructors in his various endeavors to act honorably, live purely, and resist temptations to evil that will meet him just as surely as his college days go on,—if this easy-going dealing with faith and morals is the spirit of the new departure, it is certainly the most dangerous element in the whole movement. That this is its spirit, is clear from its record. We must judge it not by what it hopes or expects or promises, but by what it has done, and these things are matters of observation.

Our hopes lie another way. What our youth most need is discipline of character, deeply inwrought with their studies. What our culture needs is men first and specialists second; otherwise, we shall not avoid the intellectual horrors that lie in exclusive specialism in one direction and diletanteism in the other. What our society needs is a large number of trained, enlightened men, the only sure guarantee for an enlightened public opinion. If these things are true, then let those who believe them resist and expose this new departure, not in, but from education.

ANDREW F. WEST.

THE NEW BUDDHA.

In Frankfort, at the crowded table-d'hôte,
Amid the steam of dishes and the sound
Of chattering voices, I beheld at last
The face I sought: a toothless lion's face,
Gray, livid, sprinkled o'er with dust of dream,
With two dim eyes that (as the lion's orbs
Gaze through and past the groups around the cage
Upon the sands of Afric far away)
Met mine and saw me not, but mark'd beyond
That melancholy desert of the mind
Where in his lonely splendor he had reign'd.
But when he rose without a word, and stepped
Across the threshold out into the street,
I follow'd reverently, and touch'd his arm.
Frowning he turn'd. "Your pardon," I exclaimed,
Standing bareheaded in the summer sun—
"To the new Buddha, Arthur Schopenhauer,
I've come with letters from your sometime friend,
Hestmann of Hamburg. Bliss it were, indeed,
If for a space you suffered me to gaze
On the one fountain of philosophy
Still sparkling to refresh an arid world!"

He took the letters, glanced them grimly through;
Then his face brighten'd and he smiled well pleased;
Then nodding, said: "You come in season, sir!
I lack an arm to lean on as I walk;
And now, if you are willing, yours will serve.
For, as you see, your Buddha (so men please
To style me; and if zeal to make men wise,
To free them from their yoke of misery,

Constitute godship, I deserve the name!)
Your Buddha groweth old, is well-nigh spent,
And soon must pass away." "Nay," I replied,
"For many a summer and a winter more
Your living force must flow to gladden man;
Philosophy is still too halt and blind
To spare you yet!" More brightly still his face
Flash'd answer to the flattery of my words.
"Right, right!" he murmur'd. "After all, they are wise
Who flout the Bible's three-score years and ten;
A strong man's season is a hundred years,
Nor less nor more; and I, though gray and bent,
May see another generation yet!"

I had reach'd his heart at once, as courtiers gain
The hearts of kings. So, resting on mine arm,
Smiling and nodding gently as we went,
He passed with me along the sunny street;
And on our way I spake with youthful warmth
Of that new gospel which the lonely God
Had offered all in vain for two-score years
To every passer-by in this dull world;
And what himself had said a thousand times
I said with zeal—that in the sun there stood
Temples and towers, but only Memnon's *sang*,
And *his* was Memnon's to a listening world.
Still more complacent grew his deity,
Finding so passionate a worshiper!
And presently he questioned of myself,
My birthplace, and my business in the city.
English by name and accent, as he guessed?
Was his name known in England? he inquired,
With quite solicitous glance; and when I said
His name was known and revered through the land,
His pale cheek flush'd with pleasure once again.

Then, as we passed along the populous streets,
With houses, shops, and marts on either side,
And folk as thick as bees that throng i' the hive,
He, finding I was apt, grew garrulous:
Told of his weary years of martyrdom,

Through which, neglected and despised, he framed
 His creed of grand negation and despair;
 How, bitter at the baseness of the world,
 Yet never faltering as his hand set down
 In philosophic rhythm the weary sound
 Made by the ocean of the Will which beats
 For ever on these wrinkled sands of Time,
 He had waited, till the pigmies wrought his crown;
 How every man-made god, or god-made man,
 Had lied, until *he* spake the "Sesame"
 Which opened the great cavern of the truth
 To every soul that yearn'd to creep therein;
 And how, now all was said that thought could say,
 He rested, while the nations one by one
 Approved — Nirwâna!

As he spake, he paused
 Before a great cathedral whose tall spire
 Pointed a fiery finger up at heaven.
 Then, smiling, "Still the pagan temples stand,
 And from the heart of each a bleeding god,
 Not Buddha nor a greater, spins his web
 To entangle insects of humanity.
 Henceforth the battle is between us twain,—
 I who have scaled the heavens and found them bare,
 I who have cast the Heavenly Father down,
 And Christ that cries, 'He reigns!'"

He rose erect,
 Nostrils dilated, eyes grown fiercely bright,
 With possible conquest.

"'Tis the Christ or I,
 And face to face we stand before the age!
 All other of the intellectual gods,
 Save I alone, were frail or timorous,
 Mad or god-drunken; I alone have set
 My finger on the canker of the world,
 Saying 'Tis fatal —'Tis incurable —
 And I defy the Christ to find a cure!
 The Titans, headed by Prometheus
 (Whom we in Deutschland call Immanuel Kant),
 Marshal'd their hosts against the Olympian throne,

And one by one before its shadowy seat
 Fell, mumbling 'God'; the tempests of the mind
 Enwrapt and overpowered them, and they fell;
 Last of the race, their Epimetheus,
 Our moonstruck Hegel, gibbering like an ape,
 Follow'd the phantom God whom he denied
 Garrulously up and down! My turn was next.
 I stood alone upon the eternal shore,
 And heard the thunder of the waves of Will
 Upmounting to destroy me, till I spake
 The mystic word 'Nirwāna,' and behold!
 They heard me and obeyed me, and were hush'd.
 A Spirit stood beside me, even Death,
 And in his clammy palm I placed my hand,
 And still together, masters of the hour,
 We stand triumphant, waiting the event!"

Again he took my arm and on we walk'd
 Toward Sachsenhausen. Passing o'er the bridge,
 'Mid crowds of pleasure-seeking citizens,
 We came among the parks and flowery ways,
 And heard among the sunbeam-laden trees
 The fluttering and the singing of the birds.
 From neighboring gardens came the fiddle's sound,
 The flute's soft whistle, and the eager shouts
 Of merry-making folk. Then, sitting down,
 Upon a bench o'erhung with whispering leaves,
 We watched the stream of festal men and maids
 That overflowed the roads and garden walks.
 Loud in the summer sunshine sang the birds,
 Answered by human voices, while the sage
 Looked sadly on, and mused:

"The stress of pain
 Dwells on the heartstrings of the feather'd choir,
 Who, prompted by the goad of fiery love
 (*Veneris ictus*, as Lucretius sings)
 Toil restlessly, build nests, uprear their young
 With eager palpitations, ever fearing
 The shadow of the cruel kestrel, Death,
 Hovering above them. Sounds their summer cry
 So merry, say you? 'Tis the o'erburdened heart

Spilling itself in waves of agony,
 Which only to the sense of babes can seem
 Sweet and ecstatic! Walk abroad; and mark
 The cony struggling in the fowmart's fangs,
 The deer and hare that fly the sharp-tooth'd hound,
 The raven, that with flap of murderous wing
 Hangs on the woolly forehead of the sheep
 And blinds its harmless eyes; nor these alone,
 But every flying, every creeping thing,
 Anguishes in the fierce blind fight for life!
 Sharp hunger gnaws the lion's entrails, tears
 The carrion-seeking vulture, films with cold
 The orbs of snake and dove. For these, for all,
 Remains but one dark Friend and Comforter,
 The husher of the weary waves of Will,
 Whom men name Peace or Death."

"A piteous creed!"

I answer'd. "Surely yonder thrush's song
 Is not all sadness? Hark how joyfully
 He, clinging to the laden apple-bough,
 Trills out his 'lover-lover! kiss-kiss sweet!'
 And yonder youth and maiden listening
 Sit hand in hand as if in Paradise,
 And seeing heaven in each other's eyes,
 Forget for once that love can die or change,
 Or youth's gay music turn to jangling bells
 Or funeral discord!"

On my Buddha's face
 A dark smile gather'd like a sulphurous flash
 Upon a lonely cloud, and died away.

"Behold," he said, "the woman close at hand
 Suckling her sickly babe; poor soul, she smiles
 To feel the famished lips that draw her milk
 And drink her feeble life! Call you that smile
 The light of living joy? To me it seems
 Rapture of misery ineffable,
 Such as the birds and beasts bear in their breasts
 Starving to feed their young! Then mark again
 That other, like a ripe and rich-hued fruit
 Pit-speck'd and rotten to the very core!

She flaunts her painted beauty in the sun,
 And hangs upon the arm of yonder Jew
 Whose little eyes are shrivel'd in his head
 With Nature's light of lust. Priapus still
 Is god o' the garden! Not a stone's-throw hence,
 Temples obscene as those Vesuvius once
 Smother'd with fiery lava, still attest
 The infamous worship! Wheresoe'er we gaze,
 On quiet field or busy haunts of men,
 Among the creeping or the upright beasts,
 Comes Nature, grinning like a procuress,
 Bringing her innocent victims to assuage
 The fire herself hath sown in the quick veins
 Of all that live. Call you that quenchless fire
 Peaceful or joyful!—yet by that alone
 We move and have our being!"

"Nay," I cried,
 "For surely there is love which conquers it,
 And Passion pallid as the passion-flower
 Rooted in earth but showering up to heaven
 Its wealth of stainless blooms!"

"Love conquers it,"
 He answer'd with a weary inward smile,
 "If e'er it conquers, by the privilege
 Of some supreamer pain. The ascending scale,
 From lower up to higher, only marks
 The clearing of the flame until its light
 Grows wholly sacrificial. Beasts and birds
 Struggle and agonize to increase their kind,
 Obeying blind pulsations which began
 Deep in the burning breast of yonder Sun
 Whose corporal beams we are; creation ever
 Obeys the blind vibrations which arose
 Ere yet the timorous nebulae cohered
 To fashion fiery worlds; but we who stand
 Supreme, the apex and the crown of things,
 Have gained supremacy of suffering
 And sovereignty of limitless despair!"

How merrily the festal music rose,
 While men and women 'neath the linden-trees

Join'd in the dance, and happy children cried,
 And birds with quick precipitous rapture shower'd
 Their answer from the blossom-laden boughs!
 Sunny as Eden seemed the earth that day;
 And yet, methought, I saw the sunlight shrink
 And all creation darken suddenly,
 As if from out the umbrage there had peer'd
 The agate-eyes o' the Snake! Then, as I gazed
 Into the pallid dreamer's filmy orbs,
 Methought the flesh and hair were shrivel'd up,
 And in their places skin and scale appeared,
 Till on his belly crawling serpent-wise
 My Buddha slipt into the undergrass
 And disappear'd. The fancy vanishing,
 I heard his voice intoning at my side.

"Supremacy of sorrow gained at last,
 Agony upon agony multiplied
 And crystallized in knowledge, He, your Christ,
 Rose and confronted Nature, as a dove
 Might face eternal Deluge. 'Comfort yet,'
 He murmur'd, 'while I set, upon the brows
 Of all who suffer, this red crown of thorns,
 And speak the promise of eternal life.'
 Eternal Life! Eternal strife and sorrow!
 Man's privilege of misery ascending
 Scale after scale, until at last it gains
 An immortality of suffering!
 What marvel if the tortured victim shrinks
 From infinite possibilities of pain,
 And casting down that crown, calling a curse
 On Nature, dwindling down the scale which once
 He eagerly ascended, gains the beast,
 Holds hideous orgy, or like Niobe
 Weeps—and is fix'd in stone! Helpless and frail,
 Sharing the desolation he surveys,
 Christ crawleth back into his sepulcher
 And sleeps again. . . . Meantime, out of the womb
 Of sorrow springs another Comforter,
 Your Buddha, even I, the lonely man
 Who walks the waves of Will as long ago

The Galilean seem'd to walk the sea.
'Patience!' I whisper; 'take the gift *I* bring—
No crown of thorns, no promise of more life,
But this black poppy, pluck'd upon a grave!
The Ocean, though its waters wash as far
As the remotest sphere, as the last sun
Just crackling, shriveling, like a leaf i' the fire,
The Ocean wide as Life, hath still—a shore!
On those dark sands each troublous wave is still'd,
Breaks, falls, and stirs no more, though other waves,
Pain following pain, identity that crowds
Fast on identity, shall still succeed.
Ye are weary—sleep; ye are weeping—weep no more;
As ye have come, depart; as ye have risen
To the supremest crest of suffering,
Break, overflow, subside, and cease forever.'
Man hears. He feels, though all the rest be false,
One thing is certain—sleep: more precious far
Than any weary walkings in the sun.
Shall not the leafy world even as a flower
Be wither'd in its season; or, grown cold,
Even like a snow-flake melting in the light,
Fade very silently, and pass away
As it had never been? Shall Man, predoom'd,
Cling to his sinking straw of consciousness,
Fight with the choking waters in his throat,
And gasp aloud, 'More life, O God, more life!
More pain, O God'? . . . Nay, let him silently,
Bowing his head, like some spent swimmer, sink
Without a sigh into the blest Abyss
Dark with the shipwreck of the nations, strewn
With bones of generations—lime of shells
That once were quick and lived. Even at this hour
He pauses, doubting, with the old fond cry,
Dreaming that some miraculous hand may snatch
His spirit from the waters! Let him raise
His vision upward, and with one last look,
Ere all is o'er, behold 'Nirwāna' writ
Across the cruel heavens above his head,
In fiery letters, fading characters
Of dying planets, faintly flickering suns,

Foredoom'd like him to waste away and fade,
Extinguish'd in the long eternal night."

As one who walks in gardens of the feast,
When the last guests flit down the lamp-hung walks
To music sadly ceasing on the air,
And sees a dark arm pass from lamp to lamp,
Quenching them one by one, so did I seem
Harkening that voice of cheerless prophecy.
I rose, walked on, he leaning on mine arm,
I listening; and where'er we went, methought
Sorrow and sunlessness preceded us;
So that the people dancing 'neath the trees,
The birds that fluted on the blossoming boughs,
The music and the murmur, made more sharp
My sense of desolation. Everywhere
I saw the hovering ernes, Despair and Death,
Watching their victim, Man.

A space we walked
In silence, then I murmur'd: "Can it be
That Death and Death's Despair are paramount?
That, even as suns and systems are consumed,
The mind of man, which apprehends or dreams
It apprehends them, shares their destiny?
Is there not something deathless, which denies
The victory to Death?"

"Their Christ says 'yea,'"
Answer'd the Buddha; "and with that lure and lie
Hath led the world for eighteen hundred years.
The mind of Man is as the rest—a flash
Of sunfire, nothing more; a quality
Pertaining only to the perishable.
Thought is a struggle with the Unconscious; soon
The struggle ceases, and the Unconscious drinks
The thinker and the thought for evermore.
Blesséd is he who, having wildly watch'd
The beauteous mirage of a heavenly home,
Knoweth 't is mirage only, and sinks down
To slumber on the arid stretch of sand
Whereon his weary feet have trod so long:
The sun shall shine upon him, and the stars

Fulfill their ministrations; he shall hear
No more the wailings of the flocks and herds,
Slain to assuage the appetite for life;
No thing that suffers and no thing that slays
Shall mar his peace with pain or sympathy;
Dust, he returns to dust; life he resolves
To life unconscious, such as quickeneth
In even trees and stones; his dream is o'er
Forever; and he hath become a part
Of elemental dumb Eternity."

"If this be so, dear Master," I returned,
"What then remains for us who walk i' the sun?
For surely Love is curst, if Love must die
Like breath upon a mirror, like the dew
Clothing the Hüleh-lily; and alas!
Since Love goes, what abides of heavenly hope
To abate our weary heart-beats?" With a smile
He answer'd, "Fold thine arms upon thy breast
And face thy destiny; Prometheus-like,
Not flattering even to its face the Power
That makes and shall unmake thee! Give the ear
To Jesus and his gaunt attendant gods,
Jove or Jehovah, and remain—a slave;
Shut up thine ears, and give those gods the lie,
And stand erect in fearless sovereignty
Of limitless despair! Grand even in Death,
Yea, grand because of Death, the mind of Man
Can front the issue of the inevitable,
Despising and appraising and defying
The anarchy and tyranny that spare
No shape that lives. Nature is pitiless;
Then be thou pitiful. Cruel is the world;
Then be thou kind, even to the creeping thing
That crawls and agonizes in its place
As thou in thine. Fever and Pestilence
Make and keep open one long-festering wound;
Anoint it with the balm of charity,
The oil of leechcraft. Thus, and thus alone,
Shalt thou in sheer defeat find victory,
And 'midst the very blast of that strong Voice

Which crieth 'Love is *not*,' shall thy last word
Attest Love's triumph, and thy soul remain
Immortal even in Death!"

In proud revolt
He paused, and pointed at the pallid heavens
As if arraigning Nature, while his hand
Trembled with palsy, and his eye was film'd,
And in his feeble frame the undaunted heart
Plunged, like a prison'd bird worn out and dying.
Then cunningly, to change the cheerless chord
He struck so strenuously, I spake again
Of his great labor, ever-increasing fame,
The homage of the world, and the long reach
Of honor, opening for his feet to tread.
And soon the Lion saw, not desert sands,
But gentle worshipers that led him on
With chains of flowers, tamely to crouch beside
The footstools of anointed crownéd kings.
Bright'ning he spake of labors yet to do,
Fair fields of fame unreapt, glad days and merry
Of taking gifts and yielding oracles!
So cheerfully, like one that loved his life,
He prattled on, beneath the blossoming boughs,
In answer to the carol of the birds,
The shouting of the children, the glad sound
Of festal fife and flute.

At evenfall

We parted, he to seek his lonely house,
I to the city hostel where I lodged;
But as he faded from me in the street
Touch'd by the bright beams of the rising moon,
Surely I saw the Shadow men name Death
Creeping behind him. Turning, with a sigh,
I left him in the grave-yard of his creed.

ROBERT BUCHANAN.

WHY CRIME IS INCREASING.

BUCKLE, in the first volume of the "History of Civilization," assumes that crime among men is a fixed quantity, varying only with population. Whatever may be the truth as to the human race, doubts will arise when we consider any particular portion of the race. Our inquiry of census reports leads to the conclusion that in the United States, at least, crime is increasing, as is shown by these figures:

<i>Year.</i>	<i>Prisoners.</i>	<i>Ratio to population.</i>
1850.....	6,737*	1 out of 3,442
1860.....	19,086*	1 " 1,647
1870.....	32,901.....	1 " 1,172
1880.....	59,255.....	1 " 860

It may be said that convictions are much more certain as the years advance; hence the number of commitments will be larger, and the increase of crime is only apparent. Statistics gathered by a Chicago newspaper from telegraphic reports of murders for the years 1881, 1882, and 1883 show an increase of more than 200 a year, from 1266 in 1881 to 1696 in 1883. Of this number, only 480 have suffered the death penalty—228 by legal execution, and 252 by lynch law. The "New York Herald," viewing a more limited field (Massachusetts and Connecticut), cites for a period of thirty years 267 trials for murder, with only 48 convictions, and but 23 who suffered the extreme penalty. No intelligent reader can have failed to observe the rapid increase in double murders, in which the murderer has taken the execution of the law into his own hands, and thereby diminished the proportionate number of commitments for crime by doubling the crimes.

* It is somewhat remarkable that the compendium of the tenth census exactly doubles these numbers that I have taken from the compendium of the ninth census.

Crimes against property, not less than crimes against the person, hardly need citations to prove increase. Burglaries, breaches of fiduciary trust, and thefts have become so common as to awaken little comment unless the sufferers be prominent in society. But it is my purpose to inquire rather about the causes of increase of crime, and to trace these causes in two directions—density of population, and occupation.

In masses of men the individual is absorbed. Responsibility is shared, and individual responsibility has less weight. In proportion as the responsibility of the individual is removed is his worth diminished. All that pertains to him, his property, his life, loses importance as he is merged in the mass. Let any man lift himself from the mass by the exercise of superior powers, and his property and his person mean more than those of any one of his unrecognized worshipers. The undistinguished mass, struggling for subsistence, crowding and jostling one another at every turn, look with envy toward the individual who seems to possess greater value than themselves. Having already lost interest in their fellows, placing a low estimate upon human life, thinking to have found in the wealth of the envied man the source of his security, they scruple not to possess themselves of that to which they attribute his elevation, even though life be sacrificed in the attainment of their end.

The increase of population in the United States is much more rapid than would result from natural growth. Immigration introduces heterogeneous elements that do not readily assimilate. To the natural loss of interest that follows aggregation of even similar elements is superadded, in the case of the United States, the mingling of elements that lack the attractive force of a common origin, a common language, and similar habits and tastes. Many have come to us from thronged cities where depreciation of the individual has already gone far beyond that which our people have attained, and their indifference adds new impetus to our own. Hawthorne, in relating his experiences in the Liverpool Consulate, says, "It was a forcible appeal to the sympathies of an American citizen that these unfortunates claimed the privileges of citizenship in our republic on the strength of the very same noble misdemeanors that had rendered them outlaws to their native despotisms." These sympathies make us more lenient to their faults, more susceptible to their influence. As we have little in common except the struggle for

existence, which tends rather to separation than to unity, disregard for human rights grows apace. Many find little warrant for the hopes that inspired their emigration. Embittered by disappointment, they care less for their neighbors, add to the prevailing unrest, and easily enter on careers of crime. The presence of a disappointed element in our population probably has its effect upon the native element with which it mingles but does not affiliate. Hence commitments for crime do not show such preponderance of foreign-born citizens as is sometimes asserted, though in comparative statistics it will appear that their influence is by no means inconsiderable. For example, Iowa has 16.1 per cent. of foreign population, according to the census of 1880, with a little less than 16 per cent. of foreign-born commitments to her penitentiaries; while Massachusetts, with 24.9 per cent. of foreign population, has committed to her penitentiaries 34.9 per cent. of foreign-born criminals. These figures will appear again in the discussion of occupation as a source of crime. For the United States, the commitments to penitentiaries are 19.2 per cent. foreign-born, while 13.3 per cent. marks the foreign-born share of the population. Comparing a few States that have the greatest density of population with crime statistics, we find the following:

<i>State.</i>	<i>Population to square mile.</i>	<i>Number in prison in proportion to population.</i>
District of Columbia.....	2960.....	1 to 466
Minnesota.....	10.....	1 " 1824
Rhode Island.....	256.....	1 " 864
Kansas.....	12..(excluding military)...	1 " 1059
Massachusetts.....	222..(excluding insane)...	1 " 492
Iowa.....	29.....	1 " 2003
Pennsylvania.....	95.....	1 " 876
Illinois.....	55..(excluding insane)...	1 " 933

It may be said with propriety that comparative statistics are of little value as between States, since their criminal codes differ widely. But the statistics of each single State show increase of crime in excess of increase of population. Accompanying increased density of population is the fact of accumulation about centers, making the distribution more and more uneven. The growth of cities and towns at the expense of rural population is marked. Thirty years have shown an advance of urban population from one-eighth of the entire population (12.5 per cent.) in 1850 to nine-fortieths (22.5 per cent.) in 1880. The quiet and

simple life of rural districts feels the influence of the city, so that urban and suburban excitements reach the majority of an entire population. The effect of density of population is manifest beyond the limits of its existence. City life lures the young from their homes long before their characters are solidified. Parental restraints are loosened. Parents dismiss their children from their thoughts under the glitter of a business career that opens before them. They have thought more of making them skillful accountants than men of stalwart honesty; their conversation has savored more of cash than of character; their counsels have led more frequently to shrewd bargains than to sterling integrity; so that boys who mean to be filial find themselves the victims of misdirection, and enter into a business life with little strength and less power of resistance. Independent before his majority and before he has real knowledge of what true independence is, or strength to use its privileges aright, the youth cherishes a confidence in himself and in his moral purposes that is unwarranted by his experience, and falls a prey to temptation. The better counsels that may at times have escaped his father's lips, the earnest prayers that have flowed from a mother's heart, are forgotten in the giddy society that surrounds him. As he has banished from his mind all thoughts of home, the warnings of those who are less to him than father and mother are unheeded. Filled with confidence in his own judgment, he first invites temptation, then dares it, and is snared and bound before he is aware that what he had called strength is fatal weakness. The home failing as a source of high moral purpose, parents look with leniency upon their sons' misdeeds, indirectly encourage vicious practices, and condone offenses, until the elders become involved in the crimes of their children. They are dismissed from parental restraints when youthful passions need curbing, and for the years when self-restraint insures health and vigor, both physical and moral, and, consequently, the social evil finds them too ready victims. In its train are crimes innumerable. The whirl and excitement of city life keep the flame constantly burning. The false side of social life allures the young man who has no abiding memory of a true home — a memory possible only to him who has known such a home not alone as a child in his tutelage, but as a young man participating in its hallowed scenes, himself a contributor to its blessedness. Take away from the youth the real acquaintance with father and mother at

a time when, upon a footing of comparative equality, they meet at the fireside, and substitute for it only the society opened to the young man away from home, and is it to be wondered at that unhappy homes, inviting to evil associations and evil practices, abound? (If the Scylla of social corruption be avoided, there is still a Charybdis of ill-assorted marriage to be shunned.)

I have dwelt at length upon the influence of city life on the young, because it appears that crimes increase in the wake of social life, and because it still further appears that the age of criminals is growing constantly less, and still further because the home loses its power as density of population increases, especially where this increase is most marked about urban centers. Approaching the reasons for this rapid growth of cities, the second part of my theme, occupation, comes naturally under consideration.

Agricultural communities have ever been distinguished for good order and stability. Their communion is more with Nature than with men. Nature is unselfish, allays rather than irritates. Her friends are subject to few disturbances; the mind retains its equipoise; temptations are rare and seldom overpowering; small means satisfy few desires. But the employment in agriculture will not suffice for an independent people. Mining, manufactures, commerce, and transportation will claim attention. Here association begins its work. Accumulation of capital and aggregation of labor bring men into contact with men. Separation into classes ensues; competition within the class stirs the blood; feverish excitement takes possession of all the faculties; rivalry provokes to jealousy. Under division of labor the field is narrowed to each laborer, and yet he finds competitors more and more numerous. One class seems to be reaping most of the benefit of another's toil, and the separation of classes grows wider. A state of things not possible to agriculture obtains in the manufacturing and the commercial world. Progress and poverty have association in fact as well as in word. The inevitable massing of workmen furnishes opportunity for combinations; common interests, common unrest, and common envies make these combinations effective. During some industrial crisis social order is disturbed and vigilance relaxed. (Criminal acts follow. In many cases necessity presses virtue to the wall, and temporary crime grows into permanence.)

Is this all theory? A study of manufacturing States in comparison with agricultural States will prove the theory founded in fact. For purposes of comparison I have taken the population above ten years of age of certain States, so as to exclude all who can be considered free from criminal acts. Taking first a group of mining States, we find that the criminals committed to prison were in these proportions: Nevada, 1 to 254; California, 1 to 268; Colorado, 1 to 416. A similar group of manufacturing States shows Massachusetts with 1 to 395; Rhode Island, 1 to 689; and Connecticut, 1 to 692. Another group, of partly agricultural and partly mining States, shows in Pennsylvania, 1 to 665; in Illinois, 1 to 687. A group of agricultural States shows Nebraska, 1 to 844; Minnesota, 1 to 1320; and Iowa, 1 to 1457. The commercial centers of the country become the rendezvous for turbulent spirits, who find fair field for their activities in communities whose absorption in business precludes attention to social and civil duties. President Seelye, in a recent address, says, "There are probably one hundred thousand men in the United States to-day whose animosity against all existing social institutions is hardly less than boundless." The larger part of these is found within not more than five cities. They have everything to gain and nothing to lose by disturbances in social order. But in these same cities the leading business men, who have everything to lose and nothing to gain by riot, plead pressure of business as an excuse for neglect of civil duties. Just in proportion as occupations require constant and unbroken attention, does this surrender of the polls to the indifferent, or the selfishly interested, or openly vicious classes, proceed to its fatal termination. (By way of episode, might not a compulsory voting system prove valuable to the republic?)

In continuation of the effects of occupation upon crime, it will serve a good purpose to note its effect upon woman, for her influence is predominant in social life. In the crowded factory villages, in the overcrowded boarding-houses with no home-feeling to soothe the girl wearied by long hours of poorly-paid toil, under the nervous excitements that constant indoor life increases, and with little brightness in the future prospect, will not temptation have an almost certain victory? A few figures tell the sad story. That the discrepancies that naturally result from differing criminal codes may be made as far as possible to disappear, I have combined prison and reformatory statistics so

as to include all who are under restraint on account of major and minor crimes, with the following results for the States named, for the year 1880: For the United States, 8.6 per cent. were females; for the cities of New York and Brooklyn, 23.2; for Massachusetts, 28; for Texas, 2.4; for Rhode Island, 14.8; for Minnesota, 4.4; for Connecticut, 22; for Wisconsin, 16.4; for Iowa, 8.4. These figures, taken at random, show excess of crime among women in the commercial and manufacturing centers.

The excitements engendered in the money-making industries, which all require more or less of associated effort, are followed by greater or less mental disturbances, and it is quite the fashion to excuse all crime under the plea of insanity. The sociologist is confronted with the fact that insanity and crime move on *pari passu*, whatever may be his convictions as to the relations of cause and effect. The ratios are shown by the following figures:

Year.	No. Insane.	No. Imprisoned.
1850.....	1 out of 1486.....	1 out of 3442
1860.....	1 " 1308.....	1 " 1647
1870.....	1 " 1030.....	1 " 1172
1880.....	1 " 554.....	1 " 860

The possibility of vital connection between insanity and crime has doubtless awakened sympathy for criminals, not always wisely expressed. (Until the humanitarian tendency of the present age shall have had time to work away from mere sentimentalism into practical methods of true reform, we must expect increase of crime as a result of sympathy for criminals.)

The division of labor, applied in the professions as well as in mechanical industries, has brought forward a class of shrewd and successful "criminal lawyers," so called; and the probability of being able to secure their services in defense may form an important factor in determining the commission of crime.) Division of labor in journalism, which assigns the making of headlines to one who can awaken the most attention, leads the reader to enter upon the perusal of the most horrible crimes with the feeling that after all it is a trivial matter. Thus made familiar with a sort of sugar-coated vice, the less scrupulous find the path to notoriety through crime.)

In all manufacturing industries the opportunities for idleness on the part of unskilled labor are rapidly increasing. Facilities for moving from place to place are daily enlarged; the tramp

question assumes greater proportions, and furnishes a partial solution to the problem of increased crime. The habit of carrying concealed weapons has doubtless grown out of distrust of those whom we meet in crowded communities. King John, in addressing his chamberlain, utters a truth good for all time:

“How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
Makes ill deeds done.”

Haste, which characterizes this intensely commercial age, shows itself in compromising with crime for the return of stolen property. The thief now calculates how large a share of the plunder that he has taken he can secure as a reward for its return; and the “law’s delays” stimulate the sufferer’s desire for compromise as the cheaper method of securing his wealth, which means more to him than the good of society.

Most if not all the causes of increase of crime are allied to the generic causes—increased density of population, with decreased individual responsibility and increased irritations growing out of, and inseparable from, the complexity of manufacturing and commercial activities.

Since the writing of this paper the statistics for 1884 have come to hand, and show 3377 murders, with only 103 legal executions and 210 lynchings.

J. L. PICKARD.

SUPERSTITION IN ENGLISH LIFE.

IN reviewing the progress of a nation, we are at once confronted with a complex series of questions respecting the separate influences that have united to mold those characteristics that stamp its individuality when compared with other countries. Each of these, if discussed with that impartial spirit of inquiry so necessary for eliciting truth in all matters of research, will supply the links in the chain of causes that have made the nation what it is. The subject is important, because by a process of analysis it traces the growth and development, and sometimes the decline, of those controlling principles that have been favorable, or otherwise, to the interests of certain features in the moral life of a people. Such a method of procedure has an intrinsic value, because it discriminates and accounts for those phases of character and motives of conduct that are ever distinguishing one country from another in the course of its history. In separating, then, the various elements that compose a nation's life, we must strive as far as possible to estimate each at its proper worth, although prejudice is sometimes apt to warp our judgment. Thus persons, whether regarded individually or collectively, hesitate before giving prominence to faults in their character; and hence it has been generally acknowledged that civilized countries have underestimated the prevalence of contemporary short-comings in their national life. This is, perhaps, specially true with regard to superstition, which, in spite of the enormous power it has exerted over most countries in bygone times, has rarely in its successive stages met at the time with due recognition. But this may be partly explained by the circumstance that the very same doctrine that has been condemned by a nation as superstition at one period of its intellectual development, was accepted in the very reverse light during the age in which it flourished. What better

illustration can be adduced that this is the case, than the great witchcraft movement, which in England reached its climax during the Commonwealth? That such a system should at any time have succeeded in not only forcing its monstrous impositions upon sensible men, but in exercising a species of terrorism upon susceptible and timid minds, is a dark stain in the pages of English history. No apologists, however forcible their defense, will ever be able to wipe away this blot; for, whilst bearing testimony to the prodigious degree to which superstition had reached, it proves how, when once the moral balance of a nation is out of gear, it may, by taking distorted views of things, condescend to acts of cruelty, as actually happened in the terrible persecutions with which the supposed practitioners of witchcraft were punished. The decline and ultimate decay of this movement, therefore, marked an eventful epoch in the history of England, because, with the exposure of its absurd pretensions, a reaction followed, accompanied by an outburst of incredulity that gave a blow to superstition from which it has never recovered. The time had at last arrived when the religious terrorism that witchcraft had produced exhausted the limits of intellectual patience, and produced a spirit of disgust, which turned into ridicule and contempt a system that had, as Mr. Lecky remarks in his "*History of Rationalism in Europe*" (Vol. I., p. 126), been regarded as "a phase of the miraculous and the work of the devil." A still more remarkable instance of this revulsion of public feeling may be found in the writings of one of the most eminent men of his time, Sir Thomas Browne. In or about 1633, when the throne, says Mr. Buckle ("*History of Civilization in England*," Vol. I., p. 365), "was still occupied by a superstitious prince, and when men were incessantly persecuted for their religious opinions," this author wrote his "*Religio Medici*," a work in which he made no attempt to deny the popular errors of the day; nay, instead of using his masterly ability to disprove such follies, he openly announced his belief in the philosopher's stone and in palmistry, and affirmed the reality of witches, saying that those who "deny their existence are not merely infidels, but atheists." But twelve years later, when he wrote his celebrated work, "*Inquiries into Common and Vulgar Errors*," it is evident that he was influenced by the pressure of the age; "for this production, it must be remembered," adds Mr. Buckle, "is remarkable as being the first

systematic onslaught ever made in England upon those superstitious fancies which were then prevalent respecting the external world." It is unnecessary to go into further details on this point, for enough has been said to show what a powerful factor in the regulation of human affairs is superstition, and more especially when it happens to impregnate the religious beliefs of the time.

Admitting, therefore, that superstition must be acknowledged as one of the constituent parts that enter into the composition of a nation's character, it is a subject for inquiry as to the sources from which the folk-lore of a people is derived, and how far in the course of years it may have been either encouraged or not by those operative principles which find a more congenial soil in some countries than in others. Confining the subject, then, to England, it may fairly be asked, firstly, how came those rich stores of romances and legends, coupled as they have been from time immemorial with a most varied assortment of superstitious beliefs and usages, into its midst; and, secondly, how far have these exercised an influence at the respective periods in which they have flourished?

In answer to the first of these propositions, there can be no doubt that, in the case of the English people, the superstitious element must be partly traced to their heterogeneous composition. Thus, to quote Mr. Elton's words in his "*Origins of English History*" (1882, p. 2), "The English nation is compounded of the blood of many different races; and we might claim a personal interest not only in the Gælic and Belgic tribes who struggled with the Roman legions, but even in the first cave-men, who sought their prey by the slowly receding ice fields, and the many forgotten peoples whose memory is barely preserved in the names of mountains and rivers." Hence, it does not require any great amount of ingenuity to ascertain the antecedent history of many of those superstitions, survivals of which linger on in most English villages. It is true that in their present forms they are often very much changed, and indeed in certain cases they have almost lost their identity; but yet they generally possess some feature or other which, in an unmistakable manner, betrays their original source. These indications would probably oftentimes escape detection by the general observer, but not so with the careful student of folk-lore, who, by applying the comparative method, easily finds out when pursuing

his inquiries what characteristics any particular superstition has in common with a similar one found in another country ; though occasionally these are microscopically small. As an illustration, pin-wells may be noticed, which prevail so extensively in Wales and Scotland. Such localities are specially visited by country girls, who, after making their customary offerings, practice sundry divinations for the purpose of gaining an insight into the secrets of futurity. Not uncommonly in the neighborhood of these "wishing-wells" there is a rag-bush on which bits of linen or worsted are tied as a gift to the presiding spirit of the well. At first sight, such a practice as that of presenting an offering to a wayside well may seem fanciful and meaningless ; but a little inquiry shows that what the village maiden does from purely superstitious motives is, in reality, a modification of an ancient ceremony that partook of the nature of a religious rite. Thus we read of money glittering in the clear pool of Clitumnus, and Gregory of Tours has bequeathed us a picture of the simple-minded villagers feasting by a Gaulish lake, and throwing to the water-gods "scraps of cloth and linen and locks of wool, together with little cakes of wax and figures of loaves and cheeses."* Again, Grimm, in his "Teutonic Mythology," following the same line of research, has collected and grouped together a vast assemblage of superstitions, and through his labors we are enabled to trace many of those survivals of primitive belief that exist to this day, as witnesses of the evolution of culture from those low forms of thought and conception that are predominant in rude and uncivilized communities. Indeed, it may be truly argued that just as flint knives or stone monuments point to a time "when Europeans resembled races where such things are still part of actual life, so do the traces in our organism of fetichism and totemism connect our past with people where such forms of thought are still predominant."† What stronger or more convincing proof of the community of origin of certain beliefs preserved in England can be urged than the observances connected with the popular festivals of the calendar? Thus Christmas is undoubtedly no other than the old Yule festival. The Yule-log not so many years ago crackled merrily on most hearths, testifying to the rites of fire-worship formerly celebrated at this season. Similarly, the bonfires that once

* See Elton's "Origins of English History," p. 285.

† J. A. Farrer, "Primitive Manners and Customs," 1879, p. 314.

blazed on the hill-tops on Midsummer Eve also had their symbolic appropriateness; for the summer solstice was originally the great season of fire-festivals throughout Europe, when, amongst other rites, blazing fire-wheels were rolled down from the hills into the valleys as a sign of the sun's descending course.* It is evident, therefore, that both Christmas and Midsummer have not merely had solar rites transferred to them, but are themselves of solar origin. It must not be forgotten, also, that, with reference to Easter, we keep this festival at the time when our pagan forefathers were in the habit of sacrificing to the Goddess Eostre; and it has been suggested by Mr. Farrer that even our English hot cross-buns may be the descendants of cakes once eaten in her honor, on which the mark of Christianity has taken the place of some heathen sign. Indeed, it has long been admitted that a great proportion of the superstitious usages that for centuries were observed throughout England, and many of which still linger on in remote districts, have an origin far older than Christianity itself. Introduced into the country from various sources and by different races, these pagan customs were often skillfully ingrafted into our Christian ceremonies, under which metamorphosis they have ever since survived. Such a system answered a twofold purpose; for, in consolidating a country like England, it was necessary as far as possible to blend the heterogeneous elements into one harmonious whole. In giving a Christian color, also, to heathen practices, any ill-feeling that might otherwise have arisen was thereby avoided; and so by means of this compromise Christianity in England gained not only additional followers, but an amount of sympathetic support of which it stood in need.

I might, without much difficulty, bring forward innumerable illustrations, if it were necessary, in confirmation of this fact, for they lie thickly scattered through English history. In truth, there is hardly an English village of any size that cannot boast of some item of superstition, or traditionary lore, which can be explained on this principle. Thus, according to a Suffolk belief, the elder is a mystic tree, and therefore must never be burned, as misfortune will inevitably overtake the person that is guilty of this sacrilegious act. Few of the peasantry can assign the true reason of this superstitious reverence with which the tree is invested, but it doubtless originated from its association with

* See Tylor's "*Primitive Culture*," 1873, II., p. 298.

Huldah, the Good Mother of Northern Mythology, whose offspring are the Elves. When we remember, too, that as recently as the fifteenth century rites were performed in her honor in the Venusberg, near Eisenach, it is not surprising that the tree bound up with her history should have been honored with such an extensive folk-lore. Again, to take one of the most popular superstitions, why does the English peasant nowadays regard with as much mistrust the sight of the raven, as when Shakspeare made Lady Macbeth, in the fullness of her murderous impulse, exclaim,

"The raven himself is hoarse
That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan
Under my battlements"?

We know, too, what powerful use Edgar Allan Poe has made of this "grim, ungainly, ghastly, gaunt, and ominous bird of yore," in his poem of "The Raven." This aversion is certainly attributable to the traditionary character of the bird, which has been transmitted from our distant ancestors, a superstition that has prevailed over the greatest part of Europe. Again, in addition to the heterogeneous composition of the English people as affording one of the explanations of the complex nature of their superstitions, may be mentioned the influences of physical causes. Thus, as Mr. Buckle has pointed out, "whatever inspires feelings of terror, or of great wonder, and whatever excites in the mind an idea of the vague and uncontrollable, has a special tendency to inflame the imagination." By way of illustration, it may be noted that, of physical events, earthquakes are the most striking, and hence their effect has been to encourage superstition. On the same principle, the scenery of a country has a similar tendency; the grandeur of the mountain, in contrast with a flat or undulating stretch of land, inspiring feelings of awe productive of superstitious fear. This, it has often been urged, is especially true in respect of Scotland and many parts of Ireland; and therefore accounts in a great measure for the rapid advancement of superstition amongst their inhabitants. Thus, as Burton remarks in his "Criminal Trials in Scotland" (I., pp. 240-243), "Superstitions, like funguses and vermin, are existences peculiar to the spot where they appear, and are governed by its physical accidents. . . . And thus it is that the indications of witchcraft in Scotland are as different from those of the superstition which in England receives the same name, as

the Grampian Mountain from Shooter's Hill or Kennington Common." Hence, too, the superstitions of the Cornish people, a country which until a recent period maintained a somewhat singular isolation. "England," says Mr. Hunt in his "Popular Romances of the West of England," "with many persons appeared to terminate on the shores of the river Tamar, and the wreckers of the coasts, and the miners of the hills, were equally regarded as indicating the semi-civilization of this country." This seclusion of the Cornish people, added to the wild features of many parts of their sea-girt coasts, explains the preservation of their primitive character, coupled with that legendary lore and superstition which still has such a firm hold amongst these simple-minded folk. Another important source of superstition is ignorance, whereby men unacquainted with natural causes assign to supernatural agencies what may be explained by physical laws. How largely this was the case in England, in bygone centuries, may be gathered from the literature of the period, in which frequent allusion is made to the vulgar errors of our forefathers. Although, happily, under the influence of education, many of the dark superstitions of the past have succumbed to the enlightening power of knowledge, yet they are still largely represented amongst the agricultural population of England. Thus, scarcely a week passes without some case being brought before a provincial magistrate, in which the complainant seeks requital for supposed injuries sustained through his having been "overlooked by the baneful influence of the evil-eye." Formerly, many a harmless individual was either subjected to ill-treatment or underwent punishment for exercising this imaginary power. Fortune-telling is extensively practiced by the English peasantry, and various kinds of divination; one of the most popular being that known as the "Bible and the key." Mr. Buckle has shown that the superstition of a nation must always bear an exact proportion to the extent of its physical knowledge, and adds that, "if we compare the different classes of society, we shall find that they are superstitious in proportion as the phenomena with which they are brought in contact have or have not been explained by natural laws. The credulity of sailors is notorious, and every literature contains evidence of the multiplicity of their superstitions, and of the tenacity with which they cling to them." That this is so, is shown by daily observation; for, in those districts

where railways and school-boards have been introduced, superstition has perceptibly declined. I have quoted some of the principal sources of superstition as existing in England, and if space permitted, I might have enlarged on this branch of the subject. At any rate, I have given a general survey of the causes that have produced this element in the national character; and it remains to consider how far superstition has exercised an influence in the nation's life.

Referring, then, to English history, it must be acknowledged, by any impartial observer, that superstition, in one form or another, has not only prevailed very largely in all sections of society, but has frequently made its influence felt in political events. Thus, the signs that foreshadow the death or fall of kings are graphically described by Shakspeare in "*King Richard II.*," and terrestrial portents, it may be remembered, accompanied the birth of Owen Glendower and Richard III. Indeed, speaking of Shakspeare, Mr. Goadby rightly remarks that in his day the current superstitions were a common possession, and he could no more have escaped from their influence than from the atmosphere he breathed. A world of supernaturalism affected alike the pulpit and the stage, the students of science, and the gossips of the village green. Queen Elizabeth was a firm believer in astrology, and even the date of her coronation was fixed by Dr. Dee, the celebrated astrologer, as the result of a stellar consultation, made at the request of Dudley. In short, superstition entered so thoroughly into the daily life of this period, that it would seem as if our forefathers were ready to invest the smallest event, out of the ordinary course of common experience, with the supernatural. Can we wonder that the most exorbitant cases of superstition were of constant occurrence amongst the middle and lower orders, when they heard of the sovereign's consulting a soothsayer for her trivial ailments, and the nobility of the land lending their coöperation and giving their sanction to the most preposterous forms of mysticism? Nor was this all; for the representatives of science, to whom the people naturally looked for guidance, were not exempt from the popular fallacies of their time. Thus we find no less a person than Lord Bacon, in his "*Natural History*," a book that was looked up to with the utmost faith by reason of his high reputation, laying it down as credible that precious stones "may work by consent upon the spirits of men to comfort and exhilarate them. Those that are

best for that effect are the diamond, the emerald, the hyacinth, and the yellow topaz." And then, again, the clergy, whose teaching was valued and respected on account of their sacred calling, were equally untrustworthy expounders of the superstitions of the time. Bishop Jewell, for instance, when preaching before Queen Elizabeth, made some pointed observations on the sorcery and witchcraft notions that had begun to gain such a wide field of popularity. "Your Grace's subjects," he said, "pine away, even unto the death; their color fadeth, their flesh rotteth, their speech is benumbed, their senses are bereft. I pray God they never practice further than upon the subject." It would seem, therefore, that the influence that superstition had gained on all classes in the sixteenth century, and, as I could also show, in the seventeenth, was almost unlimited; and this explains the rapid development of the great witchcraft movement in England, the extravagant and monstrous pretensions of which I have already spoken.

But, during the present century, the rapid advancement of physical science has been powerfully instrumental in dissipating many of those superstitions that, in the preceding centuries, had gained such a firm hold on popular credulity. Thus it exposed the fallacy of attributing to the interference of an angry God the calamities with which the world is occasionally visited, instead of explaining them on natural causes. Hence, happily, events that in years gone by were placed in the category of supernatural inflictions, are now known to be the inevitable result of certain well-known laws. At the same time, it was neither unreasonable nor contrary to what one might have expected, that, when science, some years ago, made a resolute onset against the long-established and deeply rooted convictions of the English people, it should be violently assailed as promulgating views and starting theories entirely at variance with what were regarded as so many familiar truths, the accuracy of which had never been seriously doubted. Consequently, on the one hand, science had to combat with the spirit of the age, which was satisfied to give a tacit, unquestioning assent to the traditional belief that had been handed down from father to son with an almost sacred reverence. Indeed, it was often argued, on a foolish and illogical principle, that the solutions of abstruse questions that had been decided by the leading intellects

of former generations should be upheld and respected, especially as it was urged that they not unfrequently dealt with matters concerning which human knowledge must always be limited. It was, therefore, no easy task to weaken men's faith in many of those popular theories that had received the sanction of public opinion, and on this account retained, as it were, an authoritative influence over an acquiescing people. But the steady progress of the development of physical science was not in any way disheartened or checked by the opposition it had to encounter in its struggle to expose the errors of superstition—a difficulty, indeed, from which it is not wholly free, even at the present day. A survival, for example, of an old piece of weather-wisdom, which is received with implicit faith by the educated portion of the community, is the familiar theory that the weather changes with the moon's quarterings. Although meteorologists have long ago repudiated this maxim as contrary to natural laws, yet, as an article of astrological belief, it retains its influence amongst all classes of society. "That educated people," remarks Mr. Tylor (*"Primitive Culture,"* 1873, I., 130), "to whom exact weather records are accessible, should still find satisfaction in the fanciful lunar rule, is an interesting case of intellectual survival." An instance of this kind is instructive, because it demonstrates, in a forcible manner, how tenaciously men cling to the influence of superstitious precepts, even when the ignorance that gave birth to them is superseded by a corresponding growth of knowledge. Granted, then, the difficulty of effacing existing survivals of superstitious belief, it is no matter of surprise that, two or three centuries ago, when education was at a low ebb, public feeling was ready to grasp any notion, however fanciful. As in the case of the witchcraft movement, an amount of faith was required of those who accepted its articles of belief, which is certainly not asked of the members of any religious community. Doubtless, therefore, as years roll on, and knowledge continues to increase, the tendency will be to abandon and despise superstition as a relic of an antiquated and less enlightened period. Moreover, as science in its progress throws, from time to time, new insight into the laws that regulate the universe, the feeling for the supernatural that formerly enthralled men's minds with a despotic fear will give place to the light of truth. Such a result must have an en-

nobling effect on a nation's character; because, as the intellect becomes gradually more disentangled from the trammels of superstition, it will view with a calm and fearless gaze the phenomena of the world around, which were oftentimes regarded as so many stupendous mysteries, not unfrequently supposed to be antagonistic to and at variance with the well-being of humanity.

T. F. THISELTON DYER.

COMMENTS.

MR. EDITOR: While the article on "Future Retribution," in the March number of the REVIEW, is able and masterly, Archdeacon Farrar does not pretend to criticise the argument of Dr. Shedd's thesis, "The Certainty of Endless Punishment," in the issue of the preceding month. A word or two, therefore, in reply to Dr. Shedd may not seem inappropriate. At the outset he lays much stress upon the question, "What do law and justice do when they punish?" declaring that everything depends upon the correct solution of this. His answer is both unique and startling: "Punishment, therefore," he says, "is wholly retrospective in its primary aim. It looks back at what has been done in the past. Its first and great object is requital. A man is hung for murder, principally and before all other reasons because he has voluntarily transgressed the law forbidding murder. He is not hung from a prospective aim, such as his own moral improvement, or for the purpose of deterring others from committing murder." And again, "Neither is it true that the first and principal aim of punishment is the protection of society and the public good. This, like the personal benefit in the preceding case, is only secondary and incidental." Under ordinary circumstances, an utterance so jurisprudentially unsound, and so ethically untenable, might pass for mere chicane, but the evident sincerity of the writer, and his assumption of learning upon the subject, lend at least a temporary significance. "Preventive justice," says Blackstone, "is, upon every principle of reason, of humanity, and of sound policy, preferable in all respects to punishing justice." (Commentaries, B. iv. *251.) Kent does not consider it a *vera quæstio* when he speaks of "the proper object of punishment, the protection of society by the prevention of crime." (Commentaries, vol. ii. *13.) Mr. Austin more elaborately enunciates the same doctrine, saying, "It is certainly true that when the injury is treated as a crime, the end of the sanction [that is, the justification of human punishment] is the prevention of future wrongs. The sanction is *pœna* or punishment, strictly so called; that is to say, an evil inflicted on a given offender by way of example or warning, to use the word commonly used by Latin writers, and more especially by Tacitus — *documentum*. If the evil did not answer this purpose, it would be inflicted to no end." (Austin's Jurisprudence, § 722.) Nor can Sir James Stephen be quoted in support of any such theory as the one under consideration, for he argues for hatred and desire for deliberate revenge — motives that could hardly be applauded by a divine; and, instead of entirely subordinating preventive objects, advocates their concurrence, in these words: "The expression and gratification of these

feelings is, however, only one of the objects for which legal punishments are inflicted. Another object is the direct prevention of crime, either by fear or by disabling or even destroying the offender, and this, which is I think commonly put forward as the only proper object of legal punishments, is beyond all question distinct from the one just mentioned, and of coördinate importance with it." (History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. ii., pp. 82-3.) But quite apart from the *a posteriori* consideration of legal punishment, Dr. Shedd informs us that, regarded *a priori*, the theory of expediency fails at every point, and as a conspicuous instance of failure we are asked to imagine the case of but a single person in the universe, whose transgressions against the "law of God" could not be punished by the laws of man. *Cessant ratione, cessat et ipsa lex* is a propædæutic maxim, which the learned doctor applies elsewhere in his article, where it is quite irrelevant. It were well to apply it here. Of course no human laws could govern the acts of such an individual, for the obvious reason that human law is conversant only about men in social conditions; and it would be impossible for one so circumstanced to commit crimes against society — *mala prohibita*. His offenses would be *mala in se*, for which he would only be answerable to a tribunal the laws of which differ as well in kind as in degree. Finally, such a case is "beyond common manners, common sense, and common comprehension." To analyze this article carefully would be both tedious and unprofitable. The examples of the argument offered are typical. Statements much to be doubted are made with unqualified assurance; while nearly every page shows some *non-sequitur* taken as the premise of a conclusion that is itself a paralogism.

C. DAVIS ENGLISH.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Powderly's article on the "Army of the Discontented" is as sad as it is true, and "pity 'tis, 'tis true"; but it disappoints one by the single remedy it suggests for the double-millioned evil it depicts. He proves that there are probably two millions of American workmen enduring all the wrongs of involuntary idleness. This means that our American army of the discontented is already so large that, if each member of it in passing a given point—let us say Trinity Church—were to spend just one minute in stating his or her personal grievance, and if the ragged army should thus march in single file night and day, never once halting, three years and nearly ten months would pass into eternity before the melancholy stories would come to an end! And this in 1885! But the reduction of the hours of labor would not remedy this evil, although in itself it would be a beneficent reform — beneficent, because, with nations as with individuals, it is criminal to sacrifice the man to the money-maker. I take it that man was put on this planet for a loftier destiny than to grind in the mills of our manufacturing Philistines all day long, and far into the night; and that the nation whose laborers are mere "hands," however much it may have to show of wealth accumulated, is a nation rather to be pitied than envied. That country is the happiest in which wealth, intelligence, and leisure are most widely and most equitably diffused. Two millions of workers out of work! Surely it is a vital problem. For not only are these men non-producers and non-consumers, but the entire cost of their subsistence — every dollar that is spent for their food and clothing — is a direct and needless tax on the common wealth of the active producers.

Permit me to catalogue a few only of the remedies that some of us believe must be applied for an evil so great and growing and threatening. Before the army of the discontented can be disbanded, there must be: 1. Land limitation. This means that no man shall hold a single acre of arable land on which he does not live, and which he does not cultivate; that non-cultivation shall invalidate land titles, or give the state the right to force the non-tilling owner to sell it. 2. Prohibition of ground leases in cities. This means that owners must build on their city lots, or else pay taxes equivalent to the value of improved adjacent lots, or else sell their land to those who are willing to build up the city. 3. Prohibition of the ownership of more than two lots by any citizen within a city's limits. This means that a house and a store any man may own, if he can buy or build; but that we shall not all live for the chief end of supporting our landlords. 4. Abolition of all laws for the collection of debts, so that trade may be protected from panics and the widespread bankruptcies whose total final cost comes on the whole industrious community. When trust is dead, business will be founded on the solid rock of solvency, and not till then. 5. Total prohibition of foreign manufacturing competition in our markets. We should hold our American markets sacred for our American citizen only. "Protection" is a coward's compromise. 6. A national or state ownership of all the mineral wealth of the country not yet appropriated. We can spend our mineral riches quite as well as the bonanza kings. 7. National ownership of the telegraphs and railroads. 8. Cumulative income taxation. 9. Abolition of the monopolies in banking, in transportation, in patents, and in copyrights, whereby the state shall secure, for the benefit of all the people, the great profits of fire and life insurance, of the circulation of representative money, and of the railroad traffic; and refuse so to lend the power of the commonwealth that inventions which they protect shall be transformed into instruments for increasing their burdens. These are only a few of the remedies that the thinking men in the Army of Discontent are preparing to present for political discussion. We do not mean robbery of the rich, or the confiscation of their wealth, but we do mean to endure no longer the oppression legalized by classes, or the constant reduction of our remuneration. We don't mean revolution, but we do mean business.

JAMES BERWICK.

MR. EDITOR: Upon the two articles in the REVIEW for January, 1884,—one, by Governor Murray, against Mormonism; the other, by John Taylor, President of the so-called Mormon Church, in favor of it,—permit an old resident of Utah to comment briefly. It will occur to every thoughtful person, at all familiar with the situation, who reads these articles, that plenty of attack as weak as Murray's, and plenty of defense as able as Taylor's, will go far toward making Mormonism the dog that will wag the tail for the entire inter-mountain region in the near future. Taylor shows quite conclusively the unconstitutionality of the Edmunds law, and points out an infamous instance of maladministration of it by the Commission, which was accomplished by interpolating into the oath required of voters before registering, the words, "in the marriage relation." This they did to enable open evil-livers — non-Mormon — to register and vote. Murray labors through an hypothetical indictment of the Mormons, of great length, and winds up by

proposing "a commission to govern Utah"; and, scenting war in the distance, concludes by saying, "If that should prove insufficient, the exigencies of the future will demand more effectual measures." Just why the most prosperous and best governed of the Territories should be governed by a commission, is something that the incoming Administration and coördinate branches of our great Government will honestly investigate before moving in that direction. When I say best governed, I mean that Territory where we find the greatest safety for life and property, with minimum taxation, together with harmony and contentment among the populace. You naturally ask, If this be true, why all this noise about Utah and the Mormons? Notwithstanding Murray's drag-net indictment, it will be found upon trial that polygamy is the only "nigger in the Utah fence." To save time and expense, I would suggest that that other "nigger in the Yankee wood-pile," easy divorce, be caught on the same hunt and whitewashed at the same time. Since the unchastity that made divorces easy made Mormon polygamy possible and New England polygamy fashionable, I think it would be well for the Government to apply a universal remedy for both manifestations of a common evil from a common source. To this end, I would add to the clause on the subject of religion in the Constitution, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," the words, "but Congress shall prevent the practice of crime in the name of religion." Upon such an amendment, a universal law that would uproot polygamy could be constitutionally enacted and enforced. To rout New England's legal polygamy, I would interpolate the three words, "marriage and divorce," into the fourth division of Section 8 of Article I. of the Constitution, so that it would read, "Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, marriage, and divorce throughout the United States"; and then, by a national law, I would make divorces difficult. BALLARD S. DUNN.

MR. EDITOR: Judge Pitman, in his recent article on "Woman as a Political Factor," holds, as monarchists of all ages have, that the suffrage is not a "natural right" of any being. This depends entirely upon the interpretation of the word "natural." On the supposition that a man is born to certain responsibilities, we judge also that he is born to certain rights. Every man is born with the burden laid upon him, according to all orthodoxy, to prolong his life as long as possible; to uphold the government under which he lives; to maintain justice and order, so far as he can; and to live up to the highest standards of which he is cognizant. The natural rights that our great fathers of independence defined were those which every man possesses — the rights to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." But liberty of the highest kind — in fact, of the only genuine kind — can be secured only under a good government. Every man, then, has the right to maintain, so far as the efforts of one man can avail, a good government to protect his liberty. He was born with the burden upon him to bear arms, when he should grow up, in defense of his government, if called upon; to shed his life's blood, if need be, to maintain it; to pay taxes upon his property to support it; to yield up all personal privileges, in an emergency, for the great universal

privilege of a good national government. Why, then, was he not born with the right to a voice in the selection of the rulers who constitute this government? If birth under any rule entails such heavy responsibilities, why is it not true that privileges of equal moment are a part of a man's birthright? It seems not only reasonable, but necessary, that the responsibility of the defense and upholding of government should be correlated with the privilege of partially making the government which one's life may go to defend and uphold.

KATE UPSON CLARK.

MR. EDITOR: Justice Hargis, in the interesting discussion of the law's delay, contributed to the April number of the *REVIEW*, is undoubtedly right in attributing that delay very largely to hasty and defective legislation. But the question still remains, Who is really to blame for such legislation? Lawyers and judges have long been accustomed to say, when statutes prove to be bad or erroneous, "We must take the law as we find it. We do not make it; we only execute it. The courts are one thing; legislatures are another." Let us see about that. Congress is crammed with lawyers, and every legislature in the country contains a large proportion of lawyers, if indeed they are not actually in a majority. And in every one of these legislative bodies the lawyers take a leading part. It is their business (if anybody's) to know what laws are practicable, and how they should be framed. A farmer, mechanic, merchant, clergyman, or teacher in a legislature may have a good idea, or understand and represent the wishes of the people, and may present them with force and clearness in debate; but when those wishes are to be embodied and uttered in the form of a statute, it is preëminently the business of the lawyers holding seats in that legislature to see to it that the statute is properly constructed, both as to its immediate purpose and as to its bearing on statutes already in existence, so that the courts shall have no difficulty in handling it. If not, what under heaven are so many of them there for? On all other accounts, they are the least desirable class of legislators. Suppose a legislature that contained a large number of artists and art-critics should make an appropriation for a picture or statue that proved to be a failure, should we not all hold them responsible for it? Suppose a legislature that included many school-masters and proof-readers passed bills that were full of bad spelling and could not be parsed, who would refrain from deriding the school-masters and proof-readers? The responsibility for defective and impracticable laws lies unquestionably with the guild of lawyers; and they may count themselves fortunate if they escape the suspicion of sometimes shaping legislation so as to increase litigation. But there is another thing in Judge Hargis's article that strikes an Eastern reader with surprise. He alludes, as if it were a well-known fact, to the effect produced on judges and juries by fear of mob violence. Pray, where is this an element of serious consideration in the courts? Is it so in his State of Kentucky? Surely we have nothing of the sort in New York.

ALEXANDER C. VERNON.

MR. EDITOR: I am going to speak an honest word concerning the literary hash of the period, even though I should be impaled on my own pen. Is there nothing new under the sun? Have we no writers, no poets, no

literary men who can create anything, but must we have the old authors, the old poets, the recent-dead writers, continually hashed up for our reading? I open my literary newspaper, and there I find Margaret Fuller, Hawthorne, Harriet Martineau, George Eliot, Carlyle and his wife, and dozens of lesser writers, dished up in various forms and shapes. In the popular magazines I find old comedies that ought to have died long ago, old poems that nobody cares to read in their original bindings, old madrigals sadly out of tune in this age, written by authors dead a hundred years ago. I open my NORTH AMERICAN, and there I find—what? Emerson again! Yes, in a notice of Mr. Holmes's dear old gossip book. For the past year the reading public has had Mr. Emerson served before it in every possible shape. First, it was ten days at the Concord School of Philosophy, where everybody, great and small, had his say; and then it was the newspapers and magazines, where all sorts of writers and speakers gave their estimate of this great man and his writings. I complain no more of your own critic than of others who have reviewed Mr. Emerson's character. He has given a fair *critique* from his own stand-point, and I thank him for omitting the most "gossipy" parts. Mr. Holmes's book may be delightful reading to some persons, but many of its details are too trivial to suit the taste of such a devout admirer of Mr. Emerson's genius as your correspondent. For instance, I do not care to know that Mr. Emerson had thirty-two great-grandfathers, or that a sharp bargain was driven with the stone-cutter who recorded their excellencies on their tombstones. And it pains me to read that "Master Ralph Waldo used to sit on a brick wall, longing for pears which belonged to his neighbor"; and that he was once "carried in his night-gown to a neighboring house." But if these little details of a hero's life are painful to read, what shall be said of the story of Emerson as a perpetual devourer of that New England conglomerate, pie? Yet Mr. Holmes tells us that Mr. Emerson was a "hopelessly confirmed pie-eater"; that he ate it for breakfast, when "morning opens with haste her lids," on his journeys, and perhaps even for luncheon, when he was writing those great thoughts of which your critic so justly speaks. Shall a god eat pie? I do not like to have my illusions dispelled in this way. I like to think of Emerson and the other great writers as I know them through their books, and prefer to form my own estimate of their characters. I deplore this literary hash, and I desire in future to take my gods "clear," neither seasoned by weak praise nor warmed over to suit the popular taste.

HARRIET H. ROBINSON.

MR. EDITOR: In the April number of the REVIEW appeared an article from Robert Buchanan, on "Free Thought in America." After an attempt at belittling Colonel Ingersoll,—a man he does not understand, and whose work he cannot appreciate,—Mr. Buchanan discourses of Mr. O. B. Frothingham's belief, wherein that reverend gentleman is represented as "lost in amazement that humanity ever contained that other idea of a personal immortality." All he can venture to say in plea for it is that "its very audacity favors it, its very wildness is its guarantee." Mr. Buchanan asks "how a faith can be vindicated by its own sheer improbability, how a belief may be true because it goes in the teeth of all experience," and leaves the question to be

decided by the transcendentalists of free thought. To show Mr. Buchanan that the "bad logic" he refers to has the sanction of precedence, I refer him to Tertullian's reasoning upon the Christian evidences, as follows: "I find no other means to prove myself to be impudent with success, and happily a fool, than by my contempt of shame; as, for instance, I maintain that the Son of God was born. Why am I not ashamed of maintaining such a thing? Why, because it is a shameful thing. I maintain that the Son of God died; well, that is wholly incredible, because it is monstrously absurd. I maintain that after having been buried, he arose again; and that I take to be absolutely true, because it was manifestly impossible." (Tertullian's "De Carne Christi.") Justin Martyr's "Apology to the Emperor Adrian" contains an example of such reasoning; in fact, such "bad logic" seems to have been the peculiar refuge of theologians in all ages, and transcendentalism cannot be justly charged with its introduction.

E. Q. NORTON.

MR. EDITOR: Orthodoxy gives man an immortal soul, sends the finally impenitent to eternal suffering in hell. Dr. Shedd *et al.* logically, but gently, infer eternal increase in sin and suffering. Over fifty years ago, Professor Finney, in a revival sermon, with the utmost energy asserted, "I believe the period will come in the history of every impenitent sinner when God will be compelled to exert the utmost of his infinite power to hold the wretch in existence while he inflicts upon him the utmost of his infinite vengeance." One poor woman was made insane by such blasphemy. Dr. Shedd's hell is not large nor comparatively populous. Christ declares the road to hell broad, crowded; that to life, narrow, found by few. If the "broad way" leads to an "orthodox hell," man's creation was a cruel mistake. The Bible and modern science utterly deny these orthodox premises. Science shows that a complex brain thinks, wills, feels; can be deranged, making insanity; can be small, with feeble mental manifestations; and large and vigorous, with corresponding talents. God must create each; then why depraved? This whole matter of souls is a fiction. God made no error when his sentence fell on Adam's body solely—"Dust thou art, and unto dust." Pressure, concussion of the brain, suspends consciousness; death terminates it; resurrection restores it. The judgment decides who are fit for immortality, who are only fit for "the second death." The latter are "chaff," "tares," "to be burned up," "burned to ashes," utterly destroyed, root and branch. Nuisances are forever abated.

D. H. CHASE.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Warner's admirable paper on the Elmira Reformatory proves that there are two distinct classes in the tribe of professional criminals—the class that can be reformed, and will reform under a sufficiently strong inducement (just as they fell), and the irreclaimable class, who, either by inherent indolence or hereditary instincts, deliberately prefer to lead a criminal life. But our laws take no cognizance of these two classes. They regard acts only. To certain crimes certain penalties are affixed; the penalty paid, the criminal at once resumes all his rights as a citizen. Supposing that ten families lived on a self-governed island, would they permit any one family

among them to adopt crime as a permanent profession; that is to say, to refuse to contribute by labor to the wealth of the community, by good conduct to its moral welfare, by taxation to its comfort, and by personal aid, whenever called on, to its safety in times of danger? Yet this is what we do in our America. We know that there is a permanent criminal class, who live by lawlessness; and yet after any one of its members has served out his sentence for a crime, we turn him loose on the community without asking or expecting that he will furnish any guarantee for his future good behavior, knowing, indeed, that when we release him we are licensing him to prey on the law-abiding citizens. The great criminals — such as burglars, highwaymen, and murderers — should be classified as social rebels, as the permanent enemies of society, not to be placated, nor liberated, nor regarded as having any rights whatever (excepting the right of unconditional surrender) until they reform and give evidence of repentance, until they give such pledges of their honesty as shall make their freedom compatible with a proper regard for the safety of the community. Industry should no longer be taxed to support a criminal class. We need a penal colony for the irreclaimable, a country where their escape would be difficult or impossible, and where their labor could be utilized without competing with free labor in constructing great highways and other works of permanent public utility. Alaska has all the conditions that such a colony demands; for their exile there would be a benefaction as well as a punishment, because opportunities could be afforded there for out-of-door reformation which no Eastern community would safely tolerate. Let us have a penal colony in Alaska. J. V. NELSON.

MR. EDITOR: I would like to point out one or two instances of Dr. Shedd's illogical reasoning. He says that a just God and man's free will prove the endless punishment of the sinner. Man, being free, sins voluntarily; guilt once incurred is guilt forever; God, being just, punishes forever to satisfy justice, unless the sinner repent before dying. This is his argument in brief. But if God is just, will he be so unjust as to punish a soul in eternity for a sin committed in time? And if man has free will, is he not as free to return to God in repentance as to depart from him in sin? And if guilt is eternal, would a just God limit the hour of repentance to the temporal? It is true that it is written, "Now is the accepted time." But there is no proof, but every evidence to the contrary in philosophy and in reason, that this "now" does not mean to limit the time of repentance, but to invite the sinner to come at once. The "now" lasts forever; it is always the time to turn and be good, and never too late to come to the God of justice. Every deed must return upon the doer; every sin will receive its punishment, here or hereafter. But to limit the time for the return from sin to any hour, whether it be the hour of death or before or after death, would be the work of an unjust God. Further than this, such a limit to the time of return would destroy man's freedom, for the freedom of the will would be a farce if it lasted but three-score years and ten. A man who is allowed to sin voluntarily forever, and is not allowed after a certain time to repent and return to his God, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called a creature of free will. Man, to be free, must

be free forever, to sin or to be righteous at his own choice; and the God of justice, who is also the God of love and patience, will wait to receive his returning feet. Dr. Shedd's "orthodox" God is so far beneath our ordinary philanthropists, to say nothing of our ideals of philanthropy, that one can hardly help accusing of blasphemy those who so picture the All-loving One. A God that punishes men, not that they may be made better and led to return to him from choice, but only out of revenge for their evil-doing, is not a God of justice, but a fiend. There is no such God in reality; only in the illogical mind or the diseased imagination could such a one exist. The truth concerning Dr. Shedd's article is, that a man whose idea of hell is that of a place of endless punishment, who can say that "one sin makes guilt, and guilt makes hell," unless the sinner repents during the short period of earthly life, and who believes the Supreme Being to be a God of revenge, is himself in a mental state of "hell," to which the conventional hell is as water unto wine. He damns nobody but himself, however, and even his damnation cannot last forever; for God is waiting, and will wait, until all his children return to that union with and willing obedience to him "whose service is perfect freedom."

H. R. SHATTUCK.

MR. EDITOR: Judge Hargis has done a good service to the republic by his essay on "The Law's Delay"; but, as is natural enough, he sees more clearly the errors of other classes than the short-comings of his own class. He finds that the ignorant voter is a primal source of the law's delay, by his election to the legislature of demagogues ignorant of the principles of jurisprudence, or indifferent to the welfare of the State; and his first suggestion is that, from an early date in the future, no one shall be entitled or permitted to vote unless he shall be able to read and write. This condition precedent should have been demanded and enacted long ago; but it is too late now to remedy the error made in permitting ignorant citizens to wield the supremest function of citizenship. Law cannot cure this evil, because politicians make the laws, and they would not dare to apply such a legal remedy. But the evil is not, therefore, without a remedy. Multiply schools. Encourage every local effort to establish reading-rooms, and circulating libraries, and debating clubs, and lyceums. We cannot drive our illiterate voters to school, but we can influence them to become intelligent, or, as Tory Bob Lowe, now Lord Sherbrooke, put it, "we can educate our masters"; for else what right have we to regard ourselves as superior to them? Judge Hargis's own "section" would fiercely resist the project of legally limiting the suffrage to the male readers and writers, for, as the census shows, the Mississippi and South-western States would soon largely lose in their Congressional representation by such an enactment rigidly enforced. But, without doubting or discussing the other issues raised by the Judge,—as to the lobby, for example, and ignorant jurors,—let me ask of the lawyers, as a class, are they not the chiefest causes of the law's delays, and therefore are they not more responsible than any other class for the disrespect for the law that is now so serious and so saddening a feature of our national life? I think they are. Congress, for instance, and most of the State Legislatures, are largely composed of the legal profession, and always controlled by it. What example do lawyers as legislators set to

the people? Do they consecrate their whole time to their great client, the Nation, as Charles Sumner did in the Senate and Lincoln in the White House, or as the early Congressmen all did, and as all the Presidents have done? Instead of doing so, the legislative lawyers rarely hesitate to be absent to "argue cases," even when Congress is in session, and not one of them deems it his duty to spend his vacations in advancing the national interests. If our laws are not codified as they ought to be, is it not the Judge's "learned brothers," and not the people, who are to blame? It is not quite fair to speak vaguely of a class of "demagogues," in view of the indisputable fact that all our legislatures are dominated by lawyers. But there are two other causes of the law's delay, which, to my lay mind, seem quite as serious as any one of the causes indicated by the Judge. What is the *raison d'être* of a legal pleader? Surely, to give all men an equal chance under the law. But this principle has been steadily perverted, until now the practice reverses the original reason for tolerating advocates. Say, "I am ungifted of speech, and my antagonist is eloquent"; so, the law protects me against him by permitting me to hire an orator. But as I am only one man; what rightful excuse is there for permitting more than one man to represent me? Yet I have seen half a dozen lawyers engaged to defend one man, and half a dozen more to prosecute him, and this when both men, defendant and prosecutor, were famous orators. What is the practical result of this custom? Delay and injustice. It abolishes equality. It gives wealth an undue advantage. Appeals from court to court still further increase the chances of wealth to protect iniquity by the very machinery established to execute righteousness. Whatever tends to injustice destroys respect for law; and whatever weakens the people's faith in the justice of the law strengthens the belief that a social revolution is needed to remedy acknowledged wrongs. It is the grasping selfishness of capital that gives birth to the dreaded spirit of communism; and it is the lawyer that perverts the spirit of the laws who is the real leader of the mobs that obey Judge Lynch.

JOHN BALL, JR.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

No. CCCXLIII.

JUNE, 1885.

SHALL SILVER BE DEMONETIZED?

THE people of the United States never have used silver as a circulating medium, and they have shown that they do not want to use it unless at such a ratio to the old standard of value that the debtors of the moment can win a percentage on their contracts. From 1792 to 1834, under a "double-standard" law, they used silver as a standard of value, but no silver dollars were coined from 1806 to 1836. Bank notes only were used, and there never was any test whether the people would like silver dollars as a circulating medium or not. In 1834 the rating under the double standard was changed so that the gold dollar became the standard, the change involving a depreciation of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. in the standard of contracts. The change was made to favor the gold-mining industry of North Carolina and Georgia, just as the law of 1878 was made to favor the silver-mining industry. In 1853 silver was demonetized, except the dollars. In 1873 the dollars were demonetized, never having existed as a circulating medium. Neither the United States nor any other country ever had a concurrent circulation of the two metals. Such a thing is as impossible as perpetual motion, and it makes no difference how large the coinage union may be that tries to enact it.

It is remarkable that, although money is one of the oldest human inventions, and one of the most important, there is none

that has been perfected so slowly, and is yet so far from satisfactory. Three or four thousand years ago the Chinese were struggling with the problem of a concurrent circulation, trying to use iron and copper coins side by side. The Persians advanced from silver to gold when the extent of their commerce made the latter more convenient. The Greeks did the same. The Romans went from copper to silver, and from silver to gold, as the same expansion took place. In the Middle Ages, as the trade and industry of Europe shrank, gold went out of use, and in Charlemagne's time silver was readopted. Within a century or two there has been another reversion to gold on the part of the leading nations, and in the order of their industrial rank. During all this period the perplexities arising from the inconvenience of dispensing with either metal, and the difficulty of rating them properly, if used together, have surpassed human ingenuity. There is not yet a single nation that has a simple, safe, secure, and sound system of money, free from wasteful loss and wear, and furnishing trade with such a medium and standard as convenience requires.

Our law of 1873 would have given us as good a monetary system as any nation now has, but in 1878 the silver dollar was arbitrarily restored. The law-maker has nothing to do with the mint, except to provide that it shall be ready to coin metal into such shapes and sizes as public convenience calls for. There never was any call for the silver dollar. The people have plainly shown, during seven years, that they do not want silver as a circulating medium. If the experiment ever was justifiable, it is now certainly complete, and those that made it are bound to abide by it. Even M. Cernuschi, who certainly has been fanatical enough on this question, now concedes that there is nothing to do but to widen the use of the larger silver coins by making them subsidiary with a limited legal tender. It seems to me that that would be a wise and proper course under the existing state of things until the readjustments due to the fall in silver can come about.

Silver is not wanted to-day as a circulating medium by any civilized nation. Each of them wishes that the others would use silver, but no one of them is willing to do so itself, except the United States. England and Germany blame the Latin Union for closing their mints just when the beneficent action of the double standard was wanted; but the Latin Union declined to be at the expense of serving their convenience. The United

States, however, stepped forward and said, Let us do it for you. The Latin Union blames Germany for demonetizing silver and making all the trouble, and blames the Scandinavian nations for taking the same step at the same time; but the movement was inevitable, and its simultaneousness was due to the fact that the last to adhere to silver would lose most. The United States had no silver, owned no India or other dependence interested in silver, and had no share in the trouble or risk, but we voluntarily put ourselves in the way of the worst of it.

M. de Laveleye has just published another argument to prove that we all ought to restore bimetallism. It is a strange proof of the perversity of mind that a whim of this kind will produce. The facts of the past ten years prove that the double standard of France and the Latin Union, instead of being a beneficent device, has been a source of mischief just so far as it has interfered with the free distribution of the precious metals under the laws of value. Every such interference is temporary, and produces reactions that are sudden and violent and apparently capricious. We are now suffering from just that reaction, and the Bland bill, so far as it perpetuates another and continued interference with the world's market for silver, prolongs and intensifies the mischief. The fact that no nation, except the United States, is willing to use silver, is the plainest proof that the fall in silver is not accidental, nor due to anybody's whim, but is due to economic forces of unmistakable direction and scope. To restore bimetallism would be to fly in the face of the very facts of the situation by which we should be instructed. The movement against silver as a circulating medium is one that cannot be reversed, but must go on until it develops into a new order of things in which the passing inconvenience will all disappear. To stop it would be like throwing a machine out of use because of the temporary inconvenience to capital and labor that every improvement causes. It has been my opinion that Asia and Africa were about to be opened to commerce, and that silver money would be needed to sustain that development. If so, the cheapening of silver would be a favorable event.

If, then, the people of the United States do not want silver as a circulating medium, for what do they want it? What is the object in getting it? At present, if the Treasury calls the silver coins "dollars," and compares them with the cost of the bullion, it stands to win several million dollars. But if it tries to realize this gain by exchanging the silver coins for gold dollars' value,

it cannot do it. If we, the people, have to give a gold dollar's value for a coin, we see no reason why we should not buy a gold dollar, and have what we pay for. If the Treasury sells its silver coins freely, it will find that, by the time it has marketed all its stock, it will have lost all its gain, and perhaps more. Then, however, we shall have altered our standard of value, not without a convulsion of our entire industry and finance. But eighty-five cents' worth of silver will then be worth just eighty-five cents. How will anybody be benefited by this, except those that are debtors when the change takes place, provided they can survive the intervening convulsion? If that would be a benefit to anybody, we can accomplish it far more easily and safely by reducing the weight of the gold dollar fifteen per cent.

But it is said that we shall not have money enough, or the world will not have money enough, if silver is not used as a circulating medium. Nothing can give us either more or less in value than our proportion of the world's money. If we use silver, or paper, we must give up gold. If we are thinking of the world's supply, then we must go to the expense of putting all the silver into the world's stock, for the sake of increasing our stock of money by our share of that additional supply when it comes back to us, in the ratio of our money-supply to the world's money-supply. The experience of the past ten years ought to have shown us that the old-fashioned mode of reasoning about the amount of money in the world, gold-supply, prices, etc., is no longer applicable. Specie is more and more important every year as a measure of value, and less and less important as a medium of exchange.

But it is most of all on account of the mischievous effects that would be produced on the measure of value, that the use of silver would be a calamity. The silver dollar would not stay at eighty-five cents. It would bear some other ratio to the gold dollar. Instead, therefore, of using the true and ultimate standard in all its severity and highest utility, we should come to it to be sure at last, but always through an intervening step involving doubt, risk, and loss. The more perfect any of our processes are, the more valuable is perfection in the standard of measurement. This is as true of money as of anything else, and an imperfection in our measure of value would put us at permanent disadvantage with all our rivals and competitors. The result is, that we do not want or need silver as a circulating medium, and shall not abandon it, because we never have had it.

If we want silver in order to bury it in the ground, it must be in order to make a market for it. In that case, the market will react only so much more severely whenever we withdraw. If we want it in order to take advantage of our creditors, that is why so few are now willing to become creditors, and why industry and commerce are stagnant.

W. G. SUMNER.

I SHALL here address myself solely to the question, whether those who have held the doctrine of International Bimetallism should now definitely abandon the effort to secure the concurrence of European nations in a convention for the free (not necessarily gratuitous) coinage of silver into money of full debt-paying power, at some fixed ratio to money of gold, presumably $15\frac{1}{2}$ to 1. In behalf of the continued coinage of the silver dollar I have not a word to say, regarding it as adverse to the true interests of international bimetallism. To the bimetallists that took part in the Paris Conference of 1878 it appeared that, if anything were to be done to avert the disasters apprehended from gold monometallism, it must be done then, straight away. It was not only intolerable that mankind should continue to suffer the evils already experienced from silver demonetization, but it seemed that, should the present effort fail, the logical effects of Germany's action in 1871-3 must rapidly proceed, through a series of tremendous shocks to trade and industry, to a conclusion that would make it hopeless thereafter to attempt to rehabilitate silver. It is perhaps unavoidable that those who are to take part in any contest should exaggerate the importance of individual actions, deeming each in succession to be critical and decisive. But nature is more tolerant; the order of things is too large and too well balanced to be permanently overborne by a single shock. Since 1878, alike the course of the production of the precious metals, the experiences of trade and industry, and the growth of opinion, have combined not only to give a new opportunity for the discussion of the bimetallic principle, without prejudice from previous failure, but to add force to every argument that seven years ago was urged in its favor. When the Conference of 1878 adjourned without day and without result, the anticipations of financiers and economists regarding the future of the two metals were shaped and colored by the astonishing yield of the silver mines of the United

States, and by the seeming repletion of India, traditionally the greatest consumer of that metal. But these anticipations only afford another example of the failure of philosophers to do justice to "the modesty of nature." The Comstock is as dead as Cæsar, and although Leadville has been discovered, the demand for silver, in spite of the closing of the Latin mints to that metal, and its demonetization by Germany, has been such as to hold its price well up, fairly within the reach of the European states, should they choose to resume its coinage. While thus the recent course of silver production has been such as to place the bimetallic scheme under no heavier burden than in 1878, the course of gold production, on the other hand, has been such as to convey a most impressive warning against persistence in gold monometallism. With a demand for new gold for use in the arts, for keeping up the stock of money-metal, and for enlarging this to meet the growing wants of commerce, which the London "Economist," even fifteen years ago, estimated at \$150,000,000 a year, and which is unmistakably increasing with great rapidity, in spite of paper money and the check system,—in the face of such a demand for new gold, we have the ghastly fact of an annual production little, if anything, above \$100,000,000, threatening mankind with the monstrous evils of a diminishing circulation, regarding which I may here repeat my language in the Conference of 1878: "Suffocation, strangulation, are words hardly too strong to express the agony of the industrial body, when embraced in the fatal coils of a contracting money-supply."

Secondly, the experiences of trade and industry, during the past seven years, have been such as strongly to emphasize the arguments in favor of bimetallicism presented at the Conference of 1878. At that time the United States, and the commercial world generally, were in a state of restricted production, following a financial collapse. It was reasonably urged that the existing condition had been brought about, or, at least, greatly promoted, by the German demonetization of silver. But this the monometallists denied; and the connection between the alleged cause and the situation in 1878, was, it must be confessed, not so clear as to compel assent. Within two years thereafter occurred a revival of production. Strangely enough, even at the height of this movement, prices, except in the case of a few highly speculative commodities, did not advance to the level of the period preceding 1873, but, on the contrary, persisted in remaining, in general, far below that level. Scarcely four years

more had elapsed, when signs of serious derangement in business were again manifested, world-wide ; and now, after five scant years of industrial prosperity, uneasy and troubled at the best, we find ourselves, in 1885, in the midst of a crisis of unusual severity, with prices extraordinarily and persistently low. Such an experience is of a nature to compel attention to the question of the restoration of silver to the monetary function it performed prior to the German change of standards. Has it come to this, that the interval between industrial crises is to be shortened from the traditional ten years to five? and that, even in the center of the period, at the very crest of production, money is to bear a constantly increasing purchasing power? These bitter experiences of trade and industry are not only in precise accord with what was predicted by the bimetallists of 1878, but they are unerringly to be traced, in no small part, to the wanton mischief perpetrated by Germany between 1871 and 1873.

The most immediate effect of any reduction of the money-supply is to cut into the profits of the employing class. Diminishing, as this does, the possible gains, and increasing the possible losses, of business, it makes the employer slow, cautious, and timid in all enterprises involving large expenditures for labor and materials. The effect next experienced is the enhancement of the burden of all debts and fixed charges, acting as a steady drag upon production. But these are not all or the worst effects of the demonetization of silver. By the defeat of the bimetallic scheme, that par of exchange between silver-using and gold-using states which the beneficent action of France and her monetary allies had for seventy years maintained, to the inexpressible advantage of the whole commercial world, has been destroyed, at a blow.

It would be as idle, as it would be dishonest, for the monometallists to seek to disparage the importance of this consideration, since the very arguments by which they have proven the grave, the momentous evils of an irredeemable paper money, of local circulation, non-exportable, inconvertible into the money of the world's commerce, will also serve, without qualification or alteration, to prove the grave, the momentous evils of destroying that par of exchange, that normal price of gold in terms of silver, that normal price of silver in terms of gold, which was established and approximately maintained by the operation of the French law of 1803. The London "Economist,"

the first financial journal of the world, has frankly confessed that exchange between England and India has been made so highly speculative as to place trade under the greatest disadvantage. A letter that I have received, while penning the last page, from a gentleman occupying one of the most important chairs of political economy in England, contains the following significant remark: "I am increasingly convinced of the importance of the standard-of-value question in relation to this prolonged and, I fear, increasing depression."


That, thirdly, the movement of public opinion since 1878 has been altogether favorable to a reconsideration of the action that effected the demonetization of silver, does not require formal proof. It is to be seen on every hand. Perhaps the strongest evidence of change that could be adduced is the recent admission of Professor Sumner, who, while declaring a concurrent circulation of gold and silver to be both "a scientific absurdity and a practical impossibility," concedes that an alternate standard "contains no scientific absurdity," the question of adopting it being purely one of expediency. For so much, thanks! I should be glad, did space permit, to confute the former opinion, and to show that a concurrent circulation would be perfectly feasible. But it must suffice to say that, whatever may be true of a concurrent circulation, an alternate circulation will answer the needs of commerce wonderfully well. The tide alternately rises and falls within our harbors; yet vessels lie at the wharves undisturbed, and load or unload, at ebb or at flood, without interruption and without damage, because the rise and the fall are confined within narrow limits. At six feet, the alternation does no harm; at sixty, it would compel the abandonment of every harbor on our coast. Likewise the bimetallic system, between 1803 and 1873, if it did not wholly extinguish fluctuations in value between gold and silver, did assuredly keep those fluctuations within limits that were compatible with the safe and sound conduct of business. That tie broken, by the insensate folly of Germany, we know too well what store of woes has been opened for the trade of Europe, Asia, and America.

FRANCIS A. WALKER.

INASMUCH as an international agreement on our present ratio of 1 to 15.98 is quite improbable, so far as the United States is concerned, we must either change our mint ratio to suit the

present market rate (about 1 to 18.7), or suspend the coinage of silver dollars altogether. The latter alternative is the immediate question with us, and I shall confine myself briefly to reasons for the repeal of the Act of 1878. Some of the evils to be feared from the continuance of our present policy may be summarized as follows: First, Silver will be a fluctuating standard. Second, Gold will disappear from circulation. Third, The credit of the United States will be impaired. Fourth, There will be a demoralizing change of prices. Fifth, The laboring classes will suffer.

First. Gold and silver have been selected by the common consent of the world as the materials of money, because, although they have not remained absolutely stable in value, they have shown less change than any other commodities. Of the two, silver has appeared capable of by far the greater variations in value, wholly apart from the causes of these variations. This has been a marked characteristic of silver in the past few years. The accompanying chart will make clear what a



dance this metal has kept up in the past fifteen years, and that it has danced most in a downward movement. No medium so unstable as this has now become, can serve a business community. It will transfer legitimate trade into methods of betting on prices; and as no definite calculations could be made for the future, we should go back to the commercial gambling of the period of depreciated paper. In short, the fluctuations of silver since 1872, whatever the causes may be, unfit it for the very uses for which gold and silver were first selected. These fluctuations, moreover, have not been prevented by any aid that the United States could give by passing the Act of 1878, and coining silver. It was said by advocates of this measure that our action would raise the value of silver; on the contrary, the price has steadily kept below the value in 1878, and to-day it is selling below 50*d.* an ounce. There is no reason, therefore, for continuing our experiment on the ground that it can keep up the price of the metal. In fact, the adoption of a ratio in 1878 of 1 to 15.98, when the market rate in that year was 1 to 17.96, was a flagrant violation of all monetary laws. The changes in the value of silver would be still more evident had the line in the chart been based on monthly, instead of annual, averages.

Second. Our present policy discriminates against gold, as is shown by the extreme divergence of the mint (1: 15.98) from the market (1: 18.7) ratio. As the Act of 1878 originally passed the lower House of Congress, it contained a "Free Coinage" clause, by which any holder of silver bullion could have it coined into dollars at the mint. That is, eighty-five cents' worth of silver were to be given legal-tender power equal to one hundred cents of gold. That would immediately have sent gold out of the country. This "free coinage" provision was stricken out by the Senate, and the Treasury alone was permitted to present eighty-five cents in silver to be coined into a debt-paying dollar of one hundred cents, to an amount of not less than two million dollars a month. This machinery has delayed the transition from a gold to a silver standard, and made the present situation difficult of comprehension by the general public. It simply makes it necessary that the Treasury should be gorged before the silver can get out upon the community at large. Imagine a duct leading from the mints to a great open vat (the Treasury vaults); as the silver dollars stream through the duct, none, except by special efforts of the attendants, will get outside

until the vat is filled to the brim. To-day this vat is dangerously full, and is on the point of overflowing. The Treasury hitherto has paid principal and interest of United States bonds in gold, which has come in chiefly through the payment of customs. But now silver certificates (receipts for deposit of silver dollars) are received for duties and taxes, and thus the Treasury gets less gold and more silver. When the gold-fund is insufficient to pay called bonds and matured interest, and keep a gold reserve for three hundred and forty-six million of greenbacks, the Treasury must pay in silver, and we shall then be brought to a silver basis. So long as gold is steadily diminishing and silver steadily increasing in the hands of the Government, we can see the crisis approaching. Could any measure be better calculated to prevent the revival of business, and import uncertainty and distrust into the near future? There can be little doubt that the continued depression of business is more or less due to the inability to forecast the future, in view of the coming change from a gold to a fluctuating silver standard.

But how will gold disappear? The Treasury is the great reservoir of gold. If this fund runs out, and the Government pays only in silver, the banks will be unable to get gold reserves, because only silver funds will be coming in. But gold must be had for foreign payments; other nations are not affected by our law of legal tender. Gold will, therefore, bear a premium, and be treated as merchandise, not as a medium of exchange. Payments will be made in the cheapest metal, and silver will be the only coin in circulation. There was a road crossing a certain valley on an embankment under which a river passed. The opening in the embankment became closed, and the level of the river rose until it overflowed the road a few inches. People still crossed by this means, although the slight layer of water was very disagreeable; they saw clearly enough that the rising tide would soon stop all passage by the firm road, and that they must find a way of crossing solely by water. This is a picture of our own situation. The Act of 1878 has caused an accumulation of silver, and the payment by the solid medium of gold is becoming difficult because of the rising tide of silver in the Treasury. Soon the gold road will entirely disappear, and we shall be afloat on an uncertain and fluctuating sea of silver.

The moment a gainful premium exists on gold funds, what is to prevent one kind of legal payment which is now redeemable in

gold, namely, greenbacks, from being driven out of use by another and cheaper kind of legal payment—silver dollars! The actual result may be that, as soon as the premium appears, the greenbacks will be presented to the Treasury for redemption in gold. The presentation of one-third of \$346,000,000 would exhaust the whole gold reserve of the Treasury. Of course this would result in a contraction of the currency until the vacuum was slowly filled by the regular coinage of \$2,000,000 a month of silver.

Third. If the United States, after contracting to pay principal and interest of its debt in coin (and no silver dollars were in circulation from before 1850 to 1878, during which period our bonds were marketed), had given it to be understood that gold was the means of payment, how should we have regarded an act of Congress that took fifteen or eighteen per cent. out of the gold dollar, and paid our obligations with this debased coin? We have too long reviled "effete monarchies of the Old World" for this crime, to do the same thing ourselves. But this is exactly what we are about to do if we pay principal and interest of United States securities in silver coin worth fifteen or eighteen per cent. less than that "nominated in the bond." It would be a peculiar tax, taken from one class only, those who trusted the good faith of the Government, but levied upon them to buy silver to keep up the price for silver owners. Nothing could be more dishonest. It would be Mahoneism on a national scale.

Fourth. As soon as silver dollars become the only medium of exchange, it is axiomatic that they can finally be exchanged only for their intrinsic value. The local bank will not receive silver at the end of the day from the grocer on the corner as a deposit, and agree to pay back gold on demand. There will be silver accounts and gold accounts. The increasing mass of silver cannot be kept at par with gold, because there will be no place where silver can be exchanged for gold. As silver increases in quantity, it will fall to the level of its intrinsic value. Its legal-tender quality will not sustain it above this point, any more than it kept paper money from depreciating during 1862-79. Instead of measuring commodities, as now, in terms of one hundred cents in gold, we shall compare them with a unit worth eighty-five cents in gold. No one can claim that, under such conditions, prices will remain as they are now. But the case will be worse than this. The silver dollar is not likely to continue equal to eighty-five cents. It has been fluctuating in a lively manner of late. Prices, therefore, will be set high enough to cover any

possible fluctuations, and the buyer must pay higher prices than are indicated by the actual difference between the two standards. This will be a paradise for speculators. In short, it would be hard to devise a better means of clogging the wheels of industry. Foreign trade, moreover, would be disturbed. The importer of silk, who buys his goods in France for one hundred dollars in gold, can sell them in the United States only for silver. At ten per cent. profit he would have sold them for one hundred and ten dollars in gold ; but under the silver standard he must sell them for as many silver dollars as would buy one hundred and ten gold dollars. In comparison with a gold standard of foreign countries, our silver dollars could be worth only their intrinsic value as bullion, and our prices would all be nominally higher.

Fifth. It is a matter of long experience, that wages of labor do not rise as rapidly as the prices of commodities. Capitalists are better able to adapt themselves to changes in their expenses of production than are laborers to changes in the prices of the articles they consume. When the prices of machinery or materials of manufacture rise, the employer promptly secures to himself the ordinary rate of profit by advancing the price of the finished goods. It is a different thing when the goods consumed by the laborer rise in price. The laborer finds that there is a certain custom as to the rate of money wages in his factory, and that it takes a long time to push home upon employers the fact that all the articles of his consumption — bread, meat, and clothing — have risen, while his money wages remain the same. During all the transition period from one standard to another, the working man will be the chief sufferer ; and he will continue to suffer until by threats, by strikes, by combinations, he and his fellows succeed in getting an increase of wages. Until he can accomplish this, his daily wages will purchase less food, less clothing, less comforts, than before. The result will be to give additional profit to the capitalist. The very money-dealers themselves will prosper by a change from one standard to another.

It seems quite inexplicable, therefore, that a measure that must inevitably work a damage to business, introduce a fluctuating currency, impair the credit of the United States, drive gold from circulation, raise prices, and injure the laboring classes, can be allowed for a moment to remain on the statute-books.

J. LAURENCE LAUGHLIN.

THE TARDINESS OF JUSTICE.

IN the parable of the Unjust Judge, his injustice consisted in putting off an action, not in making a wrong decision. It was harder for the suitor to be kept in uncertainty than to know positively that one could have no redress. In later times the law's delay was one of the evils against which relief was promised in *Magna Charta*. *Nulli * * * differemus rectum vel justitiam*. And it was one of the troubles that Shakespeare names as almost an excuse for suicide; a quietus with a bare bodkin. The evil continues at the present day. In most things we move more rapidly than former generations did. We travel faster; we send messages across the ocean in a few minutes; we transact business of large amounts in a short time; but when we come to our litigations, we find the reproach of the law's delay still existing. We have done very little to remedy this great wrong; indeed, it is doubtful whether in this matter we have not gone backward. Lords Kenyon and Ellenborough "tried cases at the rate of twenty-five a day. The very last day that Lord Ellenborough sat at Guildhall, when he was laboring under great infirmity and weakness, he tried seventeen defended cases." ("Life of Lord Abinger.") Contrast this with the proceedings at the present day, when one case may last a week or more; or where, as in the famous case in Brooklyn, months may be consumed in one trial. Thus, too, in criminal cases. A reference to the English State trials will show that it was an innovation when a criminal trial was continued into a second day.* Now a criminal would hardly think himself to be well defended unless the trial were protracted through two or three days; and even the charge of the Court has been known to exceed that time, as in the Orton (or Tichborne) trial. The right to appeal, the chances of a new trial, the deliberations of

* Trial of William Stone in 1796. Vol. 25: 1295.

courts, especially in the case of a capital offence, put off punishment to such a time that its infliction seems to be a cruelty.

It used to be thought that old modes of practice gave opportunity to lawyers for postponing the end of litigation, and the Court of Chancery had to bear the blame for much of the delay experienced by suitors. Jarndyce against Jarndyce was a representation of the law's delay in its worst and most aggravating form. But the Court of Chancery has been abolished; the old practice has passed away. We have enjoyed several codes intended to facilitate the rapid disposal of business, but the delay remains. It is not necessary to go into detail or into statistics. It is enough to say briefly that the Supreme Court of the United States is hopelessly in arrears. In New York the Court of Appeals is falling behind with its business. Some of the General Terms are unable to keep up with the cases that come before them, and in many of the circuits and trial terms the business is similarly behindhand. One cannot begin a lawsuit that involves a considerable amount with any hope of a reasonably speedy decision. A year's time would be short for its termination; and the plaintiff may not reach the end in three, four, five, or six years. A short time since, counsel, in arguing a matter, referred to a case that had been pending eighteen years, and was just at an issue for trial. The case may be found reported as early as 1873,* in one of its many steps, and was in fact begun in 1869. It has graduated some of its counsel to the bench, and has seen several of the judges who have sat in it carried beyond the term of their judicial career; and I suppose it is not yet tried. Another case pressed forward by the plaintiff, and entitled to a preference on the calendars of the courts, was begun in 1874, and after four trials reached its happy end in 1880.† These are not unusual instances. If any one would see further detail on this point, he need only take a volume of the Reports of the Court of Appeals, and where a decision is made which is final, examine the statement and the other reports of the case, and ascertain when the case was begun. He will soon learn what the law's delay now is.

In civil matters the delay of justice is a great wrong. *Bis dat qui cito dat* is a maxim as true of law as of charity. Men can

* *Smith v. Rathburn*, 66 Barb., 402; 13 Hun, 47.

† *Cordell v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.*, 67 N. Y., 535; 70 N. Y., 119; 75 N. Y., 330; 79 N. Y., 636.

bear what they believe to be a wrong decision, if it be made promptly; but they cannot bear the uncertainties of delay. Hope deferred maketh the heart sick. It is the weary watching by a bedside, not the fatal termination, that tries mind and body. And so with a pecuniary claim that one man makes against another. When the case is decided, he accommodates himself to the result, favorable or not; but while he is in uncertainty there is no peace. The doubting Lord Eldons are the curse of suitors, and the case of *Peebles v. Plainstones* might well drive the weary plaintiff into a feeble lunacy. If a plaintiff must wait six or eight years for his rights, now encouraged by a favorable decision, and then disheartened by a reversal, until, after three or four trials and twice as many appeals, he succeeds at last, he will learn in the end that, on the whole, he would have been wiser never to have prosecuted his claim. He will ask himself sadly, what kind of justice is that which in expense costs as much as it gives, and in anxiety costs more. He will hardly feel satisfied, even if his counsel shall inform him that his case has afforded the opportunity to settle an important point of law, which previously had been uncertain. If the life of man had not been reduced in length since the days of Methuselah, a litigant might be content to spend ten years in having all the niceties of his case discussed and decided by lawyers and judges. But life is short; law is long.

Are there any causes of this delay that can be remedied? It is often, perhaps generally, the wish of the defendant in an action to postpone a final decision. There must be of course certain legal machinery and certain deliberation, in order that reasonable justice may be done. And as society becomes more wealthy and business affairs more complicated, it may be that more thought and deliberation are required in the decision of controversies. But there ought not to be too much opportunity for the defendant to protract the litigation; and if there be any way of bringing cases to a speedy decision, it should be sought. There has been an increased laxity in requiring parties to be ready when cases are called. Slight excuses are accepted more readily than they formerly were for the putting a case over to the next court. One cause for this may be in the difficulty of retaining witnesses in attendance. The expense of daily attendance is so large compared with the legal fees of witnesses that parties have some excuse for not bringing up

their witnesses until the day when it is certain they will be needed.

In some parts of New York there is, it may be, another cause that facilitates this putting of cases over to another term. In former times a circuit judge had a certain number of counties within which he was to hold his court. If he did not try a case at one circuit, he would find it waiting for him at the next. But, under the present system, circuits in the same county are held by different judges, and if a case is put over a circuit by the judge who holds it, he is generally relieving himself from the labor of trying that case. It will come before one of his brethren at the next circuit. So that, if he has the least desire to lessen his work, he has an opportunity to do so by putting cases over.

Another cause of delay in litigations in New York has been the practice of referring causes for trial. Partly owing to a deficiency in the judicial force, and partly to a willingness in judges to avoid labor, it has become far too common for lawyers to consent to refer causes which ought to be tried either before the court or before a jury. The evil is serious. References are very expensive, and the expense falls on the defeated party. They are always protracted; because the convenience of two or more counsel and of the referee must be consulted, and because the referee cannot exercise that power of compelling promptness which can be exercised by the court. Thus a trial, which before a court or jury might be finished in a few days, will, before a referee, last for months, by reason of short sessions and long adjournments. It is to be hoped that, since the recent increase in the number of judges, there will be a return to the practice when nothing was referred except long accounts. This increase of judicial force ought now to enable cases to be disposed of promptly at all the circuits and trial terms. It is certainly the duty of the State to provide a sufficient number of judges; so that, if they do their duty faithfully, there should be no delay in reaching a cause soon after it is ready for trial. But after the litigant has come to the trial of his cause and has a decision, he greatly deceives himself if he supposes that the litigation is ended. There are appeals and appeals before him.

“Hills peep o’er hills, and Alps on Alps arise.”

Perhaps there is no other cause of delay as great as the extensive right of appeal given by our present system. In many

matters that belong merely to the preliminary skirmishing, as it might be called, appeals to the General Term can be taken, with the result of delaying the trial—such matters, for instance, as motions to change the place of trial. Yet these are often questions to a great extent of good discretion, in which the discretion of one judge might better be made conclusive, for the sake of preventing delay. This, however, is of less importance than the freedom of appeal after trial. It may be said generally that, after a trial, the defeated party has three appeals, under any of which he may obtain a new trial. First, he may apply to the court before which the case was tried. If unsuccessful, he may appeal to the General Term. If unsuccessful there, he may appeal to the Court of Appeals. In the crowded condition of the calendars this assures him a very comfortable postponement of the final result. When, however, he shall at last have had his case decided by the highest court and shall have succeeded, and shall have obtained a new trial, he will not have reached the end. He must go back to try the case again. And, armed with the decision of the highest court in his favor, he will probably succeed in his defense at the trial. That, however, is not the end. The plaintiff will now appeal; and when the defendant once more reaches the highest court, he may find that there is a *distinguendo*, and that that court did not mean quite what he thought they meant.* Once more then there must be a new trial. And once more he may have to climb the ladder of appeals, and get a new lesson of wisdom from its topmost round,—at least a new lesson of patience.

The hardship arising from appeals has been increased under modern practice. When the Court of Chancery was in existence, and an action in equity had been carried to the highest court, the decision was final; there was no new trial. But now, whether an action be legal or equitable, if the judgment be not affirmed by the appellate court, there must, in nearly every case, be a new trial, with all the trouble and expense that this involves. It is seldom that the appellate court will, or can, make a final disposition, if it does not affirm the decision below. Thus, whatever complaint was made as to the delay in Chancery actions, the parties had the satisfaction of knowing that there was to be only one trial, and that, when the case should

* *Marston v. Swett*, 66 N. Y. 206, and S. C., 82 N. Y., 526. *Urquhart v. Ogdensburg*, 91 N. Y., 67, and S. C., MS., Nov., 1884.

reach the highest court, it would be ended. But now this advantage is gone; if there is an error in the trial the remedy is a re-trial. The appellate court will not, or cannot, rectify the wrong. And the result is that many cases are tried several times before they are ended. These re-trials not only cause delay, but they afford opportunity for that dangerous drilling and preparing of the witnesses by which on a second trial a party's evidence is made to appear better than it did on the first.

Whenever any suggestion is made as to restricting appeals, a feeling is manifested that it is the right of every citizen to carry every litigation to the highest court, however small the amount involved. This is not sound. All that a litigant can justly claim of the state is a reasonably fair and able tribunal, before which his case may be tried. Any tribunal may err. Appellate courts err. If there were ten successive appellate courts, the tenth would reverse decisions of the ninth. The highest must be assumed to be right only because there is none higher. It cannot be said that there is any absolute right at which the litigants will arrive after a certain number of appeals. The decisions of the Court of Appeals are conclusive, because usually there is no higher court. But when occasions come in which cases may go from that court to the Supreme Court of the United States, then their decisions are sometimes reversed. In fact, there are four legal doctrines on which the decisions of those two courts are antagonistic. Thus the litigant, in having several appeals allowed him, is not insured an absolutely just decision, for on many points there is no such absolute and unquestionable rule of right. And the decisions of courts are only the opinions of reasonable and sensible men. Whether, then, a litigant shall have the opinion of one man only, or shall have the opinion of three more, or of seven more, is not a matter of right. It is a question of expediency in the state, endeavoring to keep uniformity in its courts, and to do justice with promptness. And therefore the state may well consider how many appeals it shall allow; and further, whether it shall permit appeals where their expense is nearly equal to, or even greater than the amount involved. Thus, one remedy for the delay in legal proceedings is to restrict appeals. This may be done in several ways, which need not now be specified.

The chief objects to be gained though appellate courts is uniformity in decisions, a ~~matter~~ in which the state is interested,

and greater time for deliberation than can be had in the course of a trial. And yet it is often noticed by those who have had experience that the appellate court loses much of that knowledge of the real merits of the case which is possessed by the trial court. To the appellate court all witnesses seem alike; not so on the trial. And further, there is often an understanding between the court and the parties at the trial, which cannot be put upon paper, and which has much to do with the merits, and with a just decision. Hence, an appellate court, while it has more time for deliberation, sometimes misses the truth of the case.

The remark that there is often no unquestionable rule of right may excite surprise. But many questions arise on the meaning of a statute. Clearly that is a matter on which men may differ, and it cannot be settled by any rule of ethics. Often too, by the wrong-doing of one man, either the one or the other of two innocent men must suffer. Which shall suffer is not a matter of ethics. The disagreement between the Supreme Court of the United States and the Court of Appeals of New York on "town bonding" questions is of this character. Hence there is often no absolute rule of right; and where there is such a rule it is impossible to say how many appeals will reach it. No one then has a right to say that wrong has been done to him because the state has allowed him only one appeal instead of ten. There must be an end somewhere.

The manner in which appellate courts act on cases before them is often such as to cause unnecessary delay. The object of each action, so far as the parties are concerned, is to obtain what they believe to be their rights; they care nothing for the settlement of legal principles. But under our system, following the English, appellate courts seem at times to care more about making precedents than about deciding the case in hand justly. This comes from the fact, so often discussed, that our law is largely "judge-made" law. Instead of being guided by the rules of codes of law, or by a sound judgment as to the merits of the case, appellate courts are constantly searching for precedents in other cases, and are anxiously making a precedent out of the case in hand. When a case is argued, the question is not whether justice was done in the court below; but it may be whether some witness said something which might be considered irrelevant—perhaps no more important to the merits than whether he stood at right angles to the jury when he testified.

When we consider that an important trial may continue a week or more, and when we think how little of the testimony the jury remember at the end of the trial, it is laughable to observe appellate courts granting new trials because they cannot say that such a piece of evidence did not affect the jury. In fact, the jury are affected, not by single and special pieces of evidence, but by the general tone of the whole case, and much too by what may be called the atmosphere of the trial, which cannot be felt by the appellate court. But the memory of the jury cannot retain definitely all the answers that have been given to the questions of counsel; and in many instances, whether a question is answered, or whether the answer is excluded, the effect is the same. The jury know generally how the question would have been answered, and that knowledge is not excluded by the exclusion of the answer.

The system by which rules of evidence are rules of law* is, I suppose, peculiar to England and to countries that have inherited English law. Very probably it has its advantages; but it certainly has its disadvantages. One who was not familiar with it, might think it strange to hear the discussions in courts as to whether such and such evidence was admissible. He might think that if any evidence proved nothing it would be harmless; if it proved anything, it should be admitted. For instance, he might think if a doctor were sued for malpractice, it would be of some use to show that the doctor had never sent in a bill for his services, as this circumstance might be some indication that he thought them valueless. And one might be surprised to learn that such evidence, if admitted, would be fatal to the trial.† Those who are accustomed to the English system are often surprised at the freedom with which, in other systems, evidence is admitted; as if matters, however remote, should be allowed to come in so as to throw any light, if possible, on the controversy.

The English system has already been largely modified with respect to the persons who may testify. The old and unwise exclusion of all interested persons has been given up. Perhaps other changes will follow, touching the whole subject of relevant and irrelevant evidence. But meantime it would be a great improvement in the speedy administration of justice if appellate courts would lean toward a disregard, as far as possible,

* Best's Evidence, § 116.

† Baird v. Gillett, 47 N. Y., 186.

of any errors in the admission of evidence. Unfortunately, the tendency in New York has been in the opposite direction. Not merely in actions of a legal character, but even in those which we may still call equitable, strict rules of evidence have been enforced. And here the appellate courts seem to have overlooked the fact that the English system of evidence grew out of the trial by a jury, presided over by a judge. It is not, in its strictness, appropriate to trials by a court, and should not be extended to them. They should be left to a greater freedom, proper enough when the effect of evidence is to be weighed by a mind trained to judicial reasoning. Yet, however a cause may be tried, our appellate courts have not felt at liberty, even in actions of an equitable nature, to disregard improper evidence, if such had been admitted, and to decide the case upon the merits as shown in the evidence unquestionably proper.* This has been the cause of new trials and delay. And it has encouraged a practice sometimes called by counsel "trying a case for the exceptions"; that is, contriving as many ingenious pitfalls as possible, by offers of evidence and by exceptions to evidence and the like, in the hope, often well fulfilled, that the trial court would fall into some of these dangers, and that thus a client with no real defense might weary out his adversary by the delay consequent on an appeal.

And not merely in matters of evidence, but upon the whole merits of the case, appellate courts might well take broader views than they do; and if they see that, on the whole, justice has been done, they might wisely disregard errors even more important than those pertaining to evidence. An appellate court, of which the members never sit in the trial of cases, and thus never have any experience in that duty, will naturally form for itself a high standard of perfection. Such a court will have a faint idea of the perplexities that may surround a trial judge, endeavoring to hold a steady course between two ingenious counsel. It will scrutinize the language of a judge's charge, as if it were one of its own essay-like opinions. It is likely to forget that the jury did not pay precise and critical attention to every sentence of the charge, and that they are besides hardly capable of making the nice distinctions that are so easy to the acute legal mind. Of course, the only object of the judge's charge

* *Foot v. Beecher*, 78 N. Y., 155.

is to guide the jury. The charge is not intended to be an exact legal essay; and therefore, in reviewing it, the question must be whether the jury were in fact misled. This should be ascertained rather from the whole scope than from single sentences. Yet appellate courts sometimes overlook this idea, especially, if, for some cause, they wish to find, or make, a reason for reversing a judgment. Some incidental remark can be found in the charge, to which probably the jury never gave any attention, even if they understood its precise effect.

Perhaps this matter may be illustrated by instances taken from that class of cases, now so common, which arise in accidents at railroad crossings. In those cases, it is not proper for a judge to submit to a jury the question whether, under all the circumstances, the railroad company ought not to have had a flagman at the crossing.* Yet the judge may permit a jury to consider the absence of a flagman, or the question as to the care with which the company ran its trains.† If a jury are permitted to consider the presence or absence of a flagman as bearing on the question of the negligence of the company in running its trains, could they make the very nice distinction that they must not consider whether the company ought not to have had a flagman? Admit the beauty and delicacy of the distinction and the logical refinement that points it out; what does it matter practically to a jury? Their verdict will not be different whether one phrase or the other is used.

One other cause of legal delay may be briefly mentioned, with due deference to the judiciary, and that is, the writing of long opinions.

"'Tis pleasant, sure, to see one's self in print.

A book's a book, although there's nothing in't."

Long opinions take up time in writing. And they cause another evil. Besides the point of law decided, there is often much in an opinion which is not decided, and is not law. These passages are caught up and used as if they were accurate statements and authoritative. They lead some lawyers astray, and they give occasion for the frequent comment of the reporter, distinguishing a case from one decided a short time before. A story is told of a layman who was appointed to a judicial position. He inquired

* *Hongwhich v. Del. and Hud. Canal Co.*, 92 N. Y., 219.

† *McGrath v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co.*, 63 N. Y., 522.

of a lawyer what he should do in this office, for which he had not been fitted by study. The lawyer, in reply, told him that his good sense would generally guide him aright in making decisions, but that, if he attempted to give reasons, he would fail. The danger of attempting to give reasons for a conclusion is sometimes seen, even in judges who have enjoyed a legal training.

I have thus specified several causes that tend to delay legal proceedings, and that deprive injured parties of that speedy redress which it is the duty of the state to give.

WILLIAM L. LEARNED.

PROHIBITION IN POLITICS.

WHETHER temperance shall be taken out of the domain of morals and put into the domain of politics, is no longer a question. Some regiments of that wing of the temperance army which fights under the banner of Prohibition have held a convention, nominated a president, and conducted a campaign. In this convention the cause of woman suffrage was formally and practically associated with that of prohibition, and we are thus enabled to survey at one glance the fields won by both. As a guide to future action, it is well to consider whether thus far the methods of the new party are better than those of the old parties, whether its aims are higher, whether its accomplishment is greater.

The avowed object of the Prohibition party was to supply the defects of the old parties. The Pittsburgh Convention was postponed until the other conventions had been held, for the expressed purpose of giving the dominant parties an opportunity to stand by the cause of Home *versus* Saloon. The opportunity seems, indeed, to have been offered more coyly than it was accepted. The Prohibition messengers were invited to speak before the Greenback Convention, and were assured of a courteous hearing in the Democratic Committee, but, says Miss Willard, with a sudden and surprising access of timidity, "we had no heart to avail ourselves of the opportunity, after asking the Republicans in vain." It looks a little as if the delegation feared that the accommodating Greenbackers and Democrats might nail the Prohibition plank into their platform out of hand, and leave the new-party people without a board to stand on. But the wise, womanly flies buzzed away from that pretty little parlor, in spite of the "courteous" assurances of the wily, flattering Democratic spider, Major Burke, and set up a party of their own. Its object was most winsome. "Women," said President

Willard, in her annual address at St. Louis, in the autumn of 1884, "women will come into politics and cleanse that Stygian pool as the waters of Marah were cleansed." I have never heard that the waters of Marah were cleansed, or that the Stygian pool needed cleansing—if it were not a river, to begin with. The Augean stable was probably in the eloquent speaker's mind, but as that building has been rather overused of late, it might have been temporarily closed for repairs, thus, as it were, forcing the convention to take to the water. At any rate, said Miss Willard, "woman will make home-like every place she enters." The object of the union is, in one comprehensive phrase, with Miss Willard's own italics, "*to make the whole world HOME-LIKE.*"

Yes, but there are homes and homes.

By what methods was this home-likeness advanced? The debates at the St. Louis meeting were, indeed, one might almost say, caressing. The speakers used, not the rough words of the Chicago conventions, but the endearing language of the home circle. The audience were addressed as "Sisters," and even as "Dear Sisters." When there was apprehension of trouble, the leaders wanted "Miss Willard to tell us how we can get sweetly out of it." "One of Iowa's loveliest women, sweet So-and-so, came gently forward, and taking my hand in hers"—certainly set a good example to the "rowdy" male West. Miss Willard herself received "such a baptism of the spirit of love and the love of my beloved sisters, that I cannot find words to express to you my deep sense of appreciation." Another speaker said she had "felt the tender pressure of your kisses on my lip, and your arms about me."

This is making it very home-like indeed, almost too home-like. Undeniably they did not fondle thus at the unregenerate old-party conventions. But this was before the election, and already Miss Willard was sweetly comforting her comrades that "the 4th of November is not far off, and at its close the galling cross-fire of harsh criticism will suddenly cease." The 4th of November is a good deal farther off now than it was then, and the galling cross-fire has rather deepened into an old-fashioned partisan cannonade, in the thick of which Miss Willard and her candidate may be seen fighting for dear life. Instead of settling down after election "to that manifest destiny of quiet routine work" which was prophesied, they are obliged to defend themselves against the charges of indignant Prohibitionists who

did not wish to be led over to the Democracy by any saint of the Old Testament or the New. Scarcely were the Prohibitionists outside the all-embracing atmosphere of St. Louis, when the "dear sisters" with their Quaker guns suddenly disappeared, and men and women alike went at hearty and well-delivered fist-cuffs. Mrs. Carse, President of the Board, charges that critics of the W. C. T. U. are cowardly and false; that "Iowa's most noble woman," Mrs. Foster, has been writing letters to the secular and religious press in a vain endeavor to disrupt the union; those who did not approve the St. Louis action are no longer "dear sisters," but "a few dissatisfied individuals," who "have deserted the ranks," and whose action against the Union is "envy or slander." The president of another union in turn characterizes this charge of Mrs. Carse's as a "malicious attack upon a true and noble woman," and declares that, contrary to Mrs. Carse's assurance, "there are few unions in which the harmony is not more or less broken"; that the action of the St. Louis Convention indicates a "willingness to sacrifice the cause to political demagogues to build up a political party"; that Mrs. Foster is steadily trying to rectify the mistake and to reestablish harmony. Of the W. C. T. U. Convention she speaks in most man-like fashion, as "the innocent, unsuspecting victim of partisan demagogues." It is affirmed "with much less sweetness than light" that Miss Willard wanted to help the Democrats in the late campaign; that she did grievous injury to the temperance organization; that at the Pittsburgh Convention, Iowa, the leading Prohibition State, was absolutely denied representation because it was known that its temperance people refused to take temperance into politics; that St. John, the Prohibition candidate, was treacherous; that Mrs. Foster has done more for the cause of temperance than Miss Willard and all her partisans together; that Miss Willard's sentiment and sympathies are with the South; and that Mrs. Foster was removed from her high position because she remained true to temperance and refused to drag the cause at the chariot-wheels of Democracy.

"The W. C. T. U.," says a leading Prohibitionist, "during the last campaign descended from its high position and became the willing ally and unconscious tool of selfish politicians. It did this deliberately. . . . A careful examination of the statistics of the late campaign completely explodes the claim to sagacity or honesty, perhaps both, in this deplorable movement."

"Lash to a retired position the tramps of the platform who have made the advocacy of this cause a profession, and seek opportunities to labor at a stipulated price for God, and home, and native land. We suffer to-day because we have permitted an insignificant but noisy minority to strut before the nation as the only temperance men whose ballots possess a conscience. . . . We must begin by rebuking the brazen effrontery of the temperance politician in such an unmistakable manner that his callous cheek shall feel a healthy smart."

Tramps! The suave voice of the St. Louis Jacob has given way to the rough fist of the old-party Esau. Brazen effrontery! Is it the "dear sisters" that "strut"? Surely the Stygian pool is quickly running foul again. The sweet womanliness of St. Louis strikes out from the shoulder exactly like the sour manliness of Chicago. Its only home-likeness is to the lively and vigorous clapper-clawing in which any loving and high-spirited family occasionally engages around the dear domestic hearth-stone; but the family never holds it up to the world as the admirable method of prayer and purity!

Unquestionably the political Prohibitionists started out with Sweetness and Light on their banner. As unquestionably the stress of battle and defeat has given to the sweetness a little acidity. How has the light fared? Have more inexorable consciences, more delicate instincts, discerned profounder truths, held up a loftier standard, than were to be found in the old Republican organization?

At the Louisville Convention, in 1882, and at the Detroit Convention, a year later, the W. C. T. U. adopted a resolution to "lend its influence to that party which should furnish the best embodiment of Prohibition principles." In the autumn of 1884 it selected its party and lent its influence. Needless to say that the party selected was not the Republican party. The party that the W. C. T. U. considered as furnishing the best embodiment of Prohibition principles was the Democratic party. As between the Republican and the Democratic party, the W. C. T. U. candidate declared for the Democratic party, and against the Republican party. He said, at Worcester, Mass., "The Republican party is no better than the Democratic party on the liquor question." "If there ever was a party which deserved to be ruined, it is the Republican party." "I will do all in my power to defeat that party." "The Republican party

has no principles worthy of being upheld by anybody." In Olathe, Kansas, he went further and said that he would rather the Democratic party would come into power. Elsewhere he recognized and justified the fact that a vote for him from a Republican was a half vote for Democracy.

The reasoning by which the W. C. T. U. convinces itself that the Democratic party furnishes the best embodiment of Prohibition principles, is illustrated by its candidate's indictment of the Republican party in Kansas for not re-indorsing the prohibitory Constitutional amendment at their last State Convention. The resolution adopted was :

"That we favor a faithful and honest enforcement of the Constitutional Amendment, that the full effects of prohibition may be realized, that the declared will of the people may be respected and the majesty of the law vindicated."

The mind that can believe this to be a rejection of the Prohibitory Amendment can just as easily believe that the Democratic party is the embodiment of prohibition. The Prohibition candidate reads the Republican letter of acceptance as a declaration "in favor of making the liquor traffic permanent in this country, to the end that the States and Territories might derive a revenue therefrom." This rendering throws no light on Republican principles, but it does throw light on the character and caliber, the instinct for truth, of the Prohibition candidate, and of the men and women that accepted his interpretations.

How successful has been the Prohibition party in developing, marshaling, or revealing the strength of the Prohibition movement? During the campaign we were repeatedly assured that the cause was rapidly gaining. The Prohibition candidate himself talked hopefully of a million votes, and the "Independent," a leading Prohibition paper, joined its instinct for truth with Mr. St. John's, and argued upon the basis of two million votes. The National Prohibition Committee in New York, Jan. 8, 1885, gave the recorded vote for St. John at 95,000 in thirty-four States. The "Union Signal," the organ of the W. C. T. U., estimates the American vote gained to St. John by the fusion at 50,000, which leaves the total Prohibition vote in all the States 45,000. By no authority and no combination has the Prohibition vote been set higher than 150,000. The total vote of the country was 10,036,057.

Comparing this political Prohibition vote with the Prohibition vote when it was not made a political issue, we find that in four States—Maine, Ohio, Iowa, and Kansas—Prohibition has received 620,000 votes non-political, against 45,000 votes political, in thirty-four States. In Iowa alone, after a most persuasive and even thrilling, but non-political campaign, Prohibition received 125,000 votes. The political campaign of 1884 reduced that vote to 1472. Is this an onward movement? Does it indicate wise generalship?

The Southern vote, admittedly repressed on other issues, but pronounced free on this, has an equally uncertain sound. The W. C. T. U., five days before the Presidential election, boasted that the cry of the "solid South" had little terror for them. The Southern delegates that sat with the Northern in convention, "whose hearts are as our hearts, whose hands are firmly and lovingly grasped in ours," in the home-like new-party way, were sternly contrasted with "the politicians who have tears only for the woes of the negro in the South." Miss Willard declared that it was "a ghost, and not a campaign issue, that is paraded by campaign orators who dwell upon a 'solid South.'" In May of the same year, the National Temperance Society said that "fully one half the territory of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Tennessee, with large portions of Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi, are under Prohibition." Of these States South Carolina, Mississippi, and Arkansas gave, according to the official returns, no vote at all for the Prohibition candidate. "Alabama, this grand State," said the "Union Signal," on Oct. 30, 1884, "never intended to be left, lost, or defeated; so right to the front, with her sister States, she is gloriously stemming the tide." Five days later she stemmed the tide as she would stem a mint-julep—with a straw, giving the Democratic candidate 92,973 votes and the Prohibition candidate 610! Kentucky cast 3006 votes for Prohibition; against Prohibition, 271,433. Nine Southern States, said to be largely prohibitory, gave 1795 Prohibition votes. In the whole South I do not find recorded 15,000 Prohibition votes. Every Southern State went for unmitigated Democracy. Miss Willard's ghost materialized, on the 4th of November, into 153 electoral votes solid for free rum and the lost cause. Could there be a more pitiful contrast between promise and performance? Is it any wonder that unhome-like, masculine, old-party veterans should, in the

first flush of ungallant anger, call Miss Willard "a Democratic cat's-paw"!

But the Prohibition vote has yet a sadder tale to tell. It was made the test of integrity and of purity, as well as of temperance. The New York "Independent," a strong Prohibition paper — whose proprietor, Mr. Henry C. Bowen, as a Federal officer, Collector of Internal Revenue in the Brooklyn district when the Hon. Hugh McCulloch was Secretary of the Treasury under President Johnson, must have a very accurate conception of official uprightness, at least of what Mr. McCulloch's idea of official uprightness used to be — characterizes the Prohibition candidate as the "one candidate in the field whose official and moral uprightness cannot be impeached." The Prohibition vote was entreated from "every man who wants to enter his moral protest in November." The name of the Prohibition candidate was declared to "stand for morality as well as for Prohibition; he has gained an untold strength among those who have turned to him as the one candidate who embodies personal and official purity."

"It is quite certain," said this incorruptible ex-Collector, "that the Republican and the Democratic candidates are not really wanted, either of them, by the respectable and conscientious voters of this country. The best men of both parties are at heart opposed to them, and will not vote for them. Good men of all parties will hang their heads with shame if either should be successful." These men — the good, the best — were declared to be flocking to the standard of St. John, whose movement "represents the only hope, politically, of the home, the church, and the nation." Great surprises were predicted on this basis. "When men come to face the issue in November, with all local questions laid aside, and consider conscientiously their duty to the country, to the cause of morals and righteousness, they will pronounce a verdict which will have no joy in it for bad men." "In the West the St. John vote will be especially large. In New York it is likely to be much greater than is generally supposed. Through New England thousands of dissatisfied Republicans will vote for St. John." "The surprise in November will be, not that this or that one was elected, but that so many were bold enough to burst all ties in support of official and personal purity. No comparison could be made between the personal characters of the Republican, the Democratic, and the Prohibition

candidates, that would not be detrimental to the two former," the latter being "the only unassailable candidate in the field."

The "Independent" was mistaken. There was one comparison that could be made, and that was made by that old English method, a jury of the vicinage. The jury of the vicinage passed a verdict on the Republican candidate. From his own ward, his own city, his own county, his own State, the Republican candidate received a larger majority than any candidate had received for twenty years. The Republican majority rose instantly around him from less than 9000 to more than 20,000. In the State of his birth, it rose from 37,000 to 80,000. The Democratic candidate maintained the strength of his party, and received in his own State a total vote of more than half a million. The Prohibition candidate in his own State—of which, like the Democratic candidate, he had once been Governor—received 4273 votes. In the same State the Republican candidate received 153,396 votes. In the State of Mr. St. John's home, where he was best known, and where the Prohibition cause was best organized, its candidate received considerably less than two per cent. of the total vote. This is not decisive of the personal characters of the candidates, but it is a comparison of their personal characters, in which the detriment does not fall where the Prohibition umpire said that it would fall; and it falls so far away from the place predicted as to be decisive of the umpire's instinct for truth.

In the whole country,—from New England, from New York, from the aroused West, and the prohibitory South,—out of ten million voters, the number of those that flocked to the standard of official integrity and moral purity, who pronounced for God and home and native land,—dissatisfied Republicans and enthusiastic Prohibitionists, all told,—was exactly 95,000!

We are forbidden to doubt that this was a test vote. The "Independent," before election, pronounced the claim of President Woolsey, Judge Noah Davis, and others, that the Prohibition party did not represent the Prohibitionists, to be "almost ridiculous." We are obliged to consider it a representative vote. Eliminating the 45,000 confessed Prohibitionists, we have, out of ten millions of voters, fifty thousand flocking for official integrity and moral purity. Forty-eight hundred thousand bad men wagging their heads over a bad man's victory, forty-eight hundred thousand bad men shaking their heads over

a bad man's defeat, and only fifty thousand good men to hang their heads for shame. I am not familiar with the statistics of the Old World, but I am afraid that Sodom had a better chance than the great republic. The "Independent" was right in one respect—it is a surprise. Mr. St. John's "untold strength" still remains untold; but his told strength, as the one candidate that embodies personal and official purity, seems to indicate that he embodies it exactly as the Democratic party embodies the principle of prohibition.

"But," says the political Prohibitionist, gracefully waving aside the Arabic numerals, "the party of Abolition did not jump to a majority in a day. Did the men who voted for James G. Birney throw away their votes?" Certainly. At least they seem to have thought so themselves, for they very soon stopped throwing them anywhere, and disbanded. The history of the Liberty party, the one historical justification of the political Prohibitionists, shows the danger of slight knowledge, of fastening on a superficial similarity without real historical discrimination. The two cases have little in common, and the little they have in common forebodes disaster to Prohibition partisanship. The Abolitionists of 1844 found no party willing to advocate their cause or to embody their principles, or in any way to advance their purpose. The Whig party and the Democratic party alike turned a deaf ear, and not only a deaf ear, but a cold shoulder and often a fighting front. Prohibitionists, on the contrary, have always found in the Republican party friends to their cause, often friends to their methods. In all the States where Prohibition has been strong enough to secure legislation, it has secured it through the action of the Republican party. In no State is there any trouble for lack of legislation. In every State, however strongly prohibitory, — in Maine, in Kansas, in Iowa, — legislation is in advance of public sentiment. There is, therefore, no need of a third party to enact laws; there is need of instruction and influence to bring people up to the standard of the party of the first part, the Republican party — in the character and intelligence of its individual members, in the elevation of its aims, in the purity of its methods, and the success of its accomplishments, the noblest party ever developed by free institutions for the defense of free institutions, and never nobler than now in its temporary defeat by an unexpected betrayal.

Again: the Liberty party did not, as is so often claimed, nominate Fremont or elect Lincoln. The Liberty party did exactly what the Prohibition party has done—made a shy at everything and accomplished nothing. The Liberty party started out to abolish slavery. The Prohibition party started out to abolish drunkenness. The Liberty party made no headway at all, and in eight years gave up the ghost. If the Prohibition party has made headway, it is the way of a broken head. Slavery was finally abolished on the line of "No more extension of slave territory," corresponding exactly to the prohibition of Dr. Crosby and Dr. Thayer, and others who would break up the saloon business. The only lesson that the Birney movement teaches to the Prohibition party is the uselessness of its existence; the only presage is a speedy dissolution.

So far as there is a parallelism, the lesson is not less disastrous. The candidacy of Mr. Birney defeated Mr. Clay and elected Mr. Polk, and thus brought about the Mexican war, with its demoralization, its loss of life, and the subsequent acquisition of territory from Mexico for the upbuilding of more slave States. Over this war-won territory came the struggle for the Wilmot proviso, scarcely allayed by the compromises of 1850, with their infamous Fugitive-Slave law. It was the courage of these successive victories that emboldened the South to break down the Missouri compromise of 1820, to press the Supreme Court into the service of slavery by practically taking it under the protection of the National Government, till one daring tyranny after another aroused the country and elected a President pledged to resist the spread of slavery into the National territory. Then the South, arrogant with the sixteen years of power that Mr. Birney's candidacy had granted them, drew the sword, and it was not sheathed until nine thousand millions of money had been blown into powder, until five hundred thousand young men, the best and bravest, were cast into bloody graves, and a million more, wasted and wounded, were left to a languishing life. This is the path on which the Prohibitionists have started. Do they mean to follow it? They have enthroned the Demon of unrestricted drink. It is not impossible that they may give him a ruinous rule of sixteen years as their exemplars gave to the Demon of Slavery. But the way is not less bitter; the goal is not less bloody. More than the nine thousand millions of treasure will be poured

out in libation to a deadlier Moloch than war. More than the half million men who sleep in honored graves will sink to graves of dishonor. When a race of drunkards has been reared, will it be easier to fight and conquer a diseased appetite? Will moral suasion be more potential with a population besotted by free rum, than with one partially redeemed from the tyranny of alcohol by agencies always opposed by the Democratic party? Is it indeed the only way of converting the world to Christ, to give the devil supreme control for half a generation?

The effect of such action is not, unhappily, a matter of pure speculation. Its disastrous results are, unhappily, not the mere forebodings of disappointment. In a smaller sphere a similar experiment has been carried to actual conclusion. In Maine, Prohibitionists, not satisfied with the manner in which the Republicans embodied their principles, put up separate tickets of their own, and in many instances succeeded in electing Democratic candidates. How great is the mischief that even a small vote may do, is clearly seen in the municipal election of Portland, March 2, 1885. Although the enforcement of the State law is in the hands of local officers, and may be made a dead letter or a terror to evil-doers, according to their sentiments, and although the Republican party in Maine has been identified with temperance reform ever since temperance reform was organized, while the Democratic party has been openly and distinctively opposed to it, still a third ticket was put into the field. It received only 413 out of the 5983 votes cast; but that small vote was enough to prevent an election, and the Democratic candidate for Mayor lacked only 33 votes of a plurality. In Portland, therefore, practically, free rum is in the ascendancy, by the action of the Prohibition party. So late as April 9, 1885, an inspector in the interests of prohibition reports that any person can find a dram-shop or a bar-room without asking the aid of a friend. A recent tour of observation through Portland showed that there, at least, hardly the pretense of secrecy is kept up. Through open doors regularly arranged bars of decanters could be seen, with men drinking in front of them. For the higher classes, the hotels scarcely hide in their basements their elegantly furnished drinking-rooms. Drug-shops scarcely disguise their liquors behind their soda fountains. No introduction is required. All these places are easy enough of access. Wide are the gates and broad the

ways that lure and lead to fiery death, and many there be that go in thereat.

The opinion entertained of Prohibition as a political issue is shown by the Prohibition vote for the Prohibition candidate in the original Prohibition State. Mr. St. John received in Maine 2160 votes, or scarcely more than one in fifty of the entire vote.

What political Prohibition has thus far done, may be summed up: By methods not only antagonistic but quarrelsome sometimes even to the borders of scurrility, by misrepresentations that charity alone can attribute to misunderstanding, it has shamed its own prophecies, destroyed its own harmony, depleted its own ranks, vitiated its own laws, defeated the party from which all prohibitory legislation has come, enthroned the party by which all prohibitory legislation has been opposed. This it can continue to do indefinitely; but no protestation on the part of its leaders, and no delusion on the part of its followers, can alter the fact that it is working in the interests of intemperance, and not in the interests of temperance. No intelligent observer can fail to recognize its character and its tendency.

GAIL HAMILTON.

WHAT IS THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL POLICY?

THE Plenary Council of Baltimore has made our national Thanksgiving Day a "feast of obligation," thus, as it were, sacrosanctifying what the will of a free people long since made really holy forever. This may be considered by some as a proof that Catholicism and Democracy are not necessarily antagonistic, and it may even prepare the public to receive with composure, as a claim founded on justice, the demand which will ere long be made for a division of the school-tax in such a manner as that Catholic "parish" schools may be virtually endowed by the state. From the stand-point of the Syllabus the common schools of this country are not to be trusted with the education of the children of Catholic parents. They are, like the elementary schools of Belgium, Germany, etc., "godless" places, on the same principle that an "Edinburgh" reviewer once termed George Eliot a "godless" writer. They teach morality, but not as a pendant to the Nicene Creed; they endeavor to lay the foundations of good citizenship, but not in connection with the postulates of any catechism of theology. Consequently, the Roman Church—bound as it is to oppose to the uttermost those principles of progress, liberalism, and the new civilization which are condemned in the Syllabus—cannot look with favor on our common school system, and, as was long since foreseen, the conflict between Clericalism and Secularism, begun in Prussia and continued in Italy, Belgium, and elsewhere, has yet to be waged in the United States. It will be a serious conflict, because one of antithetical principles. Under the late Pope, the Roman Church was definitively committed to absolutism, and the Catholic conscience was compelled to receive new doctrines which some of the most eminent among modern statesmen have declared to be utterly destructive of loyalty and allegiance to the state.

The instinctive antipathy between Romanism and the modern secular school system must naturally find expression in overt hostility to that system wherever adopted. The Papacy is the oldest monarchy in existence, and its traditions and history for over a thousand years enable it always to maintain an attitude of consistency. The secular system adopted in the common schools in this country is necessarily, from the point of view which the Roman Church must take, a "godless" system, inasmuch as it fosters independent thinking and inspires mental habits antagonistic to passive obedience or intellectual submissiveness to authority. Nowhere in Christendom has the church so much reason to dread this secularism as in the United States. Everywhere in Europe during the last half century Romanism has lost ground; even in England its progress has been incommensurate with the increase of population. Hippéau says:

"In Austria all instruction, public and private, was handed over to the Catholic clergy, by virtue of the Concordat of 1855. . . . Since 1868 all has changed. The supervision and the direction of education have been taken from the authority of the church and restored to the hands of the state. The school is no longer confessional, for the reason that every school that receives public aid must be accessible to all children, without distinction of sect."

In Germany, the so-called *Culturkampf* is suspended by a truce that can only be temporary; indeed, while these lines are being written the telegraph tells us that the Clericals and Socialists have, by uniting their votes against Prince Bismarck, effectually broken the armistice, while it is certain that the principle of completely secularizing the schools must ultimately prevail. In France, the policy of secularization has absolutely triumphed, and in England, despite "conscience clauses" and other compromises, the politicians of the future are almost definitely committed to the same principle. Only in the United States has the Roman Church made real headway during this period, and this expansion is due really to immigration. In the Old World, as ignorance is being dispelled under the influence of the public schools, so is superstition declining; hence Romanism is making no gains in Europe. In this country it is only thriving on the imported illiteracy fostered by itself in other lands, an illiteracy which our excellent school system precludes from being transmitted to other generations. Having this prospective increase in view, the Prelacy have made vigor-

ous efforts to provide the means for preserving the allegiance and securing the faith of the immigrant Catholics and their children. They have built about three thousand parochial schools, and they now support about ninety colleges, six hundred minor academies, and various seminaries for training ecclesiastics. So rapid, however, has been the increase of the Catholic population that the Prelacy have, in the matter of schools, been unable to keep pace with it, and necessarily a large proportion of Catholic children have found their way into the common schools, undoubtedly to their own advantage, but to the detriment of Catholic progress. Professor W. H. Payne, of Ann Arbor, Mich., writes :

"I am not sure that the Catholic clergy know the full extent of their danger from this source. On one occasion a poor widow brought me her little boy, saying, 'Please place this boy in your school; I am bound that this one of my children shall know something besides his catechism, and I do not care what priest or bishop may say about it, either.'"

There need be no doubt that the Catholic clergy are not ignorant of the inimical operation of the common school to Catholicity. Whoever credits them with purblindness on this point mistakes them greatly. They know that the public school stands for and represents the spirit of modern progress; that it favors and develops the formation of the modern conscience, which makes creed dependent on reason and knowledge, instead of authority; and that it is an institution as utterly alien to their church as were the sturdy colonists of Massachusetts Bay, by whom the first public schools of America were established. They have known all this for two generations, and over forty years ago they made a vigorous effort in New York to secure for themselves and their schools a share of the public money. How they were worsted in that skirmish is well known; but, though worsted, they were not vanquished. They have not ceased to complain, as Dr. Newman complains in England: "We are forced to pay rates for the establishment of secular schools which we cannot use, and then we have to find means over again for building schools of our own." This they characterize as an outrage, not because they can urge any serious charge against the public schools as means of educating children in secular knowledge, but because the common schools cannot be used to discipline children in accordance with Catholic belief and practice. Nothing can be feebler than Bishop McQuaid's impeach-

ment of the American school system, as urged in the Boston "Journal of Education," of January 18, 1883. It is, he alleges, based on a communistic principle, in "utter disregard of the rights of large numbers of citizens"; and inasmuch as it meddles with the duties and interferes with the rights and responsibilities of parents, it is an "unmitigated despotism." It has failed to eliminate the "street Arab" and the dangerous classes, it is a costly experiment, and it has not redeemed the world or enabled us to dispense with prisons. This doctrine of absolute parental rights is rather a novel, not to say an eccentric, one; it has never yet been accepted in any civilized state among Pagans or Christians; and it is assuredly one which Rome would have censured in the ages when the church engrossed and controlled the prerogative of public instruction. The fundamental idea of our public school is based on the principles of '76, and its purpose is to educate the children of the nation into good citizens on the broad ground of human equality upon which the republic is founded. Nearly every state in Europe has accepted the responsibility of forming the mind and character of its children, a responsibility whose assumption was rendered necessary by the indisputable fact that no state church has ever succeeded in educating a people, their failure in this respect being well-nigh as pronounced as was that of the Roman Church to effect the moral redemption of society in the long period of its undisputed supremacy throughout Christendom. That even this slight approximation to the communist idea should shock the Romanist prelacy may be very natural, considering how exceedingly un-Catholic must have been the condition which prevailed among the early Christians before Ananias and Sapphira opened a way to the spirit of Papalism, when greed induced them to "lie to the Holy Ghost."

This is not the place, however, for a defense of our common schools. They have already been triumphantly vindicated from such puny attacks as that to which reference has here been made, and the general verdict, based on experience of their efficiency, economy, moral results, and equity, will render it more than improbable for any machinations against them to succeed. The time, however, seems an appropriate one for the inquiry to be made, whether the Church of Rome, or any schools founded under its auspices, can be trusted as a factor in educat-

ing children into good citizenship. The demand made at the Plenary Council of Baltimore for "such a division of the school-tax as will enable the bishops to place their schools on a level with the public schools," is a serious one, and common sense requires us to consider the probability, in the event of such a division of public money, of the Catholic schools ever attaining this level. First, then, with regard to moral education. Criminal statistics loudly declare that Romanism does not insure law-abidingness on the part of those whom it educates. If the fountain-head be impure, we ought not to wonder if lower down the water is found tainted. Morality has never been a very marked characteristic of the See of Rome, and those who care to study Liverani's "*Il Papato, L'Impero, e il Regno d'Italia*" (Florence, 1861), will understand the possibility of being "near the church, but far from God." In 1656, Pascal pointed out the perils of Probabilism in Casuistry, and Richard and Giraud, later on, denounced it for its immorality; but Liguori may now be considered the confessor's guide, and however moral he himself may have been, his casuistry, and that of other text-books, can be said to hold the candle to the perpetrators of murder, adultery, idolatry, and theft. The good sense of the American people will not fail them, if called upon to decide between the ethics of daily practice as taught in our schools, and a system which we find so painfully illustrated in our criminal records, a system whose merits are strongly appreciated by the "cyprians" of our streets and by footpads, as shown in their evident belief that a life of wickedness can be atoned for at the last moment by merely "sending for a priest." The Italian Government has rooted out brigandage; it can hardly be likely that the American people will patronize or encourage brigand morality.

Intellectually it seems almost impossible for schools conducted on the principle of observing Catholic discipline to attain the level of our common schools. If, as the Plenary Council laments, the necessity is so great for a better educated clergy, we may well ask how badly instructed ecclesiastics can be regarded as competent judges of education at all. Under the guidance of Pius IX. the church deliberately elected to wage war against independence of thought, and in the fulminations of the Vatican Council we discern a spirit utterly opposed

to that individualism which it is the aim of modern education to encourage and strengthen :

“ Let him be anathema who shall say that human sciences ought to be pursued in such a spirit of freedom that one may be allowed to hold as true their assertions, even when opposed to revealed doctrine :

“ ‘ Who shall say that it may at any time come to pass, in the progress of science, that the doctrines set forth by the church must be taken in another sense than that in which the church has ever received and yet receives them.’ ”

There is no hypocrisy, no attempt even at concealment in this. It is an open declaration of war against modern thought, science, and the freedom of research ; and were it possible for the Roman Church to deal with the pioneers of knowledge in our day as it dealt with Bruno and Galileo, these fulminations might prove something more than impotent gnashing of fangs long since blunted. The highest intellectual training of Romanism is that of the Jesuits, and however thorough this may be in its way, it is, after all, only a receptive training, a system of words, not things, whose condemnation may be seen in the fact that neither modern philosophy nor science has been indebted to the Roman Church for any marked triumph or discovery. Among modern metaphysicians the late W. G. Ward ranks high as an abstract thinker, but he was the product of the Church of England. The revealed doctrine of Catholicism is a stereotyped thing, and what encouragement can there be for the investigator into nature who has always before his mind the consciousness that, however clearly it may speak, the “ voice of nature must be silent before faith ” ? Among the Reformed, or Protestant churches, despite their first hesitation when geological and astronomical discovery began to open the way to generalizations that seemed to conflict with the *ipsisima verba* of Scripture, not one has been false to the grand principle of free inquiry which underlay the Reformation ; so that it has come to pass that in every Protestant community the voice of nature is now regarded as the voice of God. Where enlightened reason and fuller knowledge have demonstrated that certain old opinions were erroneous, patient study and reflection have also shown that those opinions were in reality non-essentials of truth, and they have been quietly buried. With Rome the case is different. It has consolidated and cemented its teachings with every period of its existence, so that consistency requires it

now to uphold every stone in the antiquated edifice, since for every such portion an equally divine authority has been claimed with the whole structure.

The Catholics of Ireland have for years had two sources of primary instruction open to them—the national schools and those of the Christian Brothers. As a preparation for secular life the former is superior to the latter, but both are decidedly below the elementary schools of England to which the Education Act of 1870 gave birth. The Irish Prelacy know well that, when tested by results, their diocesan colleges cannot compete with the “godless” Queen’s colleges, while the Catholic University, which was to deprive old Trinity of the scions of the Catholic aristocracy of the country, has proved a miserable failure in that respect. The civilized world has but recently witnessed one result of Catholic education in the hostility of the Italian peasantry to the doctors who were fighting the cholera, and in their superstitious confidence in the blood of San Genarow as a prophylactic. Little, indeed, did the sturdy settlers of Massachusetts Bay foresee the time when the educational system founded, as Macaulay said, in accordance with the principle to which they pledged themselves, “that education was a matter of the deepest possible interest to all nations and to all communities, . . . in an eminent degree deserving of the peculiar attention of the state,” should be called in question as perilous to morality and religion by the representatives of a church whose highest educational seminaries are hotbeds of irrational fetichism. There is not one such seminary where some of the students, and perhaps teachers, do not wear the Carmelite scapular, to insure absolute immunity from damnation and other spiritual premiums, or the Franciscan cord, with its ridiculous indulgence, “more than enough to deliver thousands and thousands of souls from purgatory every day.” There is not, probably, in the world, one such school whose controllers would dare to pursue the study of history impartially, to favor unrestricted scientific research, or any other philosophy than that of petrification. A crooked stick will have a crooked shadow; and in the light of the perverse twisting designedly imparted within our own time to the Roman tree, we should be fatuous indeed were we to expect it to bear the fruits of civil and intellectual liberty. The Premier of England—himself an earnest Christian and zealous Catholic of the Anglican type—has expressed his

conviction that "every convert and member of the Pope's church places his loyalty and civil duty at the mercy of another," and this opinion is general among European statesmen. Doubtless were American Catholics ever brought face to face with the dilemma of a divided allegiance, they would, as men of other nationalities have sometimes done before them, fulfill the duties required of every patriotic citizen. None the less, however, does it behoove every citizen of the republic to reflect upon the possible, and to measure the inevitable evils certain to result from interfering with our common school system, whose efficiency in training our children has been amply and triumphantly demonstrated. "If," says the proverb, "we are bound to forgive an enemy, we are not bound to trust him"; and it is impossible for us to forget that the demand for a change in our school system comes from those whose first allegiance and duty have been claimed by and mentally conceded to an authority that has steadily and consistently opposed that New Civilization which is emphatically and energetically represented and embodied in the Constitution and life of the United States.

M. C. O'BYRNE.

TO ONE conscious of his own integrity, it is painful to be misjudged by those whom he respects and esteems. Such are the feelings of Catholics in regard to the misapprehensions of their educational system so prevalent among their fellow-citizens. Certain as we are that our system aims only at forming good Christians and good citizens, that it is better calculated than any other to realize both these ends, that it is prompted by love of country as well as love of our families, our church, and our God, it grieves us exceedingly that views and motives quite the contrary of these should be imputed to us. To correct these misapprehensions by stating frankly, and as fully as the limits permit, what the Catholic educational theory is — and what it is not — and what is our practical policy for its realization, is the object of the present writing.

The Catholic educational theory is based on two convictions. The first is, that the aim of education should be to equip youth with the knowledge and the principles that will fit them for life's duties and for the realization of their destiny as human

beings. The second is, that our destiny as human beings, and our consequent duties, are those taught by the Christian religion. Our conclusion from these premises is, that the education of the young should be essentially Christian, moulding them to live thoroughly Christian lives. This does not at all exclude the knowledge that will fit them for secular pursuits. The duties for this world and the duties for the next should be united in life, as the body and soul are united in a human being; and therefore they should be united in the training that prepares for practical life. We are old-fashioned enough to believe that the Christian religion is God's revelation, and therefore the best possible basis for the life of God's creatures. We have no confidence in any pretended new civilization that would offer a different basis for human life; all such experiments must end in disaster for communities as well as for individuals. We, therefore, look upon the Christian element in life and in training as absolutely indispensable.

We recognize the fact that, in the training of youth, the school plays a very important part. It has charge of them during most of the time in which they can be reasonably expected to attend to serious matters. Hence it has always been evident to the bulk of careful thinkers, whether Catholics or Protestants, that to build up a thoroughly Christian generation three agencies must steadily coöperate—the Christian church, the Christian home, and the Christian school. To leave the Christian element out of the school, would be, logically, to leave it out of the world of action for which the school prepares. One of the most dangerous tendencies of human nature is to leave religion out of practical life. But religion that does not direct one's practical life is delusive or hypocritical. Religion, to be real, should regulate a man's whole conduct. Christianity is preëminently a practical religion, meant to rule and beautify and sweeten and elevate all the details and relations of life. Hence its influence ought to pervade the whole of the training that is to prepare for life's duties, and therefore ought to be constantly felt in the school. Leave it out of the school for a generation or two, and, by the slow but sure process of practical logic, the pupils will leave it out of their lives; and then no wonder if many of them go a step further, and pass from indifference to hostility. During the present century, the experiment of exclusively secular education has been very widely tried.

The result is easily ascertainable ; a very large increase not only in the number of those who "make no profession of religion, though they have great respect for it," but also of those who have lost or are losing faith in Christianity as a revealed religion. This is the reason for the condemnation by the Catholic Church of the assertion that a Christian people may sanction a system of schools from which religion is excluded. The same conviction is fast gaining ground among other denominations of Christians, as their official utterances constantly testify. They may differ with us and among themselves about the tenets of the Christian religion, but all are coming to agree that if we wish to train up a Christian people, it must be by giving the young a Christian education in Christian schools.

It is in the nature of things that the state should be largely interested in the matter of education. Everywhere, but especially in a republic like ours, public peace and prosperity must greatly depend on public intelligence and virtue. These should be the aim and the fruit of popular education. Washington's solemn admonition in his Farewell Address ought to be the motto of our educational system :

"Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. . . . Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle."

The schools established by the Puritan Fathers in Massachusetts were framed in strict accordance with the religious principles that shaped all their public policy. Even as late as 1826 the Massachusetts school statutes required the principles of piety as well as those of morality to be inculcated. The Puritan Fathers would be horrified to hear themselves represented as the founders of a system of schools in which no Christian creed can be taught. This was the subsequent outgrowth of a greatly altered state of things, gradually leading up to a system of schools in which no creed or church has any place, because it is meant for people of every creed and church, or of no creed or church at all.

The question then presents itself : Is not this the best school system for our country, considering the circumstances of our people ? The answer to this question ought not to be dictated by national enthusiasm or partiality, but by principles and facts

calmly and honestly weighed. It is well to remember that ours is not the only system of education existing among populations of widely differing religious creeds. The same circumstances exist in Canada and in England; but, while fostering universal education, they respect the convictions of those who hold that education ought to be religious; and therefore, while supporting undenominational schools for those that prefer them, they give state support to the schools of the various religious bodies, in proportion as the pupils are found to come up to a common standard of excellence in secular knowledge. In Austria and Prussia there were formerly state religions, and the state religion was the religion of the schools. With change of circumstances came changes in their laws concerning religion, and school systems were established similar to those in Canada and England, securing both the universality and the Christianity of education. It is impossible to conceive why such a system could not exist in our country as well, or that our people would not be more Christian, and therefore better and happier in every way, in consequence of it. Catholics are convinced that the natural tendency of schools without religion is gradually to wean the young not only from Catholicity in particular, but from Christianity in general. This is our reason for saying we cannot in conscience send our children to the public schools.

To attribute our conscientious objection against the public schools to a desire to hinder knowledge or foster ignorance, would be childish, in face of our Catholic school statistics, and of the declaration of the Third Plenary Council, which says:

"We must multiply our schools till every Catholic child in the land shall have within its reach the means of education; and we must also perfect our schools, nor relax our efforts till they be elevated to the highest educational excellence."

The excellence already attained is illustrated by some recent facts concerning one of our best known teaching orders, the Christian Brothers. A conspicuous feature in the London Health Exhibition of 1884 was a display of educational methods and appliances. Concerning the exhibit of the Christian Brothers, the London "Times," of August 25th, said:

"The character of the education given by the Brothers is not surpassed by the most advanced Realschulen in Germany, and not equaled by the most advanced middle-class schools in this country. . . . The Brotherhood, as a whole, are not surpassed, and in few cases equaled, as educationalists."

Similar encomiums have been passed by the International Educational Congress on their present exhibit in New Orleans. Rev. Dr. Rigg, President of the Wesleyan Training College of Westminster, says in a recent address:

"The Brothers have done almost all for France that has been done in the way of true educational science and inspiration; and their remarkable history impressively teaches us that to moral influence and spiritual conviction and experience the educational inspiration and progress of the world is due."

Thus while the Brothers' schools uniformly surpass the secular schools in the examinations throughout France, the excellence of their methods is equally acknowledged in England and this country. But our aim is still greater perfection. Hence, as the Bishops of the Plenary Council, though declaring the excellence of the education now given to our clergy, have provided for its further improvement, that it may fully meet the intellectual needs of our age, so have they spurred on the work of perfecting as well as multiplying our schools. And, let it be well remarked, the only fund to which they appeal is the voluntary contributions of the Catholic people. The Council not only made no demand for any division of the school tax, as some venturesome writers assert, but it did not say even one word about school taxes or state aid in any way. Doubtless, most of the bishops of the country believe that the present system, which taxes Catholics for the support of schools that they cannot conscientiously use, is unjust, is "taxation without representation"; and probably many hold that a denominational system like that in Canada and England would be advisable and practicable in this country also. But there are some, and the present writer is one of them, who, seeing that government aid is apt to lead to government interference and dictation, would rather continue forever to bear the unfairness and hardship of the present system, than purchase state aid at the cost of any danger to the thoroughly Christian character and perfect religious freedom of our schools.

"But," it is objected, "your educational system and the whole spirit of your church are un-American." With all due respect for the feelings of our kind and courteous assailants, we answer honestly and plainly that the charge is sheer nonsense. It is assuredly not un-American to believe absolutely in the

Christian revelation; and it is just as little un-American to believe in the Catholic Church as its divinely commissioned exponent. The church's form of organization and government concerns only her faith and discipline. As American citizens, we are no more affected by it than are our Protestant fellow-citizens by the fact that their religious bodies are ruled by bishops, pastors, presbyters, and elders. The center of unity in our church organization does not one whit affect our relation to the civil organization of our country. In 1874, Mr. Gladstone asserted that it did. His assertion drew out the emphatic denials of Cardinal Newman, Cardinal Manning, and others. On the 8th of April, 1880, Mr. Gladstone, having had time to weigh the matter, wrote in the London "Echo" that the charge that Catholics could not be loyal subjects to the state was "a monstrous assertion,"—an acknowledgment in which we heartily agree with him,—and then gave clamoring bigotry a slap in the face by appointing Lord Ripon Viceroy of India. The Bishops of the Plenary Council, although they did not make Thanksgiving Day a feast of obligation, as some ill-informed writers declare, gave abundant expression to their hearty devotedness to our country and her institutions.

"But," it is urged, "your church and her system are opposed to intellectual freedom and modern progress." If the revelation of him who is "the Light of the World" is so opposed, then so is the Catholic Church, but not otherwise. If "intellectual freedom" means the theory that science can prove God's revelation a lie, or if "modern progress" means a system of civilization alien to Christianity, then do we frankly declare that we and our church are opposed to them. But these suppositions are preposterous, and so is the charge that is based on them.

"But," it may be further objected, "your church's system fosters immorality, superstition, and fetichism." Oh, shades of Taney and Gaston, of Brownson and Ives, of Ward and Wilberforce and Faber, of all the myriad pure and noble souls that, in full manhood and after years of careful inquiry, entered the Catholic Church and found in it your comfort in life and in death, what do you think of a charge like this? And ye men and women in our own and in every land, dear ones of countless families, ornaments of every station in life, who love the Catholic Church with an undying love, and whose lives are beautified and ennobled by your faith, what do you think of such an asper-

sion! It has been advanced by men like Liverani, of whose book the Liberal French newspaper, "*Le Pays*," of July 11, 1861, said, "It is the strangest libel that has appeared for a long time. It is the book of a man made mad by pride and anger." It has been uttered by men like Paul Bert, whose attack on the moral teachings of Saint Liguori and Gury made him ridiculous even in the eyes of his associates. Frenchmen may be found to hate Christianity, and hate the church as its exponent; they may banish religion out of the schools; they may substitute for the Catholic catechism the Positivist catechism, which asks, "What is God?" and answers, "I do not even know if there exist such a being"; they may tear down the crucifix and the ten commandments, and hang in their place "the Rights of Man," which was the watchword of the Reign of Terror; they may thus honestly acknowledge to the world what they mean by "secular education"; but French unbelievers have too keen a sense of the ridiculous to entertain seriously the farcical notion that the Catholic Church is the enemy of morality, and that they are its champions. Nor, we are confident, will the good sense of the American people entertain the absurdity.

From the elements composing the criminal classes in any country, might well be drawn a demonstration of the necessity of Christian education; but an argument to the contrary, whether leveled against Catholicism or Protestantism, could only be either a mistaken calculation or a willful sophism. And though the wretch that perseveres in crime, hoping to repent on his death-bed, only mocks God and deludes himself, yet the church's endeavors to win dying sinners to repentance are no more a stain on her holiness than it was a blot on the sanctity of our Saviour that he showed mercy to the dying thief.

Reason has been given above for the conviction of Catholics that they cannot in conscience send their children to the public schools. If further reason be asked, it is supplied by the literature of any discussion of this question. The writings of those that champion the public schools by assailing our schools and our church, bristle with sneers, innuendoes, and assertions, which, whatever their authors may think of their agreement with truth, justice, and courtesy, we know to be gross misrepresentations of our dearest and most sacred convictions. How, then, could Catholics, with any self-respect, with any regard for their conscience and their faith, intrust their children to the

influence of schools that have such champions and representatives? The question answers itself.

In no spirit of exclusiveness or of alienation from our country's interests and institutions, but, on the contrary, through a deep conviction that good citizenship here below is best secured by "seeking first the kingdom of God and his justice," the Catholics of this country have borne a heavy burden of double taxation, in order to give their children the inestimable blessing of a good Christian education. If they have occasionally complained of what they considered unfairness in the present public school system, they have only used a right possessed by every American citizen. And if, for conscience' sake, they are willing not only to continue to bear the burden until the day come when their country will treat both them and Christianity with greater fairness, but even to increase it by the multiplication and improvement of their schools, assuredly this shows not less love of their country, but more love of their children's souls, of education, of religion, and of God.

JOHN J. KEANE.

THE SWEARING HABIT.

A CURIOUS volume has recently been published in London, entitled "A Cursory History of Swearing," by Julian Sharman. The author has lightly sketched the annals of swearing, whether legal or irreverent, from the dawn of civilization to the present day. He has traced back many English oaths that by natives are commonly thought to be original contributions to the English vocabulary of imprecation and malediction, to French, Roman, and even Greek sources. We are so defective in our scholarship, as far as it relates to the art and practice of profanity in all nations and all times, that we hardly dare to question some of the results of his investigations, because the "comparative method," however successful it may be in its applications to various forms of religion, has not yet succeeded in giving to blasphemy the precision and sureness of a science.

It would seem that the habit of using oaths adapts itself to almost all classes of character, from the lowest nearly to the highest. The profane use of sacred words slides naturally into the expression of mere animal rage, but it also sometimes bursts out in the utterance of righteous wrath at fraud, oppression, and wrong. The most repulsive phase of profanity, however, is that which is most common. A man of refinement cannot walk the streets of any city, or the lanes of any country village, without having his sense of decency shocked by senseless oaths and imprecations, whether coming from the lips of a hack-driver cursing his horses, or a farm laborer cursing his oxen. Any impediment, no matter how inevitable, is the occasion for bestowing upon it a torrent of the dirtiest and most sacrilegious terms that the language contains. In some cases this profanity among uneducated men is the result of a very limited command of words to express their feelings of impatience, anger, jealousy,

spite, and hatred; in others, mere levity of mental and moral constitution leads them to adopt the common and accredited forms of blasphemy, without any thought of their import; but in too many cases the words express the real passions of coarse, hard, dull, envious, and malignant natures, indifferent to religious or moral restraints, finding a certain delight in outraging ordinary notions of decorum, flattering themselves with the conceit that in ribaldry and blasphemy they have some compensation for the miseries brought upon them by poverty or vice, and indulging in outward curses as a verbal relief to their inward "cussedness" of disposition and character.

From the houses of all these classes issue a crowd of children that have breathed an atmosphere of blasphemy from their birth, who are proficient in the language of execration and malediction learned at the parental hearth or den, whose every third word is an oath, who are educating themselves in that form of "self-culture" which may eventually lead them to the penitentiary or the gallows, and who, in the energetic words of an old divine, "seem not so much born as damned into the world." It does not require any deep sense of religion in the man that threads his way through a group of these infantile tramps, these childish ruffians,—spawned on the sidewalk before their wretched habitations,—to feel a thrill of horror, as he hears the oaths that spontaneously leap forth in their little shrill voices. Well, they have been born and brought up in households in which the "wet damnation" of bad whisky in the stomach has found its appropriate expression in the hot damnation of execrations rushing to the lips. But then the "pity of it," the horror of it, when you think of the desecration of childhood. Everybody imbued with the least tincture of literature is aware of a certain sacredness that ideal minds, especially minds of a poetic cast, attribute to children born in happy circumstances! There is a feeling that the child, in its innocence, is nearer to its Maker than the grown-up man, brought into direct contact and conflict with the practical facts of life. If we disregard Wordsworth's sublime ode, "Intimations of Immortality, from Recollections of Early Childhood," we still must have some respect for the emotion that uplifts the imagination and affections of such an apparent worldling as Thomas Moore, in his exquisite representation of the child in "Paradise and the Peri." What a picture is that of the hardened ruffian, as he gazes on the innocent

boy playing among the roses of the vale of Baalbek ! Then, as he hears it,

“— the vesper call to prayer,
As slow the orb of daylight sets,
Is rising sweetly on the air,
From Syria's thousand minarets.
The boy has started from the bed
Of flowers, where he had laid his head,
And down upon the fragrant sod,
Kneels with his forehead to the South,
Lispings the eternal name of God,
From Purity's own cherub mouth.”

Now contrast this with the way “the eternal name of God” is bandied about by the reckless urchins and the unsexed girls that line the streets to every railroad station in every city in the United States. The merely respectable man shudders as he passes by these outcasts, and congratulates himself, perhaps, that he has hidden his offspring in some country nook, where such words are unheard. But he is mistaken. The disease of profanity is infectious. It spreads like the measles, the scarlet fever, and diphtheria; and ten miles of space cannot preserve his own little innocents from the contagion. The great mystery of life, if considered in the light of what is called God's Providence, is the solidarity, the essential union, of mankind, so that every wickedness and corruption in the low and degraded populations mount up into the higher and more educated ranks, just in proportion as the higher in rank, wealth, and cultivation neglect the lower sunk in poverty, ignorance, and vice. There is no apparent reason why their offspring should have a share in the contamination of the little outcasts they shrink from in the streets. The Sunday-school, the genial home, the academy, the college, the exclusive social position they enjoy, these will keep them from the dismal fate of the wretched “lowest classes” they pity but make only ineffectual attempts to raise. What is the result? It is seen almost daily in funerals, where pious fathers and mothers, who have worked and prayed to shield their children from the talk of the profane and the practice of the vicious, have vainly striven, in scrutinizing the features of their dead and dishonored sons, to call back in memory “the smile of cradled innocence on the lips of the confined reprobate.” The tragedy of life and death is there. You should have known that you cannot preserve your own protected children from contamina-

tion, unless you labor to protect the neglected children of improvidence, carelessness, and vice from what seems to be their inevitable doom. Self-protection, dissociated from mutual protection, is the imminent danger that our present civilization is called upon to meet.

So far the practice of swearing has been condemned on what the reader might call religious or sentimental objections. Still, even those that ignore or deny the existence of God, or have only a faint traditional sense of religious obligation, are impelled by their common sense and regard for common decency to stigmatize profanity as at least vulgar. The conventional gentleman, though fifty or eighty years ago he might consider an oath as an occasional or frequent adornment of his conversation in all societies, now reserves it for "gentlemen" alone, and is inclined to deem it slightly improper in the society of ladies. The improvement has been gradual, but it is still growing, and in ordinary society blasphemy is banished from the polite tattle and prattle of good company, on the ground that it indicates a coarse nature, or a very limited command of the resources of the English language to express sterility of mind and vacuity of heart.

But there is a coarse fiber in the physical and moral constitution of the English race, which was early indicated by its habit of profane swearing. Curses were accepted as the signs of manliness. The author whom we have taken as our guide makes a desperate attempt to defend his countrymen in this respect. He shows that a profane use of sacred words is common to all races and nations, barbaric as well as half civilized. This fact must be admitted; but, in regard to modern times, one must think that the English have excelled all other nations in the meaning and emphasis they have put into their words. The Latin races swear more constantly and more volubly than their Teutonic brethren, but their execrations are trivial in comparison with the deep-mouthed and fierce-hearted oaths of the Anglo-Saxon people. The imprecations of the Italian, especially, seem to be mere outbursts of physical irritation, without any solid purpose in them; but in the ordinary English soldier and sailor profanity expresses character. It is needless to go farther back than the invasion of France in the fifteenth century. The English were called by the French peasants, who did not understand their language, "the Goddams." The heroes of Agincourt were thus named, after their favorite oath. When, afterward, the last step to make

France an English province, or to make England a province of France, was thwarted by the genius and faith of Joan of Arc, it is curious that this wonderful peasant-girl was accustomed to name the English, as distinguished from the French, "the Goddams." This is the more to be noticed because she had an utter horror of profanity. When she took command of the six thousand soldiers that, under her lead, threw themselves into Orleans, she first required that the profane and dissolute French men-at-arms who marched under her sacred banner should entirely banish from their minds, as well as from their lips, their copious stores of ribaldry and blasphemy. La Hire, one of the bravest and coarsest of her captains, growlingly consented to talk like a decent human being. Yet she always spoke of the English by the name they had doubtless acquired by the profusion with which they lavished their national imprecation on their enemies. Her knowledge of the English language was probably confined to this single phrase. When she was preparing her assault on one of the strongest forts that the English had erected against Orleans, she was asked by a French soldier to partake of a breakfast of fish, before she set out on her hazardous expedition. "In the name of God," she exclaimed, "it shall not be eaten till supper, by which time we shall return by way of the bridge, and I will bring you back a Goddam to eat it with." And in her lonely dungeon, after she had been captured and imprisoned, she proudly said to the Earls of Warwick and Stafford, "You think when you have slain me you will conquer France; but that you will never do. No! although there were one hundred thousand more Goddams in this land than there are now."

English culture, as we have said, may have banished from polite society the favorite oath of the English race; but the rough, stout soldiers, sailors, and pioneers of the race have carried the name that Joan of Arc bestowed upon them in the fifteenth century, to every savage and civilized clime in which they have appeared. It is four hundred years since their distinguishing imprecation was heard by Joan on the walls of Orleans, yet it is uttered now with equal emphasis on our own Western plains, by those pioneers that use, or rather misuse, the English tongue. After New Mexico was organized as a Territory of the United States, a gentleman of our acquaintance was sent there to occupy an official position. When he arrived at the point from which

the wagon-train of oxen and mules was to set forth for the place of his future residence, he noticed that recent rains had made the miserable roads seemingly impassable. He asked a wretched-looking Indian savage, lounging about the station, if he thought the train would get through. "The ye-hoes may," he answered, "but I don't believe the Goddams will." These terms he considered the English names of the animals he pointed out; for he had never heard their drivers mention them as oxen and mules, but he so understood their exclamations and execrations as to discriminate between the designation given to the patient and forbearing ox, and that plentifully bestowed upon the obstinate and resisting mule. In fact, he had only taken his first lesson in the English language, as taught by our boasted pioneers of civilization.

Mr. Sharman (if that be his real name) attempts to trace the oath to a French source. He declares that at the time of Joan of Arc, "*dame Dieu*!" was common on the lips of Frenchmen, that the word *Dieu* could not be pronounced by the rough Englishmen, and "that they were accordingly forced to anglicize it to fit it to the remainder of the oath;" but this derivation fails, because it is easy to prove that the English never were driven to borrow such sulphurous expletives from any nation they invaded. Their "morning drum-beat" does not more certainly circle the earth daily with their martial airs than with their martial blasphemies. The French wits and satirists have never wearied of fastening anew on the Englishman the name by which he was called four centuries ago. Voltaire, in his mock-heroic poem of *La Pucelle*, makes Talbot die, after a hard struggle, with an intense utterance of the favorite English malediction foaming from his lips. Beaumarchais, in the *Mariage de Figaro*, laughingly extols the beauty and compactness of the English language; you only need, he says, one expression (quoting that we have so often mentioned), and it will go a great ways. There are other words, he adds, used occasionally by the English in conversation, but the substance and depth of the language is in that magical oath. In 1770, Lord Hailes gives it as his experience, that in Holland, when the children saw any English people they exclaimed, "There come the — —"; and that the Portuguese, when they see an English sailor, accost him with, "How do you do, Jack? dash you." Captain Hall, many years ago, told us that when a Sandwich Islander wished to propitiate a British

crew, he exhibited his knowledge of the language they spoke by exclaiming, "Very glad see you! Dash your eyes! me like English very much. Devilish hot, sir! — —." We have a faint remembrance of a French comedy, written about a century and a half ago, in which a French imitator of English manners has contrived to express his Anglican tendencies by swearing, "Dieu-moi-dam." In 1789 a farce was played in Paris, in which one Williams enters a cabaret, with the oath that betrayed his nationality. The person addressed repeats the curse, and instantly adds, "Monsieur est Anglais apparemment." Indeed, this vice of profanity is so common in the English race that historians of manners, all playwrights and novelists, have emphasized it. From the time of Henry VIII. to the time of George IV. it has raged with the virulence of an epidemic. As the English race and language seem bound to possess the greater part of the earth, it is a pity that British soldiers and sailors should have heretofore preceded its missionaries in the conquest of savage or what are called pagan nations. It is said that there are certain barbarians in whose limited dialects every word is associated with some obscene or profane idea, and that the missionary is utterly unable to convey to them a spiritual truth or dogma, because the Bible, translated into their language, becomes a support to their degeneration, rather than affords an impulse to their regeneration. It is probable that the civilized people that first meet with them for the purpose of conquest or trade, only add new words to their restricted resources of expression in native obscenity and profanity. It is to be regretted that the great colonizing enterprises of Britain, if we except the persecuted nonconformists that settled New England, carried English coarseness, and brutality, and profanity, to the same shores to which they introduced British civilization. How could the followers of Drake, Raleigh, and Cavendish regard blasphemy as a serious offense, when they must have known that their maiden queen, the hot-tempered, despotic Elizabeth, swore as lustily as they did? Even grave historians tell us of a bishop who, when he muttered some reluctance to obey, in one instance, her imperative command, was stunned by her passionate answer: "Do it, or, by —, I will unfrock you!"

× In noting the connection of British profanity with British colonization, the disastrous attempt of the Scotch to colonize the Isthmus of Darien must not be overlooked. The expedition

carried a goodly company of clergymen to convert the heathen natives, and Christianity was intended to consecrate commerce. The colony failed as miserably in its theological as in its commercial aim; and the historian tells us that "the colonists left behind them no mark that baptized men had set foot on Darien, except a few Anglo-Saxon curses, which, having been uttered more frequently and with greater energy than any other words in our language, had caught the ear and been retained in the memory of the native population of the Isthmus."

But to return through the reigns of James I. and Charles I., the habit of swearing continued in the higher as well as the lower classes. It was checked somewhat in the despotic domination of the Puritan Commonwealth, but broke out again, at the restoration of Charles II., with a fury that nothing could withstand. Macaulay tells us that, in the reaction from the austerity of the Commonwealth, the generation that succeeded delighted in doing and saying whatever would most shock their defeated enemies. As the Puritan "never opened his mouth except in scriptural phrase, the new breed of wits and fine gentlemen never opened their mouths without uttering ribaldry of which a porter would now be ashamed, and without calling on their Maker to curse them, sink them, confound them, blast them, and damn them."

"The Glorious Revolution of 1688," whatever it did for constitutional liberty, did not do much to make profanity unfashionable. Lawrence Hyde, Earl of Rochester, did not swear in his cups more lustily than Sir Robert Walpole, the astute Whig Premier, in his orgies at his country seat. Pelham, and his brother, the Duke of Newcastle, afterward the heads of the great Whig connection, were not famous for profanity, neither was Chatham; but the plays of the period, and the novels of Fielding and Smollett, prove that profanity was quite an ordinary exercise of the English lungs. To "swear like a lord" became, with the rustic as well as the city populace, as much an object of admiring wonder, as "to get as drunk as a lord." Even women of rank did not hesitate to imitate—of course, at a respectful distance, befitting their inferior sex—the more masculine profanity of the acknowledged lords of creation. It is difficult to say how long they availed themselves of their precious privilege. Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, who did not die—much to the regret of her relatives—until 1744, once called at the house of an

eminent judge on business. Learning from the footman that he was not at home, the old harridan departed, in one of her furious fits of irritation, without condescending to mention her august title. The servant, when questioned by the judge on his return to the house as to the name of his visitor, could only answer that she had not mentioned her name, but that "she swore like a lady of quality."

There is, unhappily, a class of men who, in different degrees of depravity, seem possessed by the devil. They experience a strange delight in exalting their own wills above all moral law. They are sufficient to themselves. They despise what they call the poor weaklings of superstition, who are ruled by such abject sentiments as wonder, reverence, and awe. They disbelieve in them because they have never felt them. They are under the delusion of a moral and mental color-blindness, and have no vision of spiritual facts that are plain to humbler mortals. It is difficult to assert that they have souls, either to be saved or to be exposed to the other alternative; but if beneath the thick scum of evil experience that has settled on their minds and characters, there remains a faint, unextinguished spark of immortal fire, their souls are of a kind that "rot half a grain a day," and promise to go on rotting until they reach the appointed term of their earthly lives. These creatures find a strange pleasure in showing their superiority to common folk, by disgusting all decent people whose ears unfortunately come within reach of their tongues, by their ribaldry, and shocking by their blasphemy all devout people that are placed in the same predicament. The world has been sufficiently sermonized on the sin of self-righteousness; but neither preacher nor satirist seems to have emphasized the opposite vice, namely, self-unrighteousness, though it is but too common. The self-righteous man is ever self-complacent, when he views the multitude of trembling sinners that have not, as he has, a through ticket to pass from the tomb to the Celestial Kingdom, signed by the proper authority; the self-unrighteous man, scorning all consideration of the possible life beyond the grave, laughs at the fears of those whose cry is, "What shall I do to be saved?" and by his conduct and conversation seems to be eager to mock the supplication of penitent hearts by defiantly substituting for it that other question, "What shall I do to be damned?"

It is curious how many men of eminent ability, or eminent frivolity, have asserted their self-unrighteousness in this fashion. The frivolous do it to astonish their fellow-coxcombs by a display of what they call courage, with probably little deeper feeling than that of the good boy, brought up to reverence holy things on the mechanical method adopted by his self-righteous parents, who accordingly hated in his heart all the uncomprehended words they had lodged, by a machine process, in his memory, and who sulkingly confided his secret skepticism to a companion of his own age and degree of theological culture, as they returned one Sunday from church, in the words that he "didn't care for God, nor Christ, nor any of 'em!" But this desecration of what is essentially sacred is connected, even in the most frivolous natures, with a certain perversity, which Edgar Poe thought, or said he thought, inherent in the constitution of human beings. It certainly seemed in him to be inherent; it doubtless in many cases comes, like the gout or any other transmitted physical disease, by inheritance; but, as to the mass of human beings, perversity is generally the perversion of qualities originally intended for good. When it appears in shallow minds and hearts, this perversity is expressed in the fundamental dogma of profligacy, that vice and profanity confer distinction. Consequently, a rivalry springs up among the professors of this school of licentiousness and blasphemy, and lies are told by these aspirants for an infamous reputation, not for the purpose of denying the crimes against society that they have actually committed, but for the purpose of circulating monstrous rumors of their success in blasting the reputations of virtuous wives whom they know only by name, and of unspotted maidens they may have chanced to meet in a drawing-room. So great a poet as Byron stooped to this ignoble ambition. The published "Memoirs" that relate to the social manners and ethics of both France and England during the last and the first quarter of the present century, are full of details respecting this detestable race of shallow-hearted, feather-brained, and thoroughly depraved coxcombs. The creatures still survive, often in the highest circles of fashionable society. To do them justice, it must be admitted that they are commonly physically brave. The English Guards, at the battle of Waterloo, maintained their reputation for valor better than the Imperial Guard that "dies but never surrenders"; and their gallantry

forced from Wellington the curt remark, "The puppies fight well." In the Crimean War the "dandy" officers exhibited the same English pluck, with, we trust, a higher regard for morality.

It may be said that those who have contracted the habit of using oaths to give force, emphasis, or audacity to their conversation, are roughly divisible into two classes, the reclaimable and the irreclaimable. The first class is composed of men that swear from the surface and not from the substance of their minds, who, provided they have a sufficiently strong motive, can cure themselves of the habit, as they can cure themselves of the habit of smoking or drinking, by means of reflection and volition. It is difficult, however, to rouse careless and heedless natures to a sense of the folly and indecorum, not to say the wickedness, of their flippant blasphemies. Charles Lamb, when once asked why he did not give up the practice of smoking, humorously replied, "Because I cannot find an equivalent vice." It is in some such light way that practitioners in swearing are apt to evade the remonstrances of friends whose sense of decency their easy and voluble stream of profanity disgusts or shocks. Still, these men are reclaimable, though after conquering the habit they may occasionally show that they once allowed themselves to be conquered by it. Thus, we knew a man of talent and energy who had cultivated the art of swearing from his youth upward, but who, in mature age, had married, had become a father, and had to some degree "experienced" religion. Still, in moments of high emotion, when he was off his guard, an oath would slip into the beginning of a sentence that ended in something like a prayer. Thus, on one occasion, when he was dilating to us on the theme of his happiness in his new life, he rapturously exclaimed, "By ——! my friend, when I look at that child of mine, and think of what he may become to me, I feel thankful to God that he has vouchsafed to me such a blessing!"

The second class of swearers we have called the irreclaimable, for the reason that profanity has become a part of their organism. About thirty years ago an Englishman, who had been lessee and manager of Drury Lane Theater, and in that capacity had had an altercation with Macready, which resulted in a prosecution against the actor for a personal assault, came to the United States for the purpose of lecturing on the stage. His memory was full of recollections of distinguished actors, and his power of mimicking their great "points" was remarkable. His imita-

tions of the elder Kean were specially notable, in respect both to voice and gesture. But his seemingly unconscious profanity astonished even those whose oaths were about one in ten or fifteen of the words they used in familiar conversation. He swore as instinctively as he breathed. At a dinner to which he had been invited, the present writer sat on the right side of him and a clergyman on the left. The latter was introduced to him as Doctor C. Mr. B. began to talk fluently of his experience with actors and of the drama, sprinkling his sprightly narratives with so many unnecessary expletives that his right-hand neighbor had to whisper to him that Doctor C. was not a doctor of medicine, but a doctor of divinity. The scene that ensued was supremely ludicrous. Mr. B. turned, with extreme earnestness and politeness, to the clergyman, professed his great regard for "the cloth," dashed his eyes, body, and soul to everlasting perdition, declared if he had known the profession of his auditor he would not have used such words as might be offensive to his sacerdotal ears, and in three minutes contrived to condense into his apology more blasphemies than he poured forth in the original offense. Everybody present must have been impressed with the fact that in him, as in many similar swearers, profanity was a secretion in the throat.

We have only space to devote a little consideration to what may be called executive swearing. Though this may be more or less effective as a means of menace and intimidation, as it comes from the mouths of resolute, aggressive, strong-minded, coarse-grained men, who are habitual swearers, it has still the greatest power when occasionally employed by the strict economists of the language of profanity. The rarity of an oath increases its force. General Lee felt the truth of this when Washington, at the battle of Monmouth, discharged upon him a series of maledictions for his misconduct, which owed their smiting force to the fact that he had been selected from all the subordinate generals of the Revolutionary army to call forth such unaccustomed words from the lips of the general-in-chief. "Beware," says the poet, "beware the anger of a patient man." Fortitude and self-command are not virtues of cold natures, but are really powers fused into intrepid character by an inward fire, the external expression of which is sternly repressed; but there are occasions in war — though General Grant seems never under any circumstances to have been provoked into profanity — when

folly, stupidity, disobedience to orders, or treachery, is so plain that the hidden heat in the heart of the commander rends, for a time, all obstructions to its seemingly profane utterance, and blazes out in words that strike the person at whom they are aimed with the effect of blows. In the lives of most eminent men, specially distinguished for their fortitude, we notice these infrequent escapes of moral wrath, though the terms in which they are clothed may be such as disgust us in the language of a pot-house belcher of oaths. Shakespeare, who has touched almost every phase of human character, has not overlooked these occasional outbursts of passion in men that are noted for coolness, self-possession, and self-command. Take this passage from the third act of "Othello":

Iago.—Is my lord angry?

Emilia.—He went hence but now,
And certainly in strange unquietness.

Iago.—Can he be angry? I have seen the cannon
When it hath blown his ranks into the air;
And, like the devil, from his very arm
Puffed his own brother; and can he be angry?
Something of moment, then; I will go meet him;
There's matter in't indeed, if he be angry."

This parsimony in the use of profane expressions is specially noticeable in men of business, when the merchant or banker is a man of integrity and of high business capacity. There is, of course, a large number of traders, whose natures are irritable, petulant, and passionate, who seize every opportunity to exercise their proficiency in profanity; who swear jocosely when they have made a good bargain, and fiercely when they have made a bad one; who pester the ears of their clerks and shopmen from morning to night with their resounding execrations, and impartially curse their Maker whether they have failed or succeeded in cheating others. Such shops and counting-houses are kindergartens for the practical teaching of blasphemy. But able men of business rarely indulge in this license of the tongue. A number of years ago we knew intimately a Boston banker of exceptional capacity, who in all conditions of the money-market, especially in periods of financial panic, was ever imperturbably calm. It happened that, on one occasion, he had joined in a moderately successful speculation with an outside operator, and his partner for the time was to come at ten o'clock

in the forenoon to claim his share of the profits. At nine o'clock the banker had placed in his hands proofs that the other party had played false in the whole transaction. The would-be swindler entered the office of him whom he considered his dupe, in an easy, confident manner. The banker looked not so much at as through him, subjected him to a few stern, searching questions, and the scamp's confused and hesitating answers confirmed his guilt. Then came out the hoarded wrath of the banker, in terms that seemed to force their way into the very soul of the detected trickster. His fit reply would have been, in the words of an old English dramatist:

"I have endured you with an ear of fire;
Your tongue has struck hot irons on my face!"

but failing in these forcible expressions, which so well indicated the appearance of his ears and cheeks, he stumbled down the office stairs with the gait of a man consciously bound for the place to which he was wrathfully consigned. We do not remember having heard the banker swear either before or after this supreme occasion.

Some arbitrary rulers have a tendency to assume a certain grandiloquence in their oaths. William the Conqueror swore by "The Splendor of God"; Henry II., by "God's Eyes"; and Charles the Bold by "the hundred thousand devils of hell,"—in this phrase indicating how accurate a census he had taken of those inmates of pandemonium who most had possession of himself. Other rulers, gifted with a strong sense of religious duty, have denounced terrible punishments against the profane. Saint Louis of France ordered that the tongue of the utterer of oaths should be branded with a red-hot iron; and his gay courtiers were driven to ingenious contrivances of verbal arrangement, by which they might express the substance of swearing without using the words. At the period of the English Commonwealth, the soldier was compelled to abstain from profanity by fear of the penalties attached to its use. In 1649 a quartermaster was tried by a council of war for the offense, declared guilty, and sentenced, not only to have his sword broken over his head, and to be dismissed from the service, but to have his tongue bored with a red-hot iron. In the old drama of "The Witch of Edmon-ton," the author cautions, through the mouth of the devil him-

self, the passionate blasphemer against what may be the result of his callings on the devil:

"Thou never art so distant
From an evil spirit, but that thy oaths,
Curses, and blasphemies pull him to thine elbow."

Indeed, in hearing some men swear, the hearer is almost converted to the old doctrine of demoniac possession. What most impresses us, is the utter senselessness, the pure insanity, of his curses and maledictions. For it is the Almighty that this "aspiring lump of animated dirt" blasphemes. The folly of it can only be fitly described in that energetic and vivid passage in which Dr. South draws the contrast between the power of the offender and the divine object of his puny wrath: "A man so behaving himself," he says, "is nothing else but weakness and nakedness setting itself in battle array against Omnipotence; a handful of dust and ashes sending a challenge to all the host of heaven. For what else are words and talk against thunderbolts; and the weak, empty noise of a querulous rage against him who can speak worlds, who could word heaven and earth out of nothing, and can when he pleases word them into nothing again?"

EDWIN P. WHIPPLE.

FRENCH SPOILIATION CLAIMS.

THE bill "to provide for the ascertainment of claims of American citizens for spoliation committed by the French prior to the thirty-first day of July, 1801," which was enacted by Congress at the last session, and received the President's signature, is the result of many efforts, extending over a period of more than eighty years, for the indemnification of the heavy losses sustained by the ancestors of the present claimants.

The position of the United States at the time these claims originated was one of extreme delicacy internationally, and had it not been that united Europe was occupied in determined opposition to the French Republic, the newly acquired freedom of the American colonies would have been seriously endangered. A treaty of alliance concluded in France in 1778 had greatly assisted the thirteen original States in their war for independence. By this treaty, and by a treaty of commerce negotiated at the same time, the United States agreed to guarantee the safety of the French possessions in America, which then consisted chiefly of islands in the West Indies, and to permit all French vessels and privateers, with their prizes and cargoes, without regard to the nationality of the owner of the cargo, to enter or depart from our ports at all times. It was also agreed that other material aid should be furnished, and that our ports should be closed against the ships-of-war and privateers of any power in conflict with France, unless driven in by stress of weather, such privateers not even to be permitted to victual in our ports. These treaties, designed to perpetuate the cordial relations between the two countries, were entirely satisfactory to both parties until the outbreak of the war between France and England in 1793, when, owing to the distance of America from the hostile countries, and the want of a suitable navy, it was resolved by our Government that we should remain neutral.

At this time our relations with England were governed by international law, in the absence of any treaty on the subject of mutual intercourse, and the English Government, discovering that, in spite of our neutrality, France was causing privateers to be fitted out and manned at our ports, and was taking her captured prizes to our coasts to be sold there, protested that this was contrary to the law of nations in respect to neutral powers, and demanded that we should prohibit it. The United States, therefore, declared that France could not use our ports for this purpose, and requested that she withdraw her ships-of-war, and cease to fit out privateers or condemn prizes in our waters. France paid no attention to our requests, but continued in her course, whereupon England, pleading bad faith on our part, sent gun-boats to our coast, and in some cases condemned prizes within our jurisdiction.

France considered that she had another cause of complaint, arising from the difference between articles contraband of war under our treaty, and those contraband by the law of nations. While food, provisions, and ships' stores were contraband by international law, and as such could be seized even in ships of neutral nations clearing from a hostile port, they were not contraband under the treaty, and English provisions in American vessels were not subject to such seizure by the French. As provisions were greatly needed by both combatants, this was a source of serious annoyance to France, who, finally, in defiance of our treaty rights, issued secret orders to her navy to seize all American ships and cargoes, bring them to French ports, and sell them as prizes taken in war.

The discovery of this treachery, and the protests of our ship-owners, roused our Government to immediate action, and a special mission, composed of Messrs. Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry, was instructed to demand a rescission of these secret orders, and compensation for property already destroyed. To this demand the French authorities paid no heed, asserting that by a treaty concluded with England a short time before with regard to our neutrality, we had broken our treaty agreement with them; and on the failure of our plenipotentiaries to obtain redress, Congress at once passed acts authorizing American ships to resist search and seizure, and ordering our cruisers to attack and capture all French armed vessels that had committed or should purpose committing depredations on vessels belonging to

our citizens, to recapture American vessels, and to prohibit the entrance of French ships into American waters. Our Government then declared all treaties between France and America to be annulled.

The injury resulting from these acts soon caused France to signify her willingness to receive an embassy on the subject from America, and Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Van Murray were dispatched to France for the purpose of adjusting the matter in dispute, early in 1800. These envoys offered a draft treaty for the consideration of the French Government, and after much negotiation a provisional treaty, or convention of peace and friendship, suspending the operation of the prior treaties until an agreement could be reached as to the indemnities claimed by both parties for their infraction, was signed in September of the same year. The Senate of the United States declined to assent to the provision in relation to further negotiations for an adjustment of the indemnities mutually claimed, and limited the convention to eight years. A mutual abandonment of claims for indemnities was then agreed upon, a proviso to that effect was added, and the treaty as amended by the Senate was ratified by the First Consul of France on the 31st of July, 1801.

It seems to have been well understood at the time that in consideration of the release and set-off by France of her claims for violation of the old treaties, our Government assumed the payment of the claims of its citizens against France for their losses, and there is little doubt that such was the opinion then generally held by public men. As no action in reference to payment was taken by the United States, many memorials and petitions on the subject were sent to Congress, and the settlement of the claims was strongly advocated by the daily press. It is on record that between the years 1802 and 1870, forty-one different reports were presented to Congress on this subject, and on two occasions a bill for the payment of all claims for spoliations prior to 1801 lacked only the signature of the President to become law.

In a report made to the Twentieth Congress by the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, it was said that as several demands had been made upon the French nation by our Government, and the treaty had finally been concluded by balancing the claims of the two nations against one another, Congress had thereby assumed the payment of the claims of private

individuals, and in 1830 Mr. Livingston, Chairman of the Senate Committee appointed to investigate the claims of petitioners, concurred in this opinion and embodied the entire question in a single sentence by asserting that "the demand for indemnity does not rest on any failure on the part of the Government to assert the rights of the claimants, but on its appropriation of them to its own use." This committee brought in a bill appropriating five million dollars for the settlement of the claims, and appointing commissioners to decide upon each claim, but Congress declined to adopt it. Mr. Wright, Senator from New York, made a powerful speech in January, 1834, against payment of the claims, asserting that the conduct of both parties during the time of the spoliation constituted a state of war, and it followed that no indemnity could be claimed; but his arguments were controverted by Mr. Robbins, who clearly exposed their fallacy. One of the reports to the House of Representatives concludes with a sentence from a speech by Mr. Webster, who said "there were probably about six hundred vessels that formed claims averaging perhaps sixteen thousand eight hundred dollars of value for each vessel," which would amount to a sum of more than ten millions of dollars, exclusive of all interest. In 1846 a bill in favor of the claimants passed both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Polk, mainly for the reason that the Mexican war had so depleted the treasury that there was no money with which to satisfy the claims.

In 1847 Mr. Morehead declared in the Senate that the claims covered nearly two thousand vessels, which at Mr. Webster's valuation would be a total of more than thirty-three million dollars, exclusive of interest. In 1850 the thirtieth report on the subject was laid before Congress, accompanied by resolutions passed by each of the thirteen original States, asking the Government to pay the claims. Many eloquent speeches were made at that time, and a bill again passed the Senate and House in 1855, but was vetoed by President Pierce. In March, 1867, Mr. Sumner, of Massachusetts, advocated the bill then before the Senate, in his usual eloquent manner, and was supported by many of his colleagues. The number of vessels for the loss of which indemnity can now be claimed was placed by Mr. Sumner at eight hundred and ninety-eight, and he estimated their value at \$12,676,380.

The bill that has recently been enacted does not provide for a final settlement, but merely that claims may be properly

presented by petition to the Court of Claims, which shall examine and determine their validity and amount, together with their present ownership; that the Attorney General shall resist them by all proper legal defenses; that the Court shall report to Congress the facts found and its conclusions; that such finding and report shall be taken to be merely advisory as to the law and facts found; that all claims not finally presented to the Court within two years after the passage of the act shall be forever barred; and that nothing in the act shall be held as committing the United States to the payment of any such claims.

The principal objection to this bill seems to arise from the fact that, even though claims may be verified and established with great labor and care, their final payment remains uncertain, as it is difficult to foresee the many events that might render it unadvisable to burden the treasury with their payment after proof, the option as to compensation resting entirely with Congress. The validity of many of the claims is not open to question. And the amount involved is very large—a fact that seems to have impressed the French Government, if we may judge from the treaty avowedly made with a view to their settlement, and the substantial equivalent therein set off against them. The firmness of our Government in originally seeking redress from France impresses us with its appreciation of the losses suffered by our merchantmen, and its desire to do its utmost to uphold the dignity of the young nation already threatened with so many difficulties and dangers. Doubtless the position assumed by England in objecting to the arming of French cruisers in our waters was well taken, and to many the action of France, with its results so disastrous to our shipping, will seem unwarranted; but the terrible struggles through which the French nation was then passing may justify to some extent those acts which would otherwise meet with universal condemnation.

The passage of a bill to indemnify the claimants will make a material difference in fortune to some of them; but a large part of the claims are for comparatively small amounts, and many will be difficult to authenticate after the lapse of so long a time, during which documents and papers necessary to establish proof have been lost or destroyed.

The present bill, having become law, lays the foundation for another finally settling the question of compensation when, after two years, the claims have been properly presented and

adjusted, or for a series of yearly enactments providing for the payment of such claims as have been adjudged valid at the beginning of each session. This, however, will be a long and difficult process. In some cases papers relating to these claims have been on file in the State Department for many years; but a large number have never been presented, and many of the proofs relating to them are imperfect. The efforts made by the claimants to gain some acknowledgment of their losses and payment therefor have thus far extended over a period of eighty-two years. During this time many of the greatest and most eloquent men of the country have advocated a settlement by the Government in the strongest terms, and much time and care have been spent in investigating the facts, considering the grounds on which the claims are based, and collecting all the matter bearing upon the question, but until now with no greater success than was obtained in the enactment of the two bills vetoed by the President. The large majorities voting in favor of the present act give conclusive proof of the desire of the nation's representatives that the country shall not fail in her duty to her citizens, and while impartially adjusting the claims arising from hostile acts during the late rebellion, forget the older though none the less just demands of a previous generation, through whose unselfish efforts America has been enabled to take and hold the great place she now occupies among the nations of the world.

EDWARD EVERETT.

HOW SHALL WOMEN DRESS?

DARWIN once wrote an article on "Development in Dress," wisely restricting himself, however, to the study of men's dress. This progressive movement, securing the survival of the fittest, is attained only in two ways: either in the struggle for existence, wherein we must exert our best faculties or die, or by intellectually preconceiving what is the fittest, and in freedom striving for it with the highest faculties of our nature. This latter is duty. Development in man's dress took place chiefly under the first condition, work forcing him to discard those fripperies that encumbered his body and harassed his mind. Neither of the prescribed conditions has affected woman's dress. She has not faced the struggle for existence, nor, save in exceptional cases, will she have to face it. Neither has she intellectually preconceived the fittest, for herself or her dress, or been able freely to exert her faculties for its attainment. But none the less must she work, and strive to develop her highest faculties, if only for this, that she is the mother of the human race. This is her duty.

To insure development in woman's dress, it must be placed under the second condition of progress, and to that end are formulated the requirements of a perfect dress: 1. Freedom of movement; 2. No pressure over any part of the body; 3. No more weight than is necessary for warmth, and both weight and warmth equally distributed; 4. Grace and beauty, with comfort and convenience; 5. Power of quick changeability; 6. Not departing too conspicuously from the ordinary dress of the time.

Woman's dress not only encumbers her body, and harasses her mind, as man's did formerly, but, unregulated by the necessary conditions of progress, it has proceeded from bad to worse, now injuring her body and degrading her mind. Her body is injured because fashion is reckless of health, and her mind degraded because its sole aim is to make her outwardly attractive.

To insure that freedom without which development under the second condition is impossible, we want men's help. Too many "vested interests" uphold fashion, and conventional prejudices are too strong for us to overcome them single-handed. Dress-reform is no novelty. For centuries it has been attempted by palliatives, and within our century by radical measures. But in the former case the aim was not perceived with sufficient clearness, in the latter its attainment was not attempted with sufficient prudence. In offering palliatives, the radical error in woman's dress was overlooked, and only that part was attacked which directly caused injury. Stays were attacked, without considering that they were only an external bony framework necessary for the protection of the body against the weight and pressure of petticoats. Then when corsets were removed and petticoats were found unendurable, came a second palliative, which said, "They must hang from the shoulders, then all will be right." It makes me smile to hear women offer this panacea, and see them elevate their arms, exclaiming, "When I lift my arms, I lift all my petticoats." What should we say to nature's handiwork, if she put muscles on the shoulder to lift and propel the legs? Whatever we would say to that, the same must be said to suspending the leg-covering from the shoulders. Pressure over the abdomen is partially removed, certainly, but at the expense of chest and spine. Weight is not diminished, for the fact remains that the higher we carry weight, the heavier it is. Dr. Bernard Roth writes :

"Growing girls and weakly women have sufficient difficulty as it is in holding themselves erect while carrying the head, neck, trunk, and other extremities, without unnecessarily dragging down the shoulders by the weight of the long, heavy skirts. . . . Another great objection to suspending the skirts from the shoulders is, that the respiratory movements of the chest are unavoidably impeded."

Dr. Noble Smith wrote, referring to a pamphlet of mine :

"The remarks on suspension from the shoulders are very practical. I see a great deal of the evil effects of overweighting the spine, the muscles of which are weak from wearing corsets. Stooping and lateral curvature are the commonest results."

Dr. Pearse, in his "Modern Dress," writes :

"The weight of petticoats which is frequently suspended from the shoulders, is very injurious, and in people who are not strong compresses the chest, and is very apt to cause curvature of the spine."

When asked, "How then do you propose carrying the weight of petticoats?" I reply, With your permission, I don't propose carrying it at all, but to abolish petticoats; then corsets will abolish themselves, unless as surgical appliances for adults with an abnormal growth of adipose matter. The palliative dress but adds to its chief ugliness, which is monotony. The straight up-and-down lines of the unmitigated petticoat led to pinchings-in and puffings-out and dragglings along the ground, to get some graceful lines out of them, and to compensate for the variety lost by hiding the legs. The lightness of the divided and tapering limbs contrasts with the solidity of the trunk, while their movements afford constant change. So the eye, deprived of its natural satisfaction in the variety of the body, sought it in the vagaries of dress. Palliatives in our dress prolong the survival of the unfittest. Mrs. Whitehead writes, in her excellent little book entitled "What's the Matter?" "Legs argue trousers as much as arms argue sleeves." So, if we are accused of imitating men, the blame rests with nature for having so improperly imitated men in giving us two legs, and not with us, who merely want them properly clothed.

The second dress-reform movement failed because too rashly begun. Herbert Spencer thus reiterates the truth of the parable of the sower:

"Time after time new ideas are sown and do not germinate; or, having germinated, die for lack of fit environment, before they are at last sown under such conditions as to take root and flourish."

Emerson writes:

"Many a good experiment, born of good sense and destined to succeed, fails only because offensively sudden. I suppose the Parisian milliner, who dresses the world from her imperious boudoir, would know how to reconcile the bloomer costume to the eye of mankind, and make it triumphant over Punch itself, by interposing the just gradations."

Premising that no "imperious boudoir" is desirable, in Paris or elsewhere, we must learn that if dress-reform is to take root and flourish, it must not only be born of good sense, but the public eye and mind must be educated to secure a fit environment for its reception. Imposing any particular form of dress would be unwise, because the prevailing taste is so depraved that no good could result, and because women should choose for themselves what is fittest, resisting external imposition. But to

guide their judgment, we give rules for perfect dress by which to test their clothing. More especially should this test be rigorously applied by those conscientiously striving for reform, as any practical "set" now given it will be lastingly felt. Respecting every article of their attire they should ask, Does it give me more freedom? Does it press anywhere? Is it as light as possible, and as warm as necessary, and are the weight and warmth brought equally over my body? Can I put it on and off quickly? Is it, in form, color, and texture, as beautiful as may be, and as comfortable and convenient as can be? And, lastly, does it so approximate to ordinary dress that, by exerting my moral courage, I can and will face the world with it? If these questions cannot be answered satisfactorily, let them try something else.

We must likewise weigh the position and characters of women, and, while striving to elevate both, should not ask of them more than they are able to perform or endure. Neither should we think time expended on reform wasted if but little outward effect be observable; for while we are striving those higher faculties will arise, making us worthy to receive what we desire, and capable of rightly using any larger measure of freedom we may acquire. Women need character-reform as much as dress-reform. Indeed, we are poor creatures, with cramped minds in cramped bodies; and but that physical health leads to mental and moral health, dress-reform would hardly be worth gaining. Women say to me, "If your dress only became fashionable, we would gladly adopt it." This means, if obtainable without the smallest effort at self-improvement, or self-conquest, they would gladly have it. I devoutly hope that neither this nor any other reform will be gained thus. Assuredly this will be the longest, most trying, most far-reaching reform that women have yet undertaken; but it is the gate through which alone they can enter into their own free kingdom of womanhood.

E. M. KING.

THE gravity of the clothes question has impressed a great many philosophers who never wasted, nor improved, a moment before the mirror; and the subject of woman's dress has a peculiar fascination, because the sudden, continuous, and extreme changes in it are related to no physiological fact, and can be traced to no known or regular operation of the mind. These

changes remain as inscrutable as those in the weather; although we have established many and widely separate points of observation, reporting to one another by electricity, and can predict the coming of a change in dress, and indicate the exact spot of its origin, we cannot prevent it, and we are as far as ever from ability to account for it. It is like other epidemics, which prevail, and attack a whole nation against the will of every individual in the nation. For it is a curious psychological fact that the will of woman has nothing to do with the fashion she adopts. Hence the futility of all the attempts at dress-reform. In this case it is useless to convince the judgment and enlighten the moral nature by means of dreadful physiological pictures.

It is much to be desired that this subject should be put upon a philosophical basis. Perhaps the barren results in this direction hitherto have been due to the fact that students have given their attention to the dress itself, and not to the nature of woman, who is confessedly the most puzzling problem in creation. At least, something would be gained if we could discover the principle that, in the nature of things, ought to govern the apparel of woman; but we should be nearer the solution if we could ascertain whether there is anything in radical feminine nature that demands these unaccountable freaks of fashion in raiment, which seldom bear any relation to comfort or convenience, and often no relation to good appearance. Surely it is not mere change of taste that causes the costume preserved for us by the daguerreotype to seem ugly, for during all our changes of taste the Greek costume that *Aspasia* wore appears charming. The hooped skirt and the long-pointed stomacher were always ugly. It is unsafe to attempt to adduce a principle from isolated facts. Mr. Croker records in his diary, April 23d, 1828:

"A great crowd at the Drawing Room, and the absence of hoops brings the ladies into such close contact that some of them quarreled, and were near pulling one another's feathers."

Considered logically, this would imply that women adopted hoops in order to guard themselves from hand-to-hand scrimmages in public places, and the anecdote would convey the impression that they laid hoops aside in order to be able to indulge in pulling feathers—a logical absurdity, besides involving a contradiction in woman's nature. The truth is, that no woman could tell why she put on hoops, or why she put them off.

It was thought at one time that light could be cast upon this question by the use of the Darwinian method, and faith, at which we now smile, was put in the result of the studies of an old bachelor, Mr. Herbert Spencer. The plumage of the male bird is always more brilliant than that of the female. In the lowest states of undeveloped humanity the same tendency to conspicuous adornment is noticed in the male of the species, and when we rise a little in the savage scale, the red blankets and the striking war-paint contrast still with the plain colors of the females of the tribe. Here seems to be a general law founded in nature. But as we go on, the development theory does not develop as it ought to. At exactly what stage of development in savagery the love of ornament comes to the female, we cannot say; but it grows rapidly in the semi-civilized races; and in Oriental peoples, though the man still leads in the fineness and costliness of raiment, and retains ornament, the woman is conspicuous in the use of paints and dyes and of jewelry to set off her charms. And when we reach a civilization like our own, we get entirely away from first principles, and it is the woman that flames out as the bird of paradise, while the man sinks more and more into inconspicuousness in the plainness of his dress. Indeed, we, who believe in the progress of civilization, and mark its equal step with what is called the elevation of woman, need go no further back than the middle ages to see how the rise of women and the decadence of men in the matter of dress—that is, rich and picturesque dress—go along with our social and general development. In the oldest civilization with which we are at present in contact—the Chinese, which has developed undisturbed by ideas of so-called emancipation, the distinction between the sexes in regard to dress—take the item of shoes—is carried to an extreme. It is worth while to remark, without any reference now to natural selection, that in a good many primitive peoples still remaining sex is not much marked by dress; and in frontier and pioneer life of civilized races, where there is always a tendency to degeneration, clothes become again to a certain extent interchangeable, and a woman may often be seen in a man's hat and coat.

There are also exceptions to the feminine passion for change in fashion that warn us how difficult it is to determine any principle of universal application. The women of Upper Nubia have a peculiar way of dressing their hair (doing it up with clay balls saturated with castor oil) that is as old as history. These

women were Pagans once, if the Egyptians can be so called; they then embraced Christianity, and in turn laid that aside for the religion of Islam; but in all these changes of religious practice they have adhered to the ancient mode of dressing their hair. This example of the persistence of women in a fashion is very instructive, but it runs counter to our general theory, unless the theory is that the ways of women are unaccountable. It seems to me, however, that in a fair view of the historical field the higher the civilization the more marked is the distinction in the dress of the two sexes; and expecting, as I do, the highest and most desirable development of woman on the lines of her own peculiar physiological and mental nature, I should predict certain failure in any dress-reform that attempts in any degree to make the dress of women like that of men. If relief is needed, it lies entirely in the opposite direction. It lies in greater conformity to the woman's anatomy and her peculiar functions in our ordained life. I am old-fashioned enough to believe that beauty is a duty women owe to society, and that the needed impression of grace and sweetness and refinement she can make in the world only by following the laws of her feminine being. Item: square shoulders in man (even if the tailor has to furnish them) are indispensable to manly beauty and strength; but when a woman sacrifices her sloping shoulders, which are indispensable to the lines of female beauty, by the present fashion of building up the shoulders with pads, so that she presents the appearance of a grenadier with a knapsack on his back, she is marching right away from womanly attractiveness. So when she apes the young man in a hat and a collar and necktie, and a jacket of mannish cut, she is sacrificing to a certain novelty and piquancy of suggestion the more subtle charm of femininity. Any radical change in the costume of women, such as discontinuing the sweeping, graceful lines of the long skirt indoors, is exceedingly improbable and undesirable. But knowledge of art and of the laws of physiology must in time teach women that beauty, and the healthful development of woman as she should be, are synonymous. Weighting the hips with an intolerable load of skirts, and drawing in the waist so that the figure resembles an hour-glass, must some time be considered as much a violation of the laws of beauty as of health.

In conclusion, an encouraging sign is to be noted. While changes of fashion are as frequent and as urgent of obedience as ever, there is observable within the past fifteen years greater

liberty in individual adoption of new modes, and a more enlightened attention to the development of personal tastes. This may go on until every woman will have the courage to study and to wear what best becomes her own figure, face, and style.

CHARLES DUDLEY WARNER.

THE corset, even when not unreasonably worn or "laced," compresses the dimensions of the waist eight inches from their normal measurement. This has been repeatedly proved.

I have been told by the leading teacher of elocution in this country that he was forced to abandon the use of certain calisthenic exercises important to his art, because he found that the dress of the pupils forbade them to lift their arms above their heads.

"The very women who want their skirts trimmed most heavily," said a fashionable dress-maker, "are the ones whose backs ache so that they cannot stand long enough for me to try on their dresses."

"Every one of those spots," frankly said a distinguished oculist, pointing to a dotted lace veil, "every one of those spots is worth five dollars to me."

"My ladies," testifies another *modiste*, "are coming to me and saying, 'Make me look like Circe Cleopatra.' (Naming a beautiful and famous and favorite actress.) I answer, 'Madame, would you have of me the impossible? Circe Cleopatra has never worn a corset. That grace, that suppleness, that charm, that ease with which you observe how the lines of her costume follow the contour of her figure—— Madame, no dress-maker on God's earth can create you those things out of a French corset!'"

"My patrons," writes the manager of one of the oldest and largest enterprises for the sale of what is called the reformed underclothing, "are now chiefly fashionable women. Ten years ago, when we began struggling against the current, I had only strong-minded women. To-day, they are in the minority. My customers are society ladies ten to one."

Facts are arguments. These few representative ones are contributed to this discussion without the interference of comment.

ELIZABETH STUART PHELPS.

WITHOUT going into the consideration of the dress of women in various parts of the world, it will be sufficient if I confine what I have to say on the subject to their apparel as worn at the present day. But it is an important fact that in the earlier periods of the history of the human race there were no essential points of difference in the dress of the two sexes, except, perhaps, in the way of wearing the hair. Roman men and women, for instance, wore pretty nearly the same kind of external garments. A plate in Planché's "History of Costume" represents a group of Anglo-Saxon men and women of the tenth century, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to tell which of the figures represent men and which women. The traditional fig-leaf was the same for both sexes, and from it were evolved skirts that varied but little in shape and general appearance, whether they concealed the nakedness of a man or that of a woman. The differences that now exist have mainly been caused by the revolt of man from the inconvenience of long skirts, and the assumption by him of a separate covering for each leg. What he has gained in the facility with which he can run, leap, climb trees, straddle a horse, row a boat, and do the many other things that his occupations require of him, he has certainly lost in grace and elegance. Trousers are of Oriental origin, and in the form of breeches were worn by the ancient Gauls and Britons. They went out of fashion, however, soon after the occupation by the Romans, and the gown took their place, or rather re-acquired its place for both sexes.

So far as I know, the wearing of trousers by women is a mere matter of convenience and æsthetics that they are perfectly competent to settle for themselves, and that they certainly will decide without interference from the other sex. It is not a question into which sanitation enters. There are no statistics to show that the partial exposure of the lower extremities to the atmosphere, which more or less attends upon the absence of trousers, leads to greater ill-health or mortality than when they are more securely covered with trousers. Rheumatism, sciatica, hip-joint disease, white-swelling, neuralgia, etc., are more common in men than they are in women. It is true that women sometimes wear drawers in winter, but they are in general a poor protection in themselves compared with the close-fitting woollen drawers of men and the superimposed trousers of even more compact material. As a matter of fact, however, women

endure cold weather as well as do men, not because they are more warmly clad, but because, owing to the flowing character of their garments, and the fact that they are not in close contact with the lower part of the body, a stratum of air exists between them and the skin, and this, being a good non-conductor of heat, prevents the rapid cooling of the surface that would otherwise take place. It acts just as does the two or three inches thickness of air when double windows are put into a house.

But as the occupations of women are gradually becoming identical with those of men, it appears to be desirable, on the score of convenience, that they should wear trousers, even at the sacrifice of warmth and beauty. A woman commanding a steamboat would certainly be more efficient in trousers than in long skirts. A saleswoman in a shop would do her work with more comfort to herself, and more to the satisfaction of her employer, if she were disencumbered of the gown and petticoats that prevent her from climbing step-ladders to get down goods, or jumping over the counter, like her male rival. Even as a physician, or as a nurse in a hospital, she would more effectually perform her work if she wore trousers, and thus had more freedom in the motions of her lower limbs. A woman surgeon, for instance, called upon to reduce a dislocation of the shoulder-joint, would find skirts very greatly inconvenient when she came to put her heel into the axilla of the patient in order to obtain the necessary fixed point to counteract the effects of her traction. Besides, the flowing drapery worn by the woman physician and nurse is more apt to absorb contagion than the closely fitting trousers of man, and hence renders them carriers of disease from house to house, or from person to person.

If I had the determination of the question, I should prescribe trousers for all women that do manual labor, except such as is of a purely ornamental character — embroidery, crocheting, etc., and such as is strictly confined to the use of the hands, without the legs being necessarily brought into use — sewing, knitting, writing, painting, etc. The sewing-machine should never be worked by a woman in skirts. The gown and petticoats I would reserve exclusively for women embraced in the above-named exceptions, and for those whose office in society is to be ornamental and useful in the various social relations of life. Certainly a great deal of the æsthetics of a drawing-room, a ball-

room, or a dinner-table would be lost if the women who attend them wore trousers instead of the silk, satin, and velvet gowns that now add so much to their loveliness. I can quite conceive that a man thoroughly imbued with the prejudices received from a biased education, indisposed to accept new ideas, and deeply endowed with a love for the beautiful, might be reluctant to pay his addresses with a view to matrimony to a woman wearing trousers. Still, under the influence of familiarity with the idea of a change in the nether garments of the sex, and especially should they be generally adopted by pretty women, it might reasonably be expected that a change of opinion and emotion would ensue, and that perhaps in time he might even be brought to regard trousers as filling more completely his idea of the beautiful than do skirts at the present day.

There is another point that requires consideration, and that is the practice of wearing the gown cut low in the neck, so as to expose the breast, and without covering for the arms. It is doubtful if this leads to any ill consequences. It has been continued for many generations without apparent injury. It might be supposed, at first thought, that bronchitis, pleurisy, pneumonia, and many kinds of rheumatism and neuralgia, would be the result of the custom; but such is really not the case, all of these affections being much more frequently met with in men who cover the chest and arms with several thicknesses of woollen material in addition to a shirt of linen or cotton.

It has been strenuously urged by many so-called sanitary reformers, that women should support their skirts by straps passing over the shoulders, and some few have been induced to adopt the method. It is to be hoped that it will not spread. A woman's hips are proportionally wider than those of a man, and there is no better way of keeping up the many petticoats that it is sometimes necessary to wear, than by fastening them with strings or bands around the waist, over the corset. Shoulder-straps hinder the movements of the chest, and tend to make those who wear them round-shouldered. Besides, they could not well be worn with a low-neck dress. Even if trousers should come into general use for women, it would be better that they should be kept up by the support of the hips than by suspenders passing over the shoulders. It is true that many men wear suspenders, and this fact may perhaps lead to their adoption by some women; but again no inconsiderable number of the male sex support their

trousers from the hips. If comparatively narrow-hipped man can do this, wide-hipped woman ought to be able to do it better.

A good deal more might be said in regard to hats, shoes, and stockings. But, as I remarked in the beginning, women will settle all the questions of dress for themselves. There is no evidence to show that in this respect men have ever interfered with them, and if they should presume to make the attempt, it is not at all likely that their advice would be heeded.

WILLIAM A. HAMMOND.

A DRESS that subserves the purposes of health, utility, and beauty may be fairly considered as approaching the perfect standard. Theoretically, the problem of attaining to a standard embodying these three requisites is easily solved. Practically, its solution is beset with difficulties; yet these are lessening as sanitary knowledge and good sense take higher rank in forming public opinion, and fashion allows larger freedom for individual design and choice. Health demands clothing of texture and quality favorable to uniform bodily temperature. It insists that clothing be so distributed as to promote equable circulation, and so fashioned as to avoid undue pressure upon vital organs, impediment to the circulation, and interference with reasonable exercise of any part, whether of internal organs or extremities. Utility implies comfort and convenience. To meet these conditions a dress is required in which the wearer can live, move, and have her being without continual resistance against unnecessary weight, or constant and increasing disability because of unnecessary compression. Beauty pleads for artistic conformity to the natural human form, and this allows scope for graceful curves, for harmonious blending of colors, and for variety in style and arrangement of garments.

In studying to adapt dress to health needs, it is to be considered that the skin shares with the lungs the office of an exhaling or eliminating surface. Hence loosely woven, porous fabrics, admitting of ventilation, are desirable. It is also essential that these should be non-conductors to the extent of retaining sufficient animal heat for the maintenance of normal temperature. Woolen textures for underwear best fulfill these conditions. The unequal distribution of clothing that characterizes woman's

dress accounts largely for habitually disordered circulation, and consequent cold extremities, with congestion or inflammation of internal organs, and resulting disastrous complications. While the circulation is kept at its normal equilibrium, every structure receiving its just share of blood, hyperæmia of any part is out of the question, and it is impossible to deviate far, if at all, from health. Obviously, so long as one or two thicknesses of clothing are considered ample for the extremities, while five to eight are worn about the trunk above the waist-line, and twelve to twenty below, the blood must be diverted from its rightful channels to others already overcharged and congested. Clothing should increase in proportion to the distance from the heart; yet the reverse plan is followed, and the wearer becomes so habituated to consequent exposure as to lose natural sensibility to temperature. A dress that allows reasonable bodily exercise cannot compress vital organs or obstruct the circulation. Sound health requires harmonious development and functional use of all the bodily structures. If one system or organ is denied its rightful office, all others must share its derangement and suffering. In no direction is this fundamental law of health more fatally ignored than in the lack of wisely regulated muscular exercise during young womanhood. The muscles form the bulk and represent the dynamic value of the body. In so far as work is accomplished by visible motion, they perform it. Yet they are denied conditions essential to their vitality and efficiency, and hence remain undeveloped and comparatively powerless. Meantime, the over-active brain and nervous system become exhausted, and body, mind, and spirit yield to pain, weakness, and the sway of morbid sensibilities. Thus the vast army of refined, accomplished, helpless women is recruited by invalids and semi-invalids, who languish in idle unrest, or drag about their houses in vain efforts to do and be something worthy of their places in life. To the universal neglect of outdoor muscular exercise may be largely ascribed the invalidism of women. No educational system can be adequate to woman's life-long necessities if it fails to recognize this fact and provide as intelligently for her physical as for her mental culture. Such provision being made, what hinders her enjoyment of it? Unquestionably, her dress. Its reign of despotism begins in youth. The trunk of the growing body is encased in a corset or tight waist, under which the impressible walls of the abdomen, and even the ribs, must give

way. With maturity the weight of long, heavy skirts is added, often supported from the hips. Continued pressure upon yielding surfaces and movable organs leads to displacements, impairment of organic integrity and function, obstruction of circulation, and loss of muscular mobility and power. The vitally essential respiratory movements of ribs and diaphragm are checked, and the contents of the abdomen are crippled and pressed downward upon the defenseless pelvic organs with each additional tightening of lacings and weight of skirts. Evidently the first requisite to physical culture is physiological dress. It is equally apparent that with many invalid women some reform in dress is necessary to recovery. The most useful dress is that which allows of freest bodily activity with least expenditure of power. It is estimated that to accomplish woman's work in her ordinary dress, four times the necessary amount of force is required. Tightness of sleeves, waists, belts, shoes, and gloves, stiffness of whalebone and steel, weight and hindrance of skirts, must be considered in calculating the aggregate of resistance to be overcome with every movement.

The laws of beauty are ever in harmony with those of nature. The Greeks, whose authority in art is unquestioned, recognized this truth and illustrated it in immortal forms. True art created the Venus de Milo as a model of perfect and graceful outline. Modern artifice exhibits heads deformed by masses of false hair, necks choked by broad bands, shoulders heightened and made angular by padding, waists lengthened and laced to distortion, hips and back exaggerated by bustles and draperies, while the limbs are enveloped in spreading skirts that bear no relation whatever to the figure.

How to dress in accordance with principles of health, comfort, and true art, without undergoing social martyrdom, is the practical question. Fashion comes to the aid of hygiene in advocating loose, yet well-fitting combination undersuits, conforming to bodily outline from neck to wrists and ankles, without compressing any part, or seeming clumsy or ugly. If some substitute for a corset is considered indispensable over the undersuit, a simple underwaist, made full over the bust, corded if desired, and goared to fit the figure, is commended. Rows of buttons below the waist-line support skirts, drawers, and stockings. It is a cardinal principle that the weight of garments be supported mainly from the shoulders. During wintry months

outside drawers of ladies-cloth or flannel, in shapely leggin form, to fit inside the shoe-tops, will answer purposes of warmth much better than the usual flannel skirt, and render white muslin as superfluous as it is inappropriate. Shoes with low, broad heels, wide soles, and roomy uppers, are admissible in point of custom, and can be readily procured of anatomical shoemakers.

Thus far the attire suggested is healthful and comfortable, and in quality, design, and finish may satisfy the most exacting taste. But to make the external dress conformable to the world, and answer the highest needs, is not yet within the possibilities of woman. Nevertheless, much can be done in this direction without rendering the wearer obnoxious to friends and society. Heavy platings, long trains, intricate and endless draperies and trimmings, are not absolutely demanded, even of those who move in the dress-circles of the world. To the women who would be healthy, happy, and useful members of the community, fashion gives kindly thought. In the midst of her bewildering exhibit of complex, heavily garnished costumes, are found the redingote, pelisse, simple basque, and round skirt, and plain princesse gown. The walking-skirt entirely clearing the ground, happily holds its place. Many women, in different walks of life, are wearing loose, light, simply fashioned yet tasteful dresses, without question or criticism. In some quiet country resorts, and health institutions, picturesque short costumes are worn, the skirts reaching nearly to the tops of high-laced shoes, with drawers or leggins of the dress-material fitting inside of the shoes, and in many cases they have proved the main factor in recovery of health.

KATE J. JACKSON.

COMMENTS.

MR. EDITOR: Mrs. Cady Stanton, in her contribution to the May number of the REVIEW, entitled "Has Christianity benefited Woman?" declares that "the church in the fifth century fully developed the doctrine of original sin, making woman its weak and guilty author." While there is some ambiguity in this language, it is noteworthy that the temper of Mrs. Stanton's article goes far to justify the scorned dogma. The article is passionate, intolerant, and startlingly free from the conventional limitations of delicacy. In all these respects it stands in marked contrast with Bishop Spalding's rejoinder. Whatever may be thought of the cogency of his arguments, the bishop is uniformly calm, dignified, and courteous. It is unfortunate for Mrs. Stanton that, with so fine an opportunity for proving the woman equal to the man, she has thus allowed him to get the advantage of her. Even to hint the opinion that "all the degradation and injustice that she [woman] has suffered might logically be traced to the same source [Christianity]," is to manifest a partisan unfairness from which not only sweetness but light has wholly disappeared. Nothing can be more disingenuous than to represent, though by quotation, Paul's doctrine of marriage as providing simply for "the gratification of instinct without sin." He says, "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the church, and gave himself for it." Is that to love grossly? Mrs. Stanton's reasoning is vitiated by several obvious fallacies. By an insufficient induction she tries to establish the favorable condition of woman previous to the Christian era. From the uncertain usages of the ancient Egyptians and Germans she derives "a long, spiral ergo" of inference and conclusion. At this point Bishop Spalding's historical survey is much broader, and his collection of facts much more complete. If he had chosen to muster authorities, he would have had an embarrassment of riches. Neander, for example, in treating of "the ennobled family relations" resulting from Christianity, says: "Wherever Christianity found entrance, the equal dignity and worth of the female sex, as possessing a nature created in the image of God, and allied to the divine, no less than the male, was brought distinctly before the consciousness, in opposition to the principles of the ancient world, particularly in the East, where the woman was placed in an altogether subordinate relation to man." Another fallacy running through Mrs. Stanton's argument is that which is known as *post hoc, propter hoc*. Like Latimer's peasant, who ascribed the Goodwin Sands to Tenderden Steeple, she makes Christianity the cause of evils with which it has no causal connection. Shall we hold laws responsible for the crimes that they do not

prevent? and charity organizations for the pauperism they cannot remove? or the really noble cause of woman's elevation for Mrs. Stanton's bad logic? A third fallacy in her argument is the confounding of the church with Christianity. Christianity is more than the church. Christianity may be in the air as a controlling *zeit-geist*, and may even be promoting a reform to which the church is a positive obstruction. Thus it is that "the canon law," which so excites Mrs. Stanton's spleen, may not, in various particulars, be properly Christian at all. Here Bishop Spalding's church principles inevitably limited the effectiveness of his reply. The whole tenor of Mrs. Stanton's article excites the suspicion that in her passion for "perfect equilibrium" between the sexes, she is willing to destroy marriage and the family. Does she really mean to intimate that Aspasia and Diotema, in their "questionable position," did not sacrifice too much to intellectual and social independence?

J. R. KENDRICK.

MR. EDITOR: I have read with great interest the able discussion in the February number of the REVIEW, on the question of electing the President of our Republic. It appears to me that the real difficulty about the direct vote in the Convention of 1787 was different from what is generally supposed. I take it that it lay in the dual position of the slaves, who were considered at one and the same time as human beings and as chattels. It must be remembered that the mode of representing them in Congress had well-nigh broken up the Convention, and that after it had been settled, every one feared to re-open the question. This settlement permitted the slave States to add three-fifths of the number of slaves to the white population in fixing the ratio of representation of those States in Congress, and a similar advantage was claimed by those States in Presidential elections. But in a direct vote such an advantage would have flagrantly degraded every vote in a free State, since it would have made five votes in a slave State equal to eight in a free State, and shown openly that eight Northerners were only worth five Southerners. A wish to avoid this dilemma I conceive to have been the main reason against adopting the direct vote in the Convention; and to-day, as this reason fails, the main objection against a direct vote no longer exists. Let me also call attention to the monstrous inequalities inherent in our present system. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that there are 360 electoral votes in all, of which New York is entitled to thirty-six and Vermont to three. Let us suppose, also, that in a close election 500 Vermonters had crossed the line, and by voting in this State had secured the vote of New York for their candidate. Admitting that by this change Vermont were lost to them, they only lose one one hundred and twentieth, while they gain one-tenth of the Electoral College. But if the result in their State is not affected, then from mere useless swellers of a majority, mere ciphers, these 500 men have decided the vote of one-tenth of the entire voting power of the country. Many other illustrations of a like nature will suggest themselves. The argument that the Electoral College preserves the influence of the smaller States vanishes when seen by this light. It does the very contrary. In the State of Vermont a majority of 100,000 would only give three votes to a Presidential candidate, while a majority of one in New York State will give him

thirty-six. This proves conclusively that by the electoral system the weight of a vote increases in direct ratio with the size of the State, and gives an extravagantly disproportionate power to the large States. The direct vote, which makes the vote of one citizen equal to that of another, no matter where cast, would not deprive the smaller States of their proper influence; it would restore it to them.

ISAAC L. RICE.

MR. EDITOR: I regret to learn, through his article on "Free Thought in America," in your April number, that the distinguished Briton, Mr. Robert Buchanan, has imbibed so unfavorable an opinion of the United States and of Ingersoll. I, in common with the English critic, deplore the materialism of our age, and recognize the need of a more humanized humanity. This is why I support our great poet-orator. Therefore, when I find him characterized as "a devil's advocate, preaching the gospel of hot ginger, cakes, and ale," I feel like saying—little as he needs it—a word in his vindication. If our country is materialistic, who made it so? The Christian church has hitherto held almost undisputed sway. Free thought cannot do much worse. Ingersoll, rightly understood, is a modern prophet. Let us remember that it was Christ who anathematized the Scribes and Pharisees, and drove the money-changers from the sanctuary. Ingersoll, far from "entering the temples of religion with his hat on one side, a cigar in his mouth, and a jest upon his lips," is assailing the shrines of superstition with the bludgeon of his intellect, the rapier of his ridicule, and the sword of his righteous wrath. He, happily, has no reverence for rot nor respect for pretentious pietism; but, far from "trampling on the lotus, the rose, and the lily in the garden of the gods," he would root up the deadly nightshade of error and the poison vine of ignorance, to replant in a better earth the flowers of a fairer life. Mr. Buchanan admits that "the history of Christianity has been a long chapter of horrors," and that "its priests and paid professors have been the enemies of human progress." In this confession he gives up his case against our great champion, since to crush out such crimes and evils Ingersoll takes his sturdy and relentless stand. Two great antagonistic currents of philosophy are discernible as running through civilization; the theological and the scientific. Theology, as a body of dogma, positing a supposititious deity in an impossible heaven, erects upon such arbitrary divine authority the tyranny of king over subject, of priest over layman, of master over slave, and finds its motive in a selfish other-worldliness. Science, on the other hand, though it declines to affirm an unknowable god and an unverifiable immortality, would make "man the master of things," would in government decree democracy, in industry coöperation, and would recognize its motive in human mutualism. Against the one tendency and for the other Ingersoll ever lifts the magic of his voice. On the one or other of these sides all must sooner or later array themselves; and in this holy warfare liberals of every school, uniting on the main issues and sinking their minor differences, should show one solid front. That Ingersoll represents completeness no man claims; but were all men more like him, the world would be far nearer its millennium. To oppose him is to oppose progress.

COURTLANDT PALMER.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. David Dudley Field shows, among other things, in his otherwise able article in the May number of the *REVIEW*, that he is not familiar with the history of coöperation in Europe — of the coöperative factories and shops founded and managed by labor exclusively, and of the coöperative factories and homes founded and managed by labor and capital united. While they were and are good enough, in their way, as palliatives only, or as "local applications," their most enthusiastic advocates now admit that they have failed as radical cures of the "king's evil" that affects Europe; that, therefore, they would still more completely fail as remedies for the still more grievous corporate evil of America, is a conclusion that seems to me entirely self-evident. No thinking man complains of associations or of corporations in themselves, nor of combined action and aggregated capital in themselves. What is government, else, or society, or a nation, or an army? What working men and serious students do protest against, and what they are determined to abolish, is the creation of a privileged class, with all the inherent vices and insolent pretensions of the old oligarchies, and without even one of their remedial or humane limitations. A new corporation that, as the great English lawyer says, has "neither a soul to be saved, nor a breech to be kicked," is a far more dangerous enemy to the "ideal commonwealth," which, as Mr. Field says, is "our American aim" (in which there shall be not only no inequality of rights, but in which all shall have food, raiment, shelter, and equal chances of pursuing their own welfare) than an "old family," whose fears and whose traditions, if they did not break the shackles of labor, at least covered the iron with velvet — or homespun. Now — and this fact should be emphasized — Mr. Field's definition of an ideal commonwealth is an exact description of American life (excepting as to the colored races) before the rise of the present corporative dynasty (excepting again, to use Mr. Field's words, applied to a different policy, "where the laws of the land were pitted against the laws of nature" — that is to say, in the Southern States, in which the ever-hungry maw of slavery incessantly devoured the most fertile land, and thereby drove the negroless whites to the swamps and mountains, precisely as a kindred system drove the Irish peasants to the wet bogs and barren hills of Connemara). The slave power was a corporation whose tyranny was limited here and there by individual human sympathies, and everywhere by the fear of a servile insurrection; but these artificial beings, "bloodless and incorporeal," that we call corporations, are absolutely destitute of all human sympathies, and, again, are only held in check by the fear of a fiercer insurrection of the laborers. Mr. Field's remedy not only comes too late, but it does not strike at the root of our political upas-tree. Corporate usurpations have come from special privileges to classes, conferred on them by legislation. The evils that laws have wrought, other laws must not remedy only, but make impossible for all time to come. It is contrary to the American idea to depend for justice on the supposed "fraternal feelings" of a class whose entire power rests on monopoly — that is to say, on inequality of rights. The true remedy must be sought in restoring equality of rights, either by the sternest State supervision of corporate actions, or by State ownership and direct control of undertakings now delegated to practically irresponsible combinations of capitalists.

J. V. NELSON.

MR. EDITOR: The literarists manifest some conceit in their wail over those lost in "cakes and ale," because some have lost sight of the "immortal gods," and prefer the voice of Darwin to that of Moses. Does understanding the conditions of mind degrade it any more than immaterializing it and projecting it in space? It takes something besides transcendentalism and experience to fortify the facts of relation. Those who live much in their ideal creations may lose sight of their surroundings, and become automatic to antecedent ideas; then they have little use for the senses and the intellect. They may receive intuition direct, and have the authority of the lunatic. Every emotionalist and prophet that idealizes antecedent impressions into a dream-like entity, while he knows his ghost, may not know it was conditioned by his subjective states, or the want of "cakes," or even disease. The philosopher of the midway, Buddha, learned the effect of diet in his six years' fast, which caused visions of Mara, or despondency, and visions of Indra, exaltation. Ardā Virāf was inspired by three golden cups of wine and the sacred narcosis of Vishtasf, and gave us the conditions and splendors of paradise. The ascetic philosophy, which has been revitalized with several new prophets, and is believed by nine-tenths of the human race, is a power in fusing social solidarity as well as antagonism. I cannot say that the modern ideal of the unknowable is not the legitimate offspring of asceticism. It appears to have been the offspring of incogency or incomplete thoughts; as Kant would say, "merely the cupola of a judgment, as all inferences that would lead us beyond the limits of experience are fallacious and groundless." This, however, does not affect its use as a mythos. The philosophy of race-development, progress, or solidarity might be called an *Etré* or Being; but this mythos could excite no more pathos in an intelligent mind than understanding the elements of society, their relations, and destiny. It appears to me that science will give a greater concord of feeling and fusing solidarity than any philosophy whatever, as it contains all the elements of persistence, extension, and development.

A. J. MOORE.

MR. EDITOR: Mr. Field suggests an excellent plan, in his article on co-operation, in the May number of the REVIEW, but in practice it would meet with two serious obstacles: That "the destruction of the poor is their poverty," is as true now as in the days of Solomon, and there are few operatives that would be willing or feel able to let any part of their wages remain unused. But a worse difficulty lies in the fact that there is so great a lack of education on the part of the vast majority of our wage-workers. So long as prosperity attended a coöperative enterprise, and the laborers received their dividends regularly, all would be well; but in times of depression the position of the managers would be worse than that of the judges at a baby-show. The writer once knew a mechanic of much more than ordinary ability and intelligence, and a business man, who united their limited means for the prosecution of a business in which the former managed the shop, and the latter attended to the salesroom. The first year the profits of the concern were more than treble the combined salaries the proprietors had ever earned, and the business had been honestly conducted, yet the mechanic was dissatisfied with the result, though a minute statement of the year's business was

prepared for his inspection. He was unable to examine the books himself, and would not be satisfied with the efforts of any other person. The business continued to be unusually prosperous for several years, but the mechanic was always complaining that he was not getting his rights, though many concessions were made to him for the sake of peace. Finally the business man asked for a dissolution. It was granted, and the mechanic tried to conduct the business alone, and lost an ample fortune in a few years. A number of experienced operatives tried to run a large woolen mill on the coöperative plan. All was harmonious for two or three years, but when a depression in the market took place, and dividends were light, the managers were at once accused of fraud, and the enterprise was abandoned. These are two of many instances that have come under the observation of the writer, and seem to lead to the conclusion that coöperation cannot succeed until those engaged in it have sufficient education to take an intelligent view of business and to understand all the statements presented to them, and have the ability to spare a part of their earnings in order to accumulate the necessary capital.

S. W. NICHOLS.

MR. EDITOR: On a careful perusal of Prof. Youmans's article, "Herbert Spencer's Latest Critic," in the REVIEW of last November, I found, to my surprise, that the matter printed in small type, instead of corroborating the matter printed in large type, does the very reverse. Thus we are told in large type that Mr. Davis translates a certain Greek word by "will" and "volitional faculties." In the small type, however, the actual translation is "a ready will." But "a ready will" intimates submissiveness, and is the very contrary of the "will." In large type Prof. Youmans next quotes Ritter in support of Mr. Davis's translation. But on reading the small type, we find that Ritter translates that word by "spirit," and not a shadow of a "will" do we find, not even a "ready" one! Next we are told in large type that Plato considers state enactments the sources of right and wrong. But in small type, instead of finding any such assertion of Plato's, we are told, on the contrary, that legislators "are capable of erring," and make "some" laws that are "right," and "some" that are "wrong." These erring legislators, who pose as sources of right and wrong because they make some laws right and some wrong, are comical figures! But in large type Mr. Bain is introduced as holding the same view. Yet in small type Mr. Bain qualifies this by a demand for an "ideal state and ideal governors." Does not Prof. Youmans perceive that ideal legislators could not err, and therefore could not make some laws right and some wrong, and therefore could not fill his requirements at all? I fear that among Prof. Youmans and Messrs. Spencer, Davis, Ritter, and Bain, poor Plato is becoming decidedly mixed. No less amusingly self-contradicting than the linguistic are the musical efforts of the learned Professor. He conveys, in large type, the surprising information that there is such a thing as a *fugue* in one part. But it is easier to find a needle in a haystack than the one-part fugue in the small type. On the contrary, we are there told that "we call that a fugue where one part beginneth and the other singeth the same, for some number of notes (which the first did sing), as for example (here follows a simple two-part fugue, in which the second voice begins a bar after the first!)." But Prof. Youmans caps the

climax by criticising Mr. Rice in large type for not knowing that Mr. Cliffe Leslie retracted in one paper what he had written in another. Does the Professor seriously expect Mr. Rice to read all the newspapers in the world? Yet in reading the small type we cannot find that Mr. Leslie retracted anything. He only acknowledges that "in the main" a reply of Mr. Spencer's is satisfactory to him. Mr. Rice honestly refers to that reply, and gives reasons why it is not satisfactory. He must be judged by those reasons, not by Mr. Leslie's acknowledgments. Nay, more, the last edition of Mr. Spencer's works, published by the Appletons, under the very eye of Prof. Youmans, says not one word of Mr. Leslie's acknowledgment. Will the Professor blame Mr. Rice for relying on that edition?

E. O. RALPH.

MR. EDITOR: The article in the May number of the *REVIEW*, entitled "How to Reform English Spelling," by Prof. T. W. Hunt, is well worthy of serious consideration, inasmuch as it will, if practically realized, produce an era in the world of letters. We do not require to be told; each day presents sufficiently positive evidence that the so-called "historical" method of English spelling is not only the bane of foreigners and of the army of school-children, but a source of mortification to many real scholars. The reason is, that the social code, which is as unrelenting in the realm of letters as elsewhere, insists that accurate orthography shall be a never-failing attribute of one who aspires to the name of scholar; while the scholar who may be deficient in the mere art of memorizing, cannot conscientiously squander time and intellectual force in attempting to master a letter-puzzle so utterly arbitrary and illogical. The author answers two of the leading objections made to the proposed new method, and his refutation is pointed and convincing, unless one is already blinded by prejudice. Throughout, Prof. Hunt's assertions are based upon unquestionable authority. Even the most conservative on the subject of reform in English orthography cannot do otherwise than yield respectful attention when such distinguished names as Müller, Whitney, March, and Scott are cited. As the author says, "The sanctions are so high and numerous that if adduced in any other scheme of reform, they would be accepted as final and would warrant a fair trial." The cry for reform in this department of literature is not, therefore, the selfish cry of bad spellers merely, who urge on a revolution, knowing that, whatever results, it can be none the worse for them; but it is the demand of scholars and thoughtful men throughout the English-spelling world; it is a demand for simplification in place of abstruse complication, for some positive guiding basis in the place of none whatever. Surely this demand, and the practical way in which the great educators of the present century are setting about to answer it, attest the powerful undercurrent of good sense that is bound, sooner or later, to break through the crust of mere sentimentalism and unreasoning conservatism.

A. C. BOWEN.

MR. EDITOR: If, in asking the question, "Has Christianity benefited woman?" Mrs. Stanton and Bishop Spalding mean by Christianity the teachings of the Christ, the answer must be, Yes, in so far as these have prevailed;

but if by Christianity they mean monasticism, and much of the popular theology of the day, the answer must be, No. The superstition that these are synonymous with the teaching of the adorable Christ, whose name they blaspheme, is superstition as harmful as any of the world's darkest age. The present sad plight of theology is owing to the fact that man has ignored the teaching of him who came to show us the unity of the divine and human, and how it might be realized; yet, for every ray of light, and for all the highest that the world has ever seen, we are entirely indebted to that spirit which was in Christ Jesus. Mrs. Stanton cites England and America as the countries wherein Christianity is dominant, and admits that in them the highest type of womanhood is to be found. She then says, "Yet even here women have been compelled to clear their own way for every step in progress." And why should they not? Only can they make progress by patient, persistent endeavor. Let them keep right on, for there are no limits that man has set her that woman will not righteously transcend. In reading Bishop Spalding's paper one must keep in mind the fundamental stand-point of the sect that he represents, which is the absolute denial of subjective freedom; and must remember that he is one of a body of men (and men only) who claim that God has delegated the government of his world to them, making them supreme above state and individual. He tells us that "purity, meekness, patience, faith, and love, which are the virtues that our blessed Lord most emphasized, are above all womanly virtues." Who told him so? "He does not exalt intellect, courage, and strength." Intellect does not belong in a category of the virtues, and men have no monopoly of it, nor did our blessed Lord ever classify the virtues as manly or womanly. Woman cannot be womanly without courage, or man manly without purity. The assumption that "the church" has power to make man the head of the family is false, and is presently contradicted by Bishop Spalding himself, when he admits that it is love in the heart of woman which exalts man to that supreme dignity, and that, in conferring it upon him, the woman exercises the highest prerogative of which mortal is possessed — a prerogative that she does not share with church or state, and for the exercise of which she is individually responsible to Almighty God. In so far as man has limited the freedom of woman, he has limited his own, and impaired the birthright of his children, the greatest crime of which the race is capable. Together they are the unit of humanity and its institutions, and apart they have no rational existence.

CHARLOTTE F. DALEY.

$$\frac{11}{5}$$

$$\frac{11}{5}$$

3

